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{Abstract} “A Shine of Truth in the ‘universal delusional context of reification’ (Theodor W. 
Adorno)” defends Adorno’s aesthetics as a theory of advanced, or avant-garde, artworks. Its 
seven chapters show that aesthetic experience implies liberation from illusion (Schein). 
Chapter I engages a dialectic of viewpoints to explain how different dialectical thinkers (Marx, 
Lukács, Hegel, Horkheimer, Adorno) have contributed to a criterion of truth adequate to 
today’s total delusional context of reification—determinate negation of illusion. Chapter II 
introduces the concept of artistic aesthetic illusion—a reversible illusion opposed to the social 
illusions of mechanical musical reproduction and of the culture industry. Chapter III examines 
the question of whether truth in philosophy is a different kind of truth than truth in art. Chapter 
IV considers whether truth in twentieth-century Expressionism is a new truth based on 
immediate expression, in light of an important precedent for Expressionism in Robert 
Schumann’s “Der Dichter spricht.” Chapter V determines whether inorganic montage is more 
advanced than Expressionism. Chapter VI takes up a parting suggestion of Peter Bürger: to 
treat artworks after Dada and Surrealism on the model of “prose” in Hegel’s aesthetics. 
Chapter VII pursues the idea that Dichterliebe, op. 48, (1840) by Robert Schumann is a true 
artwork. Three results emerge from this close musical analysis: (1) exploiting, on occasion, an 
ambiguity in the rules for figuration that permits all twelve tones in the harmony, Schumann 
anticipates Schoenberg; (2) Op. 48, No. 1 is in a hidden key: to all appearances, its key is 
either A major or F-sharp minor, but its secret key is the Neapolitan region applied to C-sharp 
major; (3) the other “half” of the cadence with which Op. 48, No. 1 breaks off suddenly may 
be found in a brief applied-Neapolitan passage in No. 12. The thesis argued is that the anti-
organicity in such a work is advanced with regard to the false reality that organicity had 
become by 1930 in Germany. According to Adorno, the only life-praxis afforded by art is 
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remembrance. But the social effect of remembering social suffering is considerable when the 
Here-and-Now is its own justification.  
 
Library of Congress Subject Headings: Philosophy; Dialectic; Critical Theory; Illusion 
(Philosophy); Music—Philosophy and aesthetics; Reification; Modernism (Aesthetics) 
Authorities: Adorno, Theodor W., 1903-1969; Schumann, Robert, 1810-1856 
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{Résumé} “A Shine of Truth in the ‘universal delusional context of reification’ (Theodor 
W. Adorno)” comprend sept chapitres, un prologue et un épilogue. Chaque partie se construit 
à deux niveaux : (1) à partir des liens qui se tissent entre les phrases contiguës ; et (2) à partir 
des liens qui se tissent entre les phrases non contiguës, surtout entre les incipit des 
paragraphes, qui forment l’argument principal de la thèse. Cette exigence double découle de la 
méthode adoptée : la méthode dialectique. Le sujet de la thèse, Schein (apparence, illusion, 
clarté) est abordé de manière non formaliste, c’est à dire, de manière que la forme donne 
d’elle-même une idée de la chose : illusion comme contradiction imposée. Bien que le sujet de 
la thèse soit l’illusion, son but est la vérité. Le Chapitre I présente une dialectique de 
perspectives (celles de Marx, Lukács, Hegel, Horkheimer, Adorno) pour arriver à un critère de 
vérité, compte tenu du contexte d’aveuglement universel de la réification ; c’est la 
détermination de la dissolution de l’apparence. Le Chapitre II présente le concept d’apparence 
esthétique—une apparence réversible qui s’oppose à l’apparence sociale générée par 
l’industrie de la culture. Le Chapitre III cherche à savoir si la vérité en philosophie et la vérité 
en art sont deux genres distincts de vérités. Le Chapitre IV détermine si l’appel à la vérité 
comme immédiateté de l’expression, fait par le mouvement expressionniste du 20e siècle, est 
nouveau, jugé à l’aune d’un important antécédent à l’expressionisme musical : « Der Dichter 
spricht » de R. Schumann. Le Chapitre V se penche sur la question à savoir si le montage 
inorganique est plus avancé que l’expressionisme. Le Chapitre VI reprend là où P. Bürger clôt 
son essai Theorie de l’avant-garde : ce chapitre cherche à savoir à quel point l’œuvre d’art 
après le Dada et le Surréalisme correspond au modèle hégélien de la « prose ». Le Chapitre 
VII soutient que Dichterliebe, op. 48, (1840), est une œuvre d’art vraie. Trois conclusions 
résultent de cette analyse musicale détaillée : (1) en exploitant, dans certains passages, une 
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ambigüité dans les règles de l’harmonie qui fait en sorte tous les douze tons sont admis dans 
l’harmonie, l’Opus 48 anticipe sur Schoenberg—tout en restant une musique tonale ; (2) 
l’Opus 48, no 1 cache une totalité secrète : à l’œil, sa tonalité est soit la majeur, soit fa-dièse 
mineur, mais une nouvelle analyse dans la napolitaine de do-dièse majeur est proposée ici ;  
(3) une modulation passagère à la napolitaine dans l’Opus 48, no 12 contient l’autre « moitié » 
de la cadence interrompue à la fin de l’Opus 48, no 1. Considérés à la lumière de la société 
fausse, l’Allemagne des années 1930, ces trois aspects anti-organiques témoignent d’une 
conscience avancée. La seule praxis de vie qu’apporte l’art, selon Adorno, est la 
remémoration. Mais l’effet social ultime de garder la souffrance vécue en souvenir est non 
négligeable : l’émancipation universelle. 
 
Vedettes-matière de l’Université Laval : Philosophie ; Dialectique ; Théorie critique ; Illusion 
(Philosophie) ; Musique—Philosophie et esthétique ; Réification ; Modernisme (Esthétique) 
Autorités : Adorno, Theodor W., 1903-1969 ; Schumann, Robert, 1810-1856 
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 A shine of truth in the “universal delusional context of reification”1 sounds doubtful 
(1). It sounds all the more doubtful when the topic is art (1). The aim of this thesis is to save a 
minimal criterion of truth that holds good for art as well as for philosophy (1). Although many 
have weighed in on the question of art’s truth, the most developed and nuanced reflections on 
it in the European tradition belong to Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969), philosopher of the 
Frankfurt School (1). The conception of truth to be developed in detail here is, broadly 
speaking, that of disillusionment (2). In art, truth as disillusionment seems to entail 
didacticism, but this is not the case because the illusions lost can be illusions particular to art 
(2). Friedrich Schiller calls the illusion particular to art “ästhetischer Schein,” aesthetic 
illusion2 (2). Adorno takes up the concept of aesthetic illusion in his aesthetics, yet develops it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 GS, vol. 7, p. 252 as translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor, Aesthetic Theory by Theodor W. Adorno, ed. Gretel 
Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 168. 
2 Friedrich Schiller, Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, in Werke und 
Briefe in zwölf Bänden, herausgegeben von Otto Dann, et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 
1988-2004), vol. 8, pp. 556-676, here p. 661 n19, translated by Reginald Snell as “aesthetic appearance,” On the 
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in ways that would have been inconceivable to Schiller (2). Adorno clearly admits truth to the 
realm of art, but it is less clear whether truth in art has a necessary relation to illusion, as truth 
outside art must (3). Adorno’s “dialectic despite itself” shows up in the following four 
unmediated antinomies (4).  
1. On the one hand, truth in art necessarily implies illusion (4). But on the other hand, Adorno 
reads the twentieth-century Expressionist movement as art that seeks truth otherwise than 
through aesthetic illusion (4). 
2. On the one hand, it is impossible for art ever to lose its aesthetic illusion (5). On the other 
hand, Adorno thinks that it is possible for art to lose its aesthetic illusion (5). 
3. On the one hand, Adorno claims that “the illusory aspect of artworks [Das Illusionäre der 
Kunstwerke] has narrowed into the claim to be a whole,”3 which implies that modern art’s 
“rebellion against illusion” is a revolt specifically against the “fiction of the whole” and not 
against illusion in general, for “even anti-realistic currents such as Expressionism take part in 
the rebellion against illusion”4 (5). On the other hand, in the late essay “Little Heresy,” 
Adorno makes the blanket claim that gaining a comprehension of music disparages “atomistic 
listening” and promotes “structural listening,” which requires the perception of music as a 
“meaningful whole”: “Musical understanding, musical cultivation [Bildung] with a human 
dignity that means more than mere information content, is tantamount to the ability to perceive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters (New York: Ungar, 1965), p. 125. Note that Snell does not 
preserve the gender-neutral language of the title in German. 
3 GS, vol. 7, p. 155f., or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 101. 
4 GS, vol. 7, p. 157, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 103. 
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musical contexts, ideally developed and articulated music, as a meaningful whole [sinnvolles 
Ganzes]”5 (6).  
4. On the one hand, Adorno implies that Modern music is new (7). But on the other hand, the 
expression of Expressionism is not new (7). 
 The sorts of “contradictions” that show up in Adorno’s aesthetics do not invalidate it, for they 
are not due to inattention to the rules of logic (7). When a proposition about the whole breaks 
the law of non-contradiction then it is clear that total identification must be false on the terms 
of general logic (8). From another point of view, the sorts of contradictions that appear in 
Adorno’s aesthetics are “objective”—that is, they come out of the (social) demand for identity 
between the concept and its object (9). Adorno’s critique of Hegel would be unthinkable 
without the contribution of Marx, who, in the introduction to the Grundrisse, charges J. S. Mill 
and Adam Smith with employing an abstract notion of production: in order to speak of 
production in general consistently, these thinkers must abstract qualities from the actual object 
of production—those particular aspects of production that enter into contradiction because 
they arose in different societies, in different eras6 (10). Adorno’s own aesthetic theory is not 
immune to objective contradictions, despite his priority of the object in principal (11). 
Although objective contradictions cannot be solved in thought alone, philosophy can adopt 
practices that support their real resolution rather than hinder it (11). The present work 
approaches Adorno’s aesthetics by way of detailed interpretations of consummate works that 
make the competing demands of universal and particular explicit (12). Again, these non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 GS, vol. 17, p. 297 as translated by Susan H. Gillespie, “Little Heresy,” in Essays on Music, ed. Richard 
Leppert (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 318-324, here p. 318. 
6 Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Berlin: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1953), p. 6f. 
as translated by Ernst Wangermann, “Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58 (First Version of Capital),” in Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, 50 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1975-2004), vol. 28, p. 23. 
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identities do not invalidate Adorno’s aesthetics, as they are seated in social processes, rather 
than in one person’s subjective thought (12). The truth of art is not a lesser grade of truth than 
the truth of philosophy when it is understood as the effective critique of illusion (Schein) (12). 
Adorno’s concept of Schein will be rendered here most often as “illusion” (13). While 
“illusion” was once the usual translation of “Schein,” the recent tendency is to refer to 
Adorno’s concept as “semblance” (15). Different misunderstandings of Adorno’s position may 
result when “Schein” is translated as “appearance” (16). Adorno’s association of Arnold 
Schoenberg’s music with “Progress” becomes convincing only when the “Schein” in 
“Schönbergs Kritik an Schein und Spiel” (“Schoenberg’s Criticism of Illusion and Play”) is 
understood as a deceptive appearance: Adorno reads Schoenberg’s Expressionism as a critique 
of ideology, and not just as a critique of surfaces and unreality7 (18). The translation 
“appearance” for “Schein” has the added complication of coinciding with the standard 
translation for “Erscheinung,” which is a distinct concept for both Kant and Hegel (18). If 
Schein sounds old today, it is not because it evokes the German Idealism of Immanuel Kant 
and G. W. F. Hegel (21). Jürgen Habermas’s exact reason for abandoning ideology critique is 
the integration of its preferred objects—bourgeois art and philosophy—into “the system”… 
(21). Horkheimer, Marcuse and Adorno may at times lament the dwindling autonomy of art, 
letters and philosophy, but they must be aware that totally independent art, letters and 
philosophy would have no critical hold on society (22). Adorno’s claim that “the need to have 
suffering speak eloquently is condition of all truth” implies that truth exceeds the bounds of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  GS, vol. 12, p. 44 as translated by Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster, Philosophy of Modern Music 
(New York: Seabury, 1980), p. 37. 
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current speech8 (26). Certain changes to bourgeois society—“‘green’ problems,”9 “excessive 
complexity”10 and the “neoconservative defence of postmodernity”11—have not rendered 
Adorno’s theory of ideology critique useless (28). Today it seems necessary to construct and 
to deploy a robust concept of life in order to defend the environmental cause (29). The 
regressive current of thinking of the high bourgeois period held up life-forms as models for 
cultural and intellectual forms: organicism (29). Yet organic form served as the model not 
only in art, but also in philosophy, for at least two hundred years (29). The illusion of 
independence and naturalness that characterizes the bourgeois work of art and even works of 
philosophy also characterizes the commodity (31). The following is a story about a few of the 
Modern people and works opposing the organicist tendency (32). This work is also a critique 
of Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde, which is perhaps the most serious response to 
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory12 (32). Bürger does not sufficiently account for the negative side of 
Schein, by which art is not only self-critical, but also critical of reality, which claims to be 
what it is (32). On the assumption that there is no truth without illusion, we start out with 
illusion (33). The work comprises seven chapters (33). Chapter I engages a dialectic of 
viewpoints to show how different dialectical thinkers—Marx, Lukács, Hegel, Horkheimer and 
Adorno—have contributed to a criterion of truth that works within the total delusional context 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 GS, vol. 6, p. 29, or prefer to my translation here that of E. B. Ashton, Negative Dialectics (1973; repr., New 
York: Continuum, 1997), p. 17f. 
9 Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, vol. 2, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), p. 579 as translated by Thomas McCarthy, The Theory of Communicative 
Action, vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, 3rd corrected ed. (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1989), p. 394. 
10 Habermas, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, p. 580 as translated, Lifeworld and System, p. 394. 
11 Habermas, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, p. 583 as translated, Lifeworld and System, p. 396. 
12 Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, mit einem Nachwort zur 2. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1980), translated by Michael Shaw as Theory of the Avant-Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 
1984. Please note that only chapters 1-4 of Theorie der Avantgarde are translated in Theory of the Avant-Garde 
(as chapters 2-5). 
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of reification: the determinacy of the dissolution of illusion (33). By way of an analysis of 
parts of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, Chapter II distinguishes the concept of artistic illusion 
as reversible—opposed to the merely social illusion of mechanical musical reproduction and 
the culture industry (33). Chapter III examines the question as to whether truth in philosophy 
is a different kind of truth than truth in art (33). Chapter IV considers whether truth in 
twentieth-century Expressionism is a new truth based on immediate expression; however, a 
precedent for Expressionism in Robert Schumann’s “Der Dichter spricht” (The Poet Speaks) 
suggests that the Expressionism of Arnold Schoenberg, Anton Webern and Alban Berg is 
mediated, and not the irrationalist movement that it seems (34). Chapter V considers whether 
inorganic montage is more advanced than Expressionism, and why (34). The thesis defended 
throughout is that anti-organicity in works is advanced in light of the false reality that 
organicity had definitely become by 1930 in Germany (34). Chapter VI takes up a parting 
suggestion of Peter Bürger: to consider the artwork after Dada and Surrealism on the model of 
“prose” in Hegel’s aesthetics (34). Chapter VII pursues the idea that Dichterliebe, op. 48, 
(1840) by Robert Schumann is a true artwork (35). Schumann’s musical advances have too 
long been taken for symptoms of a chronic mood disorder or the sighs of a fiancé (35). Much 
is left out of this story (35).    
Chapter I……………………………………………………………………………………….37 
 Theodor W. Adorno was not the first to employ the term “ästhetischer Schein”— 
“aesthetic illusion” (37). The concept has an important precedent in the twenty-sixth letter of 
Friedrich Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters13 (37). While 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Friedrich Schiller, Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, in Werke und 
Briefe in zwölf Bänden, herausgegeben von Otto Dann, et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 
1988-2004), vol. 8, pp. 556-676, translated by Reginald Snell as On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of 
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Schiller defines appearance (Schein) against reality (Realität), ästhetischer Schein is “honest” 
and “independent”—“aufrichtig” and “selbstständig”—: refusing any comparison with reality, 
aesthetic Schein is not appearance, but pure appearance14 (38). Although it is rarely 
mentioned, Karl Marx, like Schiller, noticed that ästhetischer Schein extended beyond the 
artistic realm (38). Karl Marx uses the term “ästhetischer Schein” pejoratively, to denote the 
incursion of the artistic fiction of naturalness into the economic theory of Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo (40). The illusion that values pertain to “natural” properties of objects enables a 
commodity’s particular ranking within a universe of commodities to pass unquestioned (43). 
In his essay “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” Lukács bases his 
discussion of reification on Marx’s chapter on commodity fetishism, but considers congealed 
labour of all kinds, intellectual and physical, in his attempt to show that the commodity-form 
rules all sectors of society and all disciplines: that it has become in fact the total social 
preoccupation of life (45). Reification seems to arise in the first instance from the pseudo-
necessity of set working hours… (46). Reification may have begun with the social, fabricated 
necessity of set working hours, which are determined in isolation from the work itself, but 
since the tendency of the commodity is to become a universal structuring principle, finally 
nothing is untouched by reification… (48). Like Lukács, Adorno rejects the reflection theory, 
an expression of which can be found early in The German Ideology… (49). Important 
consequences follow from the refutation of the reflection model of ideology (51). In the 
observation that “without abstracting from living human beings there would be no exchange,” 
Adorno shows a definite affinity with Lukács’s (and Feuerbach’s) emphasis on the living 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Letters (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1965). Note that Snell does not preserve the gender-neutral language of the 
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14 Schiller, Werke und Brief, vol. 8, p. 664, or prefer to my translations here On the Aesthetic Education of Man, 
p. 128.	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individual, whom Hegel submits to abstract world spirit15 (54). Hardly convinced that the 
proletariat all on its own is predisposed to ending reification, Adorno is no more convinced 
that the dissolution of rigid, reified forms alone would automatically be the end to all ills 
solvable by human beings (56). Furthermore, Lukács’s dialectics risks becoming a form of 
idealism because reification is, after all, “a shape of consciousness”16 (57). Whether the whole 
is at all knowable is utterly decisive for what strain of dialectics one chooses, as Lukács 
himself was well aware…(59). Lukács cannot consistently adopt positive dialectics (60). The 
title of Adorno’s Negative Dialectics refers to an opportunity missed by both Hegel and 
Lukács: a dialectics that truly recognizes a moment of otherness (60). Given the choice 
between self-certainty and a necessarily partial cognition of estranged, mutilated and 
recalcitrant objects, thought must, to gain anything at all, prefer the latter (62). Negative 
dialectics cannot be a solution to the general “problem” of reification, as Lukács claims for 
Hegelian dialectics (63). The universal delusional context, which goes well beyond reification, 
raises the question as to how philosophy, which is essentially concerned with the truth, can 
even be possible (64). When Kant was faced with the philosophical debates concerning the 
finitude or infinitude of the universe, the divisibility or indivisibility of matter, the freedom or 
unfreedom of the will, the existence or non-existence of God, he did not immediately argue for 
one side, but asked how these antinomies came about (65). In his interpretation of Kant’s 
dialectic of pure reason, Hegel expresses the source of the contradiction somewhat differently 
than does Kant (65). Neither Kant nor Hegel considers the underlying conditions of 
contradictions—whether abstraction, indifference to the thing thought, a pretension to capture 
the totality or the attempt to flee experience—to be the truth (66). Like Kant, Hegel names the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 GS, vol. 6, p. 348, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 354f.  
16 GS, vol. 6, p. 191, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 190. 
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resolution of the antinomies to be the task of speculative reason, which “apprehends the unity 
of terms (propositions) in their opposition—the affirmative, which is involved in their 
disintegration [Auflösung, solution] and in their transition”17 (67). Adorno denies that 
knowledge completely engulfs any one of its objects18 (69). While Adorno is in agreement 
with Kant that knowledge must leave a place for otherness,19 he would not assert that, because 
pure reason has created the antinomies all by itself, it needs to solve them all by itself (70). 
The abstraction implicit in the correspondence of concept and reality precludes the positive 
dialectic, the resolution of the antinomies in thought, by the concept (71). Given the dilemma 
between resignation and collusion with exchange society, philosophers, it seems, should put 
aside their critical vocations and launch a direct assault against exchange society (71). 
Philosophy does not have to venture outside its own domain of conceptual reasoning to find 
signs of the damage wrought by socially-prescribed abstraction and indifference: it may find 
them in contradictions (72). The identifying thinking that expels contradiction from the mind 
not only fails to grasp an imperative of concept formation, as Hegel claims here, but it also 
denies the painful consequences of abstraction (73). One might raise Hegel’s objection against 
the negative dialectic: that it terminates in skepticism (77). The dissolution of a particular 
delusion indeed permits one to speak of truth even within the universal delusional context 
(79). 
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philosophischen Wissenschaften (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), vol. 8, p. 176, or, part one, as translated 
by William Wallace except where indicated in square brackets, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences 
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18 GS, vol. 6, p. 25, or translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 14. 
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Chapter II.......…………………….…………………………………………..……………….80  
 The aesthetic illusion of Robinsonades, which gives the result of a historical process to 
be original first nature, transfers into economic theory, which gives labour originally and 
naturally to be a thing independent of social ties (80). The artwork seems no less illusory than 
reality: both have a share in generalized and necessary aesthetic illusion (80). The great music 
of Beethoven distinguishes itself from mere empirical reality by the mediated, autonomous 
relation of whole and part…(81). To resist the social demand for total unity, it is not enough, 
however, to prefer Beethoven to popular music (85). Adorno’s contention that the goal of 
listening is to perceive music as a “meaningful whole” is a “little heresy” against his 
unstinting defense of the particular, summarized in his oft-quoted catchphrase, “The whole is 
the untrue”20 (89). 
Chapter III……………………………………………………………………….…………….92 
 According to Adorno, the criterion of truth—the determinacy of the negation of 
illusion rather than a positive result—holds good for art as well as for philosophy (92). To 
claim, with Rüdiger Bubner21 and Gilles Moutot,22 that art as a sphere is really free from the 
pervasive illusion of reification is to fall victim to the artistic aesthetic illusion itself, to deny 
that the artwork is a product of organized labour and to buy into the conventional wisdom that 
the artwork is an outpouring of natural genius or of a super-individual who does not rely on a 
highly specialized division of labour (94). Since artworks each require interpretation to be art, 	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21 Rüdiger Bubner, “Kann Theorie ästhetisch werden? Zum Hauptmotiv der Philosophie Adornos,” in 
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this then raises the question as to whether art does not depend on philosophy and other forms 
of discursive criticism to make its truth claim (101). The contradiction over whether art 
requires philosophy to make its truth claim does not stem from an oversight or some confusion 
on Adorno’s part (104). In the paragraph entitled “Art and Philosophy; Collective Content of 
Art” in Aesthetic Theory, he clearly lays out the contradiction (104). Adorno first posits the 
thesis that “philosophy and art converge in their truth content”23 (104). The demonstration of 
the way in which an individual expression can have universal force takes up the second half of 
the paragraph on art and philosophy (108). The question of how something can have universal 
weight without a concept might be the original aesthetic problematic, formulated by Kant 
(108). Kant’s determination of aesthetic as subjective, right at the outset of the first part of the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment, poses a remarkable challenge to his methodology, which 
so far has accorded priority to the object…(109). Adorno, however, doubts that “the 
judgement of taste is…not a cognitive judgement, hence not a logical one, but is rather 
aesthetic, by which is understood one whose determining ground cannot be other than 
subjective”24 (112). Kant’s attempt to secure the judgement of taste’s universality by relating 
it back to the faculties of mind and mental functions makes it unacceptable to Adorno, who 
considers the appeal to the faculties Idealist (113). While Adorno rejects Kant’s solution to the 
problem of aesthetic universality on the grounds that it does not allow for the subject to relate 
to beautiful artworks as objects and to make judgements on them that can be true or false, he 
nonetheless admits the Kantian thesis that what is beautiful is “purposive without a 
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24 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5:203. The pagination given here and throughout corresponds to 
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purpose” (113). Adorno reads the paradox “purposive without a purpose” as expressive of an 
epoch-making event in the history of language—the arrival of concepts—, for he elsewhere 
translates this contradiction as “that of its spiritual and mimetic essence”25 (116). Mimesis is 
an antique form of cognition based on likenesses and once took the form of communicative 
language (116). According to the mimetic theory of language, the mimetic faculty made 
communicative language possible less in that speakers needed the ability to reproduce others’ 
speech exactly than in that the gift enabled recognition of a great diversity of expressions’ 
similarity to the thing, even in utterly different sensuous mediums, as in the recognition of the 
similarity of certain combination of sounds to the visual aspect of a thing (117). According to 
anti-mimetic theories of language, what preceded signs was the utterly undifferentiated, not an 
utter diversity of distinctions corresponding to the thing (117). According to the mimetic 
theory of language, the concept did not make a distinction in a cloudy idea-soup, creating 
reason where before there was none; rather, it replaced a form of rationality (121). The small 
child merely points to the cupboard where the biscuits are kept, sticks out his tongue and 
makes an aspirate from the back of his throat, moves his hand horizontally with the palm 
sideways while opening and closing the fingers, lifts his arms up toward his father, presents 
his mother with his shoes, his tumbler or the bath plug, makes up a nonsense name for his 
blanket (122). Despite its overthrow in the field of communication, mimesis has managed to 
survive by finding a terrain where it is not in direct competition with the sign, whose linkage 
to a thing is decided by social and historical forces, rather than by the degree of resemblance 
to that thing (122). Adorno’s solution to the old problematic of art’s universality does not at 
first seem like a solution (123). The artist’s sense of form is on the most general level a sense 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 GS, vol. 7, p. 149, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 97.  
	   xix	  
of illusion, for Adorno called (artistic) illusion “form in its broadest understanding”26 (123). 
The unusual word Eingedenken would have been familiar to Adorno from the works of Walter 
Benjamin (125). While Benjamin was presenting his new method of doing history to his 
friends and peers, Sigmund Freud was preparing Civilization and its Discontents for 
publication (126). Benjamin’s “new, dialectical method of doing history” addresses the 
problem on which Freud was also working—namely, the fusion of past and present in the 
memory-trace (128). Adorno employs the Freudian category of the memory-trace critically 
when he introduces it into the sphere of art, as the memory-trace of mimesis (129). In an 
important note toward his theory of musical reproduction, Adorno states a thesis that he and 
Horkheimer would sign in Dialectic of Enlightenment—“All reification is a forgetting”27 
(130). Reification in music is not something totally other than reification in other domains: 
whether it takes the form of musical notation, the linguistic sign or the commodity, reification 
implies social domination (131). Adequate musical performance in general converts reified 
objects back into experience, into life and flowing time, into singular acts however different 
from the artists’ acts (132). Aesthetic illusion is form in the widest sense, so results from 
artists’ feeling for form, and this feeling is idiosyncratic (132). The idiosyncratic movement 
opposes not merely this or that particular norm, but the norm, the current form of universality, 
which wants neither a reminder of the past relation of individual and collective, nor 
anticipation of a changed relation, in which an individual desire for the happiness that the 
world does not give would no longer be a threat to the social order (134). When art upholds 
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Schemata, herausgegeben von Henri Lonitz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001) p. 71 (my translation). In Max 
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the universality of adequacy to itself in order to unmask signifying language’s front of 
intersubjective agreement as a sham universality, as mere conformity under duress that the 
dominant subjects exert on all the other subjects, art does not thereby deny that universality 
can be subjective (136). The point of mimesis in art is not to exhibit the atavism of a few rare 
individuals, but to recall through the atavism of these few individuals the suffering that 
everyone endures, dominated and dominating, when concepts replace mimesis (137). Mimesis 
in art is a “collective reminder” in the double sense: both a souvenir of the past and a string 
around the finger that points to something to be done in the future28 (138). Artworks become 
spiritual, objective, true and universal subjectively and mimetically (139). A changed relation 
between art and philosophy, no longer based on truth content, suggests that new art strikes out 
on its own to seek truth (140). The question now becomes whether Expressionism is 
successful in its search for illusionless truth in immediacy (140). 
Chapter IV……………………………………………………………………………...…….141 
 In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno describes the movement of modern art as the illusory 
attempt to rid itself of illusion: “To a large extent, the dialectic of modern art is that it wants to 
shake off the illusory character like an animal a grown set of antlers”29 (141). Of the 
“characteristic schools of new music” that Adorno names, Expressionism is the first to appear, 
although he goes on to say that the “radical folkloric tendencies,” whose innovations “have 
nothing in common with the blood-and-soil romanticism of the Fascist era,” can also be 
counted as a school of Modern music30 (143). Expressionism is the movement that, in music, 	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29 GS, vol. 7, p. 157, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 102. 
30 GS, vol. 18, p. 81, or prefer to my translation here that of Wieland Hoban, “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles 
on New Music,” under “New Music,” in Night Music: Essays on Music, 1928-1962, ed. Rolf Tiedemann 
(London: Seagull, 2009) pp. 269-321, here p. 311. 
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strives for the individuality of the voice not through traditional means—not through any 
means at all, but by directly expressing (144). Expressionism is supposed to be the first of 
Modernist movements; however, Schoenberg’s “first fully Expressionist work” meets 
competition from Robert Schumann’s “Der Dichter spricht,” which Adorno calls, “one of the 
earliest models of Expressionist music”31 (145). Expressionist works, then, do not eliminate 
the universality of musical language; they are part of that language—they take up Robert 
Schumann’s idiosyncrasies in “Der Dichter spricht,” the thirteenth and final piece of 
Kinderszenen (Scenes from Childhood), op. 1532 (146). One can point to three such 
idiosyncrasies (146). Firstly, during the foray into A minor (ii of the home key, G major), 
Schumann twice leaves the leading tone (G-sharp) unresolved: a dissonant vii°6, 5 chord is 
followed by an incomplete i6 chord in each case33 (146). Secondly, Schumann’s is an 
aphoristic form (146). Thirdly, Schumann presents an instrumental recitative that comments 
on what has already been presented (148). “Der Dichter spricht,” then, presents at least three 
important idiosyncrasies, yet these idiosyncrasies were able to become norms, the norms of 
the Expressionist music that was to follow some three-quarters of a century later (150). “Der 
Dichter spricht” is thereby more than just a Romantic artwork; it is also active in perhaps the 
most profuse, dynamic and decisive changes in the history of Western music (151). As long as 
works have aesthetic illusion, they are illusions of balance, illusions of being fully achieved 
wholes, so illusions of being closed and fully actualized: “The illusoriness of artworks has 
narrowed into the claim to be a whole”34 (151). To describe Modern music as a “rebellion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 GS, vol. 7, p. 252 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 168. 
32 Robert Schumann, “Der Dichter spricht (The Poet Speaks),” Kinderszenen=Scenes from Childhood, op. 15, 
ed. Holger M. Stüwe (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 2011), p. 17. 
33 Ibid., m. 6 and m. 18. 
34 GS, vol. 7, p. 155f., or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 101. 
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against illusion” and associate its inception with Expressionism weakens the case for its 
newness because it is not the first such revolt, and Adorno admits as much: “Because [the 
traits of expression], as artworks, however indeed remain illusion, the conflict between 
illusion—form most broadly understood—and expression has not been had out and fluctuates 
historically”35 (153). The question is whether Robert Schumann did not achieve emancipation 
from the concept of harmony before Arnold Schoenberg (155). Of Berg, Webern and 
Schoenberg, then, Schoenberg is the most resistant towards the aspect of agreement, but not 
because his music is more dissonant (158). In suppressing the narrow concept of harmony, 
Schoenberg may have inadvertently restored regressive aspects of the broader concept of 
harmony (158). Schoenberg’s organicism raises the question as to whether montage was not 
indeed a more critical advance than musical Expressionism (160). Schoenberg’s negated 
aesthetic illusion in withholding even the merest of cadential gestures, thereby suppressing 
hopes of an eventual reconciliation (162). The question now is whether montage was not the 
more critical technique towards 1910; whether the characterization of Modernism as anti-
organic is not more advanced than Adorno’s characterization of it as the crisis of aesthetic 
illusion (162).  
Chapter V…………………………………………………………………………………….163 
  Expressionism and montage seem to be vying with one another for first place in the 
competition of the most advanced artistic consciousness, yet Ernst Bloch described 
Expressionism as a “higher order” of montage, because Expression had started as image-
explosion... (163). According to Bloch, montage can bring forth the separation of whole and 
part, but does not do so necessarily—an “organic” montage does not… (164). While Bloch 	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sees inorganic, mediate montage as the advanced Modern form, Walter Benjamin considers 
shock to be the peculiarly Modern contribution of art to progressive consciousness (166). 
Bloch’s characterization of montage as image-explosion, however, is suggestive of shock 
(166). The question now is whether shock is the advanced effect in Modern art (166). 
According to Benjamin, modern art, particularly the poetry of Charles Baudelaire, registers a 
fundamental change in society—“the disintegration of aura in the experience of shock”36 
(166). Baudelaire has achieved something quite remarkable, according to Benjamin: 
“Baudelaire has given the weight of an experience (Erfahrung)” to “something lived through 
(Erlebnis)”37 (167). In “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Benjamin 
advances that Dada created a demand for shocks precisely in the interests of strengthening the 
ego against what it would have to confront in modern life (168). Peter Bürger rightly 
recognizes the disjunction between the feeling of shock in the viewer and determinate political 
action: “The problem with shock as the intended reaction of the recipient is that it is generally 
non-specific. Even a possible breaking through the aesthetic immanence does not insure that 
the recipient’s behaviour is given a particular direction”38  (169). One might ask if the object 
of Adorno’s aesthetics is a lost object (172). Bürger’s theory in some ways coincides with 
George Dickie’s institutional theory of art (172). Although Bürger engages reflections on 
illusion, interpreting “avant-garde” techniques such as montage and defamiliarization as the 
work’s refusal to create illusion, his understanding of the concept as affirmative is largely 
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informed by Marx and Marcuse… (174). To Benjamin, Baudelaire’s solution to the loss of 
experience (Erfahrung) was to treat mere, unconsciously-imprinted stimuli in such fashion that 
they might be consciously experienced: in poetry—yet Benjamin’s answer is ambiguous on 
the point of Baudelaire’s poetical solution to a real problem (183). In reading Proust, 
Benjamin would have no doubt seen through the false absolutization of social milieux (186). 
Absolute temporal homogeneity is not simply truth to the illusion of absolute class divisions, 
but illusion in its turn: the wishes and desires of the past do occasionally surface in the present 
in what Benjamin calls “a painful shock of rejuvenation”39 (188). Unlike “image-explosion,” 
“shock” has specific psychological connotations: it seems that consciousness as a 
psychological category must be distinguished from the notion of political consciousness 
before the progressiveness of shock claimed by Benjamin can be considered (195). True 
aesthetic experience is becoming a thing of the past, according to Adorno, because this implies 
a strong ego able to see through its own illusion of substantiality (195). The link made in 
Studies in the Authoritarian Personality between a weak ego and authoritarianism suggests 
that the psychological category of consciousness is not something totally different from 
political consciousness (196).  The interest in a conscious experience of shock no doubt lies in 
its bringing about the separation of inner from outer, of particular self from general social 
norms, of part from whole, of detail from planned structure, because their conflation goes 
along with conventional thinking and authoritarianism (196). In Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
Max Horkheimer and Adorno associate the present form of rationality with a certain 
psychological structure (197). Against the prevailing ego-weakness, montage is a form of art 
adequate to bourgeois reception, to the strong ego and to the bourgeois individual, who, in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Walter Benjamin, “Zum Bilde Prousts,” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2.1, pp. 310-324, here p. 320 as 
translated by Harry Zohn, “The Image of Proust,” in Illuminations, pp. 201-215, here p. 211. 
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shock that shakes the clear division between inner and outer, self and other, sees through the 
illusion of the ego and its unnecessary, surplus repression (201). Adorno’s grave doubt about 
shock’s productivity for advancing consciousness in contemporary art and new media should 
not be mistaken for resignation; in another context, he defends the shock experience—for 
knowledge (202). Adorno’s endeavour in theory to make the shock-experience possible again 
opens the question whether the shock experience may happen in art now, or whether, as 
Bürger claims, shocks have worn off forever and montage can never again advance 
consciousness (202). To test whether this question has really opened requires an interpretation 
of the passage on cognitive shock: “To produce a yield, cognition throws itself away on the 
objects à fonds perdu. The dizziness that this causes is an index veri; the shock of the open, 
appearing necessarily as negativity within what has been screened and what is ever-same, is 
untruth only for the untrue”40 (202). The first idea here is that cognition is a heady business 
venture, which, to gain anything at all, must expect to lose its capital investment (203). In 
Negative Dialectics, Adorno suggests that philosophy should seek infinite diversity without an 
underlying structure… (204). Adorno proposes the idea that “philosophy would truly give 
itself” to objects as an alternative to the Kantian schemata, which merely posit the likeness 
between subject and object, coordinating them in a shot41 (205). In contrasting “the screened 
(das Gedeckten)” to “the unscreened thought (der ungedeckte Gedanke),” Adorno, thereby 
evoking the Freudian concept of the screen memory (Deckerinnerung), suggests that in 
productive cognition, the ego yields its defenses42 (208). Despite his objection to Proust’s 
Idealism, Adorno’s “changed philosophy” nonetheless owes much to mémoire 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 GS, vol. 6, p. 43, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 33.  
41 GS, vol. 6, p. 25 as translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 13. 
42 GS, vol. 6, p. 43, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 33. 
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involontaire (209). Dialectics, like Proust’s mémoire involontaire, is provoked by what is left 
over from the past, by what therefore stands out from the dull continuity that has seamlessly 
progressed around it (210). Adorno’s use of the expression “the shock of the open” brings with 
it the objective association of possibility, for it was in close connection with the concept of 
possibility that Ernst Bloch developed the concept of the open, or what he more commonly 
calls “the unclosed.” (214). Given that the concept of the real Possible has been so deeply 
denied, even amongst great thinkers, Bloch sees himself confronted with the colossal task of 
showing that the real Possible is neither nothing nor just reality (217). Despite his advance of 
imageless materialism, Adorno recognizes the legitimacy of the project motivating Bloch’s 
defense of images: for Bloch, utopian images are supposed to demonstrate a category of 
possibility (220). Ignoring Adorno’s clear case for an imageless materialism, Gunzelin Schmid 
Noerr attempts to synthesize Adorno’s position and Bloch’s43 (226). The image of 
reconciliation should form naturally, independently of volition, whenever instrumental reason 
has been suspended, so, should be the true sign of material fulfilment (228). The happiness in 
the knowledge of artworks is nothing less than the explosion of their image character, image 
character which seems to say that we are happy, materially satisfied, blessed as gods (237). 
The aesthetic image is the illusion of a happiness from which all contingency has been 
emptied—the illusion not of Glück, but of Seligkeit, blessed bliss (237). The explosion of the 
aesthetic image swings the artwork back towards the expressive extreme, since expression and 
Seligkeit, which is closely associated with Schein, are polar opposites: “Bliss would be 
expressionless”44 (238). Shock became false in art because it had been reduced to the effect of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, “Bloch und Adorno: Bildhafte und bilderlose Utopie,” Bloch-Almanach 21 (2002): 
pp. 29-69. 
44 GS, vol. 7, p. 169, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 110. 
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a (historical) avant-garde technique, montage, whereas the avant-garde works of Modernism 
were advanced, according to Bloch and Adorno, not because they occasioned a shock 
response, but because they maintained a split between whole and part (238). In other words, it 
is the negation of organicity, the seeming harmony between whole and part,—rather than 
montage or expression—that is advanced (238). In this light—advanced art of the Modern 
period as a negation of organicity—Peter Bürger’s theory on what constitutes the definition 
and claims of the avant-garde—advanced, Modern art—should be re-evaluated (238). Bürger 
agrees that inorganicity characterizes the avant-garde work, but he interprets the avant-garde’s 
inadvertent renewal of the category of work as the seal of their failure: “The category ‘work’ is 
not merely given a new lease on life after the failure of the avant-gardiste attempt to 
reintroduce art into the praxis of life; it is actually expanded”45  (238). Bürger rejects the 
avant-garde theories of Adorno and Georg Lukács for failing to take into account what he 
believes is the historical avant-garde movements’ attack on the art institution;46 the exact 
object of the avant-garde attack, however, is most probably reification (241). Bürger’s strategy 
in Theory of the Avant-Garde can be guessed by the final chapter: the argument for the failure 
of the historical avant-garde to destroy the art institution allows Bertolt Brecht to emerge as 
the superior avant-garde hero (242). In the end, however, Bürger minimizes Brecht’s 
achievement when he claims that “engaged” works, of which Brecht’s, succeed only by 
becoming organic wholes (!) (243). Brecht’s epic theatre is engaged without becoming an 
organic whole in the following way (243). Epic theatre seeks to show that things can still 
always be otherwise, not necessarily to offer particular protocols for political action outside 
the theatre (243). Brecht changed the institution of art from within by making production pass 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 78 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 57.  
46 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 121 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 86. 
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into reception and reception into production, much in the way that Marx mediated production 
and consumption in the introduction to the Grundrisse, in order to explode the middle terms 
“circulation” and “exchange” in the Robinsonades of Smith and Ricardo47 (247). A side-effect 
of Brecht’s importation of Marx’s dialectical techniques into theatre is that the aesthetic 
illusion that Marx thereby aimed to exorcise from economic theory is also dispelled where it 
has its true place—art (248). That Schiller can even speak of life in aesthetic illusion and 
aesthetic illusion in living beings stands as evidence against Bürger’s claim that “the insights 
formulated in Kant’s and Schiller’s aesthetic writings presuppose the completed evolution of 
art as a sphere that is detached from the praxis of life”48 (248). At the same time, the “failure” 
that Bürger attributes to the historical avant-garde movements is far from self-evident (250). 
Bürger interprets the continuing rift between inorganic montage works and their reception as a 
problem for methodology—rather than as an indication that the art institution cannot 
completely absorb and control the challenges made to it by individual works (250). Even 
while arguing for the control of the art institution over the political effect of the individual 
works, Bürger acknowledges the confusion of literary theory (which is part of that institution) 
when it is confronted with inorganic works…(250). Bürger was closer to an adequate 
appreciation of Brecht’s contribution when he attributed its superiority over Dada and 
Surrealism to Brecht’s fidelity to the Real-Possible—even though he himself failed to grasp 
the rift between inorganic works and literary theory as an indication of the Real-Possible 
(251). In contrast to Bürger, the conclusion that Adorno draws from the contradictions 
amongst methodological approaches is that non-organic works explode the secure methods, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie pp. 5-31, esp. pp. 10-21 or translated, Collected Works, 
vol. 28, pp. 17-48, esp. pp. 26-37. 
48 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 34 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 26. 
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schemata and habits of reception that already exist, leaving the recipient on the open sea of the 
possible (252). Bürger claims that the invalidation of single forms or techniques as norms was 
a particular contribution of the historical avant-garde movements: “Once the historical avant-
garde movements revealed art as an institution as the solution to the mystery of the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of art, no form could any longer claim that it alone had either 
eternal or temporally limited validity”49 (253). Bürger begrudges Adorno the failure of his 
concept of the New to take into account the historical break that the avant-gardes made with 
art,50 for the result of this break, Bürger claims, is that “no movement in the arts today can 
legitimately claim to be historically more advanced as art than any other”51 (254). Advanced 
art, however, is not necessarily New according to Adorno’s theory of Modernism (254). While 
Bürger considers inorganicity to be a point of rupture that marked the historical avant-gardes 
out from everything that preceded them, Bloch and Adorno tend to see inorganicity not only as 
specific to Modernism, but also as part of a general tendency previous to Modernism (254). 
Anti-organic art was not new at the beginning of the Modern period, but it was the most 
advanced art at that historical moment (255). The Moderns’ adoption of inorganic montage is 
advanced not merely because it went back to the advanced art of another time: it also went 
against the most regressive current of its time: against Nazism (256). The young Adorno was 
so sensitive a thinker that by late 1928, he had already claimed anti-organicism as an advanced 
artistic norm, publicly flagging his opposition to the real organicist current, while calling on 
truth’s need of dialectic, in is essay “Schubert”52 (259). Adorno not only explicitly rejects 
organicist theories, but also adopts an inorganic form for his own text (264). Schumann, who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 121 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 86. 
50 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 83f. or translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 60. 
51 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 86 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 63. 
52 GS, vol. 17, pp. 18-33 or translated by Wieland Hoban, “Schubert,” in Night Music, pp. 19-46. 
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goes unnamed in Adorno’s slipshod allusion to Schubert’s “divine length”53—where we 
expect “heavenly length”54—wrote compositions whose inorganicity rivalled that of 
Schubert’s, not, however by way of potpourri assemblage, but rather in their brinks, in rifted 
structures of a seismic imagination that parted and distanced the similar, and which 
nonetheless created groundswells back towards it that changed the face of it (267). With a 
remarkable political astuteness sharpened no doubt by his intellectual circle, the 25-year-old 
Adorno closed his essay by blocking the reading that would equate the Schubertian landscape, 
the concept he had so consistently developed against the notion of “personality,” with a 
particular existing country or region, whether that be Austria, Germany or a frozen Northern 
land: “There is no homeland here except the remembered one”55 (270). 
Chapter VI……………………………………………………………………...…………….271 
 The question as to whether montage is more or less advanced than expression 
collapsed with the introduction of the concept of image-explosion; anti-organicity was found 
to be the criterion of advanced, modern art (271). The question now is whether any notion of 
advanced art or even art is possible, in light of challenges posed first by G. W. F. Hegel, then 
also by Adorno and Peter Bürger (271). In the conclusion to Theory of the Avant-Garde, 
Bürger claims that the impossibility of advanced art after the failure of the historical avant-
garde movements has already been registered by Hegel, in his criticism of the “prose” that 
characterizes the extreme form of Romantic art: “What we deduced for post avant-gardiste art 
from the failure of the avant-gardiste intentions, the legitimate side-by-side existence of styles 
and forms of which none can any longer claim to be the most advanced, is already observed by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 GS, vol. 17, p. 31 as translated, “Schubert,” p. 43. 
54 Robert Schumann, “Die C-Dur-Sinfonie von Franz Schubert,” in Robert Schumann in Eigenen Wort, 
zusammengestellt und herausgegeben von Willi Reich (Zurich: Manesse Verlag, 1985), p. 396 (my translation). 
55 GS, vol. 17, p. 33, or prefer to my translation here “Schubert,” p. 45. 
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Hegel with reference to the art of his time”56 (271). The “prosaic” works raise the question of 
their status because the standard of art is Ideal—the Idea of the beautiful (272). Modern works 
negate specific aspects of the Ideal: illusion, play and meaning (281). For Hegel, the Ideal 
artwork is a seeming synthesis of Being and the Idea that gives the appearance of liveliness: 
“The task of art must therefore be firmly established in art’s having a calling to display the 
appearance of life [Erscheinung der Lebendigkeit, appearance of liveliness], and especially of 
spiritual animation (in its freedom, externally too) and to make the external correspond with 
its Concept.”57  (281). An avowed source of Hegel’s concept of life is Schiller’s poem “Das 
Ideal und das Leben,” whose opening stanza contrasts divine life, which flows on eternally, 
meeting no opposition to trouble or ripple its waters, with the waves of human generations, 
each tossing between the delights of the senses and peace of mind… (282). A second avowed 
source of Hegel’s concept of life is another work by Schiller: the Prologue to Wallenstein 
(286). While Adorno admits, with Schiller, that each artwork negates its own moments of 
Schein, he emphasizes the self-critical movement of art as a whole… (288). Adorno suggests 
that art’s status as poetry, removed from the accidents and caprices of life, must be questioned, 
confronted with art that would be life—prose (289). The right to existence of poetry as a 
whole was perhaps unquestioned in philosophy of art until 1951, when Adorno made his 
contentious statement on poetry after Auschwitz: “It is barbaric to write a poem after 
Auschwitz, and that also corrodes the verdict voiced on why it has become impossible to write 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 130 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 93.  
57 G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Theorie-Werkausgabe, vols. 13-15, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), vol. 13, p. 202 as translated by T. M. Knox except where indicated, 
Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, by G. W. F. Hegel, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), vol. 1, 
p. 152.	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poems today”58 (289). Art itself had refused illusion prior to Auschwitz, and Adorno was 
keenly aware of such refusal in the interwar period (291). Paul Celan’s “Todesfuge” prohibits 
the moments of happiness promised by illusion59 (292). Adorno’s reasons for declaring poetry 
after Auschwitz barbaric may be traced to the very beginning of his career, to his aesthetics 
course of 1931/32, which has come down in the form of preparatory notes60 (295). In Aesthetic 
Theory, Adorno maintains that just by existing, artworks are necessarily affirmative to some 
extent: “No [art] leaves no trace of affirmation, if any [art], by its sheer existence, rises above 
the neediness and degradation of the merely existing”61  (297). In his judgment against poetry, 
Adorno included those artworks that attempted to erase their similarity to language (299). If 
culture as a whole can be judged barbaric, then the position of such criticism itself is 
unsustainable (303). Criticism that makes a blanket condemnation of all art on the basis of its 
affirmative character is itself affirmative, in that it leaves off its divisive work; it so annuls 
itself (304). Celan negates the idea that there can be any ancient German right to the play of 
rhyme, whose exercise would stand above all criticism, anymore (304). In light of Celan’s 
“Todesfuge,” it seems that Schoenberg’s music is more advanced than Mahler’s: the critique 
of play is more advanced than the critique of conventions through play (304). The question as 
to whether culture as a whole has become barbaric is articulated through play not only because 
the play impulse in Schiller’s aesthetics is supposed to fulfil the concept of humanity, but also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 GS, vol. 10.1, p. 30, as translated by Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber, “Cultural Criticism and Society,” in 
Prisms (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), pp. 17-34, here p. 34. 
59 Paul Celan, “Todesfuge,” in Werke, Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, 1. Abteilung [division], Lyrik und Prosa, 
begründet von Beda Allemann, herausgegeben von Rolf Bücher und Axel Gellhaus, vol. 2/3, “Der Sand aus den 
Urnen” und “Mohn und Gedächtnis”, herausgegeben von Andreas Lohr unter Mitarbeit von Holger Gehle in 
Verbindung mit Rolf Bücher, 2 Teile (parts) (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), Teil (part) 1, pp. 99-102. 
60 Theodor W. Adorno, “Aufzeichnungen zur Ästhetik-Vorlesung von 1931/32,” in Frankfurter Adorno 
Blätter 1, im Auftrag des Theodor W. Adorno Archivs, herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann (Munich: edition text 
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because in Kant’s aesthetics the task legislated for the faculty of judgement gains all of its 
legitimacy from its capacity to arbitrate specifically on the universal and necessary 
communicability of aesthetic feeling, which results from the “free play of the faculties of 
cognition with a representation through which an object [Gegenstand] is given”62 (309). To 
Kant’s resolution of the antinomy of taste, Hegel would argue that an indeterminate concept is 
really no concept at all because determinateness belongs to concepts essentially: “And because 
this determinateness is the determinateness of the concept, and hence the absolute 
determinateness, singularity, the concept is the ground and source of all finite determinateness 
and manifoldness”63 (314).  When one looks more closely into how Kant defines the arts, 
however, one discovers that the concept there is not indeterminate, but always involves play 
(317). Modern art’s critique of play evokes the Kantian concept of play, which has not only to 
do with the play of the faculties, but also with the beautiful art object (319). In “Is Art Light-
Hearted?” Adorno revises the ban on poetry after Auschwitz to cover only art that is 
“heiter”—cheerful or light-hearted: “Because Auschwitz was possible and remains possible 
for the foreseeable future, light-hearted art is no longer conceivable”64 (320). Adorno’s 
statement that poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric can be read not as a ban on the artistic form 
of poetry, but as a new answer to Hegel’s question—whether art should be poetry or prose—, 
upon the exhaustion and invalidation of cheerful, Ideal art by historical circumstances (325). 
Yet poetry (as opposed to prose) may have been invalidated some one hundred years before 
Auschwitz (326). Eduard Mörike’s “Auf eine Lampe” criticizes Hegel’s resolution of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:217.  
63 Hegel, Werke, vol. 6, p. 261 as translated by George di Giovanni, The Science of Logic (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 520. 
64 GS, vol. 11, p. 603 as translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen, “Is Art Lighthearted,” in Notes to Literature, 
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conflict between poetry and prose, Ideal and Life, on the side of the Ideal (326). Yet Adorno 
missed Mörike’s critique of German Idealism because, to judge by his 1958/59 lectures on 
aesthetics, he took Mörike’s Hegelian language in the last line of “Auf eine Lampe” to be 
Hegelian philosophy (334). While “Auf eine Lampe” escapes the charge of empiricism, Hegel 
is right to claim that everyday art, arrangements of things picked out from what simply exists, 
cannot bring down the Ideal without working against meaning at the same time (336).  
Transition to Chapter VII……………………...……………………………………………..340 
 Contrary to Hegel’s reckoning that art is to be poetry, and so, the advance of the Ideal, 
we have seen that a prosaic work, Eduard Mörike’s “Auf eine Lampe,” is “advanced” in light 
of what Ideal, with its priority of meaning, has become: affirmation (340). For in his Lectures 
on Aesthetics, Hegel splits the “Ideal as Such” between two moments—(1.) the moment of 
beautiful individuality, which posits the Ideal only to see it dissolve from within, and (2.) the 
moment in which the Ideal relates back to Nature, in an attempt perhaps to give itself a lease 
on life by borrowing from the “prose of the world” that it had cut out (340). In the 
contradictory terms of Hegel’s system, Dutch genre paintings may have failed to supplant 
Ideal with Life as the principle of art—in which case they fail as post-Romantic works—, or, 
alternatively, as Romantic works, they may have failed to dissolve the Ideal fully from within, 
for selig (serene, blissful) in the face of life, they mastered and resolved their contingency 
(342). This becomes clear when one considers the three moments that go to build beautiful 
individuality, or, the “poetry” side of the Ideal as such: (a) the harmony of inner and outer; (b) 
the negation of contingency; and (c) Seligkeit (the result) (342). Seligkeit itself is broken into 
three moments, the first of which is properly the moment of cheerfulness and affirmation, 
which relates to the achievement of the work, its “Beschlossenheit,” this conclusiveness, 
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decidedness and resolve,65 even, we might add, in the face of a “breach” between the inner life 
of the subject and external circumstances, as in tragedy66 (343). Hegel associates the second 
and third moments of Seligkeit—sustained disunity and irony—with Romantic artworks, as 
stages in decline (344). This chapter aims to detail an anti-Ideal that is not decline and 
degeneration, but rather critical choice and combination of what remains of fled life, inorganic 
and still, after the explosion of Jean Paul, arresting the aesthetics of growth and development 
(346).  
Chapter VII………………………….……………………………………………………….347 
 The thesis defended is that Robert Schumann’s song cycle Dichterliebe, op. 48, (1840) 
is a true artwork67 (347).  
Section i………………………………….…………………………………………………..347 
 Schumann began his career not long after Hegel delivered his lectures on aesthetics 
(347). Dichterliebe combines the negative moments of Seligkeit—sustained disunity and 
irony—to negate the affirmative, Ideal art favoured by Hegel (348). According to Hegel, the 
negativity of the second moment of Seligkeit appears clearly in extreme forms of Romantic 
art, where the opposition between outer and inner remains unreconciled: “It is true that in 
romantic art the distraction and dissonance of the heart goes further and, in general, the 
oppositions displayed in it are deepened and their disunion may be maintained”68  (348). 
Dichterliebe forces no reconciliation between the individual and the collective such as that 
found in Der Freischütz by C. M. von Weber: its moments of unrestrained emotion find no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 208 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 157. 
66 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 208 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 158.  
67 Robert Schumann, Dichterliebe, op. 48, ed. Hansjörg Ewert, translation of song texts by Richard Stokes 
(Kassel: Bärenreiter, 2011). 
68 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 209 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 158. 
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final acknowledgment within the world of conventions (350). Hegel would not only reject 
Robert Schumann’s music for its abstract emotional extremes, but also Heinrich Heine’s text 
for its irony—, which constitutes the third moment and downfall of Seligkeit (355).  
Section ii……………………………………………………………………………………..359 
 Besides supporting the ironic conviction of the text, the expression of Dichterliebe is 
also a solution to an objective music-specific problem (359). Expression in Schumann’s 
Dichterliebe is double-sided: it is at once the subjective reaction to rude, harsh bad objectivity, 
on the one side, and, on the other, the objective state of subjective reactions as seemingly 
private (361). Nineteenth-century bourgeois art is deeply enigmatic: Schubert and Schumann 
musically grasped reification, fetishism, phantasmagoria, alienated labour, uneven 
development, surplus value, total administration and ideology before these were truly 
conceptually grasped, notably by Karl Marx (362). Hegel interprets abstraction in art as 
recalcitrance towards resolution—as the preference for immediacy over mediation, which is 
why he—and philosophers at large—tend to cut emotion off from thinking (363). Schumann’s 
scoring of Dichterliebe for high voice puts distance between the sentiment expressed and its 
presentation, defeating the possible Hegelian charge of a clinging to immediacy (368).  
Section iii…………………………………………………………………………………….370 
 Schumann’s critique of immediacy also operates in his ostensible adoption of the cycle 
as his aesthetic form (370). Polyp Excursus: The polyp is a riddle for the taxonomist and for 
the philosopher, and has been for centuries (382). To evoke the cycle form in connection with 
extensive unity seems to be a restorative gesture: the demand that the new work be measured 
against the aesthetics of the distant past (387). Schumann, however, by calling his work a 
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“cycle,” is not evoking the older aesthetic criterion that epic poetry established for itself, 
extensive unity; rather, he offers the illusion of a form—a false immediacy (387).  
Section iv…………………………………………………………………………………….387 
 Important literature on Dichterliebe in English has concerned itself with the question 
of the whole by showing that the work is a linear progression of linked songs (387). The 
decades-long persistence of the unity question is fuelled by a basic contradiction: the dominant 
method of musical interpretation is the organicist paradigm of Heinrich Schenker; however, 
Schenker’s influential theory was never intended for multi-part works69 (388). Arthur Komar 
employs Schenker’s methods to analyze Dichterliebe, while admitting that he is not “entirely 
orthodox” in his application of them70 (389). While disagreeing with certain points of Komar’s 
supporting analysis, Rufus E. Hallmark does not contest the claims that Dichterliebe has a 
tonal plan, a compositional plan and a single key; these, however, are not sufficient (390). 
David Neumeyer for his part wishes to retain Schenkerian analysis, but makes the explicit 
criticism that, in its subordination of all elements to harmonic and melodic closure, such a 
framework is ill-equipped to deal with vocal, “narrative” works71 (391). Neumeyer’s attempt 
to extend Schenker’s concept of organic whole to narrative works, however, misses what is 
peculiar to it (392). Schenker’s theory is founded on a naturalistic presumption: he takes the 
harmonic series to be an invariable natural phenomenon (393). Despite the conservatism of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Heinrich Schenker, Der freie Satz, herausgegeben und bearbeitet von Oswald Jonas, 2. Auflage (Vienna: 
Universal Edition, 1956) translated by Ernst Oster as Free Composition, ed. Ernst Oster, 1 vol. accompanied by a 
supplement, Musical Examples, (New York: Longman, 1979). In subsequent references to Free Composition, 
page number references (p.) refer to the main volume while figure number references (fig.) refer to the 
supplement.  
70 Arthur Komar, “The Music of Dichterliebe: The Whole and Its Parts,” in Robert Schumann, Dichterliebe: An 
Authoritative Score, Historical Background, Essays in Analysis, Views and Comments, ed. A. Komar (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1971), pp. 63-94, here p. 67 n3.  
71 David Neumeyer, “Organic Structure and the Song Cycle: Another Look at Schumann’s Dichterliebe,” Music 
Theory Spectrum 4 (Spring 1982): pp. 92-105, doi: 10.2307/746012. 
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Schenker’s organicism, he at least acknowledges the extra-territoriality of text to music, in no 
way insisting that words and music form an organic whole (400).  
Section v……………………………………………………………………………………...402 
 The inapplicability of Schenker’s organicist theory to vocal works is a negative 
indication of the growing alienation of Lieder, which has its basis in the historical difficulty of 
reconciling music and text (402). Both Schumann’s music and its poetic source cast suspicion 
and even aspersion on the harmonizing claims of Lieder (403). As a cycle of ironically set folk 
idioms, Dichterliebe stands critically to the Volksideologie to come out of a certain irrational 
strain of Romanticism (407).  
Section vi…………………………………………………………………………………….412 
 The song cycle form gives the impression that Romantic love follows the seasonal 
cycle of nature in its flowering, fruition and decay; individual details of Dichterliebe destroy 
this illusion (412). Dichterliebe appears to make a perfect circle (413). To claim that 
Dichterliebe is an illusory natural whole and that it negates its illusion of unity is not to claim 
that Dichterliebe is nothing but fragments and pieces (417). Recently, the presumption of 
organic unity adopted by Schenker and others has been deemed inadequate or constraining for 
an understanding of Dichterliebe as a Romantic artwork and an aesthetic of fragmentation 
adopted instead (417). The proponents of a fragmentary aesthetic have at least made clear that 
Schenker’s theory cannot properly account for the specificity of Romantic artworks (421). 
Schenker’s theory of musical analysis should be able to account for Romantic artworks, 
considering that his organicism may be traced to a certain organicity in Hegel’s concept of 
harmony (423). Adorno’s declaration that “the emancipation from the concept of harmony 
reveals itself as a revolt against illusion” also bears some of the contradictions of the Hegelian 
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concept of harmony72 (426). Schoenberg, at least, did not abandon the idea of harmony 
inherent in the physical divisions of sound; in fact, he used the harmonic series to justify the 
dissonance in his music… (427). The notion of consonance is not based fundamentally on 
what sounds suave or pleasing, nor that of dissonance on what sounds rough or harsh, and 
Schoenberg in other moods acknowledges this (429). On one hand, Schoenberg is quite 
against the unrestricted use of dissonant chords (430). But on the other hand, Schoenberg 
undertook to make dissonance incomprehensible again, because any good theory teacher 
knows what is really happening with Wagner’s dissonances (431). The unresolved dissonance 
in Schoenberg’s music seems to correspond to the second moment of Seligkeit, to the 
sustained disunity that, according to Hegel, characterizes extreme Romantic artworks, and the 
difference between advanced Romantic works and advanced Modern works threatens to 
collapse (432). In Harmonielehre, Schoenberg himself admits that “Voll jener Süße,” op. 8, 
no. 5, and “Lockung,” op. 6, no. 7, were continuations of the advances in “schwebende 
Tonalität,” made by Beethoven, Schumann and Mahler73 (435). The contradiction in 
Schoenberg’s concept of “floating tonality” arises because his concept of tonality is 
antinomical (436). On one hand, tonality is a specific selection of tones from the twelve 
available (436). Yet, on the other hand, Schoenberg does not conceive of tonality in diatonic 
terms in the least (440). Carl Dahlhaus registers a similar collapse of the distinction between 
diatonicism and chromaticism in the theory of functions of Hugo Riemann, who, by always 
postulating an imaginary extension of the stacks of thirds in chords, strives to claim a direct 
relation between chords suggesting different keys (440). Although Schoenberg acknowledges 
floating tonality and even “sublated” tonality in the music of his predecessors, his own theory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 GS, vol. 7, p. 154, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 100. 
73 Arnold Schoenberg, Harmonielehre (s.l.: Universal Edition, 1949),  p. 459. 
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of harmony is prejudiced so as to downplay these instances, making his own music appear 
more radical than it is (443). Kofi Agawu criticizes the musicological practice of pleading 
ambiguity and argues that, while certain passages of tonal music suggest multiple readings, 
where these are not disambiguated by the music in its unfolding, the task of theory is to 
resolve ambiguities: “An analysis that terminates in undecidability represents a conscious or 
subconscious retreat from theory” 74 (445). Recently David Kopp has attempted to account for 
the unusual handling of key in the first song of Dichterliebe by supplying the concept of a key 
continuum, which, to his mind, escapes Agawu’s criticisms of tonal ambiguity while resisting 
the pressure to resolve Schumann’s puzzle definitively in favour of A major or F-sharp 
minor75 (448). The statement of key is conventionally taken to “mean” the unity of the work 
(450). The first Lied of Dichterliebe shows key to be contradictory concept (451). Tonal 
ambiguity, tonal instability indeterminacy, bitonality, or even polytonality, are easy ways to 
solve the puzzle of the first Lied’s key (452). When functions dominate qualities according to 
convention, then the progressive element of harmony, movement from chord to chord, takes 
on a landscape character: the goal comes into view and disappears, comes close into view and 
is reached (453). The last, expressive bar of the first Lied of Dichterliebe is new (454). The 
major-minor seventh chord placed at the end of the first song of Dichterliebe cannot be 
reduced to a “harmonic meaning” because the chord controls more than harmony: it also 
controls the concept of “tonal piece” or “tonal work” (455). Yet Hallmark ignores the 
artwork’s self-negation because he implicitly uses the text to justify Schumann’s eccentricity: 
for Hallmark, the last chord is the mere music-conventional equivalent of the last words of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Kofi Agawu, “Ambiguity in Tonal Music: A Preliminary Study,” in Theory, Analysis and Meaning in Music, 
pp. 86-107, here p. 107.  
75 David Kopp, “Intermediate States of Key in Schumann,” in Rethinking Schumann, eds. Roe-Min Kok and 
Laura Tunbridge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 300-325. 
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Lied, Sehnen und Verlangen (longing and desire)76 (456). The C-sharp major-minor seventh 
chord at the end of the first Lied tends across an immense distance to the F-sharp minor triad 
falling on the first syllable of the word Blumen in the first occurrence of the line Es flüstern 
und sprechen die Blumen in the twelfth Lied (457). The first Lied becomes readable in light of 
the twelfth Lied as the articulation of the problem that the applied Phrygian key area poses to 
the very idea of non-harmonic tones within a figurated texture (460). Schumann’s musical 
advance comes out of the properties of figuration itself (461). Dichterliebe opens on C-sharp'', 
the tonic, where “tonic” refers to the root of the first chord of a work (462). The opening of 
Dichterliebe, however, presents a great diversity of highly coloured chords—four different 
proportions of chords built on four different roots—yet without a sense of rupture: it is by a 
skilful use of common tones that Schumann is able to bring together chords that normally 
would not be associated in such a brief passage (464). The beauty of an interpretation in D 
major-as-Neapolitan is that it does not require any special treatment of “non-chord” tones—all 
the tones can be chord tones in this analysis (467). It may be argued that an analysis in applied 
Neapolitan should at least bring out the “tonal” moments of this progression (470). 
Schumann’s advanced, anti-organic practice lies in the contradiction between the three sharps 
seen in the score of “Im wunderschönen Monat Mai” and what its tonality sounds like to the 
ear: the Neapolitan region applied to C-sharp major (472). This contradiction cannot be 
overstepped, but, given the universal delusional context of reification, it should be resolved on 
the side of performance (472). The important words Herzen (heart) and die Liebe (the love) 
gain their interest not from arbitrary non-chord tones, to which the performers can add 
emphasis, but from a number of harmonic elements that work together: the most powerful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Rufus E. Hallmark, The Genesis of Schumann’s “Dichterliebe”: A Source Study (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University Microfilms International, 1979), p. 16.  
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harmonic movement of a half-step up to the subdominant chord on Herzen; the number of 
alterations, liberated by the applied Neapolitan figuration, in this thirteenth chord that takes up 
the whole of bar 10; the placement of the root almost at the end of this figurated chord, 
following the norm of the style brisé of Renaissance lute-playing, the advanced music of the 
past, norm which this Romantic song reinstates as its idiosyncrasy; the high voicing of this 
root, which is in fact the highest-sounding pitch of the chord; the minor g6 variant on Liebe, 
indicating an alternative reading of historical progress, this literal progress up the scale (472). 
Lied I bears a certain strophic structure, which nonetheless takes on the appearance of being 
through-composed (473). If smooth transitions assure the integrity of the circle, and of the 
work, then the cyclic form of Dichterliebe is in fact imperilled at many points (476). In 
allowing discontinuity to enter his dialectical composition in such jarring fashion, in opening 
the apparently complete work to history, Schumann in fact goes quickly to the solution to the 
problem of dialectical undifferentiatedness that Adorno would articulate in his 1932 address 
“The Idea of Nature-History”… (477). The expression of Dichterliebe is illusion (481). The 
applied Neapolitan key area continues to haunt the non-figurated second Lied, in A major 
(482). Arthur Komar remarks the importance of both C-sharp and D in the opening of the 
second Lied, but reads the A major triad (supporting C-sharp in the voice) in measure 1 as the 
point of arrival of the first Lied: “In view of the B left hanging at the end of Song 1, the initial 
C-sharp of Song 2 can be regarded as a local passing-note to the neighbour D, which resolves 
directly to C-sharp in the same measure”77 (483). For Schenker, however, it is completely out 
of the question that both the tonic and the flattened supertonic be admitted into the 
fundamental structure: “In the fundamental structure a Phrygian supertonic can no more exist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Komar, “The Music of Dichterliebe,” p. 72. 
	   xliii	  
than can a mixture”78 (484). In taking issue not with the concept of tonic, but rather with the 
exclusionary aspect of harmony, the relegation of certain notes to a subaltern category of 
“non-harmonic tones,” which needs no further comment, Schumann at his most advanced 
holds fast to the hope of transcendence (in modulation), yet determines transcendence not as 
the pure creation or break-in of the utterly different, but as a different organization of what is 
already (484).  
Section vii………....................................................................................................................485 
 Like Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, Schumann’s Dichterliebe owes its 
revolutionary form to inorganic transformation wrought under internal pressures, not to 
processes of natural growth (485). And everything that transpires from the poet’s confession 
of longing to the moment in which the flowers speak, when it becomes clear what the true 
object of longing was, once it is missed, becomes readable as a history of that reification 
(489). The poet’s confession of longing in the first Lied opens directly onto his suffering in the 
second (489). In Lied III, the poet withdraws his love of the spreading nature that served as a 
conduit to the beloved, the manifold of roses, lilies, dove, and sun, in exclusive favour of their 
pure synthesis, the beloved herself, who, going by the epic epithet of die Kleine, die Feine, die 
Reine, die Eine (the fine one, tiny one, refined one, only one) (490). In Lied IV, the poet then 
suffers the consequences of the consolidation of his love into a single one (490). The failure of 
speech to fulfil its promise seems to drive the poet to find an objective expression for the 
“wonderfully sweet hour” and the hopes it held: in Lied V, he thinks to capture the fleeting 
hour spent with the beloved by way of a lily, which would be able to play back her song off 
his soul like a quivering phonograph, reproducing the shudder of her kiss, shudder that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 77 § 104 as translated, Free Composition, p. 41, with scale degree written out.	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Schumann renders mimetically with animated chords in thirty-second notes (491). However, 
in Lied VI, the poet discovers that his beloved has already been captured in something old: in 
the painting of the Blessed Virgin Mary that he studies in Cologne Cathedral (491). To his 
horror, the poet still loves, as can be drawn from his reaction to the definitive loss of the 
beloved in Lied VII (495). In Lied VIII, hints of alienation enter the text (497). The split 
between individual and society reaches acute expression, both in Heine’s text and in 
Schumann’s setting, in Lied IX of the cycle (500). In Lied X comes the poet’s melancholy 
rumination, high in the forest, in phrases tracing deep valleys, on just what it might inflict on 
him to hear his beloved’s song again (500). Thereafter the poet descends, in Lied XI, into 
cynicism at the way of the world (501). Through each of these progressive displacements of 
the object, forced by the pursuit of fulfilment itself, the poet is alienated from the initial 
experience of natural beauty of May, removed and again removed from nature, so that when 
his wish for speaking nature is fulfilled, in Lied XII, it is completely other, and he does not 
recognize it… (501). Schumann shows his fidelity to illusion, against the affirmative vocation 
of art as a dispenser of morals, truths and practical knowledge, by closing his cycle with a 
profusion of dreams (502). The first of these, in Lied XIII, is the darkest moment of the cycle 
(503). While the tears in Lied XIII suggest that there is a term that can go between dreaming 
and waking, less is transferred from dreams to waking in Lied XIV and almost nothing at all in 
Lied XV (505). The dreamer in Lied XIV remembers most of his dreams of his beloved, but 
he wakes finding himself bereft of the spray of cypresses that she gave him and the soft word 
that she spoke to him (506). Lied XV almost celebrates the return of repressive capacities 
(507). Lied XVI follows directly from Lied XV: if dreams are mere foam, rationalizes the 
dreamer, then let us rid ourselves of them for good (510). The common reading of Lied XVI is 
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that the poet, unburdened by the weight of the past, reaches reconciliation in the “reflective” 
postlude, with its reference back to Lied XII (512). Yet the conclusion of Dichterliebe gives 
reason to hope that there may yet be awakening (514). The four-bar citation of the postlude of 
the last song begins on the dominant over a tonic pedal, then proceeds to IV7 – V4,2 – I, the 
large piece of the most common progression in Western music (515). The German sixth that 
follows the IV – V – I progression in Lied XVI touches on the poet’s un-heroic cast in this 
misery, picking up on several important moments of his alienation earlier in Lied XII (515). 
The German sixth in the postlude of Lied XVI is followed by the crescendo-decrescendo 
chord: a diminished seventh chord applied to the supertonic79 (516). It is unclear what a pianist 
asked to crescendo and decrescendo on a singly struck chord is to do (517). There are slight 
discrepancies between the postlude of Lied XII and its citation in the postlude of Lied XVI 
(518). The substitution of a major triad for a dominant seventh in the citation of Lied XVI 
gives an utterly different sense of harmonic movement away from the illuminated chord (519). 
The major II chord is the last step in the history of the supertonic that Schumann has told in 
this cycle (520). The last postlude so casts suspicion over the poet’s claims to have buried his 
pain and his love, the old songs and dreams; it suggests that such a radical, wilful act of 
forgetting only leads surely to deeper dreaming and delusion, the projection of all happiness 
into the past, mere dreams of how good people were to one another once upon a time… (523).  
Epilogue……………………………………………………………………………………...524 
  Adorno’s concept of aesthetic illusion seems like an outmoded subject today (524). 
The recent focus on appearance and apparition, on the vanishing or performative side of art, 
wishes to spare aesthetics and art the ideology critique that is the real dynamo powering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), XVI, p. 37, m. 54. 
	   xlvi	  
Adorno’s brilliant dialectics of illusion (525). The disdain for illusion in the domain of 
aesthetics is moved by the positivist spirit, which considers suspect anything that goes beyond 
the Here and Now of the observable world (528). It should perhaps be underscored that in 
“Der Essay als Form,” Adorno does not claim that the essay is devoid of aesthetic illusion—
only that it makes a claim to truth devoid of aesthetic illusion (530). In the Western tradition, 
form serves memory (533).  
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List of Abbreviations and Unusual Characters 
bsn.  bassoon 
C  Great C (two octaves below middle C) 
c  Small C (one octave below middle C) 
c'  middle C 
c''  two-line C (one octave above middle C) 
Calif.  California 
cf.  confer 
chap.  chapter 
cl.  clarinet 
ed.  edited by, editor, edition 
eds.   editors 
E. H.  English horn 
esp.  especially 
et al.  et alii (and others) 
ex.  example 
f  forte 
f.  and the following (page) 
ff  fortissimo 
fig.  figure 
Fl.  flute 
fo  folio 
 
GS Theodor W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von Rolf 
Tiedemann, unter Mitwirkung von Gretel Adorno, Susan Buck-Morss und 
Klaus Schultz, 20 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003).  
 
ibid.  ibidem (in the same place) 
l.h.  left hand 
m.  measure 
Mass.  Massachusetts 
MEW  Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke, 41 vols. (Berlin: Dietz, 1959-68). 
mf  mezzoforte 
mm.  measures 
N  Neapolitan 
n  note 
NaS  Nachgelassene Schriften (posthumously published works) 
no  numéro (number) 
no.  number 
op.  opus 
p  piano 
p.  page 
Penn.  Pennsylvania 
pf.  pianoforte 
pp  pianissimo 
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pp.  pages 
pt.  part 
pts.  parts 
repr.  reprint 
r.h.   right hand 
s.a.  sine anno (without year) 
sf  sforzando   
s.l.  sine loco (without place of publication) 
s.v.  sub verbo (under the word) 
s.vv.   sub verbis (under the words) 
trans.  translated by, translator 
v.   voice 
vcl.  cello 
vol.  volume 
vols.  volumes 
Wisc.  Wisconsin 
 
{}  accolades (to save space in the presentation of new sections) 
¶  paragraph 
§  section 
I  major tonic chord 
I6  major tonic triad in first inversion 
I6,4  major tonic triad in second inversion 
i  minor tonic chord 
i6  minor tonic chord in first inversion 
I+  augmented tonic chord 
I9  tonic ninth chord 
II  major supertonic chord  
II  altered supertonic chord 
II+   augmented supertonic chord 
ii  minor supertonic chord 
ii6  ii chord in first inversion 
iiø4,3  half-diminished ii chord in second inversion 
iii  (minor) mediant chord 
IV  (major) subdominant chord 
IV7  subdominant seventh chord 
iv6  minor subdominant chord in first inversion 
sharp-ivø4,3 sharpened subdominant half-diminished seventh chord in second inversion 
V  dominant chord 
V6,4  dominant triad in second inversion 
V7  dominant seventh chord in root position 
V4,2  dominant seventh chord in third inversion 
V9  dominant ninth chord 
vø4,3   half-diminished seventh chord in second inversion on the fifth scale degree 
vi  (minor) submediant chord 
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VI+  augmented submediant chord 
VI6,5  submediant seventh chord in first inversion 
VI6,5 +9  submediant seventh chord in first inversion with an added augmented ninth 
VI6,5 +11 submediant seventh chord in first inversion with an added augmented eleventh 
VI6,5 &13 submediant seventh chord in first inversion with an added thirteenth 
VI6,5 +13 submediant seventh chord in first inversion with an added augmented thirteenth 
viiº7  fully diminished seventh chord 
vii°6, 5  fully diminished seventh chord in first inversion 
viiø7  half-diminished vii seventh chord 
VII9  major leading-tone ninth chord 
flattened-vii6  flattened leading-tone chord in first inversion 
V/V  V applied to V, V of V 
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{Notes on Style} The main style guide adopted in the present work is The Chicago 
Manual of Style, sixteenth edition. Additional guidelines were sought in D. Kern Holoman’s 
Writing About Music: A Style Sheet, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). I 
depart from tradition in rendering figured bass horizontally from left to right instead of 
vertically from top to bottom, and separate the figures with commas (see “Abbreviations and 
Unusual Characters,” supra, pp. xlviii-xlix). Please note as well that I use the Helmholtz 
system to name the octaves where appropriate: the notes in the octave starting two octaves 
below middle C are called “Great” and written in upper case, (for example, “Great C”), those 
in the octave starting one octave below middle C are called “Small” and written in lower case 
(for example, “Small c”), those in the octave starting with middle C are identified with one 
line (for example, c') and those in the octave above that with two lines (for example, c''). Slight 
adjustments have been made to the guidelines offered in these style guides to suit the 
multilingual context of international philosophy. Following the musical convention, I italicize 
words in Italian (espressivo, pp, piano, sempre f, crescendo), but not words in other languages 
(Mit innigster Empfindung). For aesthetic reasons, I use italics rather than quotation marks 
when quoting lyric. I provide references to Adorno’s texts in their languages of composition 
and, where necessary, references to available English translations. The choice to translate on 
occasion from the original instead of quoting an already-existing translation in print should not 
be interpreted as a value judgement against the translator or translators. It is undeniable that 
there would be little motivation to learn a new language without those who first promise its 
riches, translators. Aesthetic judgements and philosophical positions are implicit in 
translations, however, and it is in the interests of philosophical consistency that I translate 
certain passages myself. 
{Prologue} A shine of truth in the “universal delusional context of reification”1 sounds 
doubtful. 
 It sounds all the more doubtful when the topic is art. Today the claim that an artwork is 
true meets not merely with suspicion, but with ridicule, scorn, ire or even hostility. 
 The aim of this thesis is to save a minimal criterion of truth that holds good for art as 
well as for philosophy. The model chosen here is European art, particularly the music and 
poetry of Germany and Austria. The model chosen is an especially clear one, but it is not the 
only one.   
 Although many have weighed in on the question of art’s truth, the most developed and 
nuanced reflections on it in the European tradition belong to Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969), 
philosopher of the Frankfurt School. Adorno had a great deal of experience in the music of his 
time: he studied composition with Alban Berg and piano with Eduard Steuermann in Vienna, 
worked as a music critic, edited the music journal Anbruch, lectured at the Darmstadt summer 
school and counted among his friends leading musicians such as Rudolf Kolisch and Carla 
Henius.2 His philosophy of art engages audaciously with particular artworks, which do not 
serve as mere examples chosen at random to fill out and justify the thought, but which stand in 
his work as the life-changing events of history, after which one must philosophize in a 
completely different way. Adorno’s aesthetic theory rests on close interpretations and analyses 
of hundreds of individual works. Academic philosophy did not then and does not now demand 
such specialized knowledge of artworks from its professors of aesthetics. This is a risky way 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 GS, vol. 7, p. 252 as translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor, Aesthetic Theory by Theodor W. Adorno, ed. Gretel 
Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 168. 
2	  For biographical details on Adorno, see Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. 
Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 1-23; Martin Jay, 
Adorno (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984); Stefan Müller-Doohm, Adorno: A Biography, trans. 
Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005).	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to philosophize, after all: a thesis, an argument or even a whole system can be felled by a 
chord. But what Adorno gains for philosophy through this risk is experience. Aesthetic 
experience is at the centre of his theory and, as experience, it implies concrete objects in time 
and space, rather than, say, a transcendent encounter into the beyond. For Adorno, aesthetic 
experience, as all experience, implies the liberation from error and illusion.  
 The conception of truth to be developed in detail here is, broadly speaking, that of 
disillusionment. Truth as disillusionment implies, on one hand, somebody who becomes 
liberated from a particular illusion and, on the other, something that remains from this process, 
concretely, and which can be discovered by somebody else, somewhere else.  
 In art, truth as disillusionment seems to entail didacticism, but this is not the case 
because the illusions lost can be illusions particular to art. 
 Friedrich Schiller calls the illusion particular to art “ästhetischer Schein,” aesthetic 
illusion.3 Its distinction is that it is forthright about being an illusion, so, in theory, it never 
effectively deceives. Schiller opposes the aesthetic illusion to “reality.” Yet from its 
beginnings, aesthetic Schein shows a tendency to overstep the bounds of art. An ambiguous 
relation to the extra-aesthetic sphere is indeed a characteristic of aesthetic Schein. Schiller’s 
distinction of a special “aesthetic” illusion raises the question of whether there is also a special 
“aesthetic” truth of art. 
 Adorno takes up the concept of aesthetic illusion in his aesthetics, yet develops it in 
ways that would have been inconceivable to Schiller. Adorno understands Modern art as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Friedrich Schiller, Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, in Werke und 
Briefe in zwölf Bänden, herausgegeben von Otto Dann, et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 
1988-2004), vol. 8, pp. 556-676, here p. 661 n19, translated by Reginald Snell as “aesthetic appearance,” On the 
Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters (New York: Ungar, 1965), p. 125. Note that Snell does not 
preserve the gender-neutral language of the title in German. 
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revolt against aesthetic illusion that culminates in a crisis, whereby art objects are practically 
indistinguishable from empirical reality, or, in the words of Arthur C. Danto, from “mere real 
things.” Arnold Schoenberg is a forerunner of this tendency, while Happenings are perhaps its 
extreme example. Although Adorno generally champions Modern art and considers the 
twentieth-century revolt against illusion to be a progressive tendency, he is without question 
opposed to the fusion of empirical reality and art that takes place in the Happening. One must 
resist the tendency to define art as illusion, Modern art as the “crisis of illusion” and Modern 
art as the crisis that threatens art in general.4  
 Adorno clearly admits truth to the realm of art, but it is less clear whether truth in art 
has a necessary relation to illusion, as truth outside art must. This is because Adorno’s concept 
of aesthetic illusion is embroiled in a number of seemingly inextricable contradictions. The 
weakening of art’s aesthetic illusion around 1910 no doubt makes Adorno’s aesthetics, which 
is more than an account of Modernism, most contradictory around this concept. The present 
work takes up a suggestion from Lambert Zuidervaart: “One aim for a reading of Aesthetic 
Theory is to expose antinomies within Adorno’s account of artistic illusion.”5 Indeed, as well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For example, Thomas Huhn, “Adorno’s Aesthetics of Illusion,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 44, 
no. 2 (Winter 1985): pp. 181-189. This is how Huhn reads Adorno: “The crisis of illusion that typifies modern art 
can be construed as the crisis of art in general to the extent to which illusion has been embedded in art. Adorno 
believes illusion has been embedded in Western art throughout its entire history” (ibid., p. 182). While Huhn here 
and elsewhere (ibid., p. 181) presents aesthetic illusion as the essential, defining aspect of art, in another mood he 
treats it as an acquired trait: “Expression existed prior to illusion. In fact we might say that illusion came about as 
the attempt to dominate and transform expression” (ibid., p. 186). Huhn is aware of the contradictions in which 
truth and illusion are enmeshed in Adorno’s aesthetics (ibid., p. 188), but his solution is perilously close to the 
Hegelian absorption of art by philosophy that he rightly wants to avoid: “Art, in order to be completed, must be 
moved beyond itself by philosophy because art’s truth content is not just its own possession but also participates 
in history” (ibid.). This does not follow, especially as philosophy is less—not more—historically conscious than 
art. Against Huhn, it must be said that the contradictions in art are themselves generated by closure; the notion of 
art being “completed” by philosophy is just as illusory as the closed, autonomous sphere of art itself, and such an 
idea in practice will generate contradictions, not secure truth. The position defended in this thesis is that art does 
not necessarily need philosophy to be true.    
5 Lambert Zuidervaart, Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1991), p. 179. 
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as being emphatically dialectical, Adorno’s philosophy is a “dialectic despite itself,” as he 
once accused the philosophy of Edmund Husserl.6  
 Adorno’s “dialectic despite itself” shows up in the following four unmediated 
antinomies.  
{1.} On the one hand, truth in art necessarily implies illusion. The artwork is something 
made, and Adorno claims that “the question about the truth of a made thing is nothing other 
than the question about illusion and its redemption as a redemption of the illusion of the true,” 
which implies that there is no truth without illusion.7 
 But on the other hand, Adorno reads the twentieth-century Expressionist movement as 
art that seeks truth otherwise than through aesthetic illusion. The truth sought in Expressionist 
music is “the illusionless, undisguised, un-transfigured truth of subjective reaction [die 
scheinlose, unverstellte, unverklärte Wahrheit der subjektiven Regung].”8 Expressionism 
suggests a truth that does not pass through illusion, since it is the “immediacy” of subjective 
expression that Expressionism ideally aims at.9 But it is not clear whether truth that passes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See GS, vol. 5, p. 132. As can be drawn from the line of criticism in Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie 
(Towards the Metacritique of Epistemology, translated as Against Epistemology: A Metacritique), Adorno denies 
truth to texts that seek consciously and deliberately to avoid contradictions, but which admit them nonetheless. 
Husserl’s thinking, despite the fact that it “passively registers breaks and contradictions in its object,” is a mere 
medium of truth, without however making good on its own claim to be truth (GS, vol. 5, p. 217, in my 
translation). It does not preserve experience, but liquidates it. According to Adorno, Husserl “would like to bring 
his results into immediate agreement with the traditional logic of non-contradiction,” but he lets contradictions 
slip in unintentionally nonetheless (GS, vol. 5, p. 132, in my translation). Adorno therefore gives Husserl’s 
phenomenology the pejorative title of “dialectic against its own will” or “dialectic despite itself”: “In the non-
dialectical system the dialectic despite itself becomes the source of errors and yet the medium of truth, in that it 
forces the analysis of the form of knowledge out of itself yet without consideration for its concrete, determinate 
content, to the point that it liquidates its very foundation” (GS, vol. 5, p. 132, in my translation). Husserl’s 
philosophy nonetheless becomes a “medium of truth” because it points beyond the extreme disregard for concrete 
particularity that predominates in Western philosophy. 
7 GS, vol. 7, p. 198, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 131.  
8 GS, vol. 18, p. 60, or prefer to my translation here that of Wieland Hoban, “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles on 
New Music,” under “Musical expressionism,” in Night Music: Essays on Music, 1928-1962, ed. Rolf Tiedemann 
(London: Seagull, 2009), pp. 269-321, here p. 275. 
9 GS vol. 18, p. 60 as translated, “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles,” p. 275. 
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through a critique and redemption of illusion could ever cede to another kind of truth, since the 
idea of varieties of truth, inviting relativism, is itself dubious, according to Adorno.  
{2.} On the one hand, it is impossible for art ever to lose its aesthetic illusion. In the text of 
his 1961 Darmstadt talk “Vers une musique informelle,” Adorno denies that art’s revolt 
against illusion could ever be effective: “The aesthetic illusion is not to be effaced from 
artworks. Even the illusionless artwork would not be one with empirical reality absent of 
mediation; illusion lives on in it, even when the artwork wants to seem [scheinen] nothing 
more than what it is.”10 In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno gives an explanation for the indelibility 
of illusion: artworks cannot efface all illusion without effacing themselves because “they 
themselves—and not only the illusion [Illusion] that they raise—are the aesthetic illusion 
[Schein].”11  
 On the other hand, Adorno thinks that it is possible for art to lose its aesthetic illusion. 
In Aesthetic Theory, he suggests that art will have to survive without illusion if it is to 
continue: “If the question about the future of art were not futile and did not reek of 
technocracy, it would come to a head over whether art can outlive illusion.”12 The reason for 
this contradiction might be a narrowing in the scope of art’s illusoriness.  
{3.} On the one hand, Adorno claims that “the illusory aspect of artworks [Das Illusionäre 
der Kunstwerke] has narrowed into the claim to be a whole,”13 which implies that modern art’s 
“rebellion against illusion” is a revolt specifically against the “fiction of the whole” and not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 GS, vol. 16, p. 535f., or prefer to my translation here that of Rodney Livingstone, “Vers une musique 
informelle,” in Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 269-322, here p. 317. 
11 GS, vol. 7, p. 155, or prefer to my translation here, Aesthetic Theory, p. 101.  
12 GS, vol. 7, p. 156, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 101f. 
13 GS, vol. 7, p. 155f., or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 101. 
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against illusion in general, for “even anti-realistic currents such as Expressionism take part in 
the rebellion against illusion.”14  
 On the other hand, in the late essay “Little Heresy,” Adorno makes the blanket claim 
that gaining a comprehension of music disparages “atomistic listening” and promotes 
“structural listening,” which requires the perception of music as a “meaningful whole”: 
“Musical understanding, musical cultivation [Bildung] with a human dignity that means more 
than mere information content, is tantamount to the ability to perceive musical contexts, 
ideally developed and articulated music, as a meaningful whole [sinnvolles Ganzes].”15 This 
implies that music that cannot be perceived as a meaningful whole—because it is completely 
aleatory and indeterminate, for example—is not illusionless music, but rather that it is not 
music at all. For even inarticulate, piecemeal music must lend itself to structural listening. But 
from another perspective, aesthetic illusion is not so much the illusion of a whole, but that of 
harmony, and this can be seen in Expressionism, which manifests the crisis of illusion by 
separating out expression, detaching it from the harmonious construction: “The emancipation 
from the concept of harmony reveals itself as a revolt against illusion: tautologically, 
construction is inherent in expression, which is its polar opposite.”16 The concept of harmony 
is not the equivalent of triadic harmony in music; it refers to the passage of art beyond the 
determinations of reflection in the illusory identity of essence and appearance. But Adorno 
suggests that the artworks dissatisfied with the idea of harmony are actually the ones that have 
gone into it more deeply, and which have given themselves over to being appearing essences: 
“The deeper artworks lose themselves in the idea of harmony, of appearing essence, the less 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 GS, vol. 7, p. 157, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 103. 
15 GS, vol. 17, p. 297 as translated by Susan H. Gillespie, “Little Heresy,” in Essays on Music, ed. Richard 
Leppert (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 318-324, here p. 318. 
16 GS, vol. 7, p. 154, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 100. 
	   7	  
are they able to content themselves with it.”17 In other words, these artworks are the most 
processual ones, the ones that have, first, posited themselves as appearing essences, the 
reconciliation of nature and spirit, then, become disillusioned with this harmony, allowing 
inconsistencies to appear. These artworks make the claim to be wholes most strongly, 
appearing manifestly to be wholes, but they negate this claim most strongly, in the height of 
their expressive moments, in the indelibility of their outstanding passages, in being parts. But 
Adorno’s aesthetics of illusion is also contradictory around the concept of Expressionism.  
{4.} On the one hand, Adorno implies that Modern music is new. The expression of 
twentieth-century Expressionism is supposed to be something different form Romanticism’s 
musical expression. In Philosophy of Modern Music, Adorno states: “Since the break, 
Schoenberg’s espressivo is qualitatively differently from the Romantic one, at least since the 
Piano Pieces, op. 11, and the George songs, if not from the very beginning, even by way of 
that ‘excess,’ which thinks Romantic espressivo through to the end.”18  
 But on the other hand, the expression of Expressionism is not new. In Aesthetic 
Theory, Adorno thinks the relation between Romantic and Modern music not on the analogy 
of a plan and its full realization, but on the analogy of model and imitation, making 
Schoenberg’s music “after the break” mere variations on what had already been realized, the 
“incomparable last piece of Schumann’s Kinderszenen, one of the earliest models of 
Expressionist music.”19 
 The sorts of “contradictions” that show up in Adorno’s aesthetics do not invalidate it, 
for they are not due to inattention to the rules of logic. The problem is with the rules of logic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 GS, vol. 7, p. 168, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 110. 
18 GS, vol. 12, p. 44, or prefer to my translation here that of Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster, 
Philosophy of Modern Music (New York: Seabury, 1980), p. 38. 
19 GS, vol. 7, p. 252, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 168. 
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themselves. More precisely, the problem is with the underlying “identifying thinking,” which 
mistakes non-contradictions for contradictions. Under the condition of total identity, more is 
lumped under the heading of contradiction than should be. No longer is contradiction 
considered to be the assertion of a thing and its opposite simultaneously and in the same 
respect, at once both a and not-a; rather, anything that escapes binary opposition, what is 
neither a nor not-a, appears contradictory: “All that does not fit into [the law of the excluded 
middle], everything qualitatively different, acquires the mark of contradiction.”20 What cannot 
be negated in its entirety, in other words, is a contradiction as far as total identification is 
concerned: a would have to perish utterly, undergo complete annihilation, or else reign 
completely in order for totalizing thinking to consider it, on its terms, true and valid. But this 
immediately pushes totalizing thinking to contradict its own law: once a either perishes 
entirely or reigns completely, the proposition “a or not-a” is no longer true, and thought steps 
outside the law of the excluded middle. Total identification is false on its own terms. Its claim 
to truth finishes in illusion.21  
 When a proposition about the whole breaks the law of non-contradiction then it is clear 
that total identification must be false on the terms of general logic. The problem, as Adorno 
reads it, is not with self-contradictory texts, but rather with the necessity to make exhaustive, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 GS, vol. 6, p. 17, or prefer to my translation here that of E. B. Ashton, Negative Dialectics, (1973; repr., New 
York: Continuum, 1997), p. 5. 
21 Cf. Alison Stone, “Adorno and Logic,” in Theodor Adorno: Key Concepts, ed. Deborah Cook (Stocksfield, 
UK: Acumen, 2008), pp. 47-62. Adorno’s logic is not an “alternative” to general logic, as Stone suggests (ibid., 
p. 47). Rather, Adorno demonstrates that the laws of thought that form general logic are false on their own terms, 
implying that general logic is invalid. For Stone, this would leave only transcendental logic. Negative dialectics 
does indeed look to be a transcendental logic, but Stone does not argue convincingly for it. A weakness of her 
exposition is her rendering of the “non-identical.” If it were, as she suggests, that aspect of a particular dog that 
cannot be brought under the concept of dog, the non-identical would be a “junk category” that would have no 
hold on the real (ibid., p. 54). A stronger case can be made for negative dialectics by thinking the non-identical as 
a historical process, by which particular aspects of real concepts are repressed. A precipitate of the non-identical 
is in principle retrievable if concepts implicitly carry repressed content along with them through time—but not if  
“the non-identical” is something unique that falls outside of the concept completely, which would be something 
on which the concept would have no hold.   
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all-or-nothing claims. Solving problems or resolving contradictions is a cosmetic fix when the 
contradictions are constantly generated from the need to seal each property off from its 
otherness (not-a), so that the two, property and its other, exhaust the whole. A text that makes 
its negations partial, gradated and diverse, within the concept itself, denies the law of the 
excluded middle. But such diversity, difference, limitation and shading within the subject 
treated would amount to “contradictions,” according to the thinking of total identification. 
 From another point of view, the sorts of contradictions that appear in Adorno’s 
aesthetics are “objective”—that is, they come out of the (social) demand for identity between 
the concept and its object. This properly social demand is the norm in analytic philosophy, but 
also in the work of Hegel. In Hegel’s Idealist dialectical practice, the resolution of 
contradictions implies a totality that is supposed to encompass partial and antagonistic 
perspectives. Hegel conceives of contradiction as more than a problem with thinking: “It is 
said that contradiction cannot be thought; but in the pain of the living being it is even an 
actual, concrete existence.”22 Adorno also understands contradictions in this sense. Hegel’s 
project, however, is to resolve all the contradictions into a totality that is at once thinking and 
existence. At the end of his key work, The Science of Logic, Hegel makes the claim that the 
resolution of thinking and existence in thought is at the same time totality—or, more than just 
thought, but also nature.23 The mediation of contradictions in Hegelian dialectics generally 
tends towards this fantastical totality. According to Adorno, however, a conceptual whole is 
not totality—not even speculatively. According to Adorno, the resolution of contradiction in a 
higher generality does not make the totality a harmony, but rather an antagonistic whole, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Theorie-Werkausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969-
1971), vol. 6, p. 481 as translated by George di Giovanni, The Science of Logic, ed. George di Giovanni 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 684. 
23 Hegel, Werke, vol. 6, p. 573, or translated by G. di Giovanni, Science of Logic p. 752f. 
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hostile to the particular, which must be conquered in order for the dialectic to advance to a 
new stage. Hegel’s resolution of thinking and existence ultimately denies real unresolved pain 
and suffering—the “contradiction” in existence, which is not the same thing as a contradiction 
in thought. As long as concepts are conceived as totality, they are grounded in fiction. The 
problem of concepts’ fictitiousness cannot be reasonably resolved by bursting all the 
traditional Idealist categories (Concept, Being, Life-Process…) and replacing them with some 
denser stuff (Capital, Commodity, Circulation…), as was Karl Marx’s strategy.24 Adorno sees 
no alternative other than to take the conceptual totality at its word: “Once conscious of the 
conceptual totality’s illusoriness [Scheinhaftigkeit], consciousness has no way but to break 
through the illusion [Schein] of total identity immanently: using total identity’s own 
measure.”25 The conceptual totality—that is, the harmony, within thought, of thinking and 
existence—claims to be totality. But it is only a conceptual totality: the pain of existence lies 
outside it. As the conceptual totality takes itself to be totality itself, any criterion lodged 
against it from the outside—such as the pain of actual existence—would be nothing to it. The 
only way to criticize the system of thought that claims to be everything is to adopt a criterion 
from within that “totality”—its own claim to be a consistent entirety with no part missing. 
Totalizing, identifying thinking is not peculiar to Hegel, but is the norm.  
 Adorno’s critique of Hegel would be unthinkable without the contribution of Marx, 
who, in the introduction to the Grundrisse, charges J. S. Mill and Adam Smith with employing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For an argument suggesting the translation of Hegel’s logical categories into Marx’s economic categories, see 
Mark E. Meaney, Capital as Organic Unity: The Role of Hegel’s “Science of Logic” in Marx’s “Grundrisse” 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002).   
25 GS, vol. 6, p. 17, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 5. The translation of “Schein” here as 
“illusion” expresses Adorno’s understanding of the totality as false. In Minima Moralia, an earlier work, he 
declares, “Das Ganze ist das Unwahre [The whole is the untrue]” (GS, vol. 4, p. 55 §29; my translation). In 
Aesthetic Theory, his last work, he uses the phrase “the fiction [Fiktion] of a totality that is recognized as 
unrealizable” to describe structure in music (GS, vol. 7, p. 154 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 100).  
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an abstract notion of production: in order to speak of production in general consistently, these 
thinkers must abstract qualities from the actual object of production—those particular aspects 
of production that enter into contradiction because they arose in different societies, in different 
eras.26 Mill and Smith nonetheless handle the concept of production in general as if it really 
encompassed all forms of production. Any harmony between the concept of production and its 
object is illusory, and due to abstraction. In fact, there is a contradiction between the concept 
of production in general and production—objective contradiction. 
 Adorno’s own aesthetic theory is not immune to objective contradictions, despite his 
priority of the object in principal. They are signs of social abstraction, and the blame for them 
cannot be laid on the lone thinker. This is because abstraction is not a matter of personal 
choice, but socially necessary, rooted in the unavoidable use of money for exchange. 
Abstraction seems reasonable in philosophy because it is the norm in the society of monetary 
exchange where that philosophy is produced. 
 Although objective contradictions cannot be solved in thought alone, philosophy can 
adopt practices that support their real resolution rather than hinder it. Instead of assuming that 
concepts really cover their objects, philosophers can recall the different aspects that, through 
time, concepts have repressed from their objects, and which disturb common assumptions 
about the things themselves. This practice goes against the social process of abstraction 
essential to the illusory harmonization of divisions in society. In aesthetics, this implies a close 
look at artworks.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Berlin: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1953), p. 6f. 
as translated by Ernst Wangermann, “Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58 (First Version of Capital),” in Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, 50 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1975-2004), vol. 28, p. 23.	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 The present work approaches Adorno’s aesthetics by way of detailed interpretations of 
consummate works that make the competing demands of universal and particular explicit. For 
the most part, I examine works in the Austro-German tradition with which he was familiar. I 
demonstrate that true, advanced artworks break out of their times, whether Classical, 
Romantic or Modern.27 The analyses of artworks in the present work are offered with the aim 
of showing that there is a non-identity between Adorno’s aesthetic theory and the artworks 
that should be adequate to it, as well as a non-identity between Adorno’s account of 
Modernism and the artworks that should be adequate to it. 
  Again, these non-identities do not invalidate Adorno’s aesthetics, as they are seated in 
social processes, rather than in one person’s subjective thought. Yet Adorno’s philosophy does 
not permit a reduction of all features of philosophical texts to social reality. Philosophy, like 
art, must make good on its claim to truth, and this puts it at odds with society. 
 The truth of art is not a lesser grade of truth than the truth of philosophy when it is 
understood as the effective critique of illusion (Schein). The contradictions around Adorno’s 
concept of Schein have to do with the determinations that the concept has gained and lost in 
philosophical history. The word “Schein” is close in meaning to “shine” in the obsolete 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 As there are recognizably Romantic strains to this conception of great works, the challenge in what follows 
will be to show that it has utmost relevance for the twentieth century and, indeed, for today. While the goal here 
is not to reconstruct the past or to defend truth as eternal, I take up the idea that great works open passages from 
one historical period to another, which Lydia Goehr has included in her characterization of the Romantic 
conception of the work: “Reconstructing the past was partly motivated by a new sort of academic interest in 
music history. Bringing music of the past into the present confirmed at least one tenet central to romanticism, that 
of replacing a traditional, static conception of nature with a dynamic conception of history. But there was another 
interest in reconstruction that was more influential. Musicians did not look back to the past, as they once had 
done, to find models for contemporaries to imitate. Instead, they began to see musical masterpieces as 
transcending temporal and spatial barriers. One level of history was being transcended to reach another. Works 
were not to be thought about as expressive or representative of concrete historical moments, but as valuable in 
their own right as transcending all considerations other than those of an aesthetic/spiritual nature. ‘Do not think 
that old music is outmoded,’ Schumann wrote in 1834. ‘Just as a beautiful true word can never be outmoded, so a 
beautiful piece of true music’.” Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the 
Philosophy of Music (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 246. 
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figurative sense of “a specious appearance, a ‘show’,” itself a loan-meaning from “Schein.”28 
Like “shine” in English, “Schein” also describes the glow of light. From this meaning, Schein 
spills over in a mass of related ideas, from surface sheen, to mere surface, semblance, 
appearance, show and, finally, illusion. It carries some or all of these senses in the works of 
philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schiller, G. W. F. Hegel, Karl Marx, Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Walter Benjamin. The great diversity within the concept has yielded quite 
distant translations for the same word: “shine,” “show,” “illusion,” “semblance,” 
“appearance,” “mere appearance,” “pure appearance” and “illusory being.” This scattered 
history makes the term all the more difficult to translate when one comes to the texts of 
Adorno, who relates to the philosophical history implicit in “Schein” not so much as a 
tradition to appropriate, but as basic working “materials” to advance.29 Michael Spitzer picks 
up on many of these echoes from the past in his definition of Adorno’s concept of Schein: 
“Artistic illumination; the sheen of natural beauty; surface semblance; illusion; veil; husk; the 
quivering of life; the flicker of aesthetic categories; an image of freedom; the promise of 
reconciliation; harmony.”30 
 Adorno’s concept of Schein will be rendered here most often as “illusion.” “Illusion” 
does not capture the entire sense of “Schein,” but, as Adorno himself remarked in his “Theses 
on the Language of the Philosophy,” word choice in philosophy is not determined by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “shine,” accessed December 15, 2013, http://www.oed.com/view/ 
Entry/178183. 
29 On this idea, see Norbert Rath, “Dialektik des Scheins—Materialien zum Scheinbegriff Adornos,” in 
Kolloquium Kunst und Philosophie, herausgegeben von Willi Oelmüller, Band 2, Ästhetischer Schein (Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 1982), pp. 51-61.	  
30 Michael Spitzer, Music as Philosophy: Adorno and Beethoven’s Late Style (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2006), p. 1; see also p. 14 for the clue to reading the definitions. 
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signification, but rather by history.31 Social criticism and the critique of culture are no doubt 
central to Adorno’s project, and the translation of “Schein” as “illusion” links him with the 
nineteenth-century tradition of the critique of Schein. As Willi Oelmüller explains, aesthetic 
Schein most definitely carries the sense of “illusion” when it is used in a critical capacity:  
 In the nineteenth century, when something is criticized as aesthetic illusion, as a rule 
this presupposes a critique of ideology and of world views: the critique of religion, of 
metaphysics, of morals, the critique of political institutions and conditions, the critique 
of the economic commodity in the capitalist process of production, the critique of 
science and of the European processes of rationalization, the critique of particular so-
called aesthetic ways in which human beings behave toward themselves, toward one 
another, toward the nature beyond themselves and towards God. When something is 
criticized as aesthetic illusion, that means: this is deception, whether self-deception or 
deception by another, it is not true, it is not the case.32  
 
Yet as Oelmüller also points out, nineteenth-century thinkers and writers employed 
“ästhetischer Schein” with a double aim: not only with a view to its critique, but also with a 
view to its “rescue” or “redemption” (Rettung). Adorno’s concept of aesthetic illusion 
encompasses both dimensions.33 He considers the redemption of illusion to be the “object of 
aesthetics,”34 and even claims that the “legitimation” of art’s truth depends on the “redemption 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 GS, vol. 1, p. 366f. 2., or in translation Theodor W. Adorno, “Theses on the Language of the Philosopher,” 
trans. Samir Gandesha and Michael K. Palamarek, in Donald A. Burke et al. (eds.), Adorno and the Need in 
Thinking: New Critical Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), pp. 35-40, here p. 35f. Thesis 2. 
32 Willi Oelmüller, opening presentation [Diskussionseröffnung] to “Argumente für und gegen die Verwendung 
des Begriffs ästhetischer Schein I: Protokolle der Diskussion vom 12.6.1981, 15.00-18.30 Uhr,” by Willi 
Oelmüller et al., in Ästhetischer Schein, pp. 318-354, here p. 320, my translation from: “Wenn im 19. Jahrhundert 
etwas als ästhetischer Schein kritisiert wird, ist dabei in der Regel die neuzeitliche Ideologie- und 
Weltanschauungskritik vorausgesetzt: die Kritik der Religion, der Metaphysik, der Moral, die Kritik der 
politischen Institutionen und Verhältnisse, die Kritik der ökonomischen Ware im kapitalistischen 
Produktionsprozeß, die Kritik der Wissenschaft und des europäischen Rationalisierungsprozesses, die Kritik 
bestimmter sogenannter ästhetischer Verhaltensweisen des Menschen zu sich selbst, zu anderen Menschen, zur 
außermenschlichen Natur und zu Gott. Wenn etwas als ästhetischer Schein kritisiert wird, heißt das, dies ist 
Täuschung, Selbsttäuschung oder Fremdtäuschung, es ist nicht wahr, es ist nicht der Fall.” 
33 See Hyung-won Min, Zur Kritik und Rettung des Scheins bei Th. W. Adorno: Der Zusammenhang der 
Gesellschafts-, Erkenntnistheorie und der Ästhetik (Frankfurt am Main: R. G. Fischer, 1992). Min clearly shows 
Adorno’s advance of both sides of the nineteenth-century tradition of Schein: critique of illusion in the form of 
ideology critique and redemption of illusion in the form of a critical aesthetics. While attesting to the important 
role of art in the redemption of illusion, Min provides no close interpretations or striking examples of artworks to 
support the argument of the second part of the dissertation (ibid, p. 157). 
34 GS, vol. 6, pp. 7-412, here p. 386, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics p. 393. 
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of illusion.”35 This centrality is no doubt why Lambert Zuidervaart sub-titled his book 
dedicated to Adorno’s aesthetics “The Redemption of Illusion.”36 Aesthetic illusion has its 
rightful place in art: to redeem illusion is to recognize the truth of art’s illusion. 
 While “illusion” was once the usual translation of “Schein,” the recent tendency is to 
refer to Adorno’s concept as “semblance.” Yet “semblance” does not properly capture the 
connotation of “deception” that “Schein” carries in Adorno’s work: he defines ideology, 
which is not a neutral or descriptive term for him, as “socially necessary illusion.”37 Ideology 
is necessarily a problem for knowledge and, as Raymond Geuss points out, it is the motivating 
factor in ideology critique (Ideologiekritik) for members of the Frankfurt School: 
“Ideologiekritik is not just a form of ‘moralizing criticism,’ i.e. an ideological form of 
consciousness is not criticised for being nasty, immoral, unpleasant, etc. but for being false, 
for being a form of delusion. Ideologiekritik is itself a cognitive enterprise, a form of 
knowledge.”38 The choice of “semblance” for “Schein” indeed has a history in the translation 
of Marx, and, while Schein serves the intention of ideology critique in the work of both 
thinkers, certain misunderstandings about Adorno can be traced to a failure to distinguish his 
concept of ideology from a certain Marxian conception of it. In the Grundrisse, “Schein” has 
been translated as “semblance,” for example, when it refers to a mere surface phenomenon 
that hides the deeper processes taking place behind it: Marx describes the “immediate being” 
of commodity circulation as “pure semblance [Schein],” elaborating, “It is the image 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 GS, vol. 7, p. 164 or prefer to my translation here, Aesthetic Theory, p. 107.	  
36 For discussion on the redemption of illusion, see Zuidervaart, Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of 
Illusion, chap. 8, pp. 178-213, esp. p. 194. The present work builds on this chapter. 
37 GS, vol. 7, p. 346 or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 233. 
38 Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), p. 26. 
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[Phänomen] of a process occurring behind it.”39 “Schein” is also translated as “semblance” in 
other contexts: semblance is a “fleeting mediation”40 or what misses its realization through 
being merely fleeting, inconsequential or partial.41 The sort of critical praxis suggested by the 
conception of Schein as semblance would involve, first, going beyond the surface to grasp the 
essential processes working beneath and, second, comparing what things are to what their full 
realization would be. But these tactics are not sufficient when Adorno’s mature conception of 
ideology is considered. First, Adorno denies that ideology is a surface phenomenon. This is 
clear in his statement: “Ideology is not superimposed as a detachable layer on the being of 
society; it is inherent in that being.”42 Second, Adorno does not begrudge what is partial, 
ephemeral and inconsequential (or “idle”), because he believes that happiness is closely 
connected to these things,43 and, moreover, although he does not give up hope for fully 
realized truth,44 he certainly does not frame the problem of ideology in terms of things’ failure 
to realize or fully and lastingly to disclose their “essences.”45 Considering its history in 
translation, “semblance” does not bring out what is new about Adorno’s conception of 
ideology.  
 Different misunderstandings of Adorno’s position may result when “Schein” is 
translated as “appearance.” For “appearance” is famously contrasted to “reality” in Reginald 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 166 as translated, Collected Works, vol. 28, p. 186. 
40 Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 124 as translated, Collected Works, vol. 28, p. 145.  
41 Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, p. 123f. as translated, Collected Works, vol. 28, p. 144. 
42 GS, vol. 6, p. 348 as translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 354. 
43 See the fourth Meditation on Metaphysics, “Glück und vergebliches Warten” (Happiness and Idle Waiting), in 
GS, vol. 6, pp. 366-368 or in Negative Dialectics, pp. 373-375. 
44 See GS, vol. 6, p. 361 or Negative Dialectics, p. 368, where Adorno criticizes metaphysical obstacles to the 
realization of truth. 
45 This can be drawn from Adorno’s famous words, with allusion to the Communist catastrophe of Marx’s 
Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, “Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment of its 
realization was missed.” GS, vol. 6, p. 15, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 3. 
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Snell’s translation of Friedrich Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of 
Letters.46 Yet the object of Adorno’s ideology critique certainly includes reality, especially its 
more or less permanent features: “When thought is banned, thinking sanctions what simply 
is.”47 He understands sanctioned reality to be the basis for irrational movements, whether 
Being for neo-ontology,48 the reality principle for revisionist psychology49 or the “given” facts 
for positivism.50 Adorno’s ideology critique, as the critique of socially necessary Schein, is 
thus certainly not limited to “appearance,” because reality forms such a large part of that 
critique. Adorno even suggests that existence itself is ideological,51 and denies that mere 
thought is unreal.52 At times, Adorno indeed means by “Schein” a superficial cover, but the 
translation “illusion” also captures the idea of unreal or superficial appearances and 
semblances. Yet, as an ideology critic, Adorno is not concerned with just any appearance or 
semblance—for example, clouds that look like whales or pears that at first seem to be apples 
because they are round rather than elongate. Adorno is concerned with appearances that 
delude and deceive, and the word for this is “illusion” in the sense of “a deceptive or illusive 
appearance, statement, belief, etc.”53 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, p. 125. 
47 See GS vol. 6, p. 93, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 85. 
48 See GS vol. 6, p. 92, or Negative Dialectics, p. 85; GS, vol. 6, p. 484, or translated by Knut Tarnowski and 
Frederic Will, The Jargon of Authenticity, (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 106f. 
49 See GS, vol. 8, p. 39. 
50 See GS, vol. 8, p. 216. 
51 According to Horkheimer and Adorno, “Existence [Dasein] is magically turned into its own ideology by its 
faithful duplication.” GS, vol. 3, p. 301 (my translation). 
52 See GS, vol. 8, p. 209, where Adorno deems the positivist critique of knowledge insufficient because, to it, the 
“objective character of exchange” would not count as real and would thus be beyond its grasp. Adorno considers 
the “Schein” of exchange value to be “the most real thing of all,” even though it remains, “in contrast to use 
value, something only thought” (ibid.). Adorno’s critique of exchange value is an example of Schein that is both 
ultimately real and mere thought. 
53 Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “illusion,” accessed August 20, 2014, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/91565. 
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 Adorno’s association of Arnold Schoenberg’s music with “Progress” becomes 
convincing only when the “Schein” in “Schönbergs Kritik an Schein und Spiel” 
(“Schoenberg’s Criticism of Illusion and Play”) is understood as a deceptive appearance: 
Adorno reads Schoenberg’s Expressionism as a critique of ideology, and not just as a critique 
of surfaces and unreality.54 Bourgeois music presents a façade of good manners, which leads 
Schoenberg to drop all social pretenses, forcing his listeners to consider whether expression, 
the registering of inner feelings and psychology, is not the truth. But Adorno would like to 
argue that Schoenberg’s music is not just a protest against the superficiality of conventional 
Viennese society, but that it is also a critique of the bourgeois deceptive mechanism of 
harmony, by which music seems to represent a classless society when in reality it only 
promotes the interests of the bourgeoisie. Ultimately, Adorno wishes to conclude that 
Schoenberg’s music, by surrendering its delusion (Trug) about harmony, actually takes a 
position against the bourgeoisie in the class struggle and is thus no longer itself an 
“ideology”!55 Schoenberg’s critique is not just aimed at the semblance of a classless society, 
but against the whole “deception of harmony,” which gives to think that classless society has 
been established when it has not.56  
 The translation “appearance” for “Schein” has the added complication of coinciding 
with the standard translation for “Erscheinung,” which is a distinct concept for both Kant and 
Hegel.57 It is also a distinct concept for Adorno, who, like Kant, denies it any claim to totality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  GS, vol. 12, p. 44 as translated Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 37. 
55 GS, vol. 12, p. 124 as translated, Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 131.	  
56 GS, vol. 12, p. 124, as translated, Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 131. 
57 For a clear explication of the distinctions between Schein and Erscheinung in the work of both Kant and 
Hegel, see Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), s.v. “appearance, illusion and 
shining.” It is interesting to note that Inwood translates the Kantian concept of Schein as “illusion” (implying 
deception) and the Kantian concept of Erscheinung as “appearance” (meaning a perceptible phenomenon), the 
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or to complete revelation. For Kant, collapsing the distinction between this world and “the 
world beyond” necessarily generates a “logic of illusion,” and Adorno remains firmly 
unconvinced by Hegel’s attempt to rehabilitate transcendental dialectics as a “logic of truth.”58 
Although “the world beyond” for Adorno would be the world beyond commodities, ideology 
and other subjective deformations, his agreement with Kant on the need for the subject to 
recognize its own limits, as well as for it to recognize the sorts of errors that result from its 
failure to recognize them, is a very good reason to translate “Schein” as “illusion.” For the 
translation “illusion” links Adorno to Kant, for whom Schein implies deception.59 Adorno’s 
qualification of Schein as “socially necessary” echoes Kant’s qualification of transcendental 
illusion as “natural and unavoidable.”60 Schiller’s qualification of Schein as “aesthetic” 
preserves recognizably Kantian vocabulary, but it is clear that Schiller uses Kant’s terms in his 
own way. For Schiller, the difference of logical appearance from aesthetic appearance is the 
fact that the former is “mere deception,”61 whereas, for Kant, illusion in painting is deception 
nonetheless.62 Aesthetic Schein does not imply deception for Schiller. Here Adorno follows 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Schillerian concept of Schein as “semblance” (as contrasted to reality and without any deception involved), the 
Hegelian concept of Schein as “shine” (not fully manifest essence) and the Hegelian concept of Erscheinung as 
“appearance” (fully manifest essence). In the field of aesthetics, Schein retains the sense of “illusion” for Kant 
and of “semblance” for Schiller, while Hegel emphasizes different aspects of Schein in his aesthetics, according 
to Inwood—the connection of the word “Schein” to the word “schön” (beautiful) and its distinction from 
deception.      
58 GS, vol. 6, p. 385 and p. 386, or Negative Dialectics, p. 393. 
59 The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant establishes both “Schein” and “Illusion” as “illusion,” 
but “Blendwerk” as “semblance.” See the glossary to Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. 
Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 757-774, s.vv. 
“Blendwerk,” “Schein,” “illusion.” NB: the pagination given here and throughout, with “A” and “B” editions 
noted, corresponds to the Academy of Sciences edition of Kant’s works (Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: 
G. Reimer/ W. de Gruyter, 1902-) and appears in the margins of Guyer and Wood’s translation).	  
60	  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A298/B354.	  
61 Schiller, Werke und Briefe, vol. 8, p. 662n as translated, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, p. 126. 
62 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5:323. The pagination given here and throughout corresponds to 
the Academy of Sciences edition of Kant’s works (Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: G. Reimer/ W. de 
Gruyter, 1902-), and appears in the margins of Guyer and Matthews’s translation. 
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Kant. The redemption of illusion is not a task that can be accomplished by Hegelian, 
“positive” dialectics. For Adorno, art is an empty placeholder for a better world, for the world 
which does not yet exist, precisely because it maintains its dialectic of illusion rather than 
resolving its contradictions in appearance (Erscheinung): “The ineffableness of illusion 
[Illusion] stops it settling the antinomy of aesthetic illusion [Schein] in a concept of absolute 
appearance [Erscheinung].”63 Art’s suspension of the antinomy of illusion, its denial of claims 
to reveal or to manifest the world to come, is closely connected to the redemption of illusion: 
the not-yet-existing redeemed world is not ideology in art because artworks take a critical, 
suspended, unresolved position on it. The connection between redemption and illusion is well 
expressed by “Schein,” which joins the notion of speciousness to the shine of light. While 
“illusion” does not evoke the light of redemption like “shine” does, it indicates the similarity 
of Adorno’s and Kant’s positions on what we can know of the world beyond. Adorno makes 
active use of the double meaning of “Schein”: his imagery and metaphors of light are not 
decorative, but, like the illuminations in illuminated manuscripts, function as mnemonics. 
They evoke the other sense of Schein indirectly, so that, even in some of his most 
transcendental and metaphysical moments, Adorno quietly recalls this world and its 
illusions.64 By the same token, Schein, employed to mean “illusion,” is also a tacit reminder of 
the light of redemption, of the end resolution of all contradictions in a better world that does 
not yet exist and which may never exist.65  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 GS, vol. 7, p. 159, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 103. 
64 Consider, for example, “Knowledge has no light but that shed on the world by redemption: all else is 
reconstruction, mere technique.” GS, vol. 4, p. 283 §153 as translated, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a 
Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: Verso, 2005), p. 247. 
65 Adorno sees something Hitlerian in neo-ontology’s “revolt,” which prefers what is worse to the illusion of 
what would be better: “And this is what the up-to-date philosophies are glad to toil for. The tragic Hitlerian pose 
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 If Schein sounds old today, it is not because it evokes the German Idealism of 
Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel. It is because the ideology critique with which it is 
associated has fallen out of practice. Ideology critique characterizes the work of the Frankfurt 
School represented by Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Leo Löwenthal, Walter 
Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm.66 But in the 1970s, critical theory shifted away 
from its social task.67 With the publication of Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (The 
Theory of Communicative Action) in 1981, Jürgen Habermas redirected critical theory away 
from ideology critique towards a critique of the so-called “steering media,” power and 
money.68 In other words, the concept of Schein has almost no place in Habermas’s influential 
theory, whereas it is a central to the Critical Theory of Adorno.  
 Jürgen Habermas’s exact reason for abandoning ideology critique is the integration of 
its preferred objects—bourgeois art and philosophy—into “the system”: 
Ironically, however, the critiques of ideology carried out by Horkheimer, Marcuse 
and Adorno confirmed them in the belief that culture was losing its autonomy in post-
liberal societies and was being incorporated into the machinery of the economic-
administrative system. The development of productive forces, and even critical 
thought itself, was moving more and more into a perspective of bleak assimilation to 
their opposites. In the totally administered society only instrumental reason, 
expanded into a totality, found embodiment; everything that existed was transformed 
into a real abstraction.69 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of lonely valor makes them feel already in tune with the dawning order of the most powerful interests.” GS, 
vol. 6, p. 96 as translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 89. 
66 On the Frankfurt School, see Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and 
the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) and Rolf 
Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance, trans. Michael Robertson 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994. 
67 See Lambert Zuidervaart, Social Philosophy After Adorno (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
p. 6. For a review of the important literature concerned with a “critical retrieval” of Adorno from Habermasian 
distortions, see esp. ibid., pp. 7-10. 
68 Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, vol. 2, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), p. 549 as translated by Thomas McCarthy, in a version whose 
emendations by Jürgen Habermas has resulted in “minor departures from the original text” (p. 1), The Theory of 
Communicative Action, vol. 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, 3rd corrected ed. 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), p. 374f. 
69 Habermas, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, p. 560f. as translated, Lifeworld and System, p. 382. 
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It does not follow from the increasing co-opting of thought and other productive skills for the 
futile needs of the economy that everything has already been integrated into the totally 
administered society, and that no critical thought is now possible. The total integration of 
society, however, is precisely what is in question.  
 Horkheimer, Marcuse and Adorno may at times lament the dwindling autonomy of art, 
letters and philosophy, but they must be aware that totally independent art, letters and 
philosophy would have no critical hold on society. This is why significant contributions by 
these and other members of the Frankfurt School are critiques of social objects that are well 
integrated into the “machinery” of the economic bureaucracy—objects such as propaganda, 
authority and technology.70 When the Frankfurt School was officially created as The Institute 
for Social Research on February 3, 1923, it was to be a Marxist institute devoted to the 
“radical dissection of bourgeois society.”71 The direction that the research actually took 
suggests that the prospects of critique were perhaps far vaster than Felix Weil had imagined 
when he decided to found the Institute. The particular attention paid by the Frankfurt School to 
the administrated or economic elements of the cultural sphere suggests that, since even a 
presumably autonomous sphere can be determined by administration and the economy, then 
some critique that transpires in this so-called autonomous sphere may also be transferable to 
the administration and the economy. Habermas defines the practice of cultural ideology 
critique very narrowly, and in a way that does not do justice to Adorno’s un-schematic and 
highly spontaneous approach. Certainly Adorno’s music criticism does not conform to a given 
formula, as Habermas suggests when he presents ideology critique as practiced by Marcuse, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 For example, see the essays collected in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, eds., The Essential Frankfurt 
School Reader, introduced by Paul Piccone (New York: Continuum, 1982). 
71 Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, p. 10. 
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Löwenthal, Benjamin and Adorno as having a shared aim: the separation of “the transcendent 
contents of authentic art—whether utopian or critical—from the affirmative, ideologically 
worn-out components of bourgeois ideals.”72 Habermas assumes that, for these critics of 
culture, ideology comes in the form of “bourgeois ideals” each and every time, whereas these 
ideals may be a question in a Frank Wedekind play, but not in a Volksstück (popular or folk 
play). In immanent critique, which is the criticism adequate to testing the claims of totality, the 
criterion is supplied by the object criticized, rather than being something fixed, defined in 
advance, such as “bourgeois ideals,” “money” or “power.” Suspicions that society is totally 
administered are not grounds to abandon ideology critique, but they oblige ideology critique to 
take the form of immanent critique, because total society does not recognize anything outside 
it. Habermas, however, rejects ideology critique altogether on the grounds that it requires “a 
theory of history” in order to be applied to cultural phenomena.73 More specifically, Habermas 
seems to think that it requires Marx’s theory of history. First of all, Habermas bases his claim 
on a reading of early Marcuse, rather than on the work of the mature Adorno—a better 
indication of the level to which ideology critique had attained. Adorno is not interested in 
determining and naming exactly what is objectively possible in a historical situation, but rather 
in negating the claims of the epoch to be closed and total. The social totality claims to have 
everything, including a theory of history, and this is a problem. Adorno for his part rejects the 
historical determinism that Habermas seems to impute to Critical Theory. Habermas is right to 
conclude from Marcuse’s statement on critical practice—that the process of critical theory is 
one of “bringing to consciousness potentialities that have emerged within the maturing 
historical situation itself”—that “critique would be delivered up to the reigning standards in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Habermas, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, p. 559 as translated, Lifeworld and System, p. 381.  
73 Habermas, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, p. 560 as translated, Lifeworld and System, p. 382.  
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any given historical epoch.”74 A potentiality that has emerged is just actuality, which meets 
with the “reigning standards,” whereas critique implies negation of the reigning standards. 
Habermas’s critique of Marcuse is valid, but it cannot be generalized into a critique of the 
ideology critique of the Frankfurt School. Furthermore, Habermas makes a criticism of 
Marcuse that can be turned back on his own theory of communicative action, which is 
supposed to find its critical effectiveness in the “potential for rationality” in speech. But if “the 
potentiality for rationality found in the validity basis of speech” is a potentiality that has 
emerged, it is just actuality, and it is up to the “reigning standards” that exist.75 One might ask, 
then, in what sense the theory of communicative action is critical. If it is a potentiality that has 
not emerged, then the rationality that Habermas claims for existing speech is not real. If this 
potential for reason is intermittently “activated,” it is not the validity basis of everyday speech 
in general, but some other kind of validity basis that serves as the critical deterrent to what he 
calls “colonization of the lifeworld.” For, according to Habermas, domination no longer has an 
ideological cloak, but takes the form of open colonization: 
In place of “false consciousness” we today have a “fragmented consciousness” that 
blocks enlightenment by the mechanism of reification. It is only with this that the 
conditions for a colonization of the lifeworld are met. When stripped of their 
ideological veils, the imperatives of autonomous subsystems make their way into the 
lifeworld from the outside—like colonial masters coming into a tribal society—and 
force a process of assimilation upon it.76 
 
In other words, money and power openly interfere in subjects’ life practices for reaching an 
understanding. Communication, however, represents a hope against such colonization because 
the replacement of communication by power and money does not necessarily result in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Habermas, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, p. 560 as translated, Lifeworld and System, p. 382. 
75 Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, vol. 1, Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche 
Rationalisierung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), p. 455 as translated by Thomas McCarthy, The Theory 
of Communicative Action, vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p. 339.  
76 Habermas, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, p. 522 as translated, Lifeworld and System, p. 355. 
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reification.77 As the transformation of understanding into power and money does not 
necessarily concern a theory of value, Habermas argues, another theory is needed to account 
for it—i.e. the theory of communicative action. Such a transformation, however, would be an 
insufficient reason for rejecting ideology critique. On one hand, money does indeed concern 
value, so a theory of value would be useful in explaining the assimilation of understanding to 
power and money, in, say, the distortion of scientific research by the interests of corporations 
who have invested in it; on the other hand, ideology critique concerns more than just value. 
Understood as “socially necessary illusion,” ideology is obviously not limited to value: 
illusion can take many forms. By at least the 1960s, Adorno was aware that disenchanted, 
jaded society was not apt to adopt any sort of identifiable worldview (communism, fascism, 
syndicalism) en masse. But he did not thereby conclude that ideology had reached its end; 
ideology, as he understands it, survives this change because “ideology is not superimposed as 
a detachable layer on the being of society; it is inherent in that being.”78 Adorno goes on to 
argue that the “disregard for living human beings”79 necessary for exchange (which is 
supposed to serve life processes) necessarily implies “social illusion [gesellschaftlichen 
Schein]”80 within the life-process itself. The idea that the lifeworld is just the lifeworld and 
that all incursions into it are too obvious to be called “ideological” is based on the definition of 
ideology as a worldview that veils reality. Adorno is arguing that, in fact, social reality is 
inherently ideological because its sheer existence is also the claim to legitimacy, the claim to 
the right to existence and the pretense of being “natural”—when in fact social reality is a 
“second nature” that is in the historical process of usurping original nature, leaving no place 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Habermas, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, p. 549 as translated, Lifeworld and System, p. 375. 
78 GS, vol. 6, p. 348 as translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 354. 
79 GS, vol. 6, p. 348 as translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 354. 
80 GS, vol. 6, p. 348, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 355. 
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that is free of human intervention, while returning civilization to a state of nature.81 In this 
context, where ideology is indeterminate and reality also contains its self-legitimation, 
ideology critique must in a sense find its object before it can criticize it. Habermas’s claim 
above that “fragmented consciousness” has replaced “false consciousness” is not a convincing 
reason for abandoning ideology critique. Certainly fragmented consciousness does not 
preclude false consciousness, but it is only ideology critique that puts us in a position to make 
a claim such as Habermas’s. While resistance to scientific debate and to the sharing of 
perspectives and expertise is a problem for knowledge today, as increasingly the money and 
power of top researchers seem to grant them not only immunity from critique but also 
dispensation from service to the non-paying general public, the nonetheless important 
dimension of education that Habermas underlines—coming to an understanding—is not the 
same thing as truth. 
 Adorno’s claim that “the need to have suffering speak eloquently is condition of all 
truth” implies that truth exceeds the bounds of current speech.82 The suffering subject gains 
emancipation from the society that continues to wrong it when a language of its own is found 
for its suffering—not when the subject itself converts its suffering into the current terms of 
social communication, as a theory such as Habermas’s suggests it would. In Mother Courage 
and her Children, the odds are stacked against the mute: the mute Kattrin’s drumming is 
answered by musket fire. The truly mute have neither the power of speech nor sign language; 
the mute suffer because no one hears them, not because they cannot speak. Or, rather, as 
Brecht suggests in Mother Courage and her Children, the hearing is selective: the village 
hears and adequately interprets Kattrin’s drumming, which is in their interests, but not the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 GS, vol. 6, p. 351 as translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 357. 
82 GS, vol. 6, p. 29, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 17f. 
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“jämmerliche Laute” (pitiful sounds) and crying that she in fact produces when her own 
livelihood and life alone are in danger.83 The interest in expressing suffering is not “reaching 
an understanding”; it is: to end suffering. It seems that the objective conditions that caused the 
suffering in the first place would stand a better chance of dissolving if the suffering were 
conveyed in conventional, purely conceptual terms. But society further wrongs those it has 
wronged in demanding that their language production remain purely within current forms of 
understandability. Philosophy, according to Adorno, has a duty not to make suffering merely 
thematic, but to express objective suffering: a “duty to make a production [Darstellung]” or to 
deliver what it has to convey.84 To free itself, philosophy puts its unfreedom into a form of its 
own; for thinking distinguishes itself in its “resistance toward what is imposed on it.”85 
Expressing suffering by way of Darstellung—where a showing or production of the thought is 
put on—gets around society’s repressive censure of emotional outbursts, but it also raises the 
bar for interpreters; presentation is not conventionally considered to be the evidence of 
suffering or the precipitate of what was lived through.86 Consequently, hope for a “right and 
just reality” lies “only in traces and ruins”—in the clues that accidentally escape the cool, 
harmonized totality that bans painful feelings.87  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Bertolt Brecht, Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder, in Werke, hrsg. von Werner Hecht et al., Große kommentierte 
Berliner und Frankfurter Ausgabe, 30 Bde. (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988-2000), 
vol. 6, pp. 7-86, here p. 83.  
84 GS, vol. 6, p. 29, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 18. 
85 GS, vol. 6, p. 30, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 19. 
86 Shierry Weber Nicholsen is one of the few interpreters to consider seriously both what Adorno says in 
language and what he does with language. Her thesis—that, in Adorno’s work, these never detach from one 
another—is beautifully argued and robustly demonstrated; yet, for his language really to be up to his philosophy 
of language, what Adorno does in language would actually have to be more than what he can say. What imposed 
itself on Adorno (and all others in his time) with the force of taboo should nonetheless be readable nowhere else 
but in what he does in language alone. See Exact Imagination, Late Work: On Adorno’s Aesthetics (Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 1997).  
87 GS, vol. 1, p. 325, or prefer to my translation here that of Benjamin Snow [?], “The Actuality of Philosophy,” 
Telos, no. 31 (Spring 1977), pp. 120-133, on p. 120.  
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  Certain changes to bourgeois society—“‘green’ problems,”88 “excessive 
complexity”89 and the “neoconservative defence of postmodernity”90—have not rendered 
Adorno’s theory of ideology critique useless. Habermas wishes to analyze contemporary 
conflicts in society in terms of resistance against the “colonization of the lifeworld,” rather 
than to determine and to dissolve the illusion that is turning out the antinomies.91 Yet it is 
thanks largely to ideology critique that the most successful of the protest movements credited 
by Habermas,92 the feminist movement, has been able to make its advances—not due to an 
emphatic concept of life.93 It is difficult to imagine in what way the concept of the lifeworld 
would explain the struggles and successes of the feminist movement, which in many respects 
wanted to dissociate the concept of woman from notions of carrying, giving, nurturing and 
sustaining life. Good Marxian categories such as division of labour, wages, slavery, property 
and working-hours, as well as the schoolbook sociological terms to denote the degrees of 
delusional thinking about groups—stereotype, prejudice and discrimination—, can take much 
more credit for women’s gradual emancipation than the concept of lifeworld.94  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Habermas, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, p. 579 as translated, Lifeworld and System, p. 394. 
89 Habermas, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, p. 580 as translated, Lifeworld and System, p. 394. 
90 Habermas, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, p. 583 as translated, Lifeworld and System, p. 396. 
91 Habermas, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, p. 579 as translated, Lifeworld and System, p. 394. 
92 Habermas, Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft, p. 578 as translated, Lifeworld and System, p. 393f. 
93 Although some feminisms have recourse to an emphatic concept of life, such a concept did not obstruct the 
legalization and accessibility of abortion in advanced countries, for example.  
94 The concept of androcentrism is relevant in explaining the great success of the “generation of Adorno’s sons” 
(as Elisabeth Lenk put it), compared to the relative obscurity of his student Regina Becker-Schmidt, who, in not 
only unfolding classic sociological categories such as work and equality but also pressing into service 
Adornonian concepts such as non-contemporaneousness and identifying thinking, asks overtly whether women’s 
integration into the economy is really in their best interests— thus presenting a much more articulate, pointed, 
objective, recognizable and critical analysis of contemporary society than does Habermas. Elisabeth Lenk, “La 
catégorie de la féminité chez Adorno: Une contradiction secondaire qui a survécu à la contradiction principale,” 
trans. Nicole Gabriel, in “Adorno critique de la domination: Une lecture féministe,” edited by Sonia Dayan-
Herzbrun, Nicole Gabriel and Eleni Varikas, themed issue, Tumultes, no 23 (novembre 2004): pp. 11-27, here 
p. 15; Regina Becker-Schmidt, “Critical Theory as a Critique of Society: Theodor W. Adorno’s Significance for a 
Feminist Sociology,” in Adorno: Culture and Feminism, ed. Maggie O’Neill (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 
pp. 104-118.    
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 Today it seems necessary to construct and to deploy a robust concept of life in order to 
defend the environmental cause. In fact, the use of an emphatic concept of life to guide 
cultural and intellectual practice is part of so-called green problems—or, what might be better 
called the outstripping of natural resources when a quality of life, growth, is projected onto 
non-life, capital.  
 The regressive current of thinking of the high bourgeois period held up life-forms as 
models for cultural and intellectual forms: organicism. In particular, it was the integrity of 
organisms growing harmoniously and proportionately toward an encompassing goal—to 
which all parts were subordinated—that characterized the “organic” work. But when natural 
form must serve as the standard for made things, a kind of necessary illusion must inevitably 
result: “Art acquired the ‘semblance,’ ‘appearance’ or ‘illusion’ (Schein) of nature (this 
applies particularly to the music of the Austro-German tradition, with its strong emphasis on 
‘organicism’).”95 
  Yet organic form served as the model not only in art, but also in philosophy, for at 
least two hundred years. The idea of organicism is clearly expressed by Benedetto Croce, 
interpreting Hegel: “As empirical concepts are distinguished into classes and subclasses, so 
the philosophical concept possesses its particular forms, of which it is not the mechanical 
aggregate, but the organic whole, in which every form unites itself intimately with the others 
and with the whole.”96 But it was Marx who unriddled the puzzling craze for organic wholes. 
Marx’s main argument was that the system of capital works because it demands and creates 
insensitivity to the life congealed in every commodity; yet, in borrowing Hegel’s organic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Max Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 57. 
96 Benedetto Croce, What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, trans. Douglas Ainslie 
(London: Macmillan, 1915), p. 9. 
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structure of The Science of Logic for his own work, Marx showed the form that mimicked the 
living organism to be the mere appearance of the whole capitalist system itself—or, more 
precisely, of its present stage.97 One inference to draw from the organic form of capital 
claimed by Marx is that mere appearances of organic unity in the cultural, intellectual sphere 
are not driven by intellectual demands, but have to do with economic imperatives. This is 
consistent with how our North American Stó:lō culture might view the “living/nonliving” 
distinction.98 The idea that plants, animals and people are animate, while minerals and all that 
has been crafted, manufactured or otherwise developed skilfully are inanimate looks to be a 
product of socially forced, anonymous labour, because this way of dividing up the world does 
not belong to this philosophical tradition developed here in North America before capitalism 
and its colonialism.99 It is not a question of adopting North American ontologies in the present 
work. Since the European way of thinking does not necessarily even recognize North 
American categories, we have no choice but to use theirs—yet we may do so to show that the 
system in which the categories of European philosophy fit is unsustainable on its own terms. 
Organicism makes contradictory demands: on one hand, it demands that a distinction between 
animate and inanimate be recognized; on the other hand, it demands that cultural objects 
falling under the defined category “inanimate” be given the appearance of the “animate,” and 
this, according to specific distinctions. This is why the current system does not consider life, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 As Adorno glosses Marx: “Decisive here, in the present stage, is the category of the organic composition of 
capital” (GS, vol. 4, p. 261 §147 as translated, Minima Moralia, p. 229). 
98 See Deanna Reder, “A Complex Web of Relations that Extend Beyond the Human: A Reply to Chung-ying 
Cheng,” Contours, no. 3 (Fall 2012), http://www.sfu.ca/humanities-institute/?p=1651. 
99 Cf. J. M. Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
According to Bernstein, “the living/nonliving distinction is necessary to even begin making the kinds of 
discriminations necessary for ethical life” (ibid., p. 194). Perhaps without realizing it, in making ethical life 
dependent upon the living/non-living distinction, Bernstein excludes from ethical practice those peoples whose 
“ontological categories defy Western classification systems based on animate and inanimate binary groupings,” 
as Deanna Reder attests for the Stó:lō. Reder, “A Complex Web of Relations,”  
http://www.sfu.ca/humanities-institute/?p=1651. 
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and is structured in such a way that the life in it is necessarily distorted beyond recognition. 
There is no reason to think that what is living can be unproblematically discerned, affirmed 
and rescued for reason, ethics or aesthetics.100 So there can be no question here, as Benedetto 
Croce proposed for Hegel’s thought, of actually separating out what is living, “of sifting the 
intimate and vital elements…from the extrinsic and dead.”101 The demand that the cultural 
beneficiaries of deadening forced labour make their products lifelike is a social contradiction 
and a necessary, real illusion. This is why Adorno is able to make the paradoxical claim that 
“only death is an image of undistorted life”102 in the first part of Minima Moralia, which, 
incidentally, bears as its epigraph the words of the exiled writer Ferdinand Kürnberger: “Life 
does not live.”103  
 The illusion of independence and naturalness that characterizes the bourgeois work of 
art and even works of philosophy also characterizes the commodity. It is even how the 
commodity is able to go on existing, despite the damage that its universalization inflicts on 
workers, human and animal, and on the environment. In the argument that forms this thesis, I 
will show in detail why the conception of the artwork, cultural work or product as an organic 
totality is false—no matter whether it occurs in art, philosophy or everyday life. This is not 
merely an argument against capitalism, but against a false way of thinking that is a pillar of 
capitalism and whose catastrophic consequences are not only economic.     	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Bernstein is wrong to assert that “the living/nonliving distinction is for Adorno not only antecedent to the 
distinction between consciousness and being, but that for adequate conceptions of knowledge, rationality and 
normativity the living/nonliving distinction is the fundamental one” (Bernstein, Adorno, p. 194). Adorno claims 
rather that it is the lack of distinction between life and non-life—i.e., in the pseudo-life that constitutes the sphere 
of consumption—that is antecedent to “the consciousness and unconsciousness of individuals” (GS, vol. 4, p. 13 
as translated, Minima Moralia, p. 15). Adorno’s conceptions of knowledge and rationality are not based on the 
living/nonliving distinction because he judges that “our perspective of life has passed into an ideology which 
conceals the fact that there is life no longer” (GS, vol. 4, p. 13 as translated, Minima Moralia, p. 15). 
101 Croce, What Is Living and What Is Dead, p. 215. 
102 GS, vol. 4, p. 87 §48 as translated, Minima Moralia, p. 78. 
103 GS, vol. 4, p. 20 as translated, Minima Moralia, p. 19. 
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 The following is a story about a few of the Modern people and works opposing the 
organicist tendency. Claimed here is not that Modern artists and the theorists who wrote on 
them somehow possessed an uncanny ability to see beyond the system to the life that it 
disguised. Rather, even working within the system, they refused to apply the organicist 
standard for works in European culture—that of a harmonized, resolved whole with no part 
missing, defective or insubordinate.104 Much of the Modern art examined here is music, since 
this was the field in which Adorno excelled. It is not clear to what extent his aesthetic theory 
takes into consideration the advances made in other arts. The works considered here were 
made in European centres where socially necessary illusion reigns supreme. 
 This work is also a critique of Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde, which is 
perhaps the most serious response to Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory.105 I draw on Bürger’s 
categories, but argue that his theory is not as advanced as that of Adorno.  
 Bürger does not sufficiently account for the negative side of Schein, by which art is not 
only self-critical, but also critical of reality, which claims to be what it is. Adorno has adopted 
these aspects from Friedrich Schiller in order to relate Schein to truth. The motivation for the 
critique lodged in this dissertation is to invalidate the post-modernism, looming around Theory 
of the Avant-Garde, that has given up on truth. Nothing could be less acceptable to post-
modernists today than to claim that a particular work is wrong and false, and post-modernism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 The thesis defended in this dissertation is that Adorno’s response to the social necessity of apparent life is the 
determinate negation of organicism, not a middle way between the animate and inanimate, as Bernstein claims: 
“Adorno’s philosophical project is to resurrect a legitimate anthropomorphism, an anthropomorphic nature that is 
somewhere between the mythic extremes of myth ‘which compounds the inanimate with the animate,’ and 
enlightenment, ‘which compounds the animate with the inanimate’” (Bernstein, Disenchantment and Ethics, p. 
196f.). Bernstein quotes from the John Cumming translation of Dialektik der Aufklärung, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment (New York: Seabury Press, 1972), p. 16. 
105 Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, mit einem Nachwort zur 2. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1980), translated by Michael Shaw as Theory of the Avant-Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 
1984. Please note that only chapters 1-4 of Theorie der Avantgarde are translated in Theory of the Avant-Garde 
(as chapters 2-5). 
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is now the norm in art. To degrade truth in art to mere “truthfulness” (Habermas) or to permit 
art no more than a “truth potential” (Wellmer) denies that artworks, despite their protestations, 
are bound up in society, and that through the memories that they evoke, artworks have a social 
effect. Artworks are concrete results of positions taken on social reality. A critique of 
organicism in 1928 is true whether it comes in the form of a discursive text or a song. Even 
within the society that was narrowing into totalitarianism, critical men and women did not just 
wade about in a state of delusion, but analyzed what defined the delusional context, and so 
determined that the illusion of organic unity was a particular persuasive force in it, yet 
determined it to be, at the same time, essentially nothing. 
 On the assumption that there is no truth without illusion, we start out with illusion. 
 The work comprises seven chapters. 
 Chapter I engages a dialectic of viewpoints to show how different dialectical 
thinkers—Marx, Lukács, Hegel, Horkheimer and Adorno—have contributed to a criterion of 
truth that works within the total delusional context of reification: the determinacy of the 
dissolution of illusion.  
 By way of an analysis of parts of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, Chapter II 
distinguishes the concept of artistic illusion as reversible—opposed to the merely social 
illusion of mechanical musical reproduction and the culture industry. 
 Chapter III examines the question as to whether truth in philosophy is a different kind 
of truth than truth in art. This is a persistent question in the secondary literature on Adorno, 
and a great cause for misunderstanding. A common view is that art is “mimetic” or “non-
reified,” while discourse is reified and conceptual. A close reading of the paragraph in 
Aesthetic Theory specifically treating the relation of art and philosophy shows a historical shift 
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from a relation based on shared truth content to a relation based on a shared language-
character. 
 Chapter IV considers whether truth in twentieth-century Expressionism is a new truth 
based on immediate expression; however, a precedent for Expressionism in Robert 
Schumann’s “Der Dichter spricht” (The Poet Speaks) suggests that the Expressionism of 
Arnold Schoenberg, Anton Webern and Alban Berg is mediated, and not the irrationalist 
movement that it seems. 
 Chapter V considers whether inorganic montage is more advanced than 
Expressionism, and why. This chapter first examines an alternative reading of Modernism—
that of Walter Benjamin, for whom shock is the decisive element in Modernism in general and 
in montage in particular. This reading is interesting because at a certain point in Negative 
Dialectics, Adorno seems almost to claim shock for the philosophical truth experience. As a 
characterization of Modernism, however, shock is problematic because it is unspecific, as 
Peter Bürger points out. Furthermore, Adorno seems to mean something different by it than 
does Benjamin: an indication of the real Possible. This concept is developed with reference to 
Ernst Bloch. It is put forth that shock, in itself neither advanced nor regressive, can be a 
reaction to a specific type of work: the non-organic work.  
 The thesis defended throughout is that anti-organicity in works is advanced in light of 
the false reality that organicity had definitely become by 1930 in Germany.  
 Chapter VI takes up a parting suggestion of Peter Bürger: to consider the artwork after 
Dada and Surrealism on the model of “prose” in Hegel’s aesthetics. Bürger claims historical 
specificity for his theory; however, the poetry of both Eduard Mörike and Paul Celan can be 
conceived as anti-poetry—determinate negations of the poetic Ideal that Schiller and Hegel 
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characterize by concepts such as play, illusion and meaning. Montage is not specific to the 
twentieth-century art-historical period known as Modernism, as revealed by an analysis of 
Mörike’s poem “Auf eine Lampe” (On a Lamp). I compare Mahler’s critique of convention in 
his ironic play of forms to the “play” in Schoenberg’s twelve-tone technique.  
 Chapter VII pursues the idea that Dichterliebe, op. 48, (1840) by Robert Schumann is a 
true artwork. It is itself divided into seven sections. Section i of VII establishes Dichterliebe as 
a Romantic artwork. Section ii of VII discusses the expression of Dichterliebe. Section iii of 
VII examines the song-cycle form. Section iv of VII looks at the unity debate on Dichterliebe. 
Section v of VII explores the themes of the folk song and the Volk. Section vi of VII is 
dedicated to exposing the contradictions of tonality, with a detailed analysis of Lied I in a 
hidden key. Section vii of VII is a narrative, song-by-song interpretation of Dichterliebe, 
which I read as a history of reification.  
 Schumann’s musical advances have too long been taken for symptoms of a chronic 
mood disorder or the sighs of a fiancé. But not only did he bring the contradictions of tonality 
to their extreme expression; he also pointed the way out of them. Judged by Hegel’s 
aesthetics, this song cycle fits the description of a Romantic art form: it is ironic and 
disunified. Yet in many respects it is a Modern work, which regards all traditions, styles, 
techniques, forms and materials as co-existing on the same level, awaiting judgement. 
Dichterliebe is a critical reading of its own—of art, events, ideas and historical processes. It 
achieves the new. Yet it is true to illusion.               
 Much is left out of this story. The goal, however, is not to provide an exhaustive 
explanation of what makes a work advanced or even to present the most advanced artworks of 
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today. The idea is to negate such notions as “historical avant-garde” by breaking certain works 
out of strict historical periodization, to show them to be “more” than they are. 
{Chapter I} Theodor W. Adorno was not the first to employ the term “ästhetischer Schein” 
(aesthetic illusion). 
 The concept has an important precedent in the twenty-sixth letter of Friedrich 
Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters.1 There, Schiller opposes 
“Schein” to “Realität”— appearance as opposed to reality: “The reality of the thing is the 
work [Werk] of that thing; the appearance of the thing is the work of human beings, and a soul 
that revels in appearance delights no longer in whatever greets it, but rather in what it makes.”2 
On the face of it, this distinction is grossly counter-intuitive. The deed or work of an inanimate 
object would, to the usual understanding, be its appearance, whereas its reality would be the 
human labour that goes on behind the scenes. This double aspect of things is likely what drew 
the thinkers of the Enlightenment to the theme of automata: automata are non-living things 
that appear to work by themselves, when in reality they are the work of human beings. 
Schiller, however, wishes to argue that the fascination with automata and other appearances is 
itself essentially human: humanity distinguishes itself from savagery through its “pleasure in 
illusion [Schein], the tendency toward finery and play.”3 Considering, however, the inhumane 
conditions in which modern automata are produced, the question is rather whether delight in 
appearances, dress-up and play has become a sign not of humanity, but rather of savagery. The 
                                                
1 Friedrich Schiller, Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, in Werke und 
Briefe in zwölf Bänden, herausgegeben von Otto Dann, et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 
1988-2004), vol. 8, pp. 556-676, translated by Reginald Snell as On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of 
Letters (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1965). Note that Snell does not preserve the gender-neutral language of the 
title in German.  
2 Schiller, Werke und Brief, vol. 8, p. 661, or prefer to my translation here On the Aesthetic Education of Man, p. 
125. I follow Snell in translating “Schein” as “appearance” here because the meaning of “Schein” that Schiller is 
picking out is that of appearance as opposed to reality. Schein does not imply deception for Schiller. As a rule, I 
do not translate “Schein” as “appearance,” in order to avoid confusion with the concept of Erscheinung—
“appearance” in the sense of “manifestation” or “act of appearing.” 
3 Schiller, Werke und Brief, vol. 8, p. 661, or prefer to my translation here, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, 
p. 125. See note 2 above. 
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question is whether the concept of Schein is anything other than the repressive Idealism, 
European chauvinism, imperialist culture and empty glorification of settled, bourgeois 
autonomy in which it is steeped.  
 While Schiller defines appearance (Schein) against reality (Realität), ästhetischer 
Schein is “honest” and “independent”—“aufrichtig” and “selbstständig”—: refusing any 
comparison with reality, aesthetic Schein is not appearance, but pure appearance.4 
Ästhetischer Schein as pure appearance differs from plain appearance in that it “expressly 
renounces all claims to be reality.”5 But while ästhetischer Schein is the essence of all fine art, 
according to Schiller,6 it is not specific to fine art, nor is fine art reducible to aesthetic 
appearance, although the relation between aesthetic appearance and life is asymmetrical: “But 
admittedly it requires an incomparably higher degree of fine cultivation to experience only the 
pure appearance alone in the living being than to deprive appearance of life.”7 
 Although it is rarely mentioned, Karl Marx, like Schiller, noticed that ästhetischer 
Schein extended beyond the artistic realm. In a way, Marx demonstrated his “incomparably 
higher degree of fine cultivation” when, in the introduction to the manuscript of 1857-1858, 
the “Grundrisse,” he noted that within economic theory there persisted an “aesthetic illusion” 
that had begun its life as a fable—“the aesthetic illusion [der ästhetische Schein] of the small 
and big Robinsonades.”8 For Marx, “Schein” here has a pejorative sense: it is not mere 
                                                
4 Schiller, Werke und Brief, vol. 8, p. 664, or prefer to my translations here On the Aesthetic Education of Man, p. 
128. See note 2 above. 
5 Schiller, Werke und Brief, vol. 8, p. 664, or prefer to my translations here On the Aesthetic Education of Man, p. 
128. See note 2 above. 
6 Ibid., vol. 8, p. 662 Anmerkung 19 or prefer On the Aesthetic Education of Man, p. 126. 
7 Schiller, Werke und Brief, vol. 8, p. 664, or prefer to my translations here On the Aesthetic Education of Man, p. 
128f. See note 2 above. 
8 Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Berlin: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1953), p. 5 as 
translated by Ernst Wangermann, “Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58 (First Version of Capital),” in Marx and 
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semblance (an outward appearance that can be true or false), but rather a spurious 
appearance—illusion. The aesthetic illusion with which Marx reproaches the economists 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo is not honest and independent illusion, but rather the illusion 
of honesty and independence. This is manifest in their choice of starting point. They begin 
with some such isolated, independent, natural man, the hunter or the fisher, who is supposed to 
build up a society gradually around himself. Marx suggests that the isolated man forced to 
reproduce life all on his own, will be the result of civil-bourgeois society; the lonely human 
economic unit is not an original first existing prior to society. The works of writers such as 
Daniel Defoe should be read as allegories of the bourgeois society in store—as results of the 
process of breaking up feudal ties, not as mythological explanations of origins for the present. 
In the novel Robinson Crusoe, what will be the result of the historical process of transition 
into bourgeois society seems to be frozen nature. This is aesthetic illusion in the Marxian 
sense. Marx accuses Smith and Ricardo of having imported this aesthetic illusion into their 
economic theories:9 the endpoint of the civil-bourgeois society appears in their work as if it 
were static nature.10 Yet in Smith and Ricardo, the naturalness of isolated man who fends for 
                                                                                                                                                    
Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, 50 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1975-2004), vol. 28, p. 17. 
Note this important precedent for the translation “aesthetic illusion” for “ästhetischer Schein.” 
9 Accusing Smith and Ricardo of having imported aesthetic illusion into theory, Marx is in essence accusing 
them of exploiting the “art of persuasion,” as Kant defined it: “Rhetoric, insofar as by that is understood the art of 
persuasion, i.e., of deceiving by means of beautiful illusion (as an ars oratoria), and not merely skill in speaking 
(eloquence and style), is a dialectic, which borrows from the art of poetry only as much as is necessary to win 
minds over to the advantage of the speaker before they can judge and to rob them of their freedom; thus it cannot 
be recommended either for the courtroom or the pulpit.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. 
Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5:327. The 
pagination given here and throughout corresponds to the Academy of Sciences edition of Kant’s works (Kant’s 
Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: G. Reimer/ W. de Gruyter, 1902-) and appears in the margins of Guyer and 
Matthews’s translation.   
10 In the last section of what could well be considered the foundational text in philosophical fictionalism, The 
Philosophy of “As If”, Hans Vaihinger looks at illusion in the thought of Nietzsche, tracing the development of 
the concept in distinct stages. Vaihinger reads “Schein” in The Birth of Tragedy as a historical precedent for his 
own philosophy of fictionalism, offering as evidence Nietzsche’s repeated use of the “as-if” construction in 
connection with Schein, which, he shows, Nietzsche uses as a synonym for “Illusion.” Hans Vaihinger, Die 
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himself does not give itself to be an illusion, renouncing all claims to reality, as it does in art; 
it gives itself to be truth. 
  Karl Marx uses the term “ästhetischer Schein” pejoratively, to denote the incursion of 
the artistic fiction of naturalness into the economic theory of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. 
Adorno, writing about a century later, holds that such aesthetic illusion, which takes historical 
endpoints for eternal nature, has become a structural delusion: the “universal delusion-context 
of reification.” In the meantime, aesthetic illusion changes its quality. It takes on the character 
of having escaped from the delusion that everywhere prevails: 
Artworks’ illusion of being in themselves [Ansichseins], their illusory character, 
rejects the fact that, in the totality of their subjectively mediated existence, they 
partake in the universal delusional context of reification; that they, as Marx would 
say, necessarily reflect a relation of living labour as if it were objective 
[gegenständlich].11 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Philosophie des Als Ob: System der theoretischen, praktischen und religiösen Fiktionen der Menschheit auf 
Grund eines idealistischen Positivismus, Mit einem Anhang über Kant und Nietzsche, siebente und achte Auflage 
(Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1922), p. 773.  
 Like Nietzsche, Adorno uses the As-If construction in relation to art: “Artworks make their way out of 
the empirical world and produce a world contrary to it, of a separate essence, so as if this one too were an 
existent.” GS, vol. 7, p. 10, or prefer to my translation here that of Robert Hullot-Kentor, Aesthetic Theory, 
ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 1.  
 Yet the “essence” of the art world, its As-If “character,” is a difference in a very odd sense, since 
specific difference still presupposes empirical experience. Artworks are generally opposed to empirical 
experience: “Artworks’ difference from empirical experience [Empirie], their illusory character 
[Scheincharakter], is constituted upon empirical experience and in the tendency against it” (GS, vol. 7, p. 158, or 
prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 103). In a further passage, Adorno argues against shock or other 
subjective reactions being constitutive of art precisely because they are lived and therefore not fiction: “But also 
because what one calls ‘lived aesthetic moments’ [ästhetische Erlebnisse] is, as a lived moment, psychologically 
real, it would be difficult to make anything out of such things if one transferred the illusory character 
[Scheincharakter] of art onto them. Lived moments are not As If” (GS, vol. 7, p. 364, or prefer to my translation 
here Aesthetic Theory, p. 245). Adorno indicates that art’s illusory character is a new development in art-alien 
bourgeois society (GS, vol. 7, p. 350, or Aesthetic Theory, p. 235) and that the dodecaphonic revolt against 
illusion was specifically directed against “fictional developments,” suggesting that New Music is a suppression of 
Schein-as-fiction and not of aesthetic Schein per se (GS, vol. 7, p. 154 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 100).  
 For a reading of Schein as fiction, see Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or the Persistence of the 
Dialectic (London: Verso, 2007), pp. 166-170 and p. 173, but esp. p. 167, where Jameson cites the transformation 
of culture into the “culture industry” as a cause of the fictionalization of Schein. For Nietzsche’s influence on 
Adorno, see Karin Bauer, Adorno’s Nietzschean Narratives: Critiques of Ideology, Readings of Wagner (Albany: 
State University of New York Press), 1999; Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the 
Thought of Theodor W. Adorno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978).  
11 GS, vol. 7, p. 252, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 168f.  
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Artworks do not really escape the structural illusion under which all empirical reality is 
organized; they, too, fall under the universal, extra-aesthetic principle that imposes illusion on 
all products of labour. In the statement that artworks “necessarily reflect a relation of living 
labour as if it were thingly” or “objective,” Adorno glosses Marx’s concept of the commodity 
fetish without however naming it: 
The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact 
that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s own labour [den 
Menschen die gesellschaftlichen Charaktere ihrer eignen Arbeit, the social 
characteristics of human beings’ own labour] as objective characteristics of the 
products of labour themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things. Hence it 
also reflects the social relation of the producers to the sum total of labour as a social 
relation between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers. 
Through this substitution, the products of labour become commodities, sensuous 
things which are at the same time suprasensible or social. In the same way, the 
impression made by a thing on the optic nerve is perceived not as a subjective 
excitation of that nerve but as the objective form of a thing outside the eye. In the act 
of seeing, of course, light is really transmitted from one thing, the external object, to 
another thing, the eye. It is a physical relation between physical things. As against this, 
the commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within which it 
appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the commodity and 
the material [dinglich] relations arising out of this. It is nothing but the definite social 
relation between men [Menschen, human beings] themselves which assumes here, for 
them, the fantastic  [phantasmagorische, phantasmagoric] form of a relation between 
things.12 
  
Commodities are made things invested with power in and of themselves. In other words, the 
human source of their power, the power of labour, is abstracted and forgotten. For Marx, 
commodity-fetishes are made things, and this happens to be reflected in their etymology: the 
word “fetish” is derived from the Portuguese “feitiço,” which is ultimately from the Latin 
“facticius,” meaning “made by art, artificial, skilfully contrived.”13 In Du Culte des dieux 
fétiches (On the Worship of Fetish Gods), however, Charles de Brosses gave its etymology 
                                                
12 Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Erster Band, in Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke 
[MEW], 41 vols. (Berlin: Dietz, 1959-68), vol. 23, here vol. 23, p. 86 as translated by Ben Fowkes, except where 
indicated, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, introduced by Ernest Mandel (1976; repr., 
London: Penguin, 1990), p. 164f. 
13 Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “fetish,” accessed January 19, 2014, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/69611. 
 42 
rather as “chose fée, enchantée, divine ou rendant des oracles” (magical, enchanted, divine or 
prophetic thing), and applied the term to any object, whether natural or made, worshipped by 
peoples of vastly different cultures, whom he called “Sauvages” (savages).14 In 1760, “fetish” 
was clearly a term of scorn for the widely diverging sacred practices of non-Europeans, from 
Syria to Gaspésie.15 Like Charles de Brosses, Marx uses the word in disparagement—not 
against non-Europeans, but rather against what he deems the true barbarism, capitalism. 
Nonetheless, the word has retained something of the original vilification by the bourgeoisie of 
those human beings who do not attain to bourgeois “autonomy,” whether women or jazz fans. 
On the other hand, something of Marx’s critique of the commodity is vital to the 
anthropological definition: fetishes “were not idols, since they were not images of gods 
located elsewhere but were deemed potent in themselves.”16 Marx suggests that commodities’ 
potency “in themselves”— or, to speak in the terms that Adorno borrows from Hegel, their 
“illusion of their being in themselves”—would dissolve utterly if the dependence of these 
objects on human labour were revealed and the quality of this labour correctly appreciated.17 
The “in itself’ or “an sich” of the commodity is an illusion because, in denying the human 
labour on which it depends, it can only be a mere partial reality, not the whole, which alone 
would really be the self-identical, independent power that the fetish claims for itself.18 But the 
idea that fetishes claim to be potent in themselves is certainly a European projection of the 
commodity form onto the sacred objects of non-European peoples. In not-yet thoroughly 
                                                
14 Charles de Brosses, Du Culte des dieux fétiches, ou, Parallèle de l’ancienne Religion de l’Egypte avec la 
Religion actuelle de Nigritie, texte revu par Madeleine V.-David (s.l.: Fayard, 1988), p. 15. 
15 Ibid., pp. 29-30 and pp. 38-44. 
16 Wyatt MacGaffey, “Fetish and Fetishism,” in New Encyclopedia of Africa, edited by John Middleton and 
Joseph C. Miller, 5 vols. (Detroit: Thomson/Gale, 2008), vol. 2, pp. 368-370, here p. 368. 
17 GS, vol. 7, p. 252, or prefer to my translations here Aesthetic Theory, p. 168.  
18 According to Charles Taylor, “only the whole is truly an sich in this sense [in the sense of self-contained, not 
dependent on anything outside].” Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 112.  
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capitalized regions of North America, the sacred is not an autonomous “in itself” that hides 
social relations, but quite the opposite: the sacred lights up social relations and obligations, 
and not only those between and towards human beings.19 Furthermore, what Europeans took 
to be non-Europeans’ inability to see things for what they were really worth,20 turns out to be 
Europeans’ own inability to see that value is relative and can by no means be an “in itself”—
what would be called “real worth” or “true value.” Marx suggests that the value of 
commodities cannot be “true” because it necessarily contains a surplus, which is withheld to 
be reinvested into the company so that more of the market may be captured for it. This 
potential for growth, the commodity’s “power,” has nothing to do with the object intrinsically 
on its own, but with the social relations in which it is actually enmeshed: “The power 
attributed to an object…derives from that object’s relationship to human beings, never solely 
from the fetish itself or from its physical components.”21 The social basis of the fetish’s power 
remains hidden from commodity-fetishists, who support the illusion whereby power, or 
“value,” seems to be nothing but the natural property of an object, instead of truly emerging as 
it is—as the result of a social links existing amongst the human beings who have put the object 
together.   
 The illusion that values pertain to “natural” properties of objects enables a 
commodity’s particular ranking within a universe of commodities to pass unquestioned. 
According to Marx, the value of commodities, which is their possibility of being compared to 
one another, comes from socially organized work, delivered in standardized units: “As 
                                                
19 Deanna Reder, “A Complex Web of Relations that Extend Beyond the Human: A Reply to Chung-ying 
Cheng,” Contours, no. 3 (Fall 2012), http://www.sfu.ca/humanities-institute/?p=1651. 
20 “Dutch Protestant merchants extended the term to cover what they saw as an African inability to assess 
material goods at their ‘true’ value.” MacGaffey, “Fetish and Fetishism,” p. 368. 
21 Ibid., p. 370. 
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exchange-values, all commodities are merely definite quantities of congealed labour-time.”22 
Yet what makes commodities comparable actually rests on what is incomparable: not only 
moments of individuals’ lives, but also the qualities of the objects that these individuals 
produce. Furthermore, capitalism has forced a situation whereby no need can be satisfied 
without comparing the “incomparable,” which occurs without fail during the exchange of 
commodities. The very people whose lives are indifferently converted into objects of use 
must, for their own survival, use the lives of others, most certainly worse off than they. The 
limits of affordability define the circles of this hell. Marx’s solution out of it, however, is not 
to adhere philosophically to the impossibility of converting quality into quantity. Rather, he 
distinguishes between “use value” and “exchange value.” For Marx, something counts as a 
commodity only if it is an object of utility and an exchangeable item. Socially organized 
labour is the sole veritable source of exchange value, according to the chapter on commodity 
fetishism, but if the thing produced is to have value at all, then it must have an afterlife beyond 
its existence on the market and actually serve someone as a use value, for “if the thing is 
useless, so is the labour contained in it; the labour does not count as labour, and therefore 
creates no value.”23 On this point, however, Marx enters into contradiction with himself. 
Utility is not decisive for value any longer, for it is rarely clearly identifiable in the post-
scarcity capitalism of fashion, planned obsolescence and gadgets whose functions are so 
specialized that the occasion to use them almost never arises. These seemingly useless 
commodities do manage to eke out values, and so their labour should count as labour. 
However, from another point of view, such commodities are only seemingly useless, for all 
commodities have become useful to the act of exchange itself. Marx elsewhere realized that 
                                                
22 MEW, vol. 23, p. 54 as translated, Capital, p. 130.  
23 MEW, vol. 23, p. 55 as translated, Capital, p. 131. 
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usefulness no longer necessarily underlay production. The capitalist as capital personified “is 
fanatically intent on the valorization of value; consequently he ruthlessly forces the human 
race to produce for production’s sake.”24 Production as an end in itself conflicts with the use 
value that Marx could still evoke as the unquestionable reality behind the illusory exchange 
value. Adorno, aware of this contradiction in Capital, draws the consequences for use-value of 
an ever-expanding exchange value: “In the age of overproduction, use-value for its part 
became doubtful.”25 Use value might now be unrecognizable, so deformed is it by the constant 
pressure of exchange as an end in itself. This is why, as Simon Jarvis puts it, Adorno “regards 
attempts to invoke an immediate access to use-value as an ideological cover for the way in 
which all human activity is mediated by commodity exchange.”26 When the illusion of 
exchange extends down into the commodity’s utility, illusion becomes inevitable and 
structural. When the commodity assumes the total preoccupation of life, we find ourselves in a 
“universal delusion-context of reification.” The social power exercised by religious fetishes, 
considerably more limited, is almost harmless in comparison.  
In his essay “Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” Lukács bases his 
discussion of reification on Marx’s chapter on commodity fetishism, but considers congealed 
labour of all kinds, intellectual and physical, in his attempt to show that the commodity-form 
rules all sectors of society and all disciplines: that it has become in fact the total social 
preoccupation of life. Relations,27 language28 and even consciousness29 may be reified. Lukács 
                                                
24 MEW, vol. 23, p. 618 as translated, Capital, p. 739. 
25 GS, vol. 7, p. 32, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 17.  
26 Simon Jarvis, Adorno: A Critical Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 55. 
27 Georg Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, in Werke, vol. 2, Frühschriften II: “Geschichte und 
Klassenbewußtsein,” 2. Auflage (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1977), pp. 161-517, here p. 361, or translated by 
Rodney Livingstone, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1971), p. 177. 
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emphasizes the commodity’s power to make labour return as an independent thing, 
unrecognizable as such: “Man’s own activity, his labour becomes something objective and 
independent of him, something that controls him by virtue of an autonomy alien to man.”30 
Lukács thus focuses on the “objective characteristics” that the result of social labour takes 
on.31 Reification may be called a “phantom objectivity” because it gives something that only 
humans could have created the appearance of a fact, fate or nature seemingly beyond their 
control.32 The social, conventional character of the thing is forgotten, and the object takes on 
the look of fossilized remains of a rigid “second nature”:  
For, on the one hand, men are constantly smashing, replacing and leaving behind 
them the “natural,” irrational and actually existing bonds, while, on the other, they 
erect around themselves in the reality they have created and “made,” a kind of 
second nature which evolves with exactly the same inexorable necessity as was the 
case earlier on with irrational forces of nature.33 
 
Against the argument made by a wave of philosophers, led by Kant and Fichte, that human 
beings can only know what they create, Lukács claims that the created world itself slips out of 
conscious control to become just as irrational as the forces that it was set to combat.34 The 
man-made world is no longer clearly opposed to the natural world, for it, too, operates 
according to obscure laws that seem to have always existed. Reification names the natural 
look of anything made.    
Reification seems to arise in the first instance from the pseudo-necessity of set working 
hours: “The period of time necessary for work to be accomplished…is converted, as 
                                                                                                                                                    
28 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 267 Anmerkung 1, or translated, History and Class 
Consciousness, p. 209 n16. 
29 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 268, or translated, History and Class Consciousness, p. 93.  
30 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 261 as translated, History and Class Consciousness, p. 87.  
31 MEW, vol. 23, p. 86 as translated, Capital, p. 164f. 
32 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 257 as translated, History and Class Consciousness, p. 83.  
33 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 307 as translated, History and Class Consciousness, p. 128. 
34 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 299f., or translated, History and Class Consciousness, p. 121f. 
 47 
mechanization and rationalization are intensified, from a merely empirical average figure to an 
objectively calculable work-stint that confronts the worker as a fixed and established 
reality.”35 Workers begin to treat their own time just like the preconceived commodity that 
they produce. Yet it is clear that production for production’s sake—the useless production of 
exchange values—creates waste labour, and the length of the working day cannot be a fixed 
and established reality. However, instead of making regular analyses of the minimum number 
of working hours actually required to satisfy needs, workers accept the conventional 
workweek, and with it the idea that the destruction of their time and the waste of their lives 
performing avoidable tasks is normal and natural. Full full-time employment is an end in 
itself, not a means to satisfy needs, because human beings are reduced to “human resources” 
on the same level as natural resources to exploit.36 The working day no longer seems to be the 
result of a process, but a thing that always was what it is—or at best, an organism that changes 
naturally and of its own accord. Lukács underlines Marx’s observation that “in the history of 
capitalist production, the establishment of a norm for the working day presents itself as a 
struggle over the limits of that day, a struggle between collective capital, i.e., the class of 
capitalists, and collective labour, i.e., the working class.”37 According to Lukács, it is only 
with a consciousness that “goes beyond what is immediately given” that workers can 
forcefully shorten their artificially long working day and rescue their time.38 Reified 
consciousness is a consciousness that does not go beyond what is immediately given, and the 
                                                
35 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 262 as translated, History and Class Consciousness, p. 88.  
36 In some provinces of Canada, the unemployed must be employed full-time looking for work to obtain and 
maintain benefits. Friedrich Pollock notes that a peculiarity of state capitalism is that “full employment of all 
resources is claimed as the main achievement in the economic field.” See Friedrich Pollock, “State Capitalism: Its 
Possibilities and Limitations,” in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, 
introduction by Paul Piccone (New York: Continuum, 1982), pp. 71-94, here p. 73. 
37 MEW, vol. 23, p. 249 as translated, Capital, p. 344. 
38 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 363 as translated, History and Class Consciousness, p. 178.  
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first evidence of it is the halt of negotiations over the working day, negotiations which should 
be ongoing as long as overproduction is the norm. However, when exchange values and not 
use values are consumed, the state of overproduction becomes exceedingly difficult to 
recognize.  
Reification may have begun with the social, fabricated necessity of set working hours, 
which are determined in isolation from the work itself, but since the tendency of the 
commodity is to become a universal structuring principle, finally nothing is untouched by 
reification: “The proletariat shares with the bourgeoisie the reification of every aspect of its 
life.”39 As evidence for this, Lukács shows that even in a discipline remote from proletarian 
labour, philosophy, workers forget that they themselves have made concepts and categories, 
which confront them as fixed, alien powers. Philosophy falls into insoluble antinomies 
because philosophers prove to be just as incapable of negotiating the terms of their labour as 
any other workers:  
We drew attention … to the antinomies (between subject and object, freedom and 
necessity, individual and society, form and content, etc.) to which [bourgeois] 
thought necessarily led. It is important to realise at this point that although bourgeois 
thought only landed in these antinomies after the very greatest mental exertions, it yet 
accepted their existential basis as self-evident, as a simply unquestionable reality. 
Which is to say: bourgeois thought entered into an unmediated relationship with 
reality as it was given.40   
 
The conflicting concepts that appear to the philosopher as fixed and given are not merely 
analogous to the workweek that appears to the worker as fixed and given. Capitalism depends 
for its existence on a universal lack of time-consciousness. In order for the sacrifice of 
workers’ hours not to seem like the catastrophe and barbaric loss of life that it is, time must 
become everywhere abstract, homogeneous, empty, convertible, exchangeable and 
                                                
39 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 332 as translated, History and Class Consciousness, p. 149.  
40 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 339f. as translated, History and Class Consciousness, p. 156.  
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inconsequential, even in philosophy. Time must not appear as what it is: consisting of work 
and struggle. When philosophers suppress the temporal core of concepts, they are simply 
upholding the illusion that exists everywhere: that there is no work in things. But in failing to 
recognize the past work done on the concepts that they take up, philosophers are tacitly at one 
with a system that dissimulates a desecration of life under a high society of alluring products. 
A “logical world of ossified concepts” is not the mere spiritual reflection or effect of a “world 
of ossified things.”41 The young Lukács rejects the dualism between “thought and existence, 
consciousness and reality” to which Marx and Engels’s reflection model of ideology falls 
victim, as itself a product of “reified consciousness.”42  
  Like Lukács, Adorno rejects the reflection theory, an expression of which can be 
found early in The German Ideology: 
The phantoms formed in the brains of men are also, necessarily, sublimates of their 
material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material 
premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology as well as the 
forms of consciousness corresponding to these, thus no longer retain the semblance 
of independence [Schein der Selbständigkeit]. They have no history, no 
development; but men, developing their material production and their material 
intercourse, alter, along with this their actual world, also their thinking and the 
products of their thinking. It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that 
determines consciousness.43 
 
Adorno reiterates Lukács’s charge that the reflection theory is a product of an “untiring reified 
consciousness,” but rejects it on different grounds.44 Adorno criticizes not so much the rigid 
opposition between life and consciousness that so appalled Lukács, but rather the idea that 
material base could be completely absorbed into consciousness without a remainder. Unlike 
materialist apologists for the totalitarian Soviet Union, Adorno criticizes its “state terrorist 
                                                
41 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 374 as translated, History and Class Consciousness, p. 188.  
42 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 388 as translated, History and Class Consciousness, p. 200. 
43 MEW, vol. 3, p. 26f. as translated, Collected Works, vol. 5, p. 36f. 
44 GS, vol. 6, p. 205, or prefer to my translation here that of E. B. Ashton, Negative Dialectics (1973; repr., New 
York: Continuum, 1997), p. 205.  
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machinery”45 and “relapse into barbarism,”46 which he traces to the lack of reflection of the 
materialist base into consciousness. Adorno points to “immaturity” (Unmündigkeit) as the 
cause of materialism’s “self-abasement” and renunciation of solidarity that characterize the 
situation in the Soviet Union.47 This immaturity is precisely the lack of aptitude on a society-
wide scale for reflecting material conditions: “Materialism’s immaturity (Mindere) is the 
prevailing condition’s unreflected immaturity.”48 Barbarism comes about not because human 
beings reflect all of material life in their thoughts, even “upside-down as in a camera 
obscura,”49 but because they do not reflect it: something in the vast misery of the reproduction 
of material life conditions is left out. However, the point is not to reflect everything in thought, 
for consciousness does not have “photographs of objectivity” in the first place.50 Rather, 
according to Adorno, the reflection theory misses the insight that active consciousness does 
not dumbly, inexorably perform the same distorting operation on whatever is put before it, like 
a camera, but works on its material. It is Marx and Engels’s oversight of the work performed 
by consciousness that marks their reflection theory out as reified. The reflection theory leaves 
open no possibility for consciousness to contest material conditions, to break them apart and 
re-form them: 
The reflection theory [Abbildtheorie] denies the spontaneity of the subject, a 
movens of the objective dialectics of forces of production and relations of 
production. If the subject is limited to the stubborn reflection of the object, which 
necessarily misses the object, as the object is open only to the subjective surplus in 
the thought, then the result is the impacific intellectual silence of the integral 
administration.51  
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Because something of material conditions does not go into thought but persists as a remainder 
on the side of the object, as witnessed by the lack of reflection in material conditions, the 
subject actually comes closer to the core of the object not by trying to grasp its totality, but by 
giving this objective remainder a subjective correlate, by doing its own work, spontaneously 
reading something out of the object that was not made or put there. Theory does not aim at 
copying the object, but at discovering always “more” within it.  
Important consequences follow from the refutation of the reflection model of ideology. 
It is no longer possible to make a blanket claim and dismiss “morality, religion, metaphysics” 
wholesale as ideology.52 This entails the hopelessness of dispelling illusion by merely 
discrediting the “superstructure,” the spiritual spheres of art, philosophy and religion: 
Where [ideology] is no longer added to what exists [zum Seienden] as something 
that justifies or complements it, but rather passes over into the illusion [Schein] that 
whatever exists is unavoidable and is therefore legitimate, then a critique that 
operates with the clear causal relation of superstructure and base misses the mark. 
In the total society, everything is equally close to the focal point; that society is as 
see-through, its apology as threadbare [fadenscheinig], as those who see through it 
are dwindling.53 
 
Adorno’s criticism of the reflection theory of ideology is not that consciousness is never the 
unthinking reflection of reality, but rather that consciousness in the strong sense is more than 
just a lens for reality. But the reflection theory of ideology is true to the extent that 
consciousness has become something like an automatic camera. What distinguishes the total 
society from one in which there can be a distinct superstructure is that the total society is 
organized around a single focal point—the legitimacy of whatever exists—to which 
everything else is equally fuzzy in comparison. Consciousness “sees through” this set-up in 
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inverse proportion to the staginess of society. Adorno is not willing to concede, however, that 
consciousness is limited to the frame that society presents it. But in order to see through the 
total society, critics cannot limit their attention to whatever looks like a justification for it—
religious tracts, philosophical texts and other forms of discourse. Not only philosophy, religion 
and art, but anything— fixed working hours, traffic lights, hospital triage, bus schedules, 
union dues, charity fund drives, newspapers and children’s summer camps—can be made to 
legitimate the idea that things cannot be otherwise. Lukács sees the commodity form, broadly 
understood, as the epitome of such self-legitimation, in its seemingly infinite reproduction of 
the same. Adorno agrees, but departs from Lukács in how he understands the role of 
consciousness in delegitimizing the existing order. Adorno understands ideology to be self-
perpetuating society as a whole, so he does not lay the blame for the bad order of things solely 
on the individual consciousness that accepts things as they are: “The doom lies in conditions, 
which condemn human beings to powerlessness and apathy and would still be changed by 
them; it does not lie primarily in human beings and the way in which the conditions appear to 
them.”54 This is because the more objectively obvious social illusion is, the more individuals 
personally risk in exposing it. Adorno thus emphasizes the necessity of the illusion:  
Ideology is not a detachable layer overlying social Being, but is inherent to social 
Being. It is based in abstraction, which essentially counts toward the exchange 
transaction. Without abstracting from living human beings there would be no 
exchange. Then necessarily social illusion is implied in the real life process up to 
today. At its core is value as the thing-in-itself, as “nature.”55 
 
In this passage, Adorno draws from Lukács, who originally recognized in the inscrutability of 
Kant’s thing-in-itself the inscrutability of the commodity form. An unknowable thing with the 
human element, time, removed, is an apt description for either thing. But this similarity is not 
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a mere coincidence. The interdiction against knowing the thing-in-itself is in league with the 
socially necessary indifference towards the flown, irrecoverable time of fellow human beings 
in the act of exchange. Because the thing-in-itself is not just a metaphor for the commodity 
form, but an integral part of its illusion, Lukács regards Hegel’s critique of the thing-in-itself 
as the genuine starting-point for the end to reification in all spheres. This critique of the thing-
in-itself takes the form of dialectical method: “The genesis, the creation of the creator of 
knowledge, the dissolution of the irrationality of the thing-in-itself, the resurrection of man 
from his grave, all these issues become concentrated henceforth on the question of dialectical 
method.”56 Hegelian dialectics for Lukács is nothing other than “the ending of a rigid 
confrontation of rigid forms,” or the ending of reification.57 Yet, in contradistinction to Eleatic 
and Sophistical dialectics, Hegel’s is a dialectics in which the subject is active: “The 
dialectical process…is enacted essentially between the subject and the object.”58 Thus, 
Hegelian dialectics looks to be a very promising antidote to the reified consciousness of the 
individual intellectual or physical worker. However, according to Lukács, Hegelian subject-
object dialectics did not succeed in overcoming reification because the subject Hegel chose 
was not an individual consciousness or even, in the final analysis, a particular people or 
culture, but rather an abstract “world spirit.” Here Lukács takes up from Ludwig Feuerbach, 
who criticized Hegel for reducing sensuous consciousness to self-consciousness and self-
certainty, thus breaking with the individual consciousness insofar as it is interested in its 
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material needs and fulfilment.59 The world spirit uses individuals and peoples to accomplish 
its historical deeds, quite beyond their understanding: “The deed becomes something 
transcendent for the doer himself and the freedom that seems to have been won is transformed 
unnoticed into that specious freedom to reflect upon laws which themselves govern man, a 
freedom which in Spinoza a thrown stone would possess if it had consciousness.”60 No true 
transformation of the ossified forms is possible for a grotesque abstraction of consciousness, 
and so the Hegelian philosophy “is driven inexorably into the arms of mythology.”61 
According to Lukács, the abstract character of classical philosophical work itself was 
preventing Hegel from locating the true subject of history: that very group of people who 
experience their work “directly” as “the naked and abstract form of the commodity,” the 
proletariat.62 Although Hegel had found the correct method for dissolving ossified forms, his 
reduction of the individual consciousness to a fungible, blind, contingent servant of a mythical 
world spirit reintroduced the irrational element that his dialectics sought to overcome. 
 In the observation that “without abstracting from living human beings there would be 
no exchange,” Adorno shows a definite affinity with Lukács’s (and Feuerbach’s) emphasis on 
the living individual, which Hegel submits to abstract world spirit.63 Suffering and oppression 
will continue as long as the individual consciousness is left out of the dialectic. Yet, for 
Adorno, solving the problems wrought by exchange cannot be a simple matter of a certain 
class recognizing the liquid historical core of whatever appears frozen, natural, timeless or “in 
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itself.” In fact, it should not seem so to Lukács, either. The idea that only the proletariat can 
put an end to reification, for the reason that this class experiences work “directly” as taking the 
commodity form, is invalid on Lukács’s own terms.64 For Lukács himself elsewhere argues 
that such “immediacy” is indeed what blocks change and progress: 
It may be hoped that our arguments up to this point have demonstrated with sufficient 
clarity that this particular mediation was absent and could not be otherwise absent 
from bourgeois thought. In the context of economics this has been proved by Marx 
time and time again. And he explicitly attributed the mistaken ideas of bourgeois 
economists concerning the economic process of capitalism to the absence of 
mediation, to the systematic avoidance of the categories of mediation, to the 
immediate acceptance of secondary forms of objectivity, to the inability to progress 
beyond the stage of merely immediate cognition.65  
 
Thus, the seemingly immediate experience with the “naked” commodity form is in fact an 
obstacle to progress, not a boon. Furthermore, this passage reveals, quite against the preceding 
one, that intellectual workers (“bourgeois economists”) also experience the apparent 
immediacy of the commodity form. This is because apparent immediacy in fact belongs to the 
very notion of reification, which Lukács describes at one point as “the necessary, immediate 
reality of every person living in capitalist society.”66 Here Lukács plainly asserts that 
immediacy characterizes the experience of proletariat and bourgeoisie alike. In other words, it 
makes no difference whether one works with pre-formed automobile parts or pre-formed 
philosophical categories: abstraction disguises the experience with the material as a direct one. 
Thus, the proletariat should have no necessary role to play in the possible progress to a better 
society. While Lukács does not draw this conclusion from his own elucidations of reification, 
Adorno does.  
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 Hardly convinced that the proletariat all on its own is predisposed to ending reification, 
Adorno is no more convinced that the dissolution of rigid, reified forms alone would 
automatically be the end to all ills solvable by human beings. Adorno does not even view 
reification as an evil in itself, for he makes the surprising point that “with the birth of the 
natural sciences, reification and reified consciousness also brought about the potential for a 
world without privation.”67 Reification itself is less prominent in Adorno’s philosophy than an 
expression such as “the universal delusional context of reification” would suggest. For in 
Negative Dialectics, Adorno asserts: “The lament over reification skims over what human 
beings suffer under, sooner than denouncing it.”68 Suffering, not the petrified forms in and of 
themselves, is the pressing evil, but Lukács seems not to entertain the thought that reification 
is itself a defense against suffering. All members of society suffer from an all-pervasive 
indifference, and not merely workers in the act of unfair exchange. In a dramatic claim, 
Adorno spells out the extent of this indifference: “Without exception human beings are 
doubtless under the spell, not one really capable of love, and consequently each one thinks 
himself loved too little.”69 If human beings are not even really capable of love, this means that 
the coldness between them exceeds the degree of indifference actually required by exchange, 
which thereby loses its priority. The real danger of destroying the entire world a thousand 
times over, to no one’s advantage, falls outside of the explanatory power of the theory of 
reification: “Compared with the possibility of total catastrophe, reification is an 
epiphenomenon.”70 Global nuclear disaster, in the end, does not serve capitalism. Lukács’s 
critique of capitalism in a way fails to produce dialectics because he works with one large 
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category: “Dialectics can no more be made off reification than off any other isolated category 
whatsoever, even if it were just as polemical.”71 Reification needs to be mediated with another 
category—that of love, for instance—in order for its true groundlessness to be demonstrated 
and its illusion determined. 
 Furthermore, Lukács’s dialectics risks becoming a form of idealism because reification 
is, after all, “a shape of consciousness.”72 Although Lukács admits that “reification is … the 
necessary, immediate reality of every person living in capitalist society,” he does not 
concentrate his thought on the reality of this necessity.73 Instead, he lays the emphasis on 
consciousness. Reification, according to Lukács, “can be overcome only by constant and 
constantly renewed efforts to disrupt the reified structure of existence by concretely relating to 
the concretely manifested contradictions of the total development, by becoming conscious of 
the immanent meanings of these contradictions for the total development.”74 This passage 
reveals another way in which idealism is a danger for Lukács’s theory:  Lukács’s solution to 
reification, which is also the dissolution of capitalism, is completely in line with the Hegelian 
pretension to know the whole. Here Lukács advances that reification can be overcome only by 
a comparison in consciousness of contradictions with the “total development.” However, 
earlier in that same essay, Lukács argued that no complete knowledge of the whole looked 
possible: 
If a rational calculation is to be possible the commodity owner must be in possession 
of the laws regulating every detail of his production. The chances of exploitation, the 
laws of the “market” must likewise be rational in the sense that they must be calculable 
according to the laws of probability. But they must not be governed by a law in the 
sense in which “laws” govern individual phenomena; they must not under any 
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circumstances be rationally organised through and through. This does not mean, of 
course, that there can be no “law” governing the whole. But such a “law” would have 
to be the “unconscious” product of the activity of the different commodity owners 
acting independently of one another, i.e. a law of mutually interacting “coincidences” 
rather than one of a truly rational organisation. Furthermore, such a law must not 
merely impose itself despite the wishes of individuals, it may not even be fully and 
adequately knowable. For the complete knowledge of the whole would vouchsafe the 
knower a monopoly that would amount to the virtual abolition of the capitalist 
economy.75 
 
Lukács himself observes that if knowledge of the whole were at all possible, someone would 
have long since used this knowledge to secure for himself complete control of all markets. 
Lukács claims that if a key to this chaotic system really existed, capitalism would cease. For 
capitalism feeds on competition, that uncoordinated, bumbling chaos of pseudo-random 
interactions stirred up by the perverse effects of fashion, advertising and the mass media. 
Since the unconsciously-produced “laws” of capitalism are more like dream images than real 
knowledge, all commercial activity necessarily brings with it loss and waste, which to the 
mind of the investor are not real sufferings of human beings and nature, but “his” risks, which 
profit compensates. The chaos of the market thus provides investors have a perfect way of 
rationalizing their actions: profits are rewards for taking the risk of heavy financial losses that 
any commercial activity brings with it. The emergence of government controls does 
practically nothing to eliminate this character of blind destruction, as can be gathered from the 
state’s powerlessness in impeding the financial crises that return regularly, depriving people of 
comfort and security, emptying company towns and dashing hopes for a better material 
existence. It is difficult to see in what sense the historic spread of this chaos could be 
understood as “development.” While Lukács is right to associate capitalism’s chaos with an 
unknowable totality, he does not see this impenetrability as real. 
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 Whether the whole is at all knowable is utterly decisive for what strain of dialectics 
one chooses, as Lukács himself was well aware: 
Hegel himself distinguishes between negative and positive dialectics (Encyclopädie, 
§81).76 By positive dialectics he understands the growth of a particular content, the 
elucidation of a concrete totality. In the process, however, we find that he almost 
always advances from the determinants of reflection to the positive dialectics even 
though his conception of nature, for example, as “otherness”, as the idea in a state of 
“being external to itself” (ibid., §247) directly precludes a positive dialectics.77 
 
Lukács points out here that positive dialectics, which presumes knowledge of the whole, is not 
possible as long as nature comes into play. However, rather than limit himself to negative 
dialectics, Lukács simply excludes the category of nature from his work. According to Martin 
Jay, closing the concept of nature to all movement caused Lukács’s concept of history to be 
“reified”78 and earned him the criticisms of the Frankfurt School: 
While thoroughly endorsing Lukács’ insight that society under capitalism was falsely 
perceived as a “second nature,” Adorno felt that Lukács had neglected the “first 
nature” which man could not entirely escape. To Adorno, the total socialization of the 
world, which both Marx and Lukács had celebrated, threatened a new regression to a 
socialized barbarism. The revenge of exploited nature was one of the main Frankfurt 
School explanations of fascism in the 1940s.79 
 
Lukács’s dialectic turns a blind eye to the increasing domination of first nature. Yet he could 
not simply modify the notion of the whole without grotesquely reproducing what he had cut 
out. For the “second nature” of reification is indeed a state of being external to oneself, and 
would play the same role in Lukács’s dialectics as first nature played in Hegel’s: both first 
nature and second nature give the lie to the presumed total knowledge. It thus becomes 
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extremely difficult to see how reification, as otherness, is to be overcome if this overcoming 
assumes prior knowledge of the “total development.” If it were possible to elucidate a 
“concrete totality,” reification would not present itself as a problem, either because otherness 
would be total or because existence would really be a bare immediacy or animal existence and 
not just the appearance of one. The peculiar loop whereby the solution to the real opaque 
whole requires just that whole, imagined transparent, is the product of a dialectics limited to a 
single category. Dialectics, then, if it is to avoid this mystical, self-enfolding loop, cannot do 
without otherness.  
 Lukács cannot consistently adopt positive dialectics. This leaves negative dialectics,80 
which only mediates the determinations of reflection [Reflexionsbestimmungen]: the 
contradictions. What is negative dialectics and what might it achieve?    
 The title of Adorno’s Negative Dialectics refers to an opportunity missed by both 
Hegel and Lukács: a dialectics that truly recognizes a moment of otherness. What this amounts 
to is, in a certain sense, a return to Kant. Both Hegel and Lukács claim for their dialectics an 
effective resolution of the thing-in-itself problem. However, their forms of dialectics are 
idealist in that they do not treat the imponderability of the thing-in-itself as real, but as a 
problem of consciousness. Lukács believes that the commodity form can be effectively 
dissolved as soon as the worker attains self-consciousness of the commodity structure 
reproduced in himself: “When the worker knows himself as a commodity his knowledge is 
practical. That is to say, this knowledge brings about an objective structural change in the 
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object of knowledge.”81 The priority here is laid upon the subject (who is also an object) in that 
objective conditions are thought to change automatically with a change in (self-
)consciousness. It is assumed: (1) that the only thing one really has to know or can know is 
oneself; and (2) that objective conditions are completely absorbed by the self, because that is 
what is required for mere self-knowledge to bring about the desired change in the object. The 
claim that theory is already praxis, that the object changes through mere self-knowledge, 
seems to be a version of the reflection theory of ideology that Lukács will reject some pages 
later. Adorno, for his part, does not see how the relevant objective conditions could be totally 
controllable by the mind in this way, as if mind and the object of knowledge formed a perfect 
identity.82 This is why Adorno sees conceptuality’s need “to turn toward the non-identical” as 
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the turning point for dialectics, as against Lukács, who sees the commodity, thing or object of 
thought as already belonging totally to the self and consciousness and so remains on the path 
of Hegelian dialectics.83 In grasping the otherness of the thing-in-itself as something real, 
insuperable by mere consciousness, Adorno follows Kant, who “really does not sacrifice the 
idea of otherness,” for “without it, knowledge would disintegrate into tautology; the known 
would be knowledge itself.”84  
Given the choice between self-certainty and a necessarily partial cognition of 
estranged, mutilated and recalcitrant objects, thought must, to gain anything at all, prefer the 
latter. The choice presents itself because the identifying mode of thinking is not merely a 
blend or balance of subject and object, but also contains the assumption of the subject’s ability 
to control whatever aspect of the object it wants by thought alone. Splitting the identity apart 
thus means reading a limit into the subject. What is really objectionable in identifying thinking 
is not the imbalance of subject and object—symmetry is a formalistic aesthetic criterion and 
has nothing to do with the matter itself—, but the way in which the assumption of total 
knowledge of the object immediately translates into control of the object, i.e., into 
instrumental reason. The move to instrumental reason can be plainly seen in Lukács’s 
conclusion in the quotation given: as soon as the proletariat has consciousness of itself as an 
identical subject-object, its theory become practical and it can exert influence on the object 
(merely itself), almost by default. Negative dialectics therefore is not the “restoration” of a 
mythical balance between subject and object according to some worn-out aesthetic schema, 
but rather the attempt to divert instrumental reason by reminding it of the object’s remainder: 
that in the object that is not thought. Thus, “critique of identity that has been carried through 
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casts about for the preponderance of the object.”85 Subjective philosophy is no longer possible 
once it is admitted that the mind does not have the power to change practice merely by 
reflecting on itself and its activity, since the subject is not at one with the totality of conditions 
for its actions. The existentialist attempt to get rid of the reified with a “doctrine of action”86 
sacrifices knowledge to the arbitrary will of the subject: 
The liquefaction of everything thing-like without a remainder regressed to a 
subjectivism of the pure act and hypostatized mediation as immediacy. Pure 
immediacy and fetishism are equally untrue. The insistence on immediacy as 
opposed to reification relinquishes the moment of otherness in dialectic, as Hegel’s 
institutionalism clearly comprehended, and this is just as arbitrary as the dialectic in 
the later Hegel’s practice, though, that does not let anything fixed and permanent 
beyond it stand in its way.87  
 
Adorno’s point here is that an unstoppable total dialectic is no less arbitrary and subjective 
than the existentialist doctrine of action. Neither allows a moment of otherness, which would 
be beyond human being. Sartre, in declaring, “there is no universe other than a human 
universe, the universe of human subjectivity,”88 exchanges the discovery of what would be 
other for a world of “values” and “meaning” that human beings invent for themselves.89 Yet 
these invented values do not get around the problem of reification, but in fact support the 
commodity form. For what is capitalism but a universe of invented values?  
 Negative dialectics cannot be a solution to the general “problem” of reification, as 
Lukács claims for Hegelian dialectics.90 This is not to say that negative dialectics necessarily 
                                                
85 GS, vol. 6, p. 184, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 183.   
86 Jean-Paul Sartre, L’existentialisme est un humanisme, présenté par Arlette Elkaïm-Sartre (s.l.: Gallimard, 
1996), p. 78 as translated by Bernard Frechtman, “The Humanism of Existentialism,” in Essays in Existentialism, 
ed. Wade Baskin (New York: Carol Publishing, 1990), pp. 31-62, here p. 62.    
87 GS, vol. 6, p. 367f., or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 374f. 
88 Sartre, L’existentialisme est un humanisme, p. 76 as translated, “The Humanism of Existentialism,” p. 61.  
89 Ibid., p. 74 as translated, “The Humanism of Existentialism,” p. 60. 
90 This is a danger for Gillian Rose’s account of Adorno’s theory of reification in The Melancholy Science: An 
Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978).  In referring to 
the “non-reified concepts of critical theory,” where “something is non-reified when the concept is identical with 
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takes the commodity structure, which the thing-in-itself encodes, as a permanent feature of 
reality. But for the time being, thought cannot do without the petrified, congealed, mindless, 
accepted and established element. This is not to say that philosophy must therefore stand in 
collusion with capitalism. Although universally dissolving the commodity form is beyond the 
scope of philosophical practice, philosophy does have the capacity to withdraw its tacit 
support of the commodity form. Furthermore, if philosophy is to continue as philosophy, it 
must withdraw its support of the commodity form.   
 The universal delusional context, which goes well beyond reification, raises the 
question as to how philosophy, which is essentially concerned with the truth, can even be 
possible. The very working materials of philosophy divide into antinomies, whose sides are 
equally convincing. Delusion thus seems structural and inescapable. It may be recalled that it 
was in the understanding of these antinomies as an established existential reality and not 
something historically produced that Lukács located philosophy’s adherence to bourgeois 
class interests:  
We drew attention…to the antinomies (between subject and object, freedom and 
necessity, individual and society, form and content, etc.) to which [bourgeois] 
thought necessarily led. It is important to realise at this point that although bourgeois 
thought only landed in these antinomies after the very greatest mental exertions, it yet 
accepted their existential basis as self-evident, as a simply unquestionable reality. 
Which is to say: bourgeois thought entered into an unmediated relationship with 
reality as it was given.91   
  
But while Lukács understands dialectics as the way of effectively getting rid of the reification 
of these categories, Adorno understands dialectics as a way to rescue their content. 
                                                                                                                                                    
its object,” she suggests that Adorno had overcome reification in fact (ibid., p. 47). But the concepts of critical 
theory are not something wholly other than the concepts of the individual (social) sciences from which they are 
taken. This is how the concepts of critical theory are able to point beyond themselves toward changing social 
practices. That the concepts of critical theory do not automatically rid their objects of reification shows that 
something is still lying unabsorbed by these concepts. Therefore, these concepts are not identical with their 
objects, as Rose claims. It is Idealist to speak of a non-reified concept in a world of reified objects.   
91 Lukács, Geschichte und Klassenbewußtsein, p. 339f. as translated, History and Class Consciousness, p. 156.  
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 When Kant was faced with the philosophical debates concerning the finitude or 
infinitude of the universe, the divisibility or indivisibility of matter, the freedom or unfreedom 
of the will, the existence or non-existence of God, he did not immediately argue for one side, 
but asked how these antinomies came about. The ‘natural’ need of conditioned reason to think 
the unconditional landed philosophy in these precise battles:   
Now we have before us the entire dialectical play of the cosmological ideas, which do 
not permit an object congruent to them to be given in any possible experience, which, 
indeed, do not even permit reason to think them in agreement with the universal laws 
of experience, but which have not been thought up arbitrarily; reason, rather, in 
continuous progression of the empirical synthesis, has been led to them necessarily 
when it tries to liberate from every condition, and to grasp in its unconditioned totality, 
that which can always be determined only conditionally in accordance with rules of 
experience.92  
 
Experience would solve the antinomies, but when do we have experiences of the outer and 
inner limits of space or of the ultimate causes of our actions or of the universe? Reason has in 
Kant’s view a natural propensity to seek release from the bounds of experience. He goes on to 
say that the number of antinomies is limited because there is a certain structure to these 
extravagant claims. They consist in taking what is really subjective and therefore limited, the 
forms of intuition, time and space, for objective and total, as if they were not conditions for the 
possibility of our experience, but things that we could get outside of to see in their entirety. 
The departure from experience necessarily results in contradiction. 
 In his interpretation of Kant’s dialectic of pure reason, Hegel expresses the source of 
the contradiction somewhat differently than does Kant. He expresses the flight from 
experience as abstraction, indifference to the thing thought and a refusal on the part of the 
                                                
92 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), A462/B490. The pagination given here and throughout, with “A” and “B” 
editions noted, corresponds to the Academy of Sciences edition of Kant’s works (Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, 
Berlin: G. Reimer/ W. de Gruyter, 1902-) and appears in the margins of Guyer and Wood’s translation. 
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understanding to work on its objects. Ready-made cognition inevitably produces 
contradiction:  
In modern times it was, more than any other, Kant who resuscitated the name of 
Dialectic, and restored it to its post of honour. He did it, as we have seen (§ 48), by 
working out the Antinomies of the reason. The problem of these Antinomies is no 
mere subjective piece of work oscillating between one set of grounds and another; it 
really serves to show that every abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely 
as it is given, naturally veers round into its opposite.93 
 
Like Kant, Hegel emphasizes the objectivity of the antinomies.  
 Neither Kant nor Hegel considers the underlying conditions of contradictions—
whether abstraction, indifference to the thing thought, a pretension to capture the totality or the 
attempt to flee experience—to be the truth. Nor does either thinker draw a relativistic or 
skeptical conclusion from the objectivity of the contradiction. Both thinkers believe that 
philosophy, if it is to be knowledge, must resolve the antinomies. Kant even speaks of an 
obligation to resolve them:  
Now I assert that among all speculative cognition, transcendental philosophy has the 
special property that there is no question at all dealing with an object given by pure 
reason that is insoluble by this very same human reason; and that no plea of 
unavoidable ignorance and the unfathomable depth of the problem can release us from 
the obligation of answering it thoroughly and completely; for the very same concept 
that puts us in a position to ask the question must also make us competent to answer it, 
since the object is not encountered at all outside the concept (as it is in the case of 
justice and injustice).94  
 
Kant asserts that it is objectively clear that the antinomies do admit of solution. This is 
because transcendental philosophy is indeed concerned with an objective order. The 
antinomies are concerned with questions involving time, space and causality. Pure reason does 
not run up against the element of otherness, the thing-in-itself, as it would in ordinary 
cognition, because time, space and causality cannot be things-in-themselves. For that reason 
                                                
93 Hegel, Werke, vol. 8, p. 174 as translated, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, p. 117. 
94 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A477/B505. 
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Kant judges that such questions may be “unknown to us, but not on that account 
impossible.”95 
 Like Kant, Hegel names the resolution of the antinomies to be the task of speculative 
reason, which “apprehends the unity of terms (propositions) in their opposition—the 
affirmative, which is involved in their disintegration [Auflösung, solution] and in their 
transition.”96 Hegel is in agreement with Kant that, for this to be possible, the object of the 
dialectic must lie entirely within the concept. Hegel gives different supports than does Kant, 
however, for the conviction that the object must lie entirely within the concept for the 
antinomies to be solved. According to Hegel, it is possible for mind alone to solve the 
antinomies not because the object of the dialectic has the peculiarity of corresponding to no 
experience, but it is rather because for something to be real is already for it to have its concept. 
In other words, there is no thing “in itself” that could not also be “for us.” While in the 
Kantian philosophy the object of the dialectic is exceptional because the object would 
normally have an unknown side, its “in itself,” for Hegel the reality that falls outside the 
concept “would be a nothing”: 
It is not just that the subject matter, the objective and the subjective world, ought to be 
in principle congruent with the idea; the two are themselves rather the congruence of 
concept and reality; a reality that does not correspond to the concept is mere 
appearance [bloße Erscheinung], something subjective, accidental, arbitrary, 
something which is not the truth. When it is said that no subject matter to be found in 
experience which is perfectly congruent with the idea, the latter is opposed to the 
actual as a subjective standard; but there is no saying what anything actual might 
possibly be in truth, if its concept is not in it and its objectivity does not measure up to 
this concept; it would then be a nothing.97 
 
                                                
95 Ibid., A478/B506. 
96 Hegel, Werke, vol. 8, p. 176, as translated except where indicated in square brackets, Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences, p. 119. 
97 Hegel, Werke, vols. 5-6, Wissenschaft der Logik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969), p. 464 as translated by 
George di Giovanni, The Science of Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 671f..  
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Hegel sees the resolution of the contradiction as necessary if philosophy is to avoid 
skepticism. The skeptic wrongly ignores the total reality that is already in the universals that 
the dialectic has produced:  
In contradistinction to mere Scepticism…philosophy does not remain content with the 
purely negative result of Dialectic. The sceptic mistakes the true value of his result, 
when he supposes it to be no more than a negation pure and simple. For the negative 
which emerges as the result of dialectic is, because a result, at the same time the 
positive: it contains what it results from, absorbed into itself, and made part of its own 
nature. Thus conceived, however, the dialectical stage has the features characterizing 
the third grade of logical truth, the speculative form, or form of positive reason.98  
 
Once dialectic successfully shows the illusion of independence and unity that each abstract 
concept, taken as given, has, it must take the additional step of resolving the contradictions 
that have come forth as evidence against this independence and this unity. Hegel perhaps 
views the negative result of dialectic as already positive because he bases his dialectic loosely 
on that of Plato, whose negative results include not only confusion, the relinquishment of 
finite views and removal from particulars, but also the universal:  
The dialectic that goes further than this consists in taking the universal that emerges 
from the confounding of the finite, in defining it within itself and resolving the 
antitheses within it. The outcome is the resolution of contradiction, it is the 
affirmative; this is the universal defined as what inwardly resolves—and has 
resolved—the contradictions or antitheses, and it is thus defined as the concrete, as 
what is inwardly concrete. In keeping with this definition, the dialectic is Platonic in 
the proper sense; it is speculative dialectic because it does not culminate in a negative 
result but exhibits the unification of the opposites that have nullified themselves.99 
   
The same “negative” result of the dialectic, the universal concept, turns out to be what is 
capable of resolving the two sides. Ultimately, the concept resolves all contradictions and 
grasps all of reality, leaving no merely contingent or subjective appearance within it.   
                                                
98 Hegel, Werke, vol. 8, p. 176 as translated, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, p. 119. 
99 Hegel, Werke, vols. 18-20, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
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 Adorno denies that knowledge completely engulfs any one of its objects.100 Hegel is 
incorrect to dismiss the reality that falls outside the concept—the arbitrary, the contingent, the 
subjective, the phenomenal—as “mere appearance,” “nothing,” the untrue, that will one day 
be concept.101 This is to deny the need of otherness that, as Lukács has pointed out, already 
forms Hegel’s dialectic of nature. Truth does not show up within the concept, according to 
Adorno: “But the truth hit upon by concepts beyond their abstract range can have no arena 
other than what the concept suppressed, disregarded and discarded.”102According to Hegel’s 
Idealist model, truth is the correspondence of subject and object, of the concept and the 
conceptless—ultimately, the rational concept, the absolute Idea. Marx, however, explains that, 
in order for us to have a concept of production in general, which covers the earliest production 
up to the most recent, we must cut away qualities that are specific to production in certain 
eras:  
Production in general is an abstraction, but a reasonable abstraction in so far as it 
actually emphasises and defines the common aspects and thus spares us the need of 
repetition. Yet this general aspect, or the common element which is brought to light 
by comparison, is itself multiply divided and diverges into different determinations. 
Some features are found in all epochs, others are common to a few epochs. The most 
modern epoch and the most ancient will have [certain] determinations in common.103  
 
The correspondence of the concept and what it covers does not mean that the concept correctly 
grasps true reality; it means that the concept has abstracted and suppressed certain 
determinations for the sake of convenience. Adorno advances that truth is played out not in the 
common elements that the concept brings together, but rather in the diverging elements that 
the concept cut away because they diverged. Certainly, concepts are the means by which truth 
                                                
100 GS, vol. 6, p. 25, or translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 14. 
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is hit upon. But the concept that corresponds to reality does not overcome abstraction, since, in 
order for the concept to cover an ever-changing reality, it necessarily has to abstract 
determinations that belong to merely one era or place.  
 While Adorno is in agreement with Kant that knowledge must leave a place for 
otherness,104 he would not assert that, because pure reason has created the antinomies all by 
itself, it needs to solve them all by itself. Not only pure reason, but also the social order, in 
which all needs are fulfilled through exchange, creates antinomies. Abstraction, indifference, a 
pretension to totality, flight from experience—the errors that generate contradictions in 
philosophy are not absolutely different from those that generate contradictions in reality. 
Conceptual thought takes on an abstract character because abstraction was already the norm—
what resulted when work, life, activity, feeling and suffering were rendered into wages 
insufficient to express or even compensate the time lived.105 Reification and exchange give 
rise to abstraction, rather than the inverse. According to Adorno, it is not true that the object of 
dialectic is not encountered at all outside the concept: it is encountered every day in the unjust 
exchange of commodities. If reason thinks that it can conceive of the totality of causes in order 
to answer the question of the possibility of human freedom—if the perception of the totality of 
time, from the outside, as if it were a “thing,”106 seems possible for it—, it is because in 
exchange society the mind must persistently perceive time as a thing. But time is not a thing. 
                                                
104 GS, vol. 6, p. 185, or translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 184. 
105 In his biography, Adorno, Stefan Müller-Doohm traces Adorno’s recognition of the social basis of Kant’s 
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The problem is no longer that the mind ventures beyond the bounds of experience, but rather 
that experience has shrunk. Part of what is now considered, so to speak, “in itself” should be in 
theory knowable because it was once experience—“for us.” The task of reason is not to 
resolve the antinomies, but to avoid creating them through the reification of what is really “for 
us.”  
 The abstraction implicit in the correspondence of concept and reality precludes the 
positive dialectic, the resolution of the antinomies in thought, by the concept. The true 
resolution of the antinomies would amount to nothing less than ending the unfair exchange of 
commodities mediated by money, as well as the ambient abstraction and general indifference 
that enlarge its charmed circle. It seems, then, that philosophy is condemned both to total 
resignation in the face of the contradiction and to absolute collusion with exchange society. 
On one hand, to resolve contradictions in the idea is to abstract qualities diverging from the 
concept, and so to adopt a practice that is a mere result of exchange society—so, contingent 
and transitory, rather than necessary and timeless; on the other hand, to ignore the 
contradictions is to ignore the signs of a false world.   
  Given the dilemma between resignation and collusion with exchange society, 
philosophers, it seems, should put aside their critical vocations and launch a direct assault 
against exchange society. Yet the very implication of unjust exchange in metaphysical 
questions, which prohibits resolving the antinomies in thought, at the same time permits 
philosophy to engage with unjust exchange in reality—without however leaving behind its 
medium of concepts. Philosophy can withdraw its actual tacit support of exchange society by 
ceasing to perform the mental acts that exchange society produces: abstraction, indifferent 
bracketing of the thing thought, totalizing thinking and disregard for experience. While 
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philosophy cannot single-handedly vanquish them, it can show these mental acts to be false 
not only through the real suffering they cause, but also through the antinomies that they also 
happen to produce. For an Idealist such as Hegel, knowledge can be squeezed from suffering, 
which is why he, in the backward manner typical of men of his time, puts knowledge, the 
knowledge that Greek ethical life has collapsed, over and above the life of a woman, 
Antigone, whose death is supposed to produce this knowledge, thus providing another rung on 
the ladder to the absolute standpoint.107 For a materialist such as Adorno, it is barbaric to think 
that knowledge makes good suffering; suffering is an evil in itself that puts knowledge on 
trial.108 In order not to relinquish all possibility of truth, materialist philosophy must aim at 
disrupting those conditions that have created and continue to sustain suffering: the context of 
pervasive, socially necessary illusion that is exchange society. In such a context of universal 
delusion, there can be no existing truths, lying available for the taking. When truth can no 
longer be an affirmation, philosophy must turn to the negative work of weakening ideological 
supports. 
Philosophy does not have to venture outside its own domain of conceptual reasoning to 
find signs of the damage wrought by socially-prescribed abstraction and indifference: it may 
find them in contradictions. For Adorno, not only the Kantian antinomies, but also 
inconsistencies in any of the most developed spiritual works, are signs of ambient abstraction. 
Thus, bringing contradictions to consciousness and thinking them through inculpate exchange 
society, which overproduces abstraction to mask systematic uncompensated and even 
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unnecessary toil. The “formal thinking” disparaged by Hegel is actually more profoundly 
reactionary than he believes:   
But formal thinking makes identity its law, lets the contradictory content that it has 
before it fall into the sphere of representation, in space and time, where the 
contradictory is held in external moments, next to and following each other, parading 
before consciousness without reciprocal contact. The firm principle that formal 
thinking lays down for itself here is that contradiction cannot be thought. But in fact 
the thought of contradiction is the essential moment of the concept. Formal thinking 
does in fact think it, only it at once looks away from it and stating its principle it only 
passes over from it into abstract negation.109 
 
 The identifying thinking that expels contradiction from the mind not only fails to 
grasp an imperative of concept formation, as Hegel claims here, but it also denies the painful 
consequences of abstraction. A philosophy concerned with what has made the world false will 
have to work with contradictions in some way. In other words, it will have to adopt a 
dialectical method for at least part of the time. Resolving the contradictions in thought has 
been ruled out. With positive dialectics ruined by the abstraction it implies, and abstract, 
formal thought rendered false through its collusion with commodity exchange, the responsibly 
practiced philosophy remaining is negative dialectics.110 Adorno thus proposes the following 
handling of contradiction: 
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[The objective contradiction] carries more weight than it did for Hegel, who was the 
first to set his sights on it. Once the vehicle of total identification, objective 
contradiction turns into the organon of the impossibility of total identification. 
Dialectical cognition is not supposed to construe contradictions from above and 
advance by way of their solution, like its opponents reckon it does, although Hegel’s 
logic proceeds in this way every now and then. Instead, it is incumbent on dialectical 
cognition to investigate the inadequacy of thought and thing, to experience it in the 
thing. Dialectics does not have to fear the reproach that it obsesses over the idée fixe of 
objective antagonism when all the while the thing is pacified; nothing individual finds 
peace in the un-pacified whole. The aporetical concepts of philosophy are marks of 
what is objectively unresolved, not simply unresolved by thinking. To load 
contradictions with the guilt for intractable speculative stubbornness would shift the 
blame; shame demands that philosophy not repress Georg Simmel’s insight: it is 
astonishing how little the history of philosophy says about the sufferings of 
humanity.111 
 
Once they are understood to be objectively irreconcilable by speculation alone, contradictions 
become clues to what makes life false. As clues to real systematic misidentifications not only 
of living labour and wages, but of minds and their objects, contradictions may incriminate the 
system of identity. Adorno’s adoption of negative dialectics does not mean that he utterly 
repugns speculative thinking, as Gillian Rose contends.112 He only rejects the narrow Hegelian 
definition of speculative thought, whose specific nature “consists solely in grasping the 
opposed moments in their unity.”113 If speculative thought amounted to nothing more than this 
                                                                                                                                                    
Adorno in no way accepted Idealism, and in fact the collective project to arrive at a clear concept of Idealism 
went precisely to develop a theory free of all idealist baggage. On this, see Pierre-François Noppen, “Marx, 
Horkheimer, Adorno et the projet d’une théorie post-hégélienne de la dialectique,” (PhD diss., Université Paris 
IV – Sorbonne, 2007), pp. 297-301.  
 Bernstein’s other piece of evidence for Adorno’s supposed Idealism would be the latter’s “speculative 
identities” (“Negative Dialectic as Fate,” p. 19). Bernstein claims that for Adorno “history and nature are one,” 
just as “philosophy … and art … are one” (ibid., p. 20). His evidence for these “identities” is dialectical method 
itself, in which “two apparently opposing items are shown to be internally related to one another, to somehow 
belong together” (ibid., p. 19). Bernstein here conflates the concept of relation with the concept of identity, while 
ignoring Adorno’s numerous interdictions against the unification of art and philosophy (see, for example, GS, 
vol. 6, p. 26 or, translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 15). By distinguishing the negative dialectic, which only 
mediates the terms, from the positive dialectic, which undertakes their identification through speculation, one can 
clearly see what Adorno took from Hegel. Adorno’s anti-idealism compelled him to remain with the negative 
dialectic: he saw the actual state of contradiction between the terms as belonging to objective conditions, not to 
mind.  
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113 Hegel, Werke, vol. 5, p. 168 as translated by G. di Giovanni, The Science of Logic, p. 122. 
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“positive dialectic,” Adorno would indeed reject it entirely. As Hegel himself acknowledges, 
the reconciliation and resolution of the contradiction is “the ideality of the distinct 
moments.”114 Grasping the opposing moments in their unity is obviously incompatible with a 
materialist philosophy that recognizes the reality of what does not have its concept—just by 
the power of those appearances to mould lives and cause unnecessary suffering. The concept 
of speculative thinking need not be restricted to the definition that Hegel offers of it. While 
speculative thought today cannot reconcile contradictions, its hope for reconciliation may take 
the form of breaking through the illusions that throw up contradictions in the first place: “The 
power of what prevails erects façades, which consciousness comes up against. It must strive to 
knock through them. That alone would wrest the postulate from the depths of ideology. The 
speculative moment survives in such resistance.”115 The “postulate” to which Adorno refers 
here is the “demand for identity,” which he associates with a self-defeating philosophy that 
“would imitate art.”116 But neither contradiction nor identity would be true reconciliation: 
“Utopia would be above identity and above contradiction; a cooperation of various people and 
miscellaneous things.”117 Adorno’s resistance toward the contradictory world does not take the 
form of a resolution of contradictions, but rather that of an ideology critique that holds out 
hope for something better. Adorno’s philosophy can be called speculative because, like 
Hegel’s and Kant’s, it does not give up on the hope of reconciliation.118 Yet this hope is, 
                                                
114 Hegel, Werke, vol. 5, p. 168 as translated by G. di Giovanni,The Science of Logic, p. 121. 
115 GS, vol. 6, p. 29, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 17. 
116 GS, vol. 6, p. 26, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 15. 
117 GS, vol. 6, p. 153, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 151. 
118 Simon Jarvis sets the speculative element in Adorno’s thought somewhat differently in his “What is 
Speculative Thinking?,” Revue internationale de Philosophie, no 227, (2004): pp. 69-83. Jarvis claims that 
something of the tradition of speculative thinking survives in Adorno’s work where the expression of suffering is 
concerned: “Thinking, powerless to make suffering go away, yet has this single freedom: to express, without 
legitimizing, its suffering. That is where ‘speculative’ thinking survives” (ibid, p. 78; emphasis added). Suffering 
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paradoxically, most illuminating, for Adorno, when the work with contradiction comes up 
against the limits of mind, leading to an experience of which Hegel and Kant denied the 
possibility: the encounter of the object of the dialectic outside of the concept—or, as Adorno 
puts it, the experience of the thing’s inadequacy with the concept. For negative dialectics starts 
with this: it resists dismissing as “nothing” the waste laid to lives by the unpredictability of the 
economy and of repressive, discriminatory regimes.  
                                                                                                                                                    
is indeed key to Adorno’s notion of speculative thought; however, he does not intend so much the suffering of 
thinking alone. As his linkage of suffering to the unreflective automatisms of reification suggests, it is suffering 
provoked by thoughtlessness that really concerns him. More importantly, Adorno emphasizes the need of 
speculative thinking to break through the social illusions that produce and reproduce suffering. Jarvis’s 
concluding appeal to Michel Henry’s material phenomenology (ibid., p. 83) ignores the impulse of Adorno’s 
speculative thinking not to persist in the phenomenon of suffering, but to determine and criticize the conditions 
that cause avoidable pain and distress. It should be noted that Henry, in his reference to the Greek of his title 
“Pathos-avec,” takes the notion of “souffrance” in a much larger sense than we usually understand by “suffering” 
(Phénoménologie matérielle, Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1990, p. 137). Suffering for Henry does not 
necessarily imply pain, negativity, displeasure or unhappiness, as it does for Adorno (GS, vol. 6, p. 202 or, in 
English, Negative Dialectics, p. 202). While Henry is ultimately concerned with conceptualizing a community 
based on a shared reality, the affectivity of all living things, Adorno is concerned with criticizing the social 
structures that do violence to human beings, nature and inanimate objects. And while Henry’s “communauté 
pathétique” assumes a fundamental state of compassion amongst all sensing things (Phénoménologie materielle, 
p. 179), Adorno points to the structural lack of compassion that must have been in place for Auschwitz to happen 
at all, but whose causes his philosophy seeks to unriddle and criticize. Jarvis’s contention that the speculative turn 
of negative dialectics “requires” a material phenomenology (“What is Speculative Thinking?,” p. 83) becomes all 
the more questionable when one considers that Henry bases his phenomenology on a primitive, non-signifying 
“Fond de la vie” in which no subject-object distinction is made and in which each living thing experiences 
himself “identically” even while losing himself in the other (Phénoménologie materielle, p. 178). It is precisely 
these identifying tendencies with their reversion to mythology that Adorno’s speculative thinking resists. In “The 
Actuality of Philosophy,” Adorno himself is overtly critical of the material phenomenology of Scheler, which 
Henry emphatically takes up:  
The transition to “material phenomenology” has only apparently succeeded, and at the price of 
that certainty of the findings which alone provided the legitimacy of the phenomenological 
method. If in Max Scheler’s development the eternal, basic truths alternate in sudden changes, 
to be exiled finally into the powerlessness of transcendence, then one can certainly recognize 
the tirelessly questioning impulse of a thinking which takes part in truth only in moving from 
error to error. But Scheler’s puzzling and disquieting development needs to be understood 
more rigorously than as the fate of an individual mind. On the contrary, it indicates that the 
transition of phenomenology from the formal-idealist to the material and objective region 
cannot succeed with continuity or total assurance, that instead the images of transhistorical 
truth, which at one time [Scheler’s] philosophy projected so seductively onto the background 
of closed, Catholic theory, became confused and disintegrated as soon as they were sought for 
in just that reality, the comprehension of which was in fact precisely what constituted the 
program of “material phenomenology.” 
GS, vol. 1, pp. 328-329 as translated by Benjamin Snow [?], “The Actuality of Philosophy,” Telos, no. 31 (Spring 
1977):  p. 122. 
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 One might raise Hegel’s objection against the negative dialectic: that it terminates in 
skepticism. Thought that did nothing but blindly, obsessively maintain contradictions in their 
opposition would be skeptical, as Hegel says. If thought were nothing but negative dialectic, 
no truth claim could be made, just as if thought were nothing but positive dialectic, it would 
automatically set everyone (or no one but a fictitious world spirit) on the reasonable path of 
knowledge, which would be self-evident.  But Adorno (and Hegel) must deny that dialectic is 
“total” if knowledge is not to be tautology.119 Indeed, the Hegel of the Phenomenology 
criticizes Skepticism precisely on the grounds of its denial of otherness:  
Dialectic as a negative movement, just as it immediately is, at first appears to 
consciousness as something which has it at its mercy, and which does not have its 
source in consciousness itself. As Scepticism, on the other hand, it is a moment of self-
consciousness, to which it does not happen that its truth and reality vanish without its 
knowing how, but which, in the certainty of its freedom, makes the “other” which 
claims to be real, vanish.120 
 
Hegel here contrasts Skepticism to “dialectic as a negative movement”: Skepticism’s 
positivity lies in its certainty that self-consciousness is free, that it is really able to detach itself 
from all the contradictory and confusing appearances that present to it, and maintain its 
attitude of doubt. The Skeptic simply resists whatever is put before him, systematically 
opposing any assertion to come forward with one of equal weight. But in the end such abstract 
negation can only support the status quo: indeed, Sextus Empiricus asserts that, “attending to 
what is apparent, we live in accordance with everyday observances [kata tên biôtikên têrêsin], 
without holding opinions.”121 Skepticism resigns itself to whatever customs and laws exist 
                                                
119 GS, vol. 6, p. 398, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 406. 
120 Hegel, Werke, vol. 3, p. 160 as translated, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 124. 
121 Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrôneioi hypotypôsei, vol. 1 of Opera, recensuit Hermannus Mutschmann (Leipzig: In 
aedibus B. G. Teubneri, 1912), p. 10, https://archive.org/details/rsoperarecensuit01sextuoft, as translated by Julia 
Annas and Jonathan Barnes, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 9, book 
1, chap. xi [I 23].  
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because the “causal principle of Scepticism…is the hope of becoming tranquil.”122 To the 
Skeptic, the real error lies not in the deception of the senses by a contradictory world but in the 
judgement made about it, hence the Pyrrhic maxim, “I determine nothing.”123 Thus Skeptics, 
even while attributing to consciousness an absolute power of resistance against deceptive, 
changing reality, simultaneously forego the chance to criticize specific features of that reality. 
Skeptical self-consciousness consequently falls fully under the sway of whatever exists: for 
example, it “affirms the nullity of ethical principles, and lets itself be governed by these very 
principles.”124 Negative dialectics, by contrast, does not affirm the absolute freedom of self-
consciousness. Nor does it reduce freedom to the abstention from judgement. Negative 
dialectics determines something—namely, the context of illusion. The determination of 
illusion so destroys the charge of skepticism:   
An entrepreneur who does not want to be left behind in the competition must calculate 
such that the unpaid portion of the return made by alien labour falls to him as profit, 
and he must think that in so doing he is exchanging like for like—labour against the 
costs of its reproduction; but to demonstrate why this objectively necessary 
consciousness is objectively false is just as stringent.125 
 
As this particular case makes manifest, dialectical work with contradictions aims at 
determining the universal delusional context in some way. Arriving at the specificity of the 
entrepreneur’s delusion, namely that his profit is actually his rightful pay for reproducing the 
existing labour conditions, which are dreadful and even dangerous, saves us from the blanket 
skeptical point of view. Not necessarily absolutely everything is to be doubted, but rather the 
specific illusion must be carved out of the whole—here, the entrepreneur’s delusion that the 
                                                
122 Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrôneioi hypotypôsei, vol. 1, p. 6 as translated, Outlines of Pyrrhonism p. 5, book 1, 
chap. vi [I 12]. 
123 Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrôneioi hypotypôsei, vol. 1, p. 49 as translated, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, p. 49, book 1, 
chap. xxii [I 197]. 
124 Hegel, Werke, vol. 3, p. 162 as translated, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 125. 
125 GS, vol. 6, p. 47, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 37.  
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mere reproduction of existing conditions is worthy of some reward. Furthermore, this 
determination of the illusion clearly points toward some action—namely, the abolition of 
unfair exchange. Adorno therefore does not engage in the abstract negation of whatever 
proposition presents itself, but pursues contradictions in order to come to the determinate 
negation of some aspect of the universal conditions of falsehood. The Pyrrhic Skeptics 
themselves would have come to this conclusion had they pushed their dialectic far enough, 
because they must have at least determined the concept of determinacy to have been able to 
negate it in their refusal of it. Hegel’s critique goes exactly in this sense.126 Thus it is 
mysterious that he himself was later so closed to the notion of negative dialectic.      
 The dissolution of a particular delusion indeed permits one to speak of truth even 
within the universal delusional context. As Adorno advanced in conversation with 
Horkheimer, “There is no other measure of truth but the determinacy of the dissolution of 
illusion.”127 
                                                
126 Hegel, Werke, vol. 3, p. 161, or translated, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 125. 
127 Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Leo Löwenthal et al., “Diskussionen über Positivismus und 
materialistische Dialektik,” Meeting of April 5, 1939, in Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 12, p. 490. 
{Chapter II} The aesthetic illusion of Robinsonades, which gives the result of a historical 
process to be original first nature, transfers into economic theory, which gives labour 
originally and naturally to be a thing independent of social ties. The total delusional context of 
reification is this illusion become objective social necessity. Artworks, as products of labour, 
participate in it.  
 The artwork seems no less illusory than reality: both have a share in generalized and 
necessary aesthetic illusion. The artwork, however, itself is illusion as well as its opposite. On 
one hand, it deludes itself in thinking that it can just reject out of hand the context of delusion 
under which it falls. On the other hand, it really is illusion that it emphatically gives itself to 
be. On one hand, it is awake to truth, rejecting the false reality that everything else accepts. On 
the other hand, it is also false, no less an illusion for having rejected illusion. Artworks so 
contain illusion and disillusionment within themselves. Directing comparison inward, asking 
to be judged by their own criteria, autonomous artworks deny that the dubious external reality 
beyond them constitutes the standard of truth. What separates art from empirical reality is the 
relation between what the artwork comes on the scene as and what it is: 
Today every element of aesthetic illusion bears aesthetic inconsistency, contradictions 
between what the artwork appears as [als was das Kunstwerk auftritt] and what it is. Its 
appearance [Auftreten] makes the claim to essentiality; the artwork makes good on this 
claim only negatively, but at the same time the gesture of something more, a pathos 
that even the most radically unimpassioned work cannot relinquish, is inherent in the 
positivity of its peculiar appearance [Auftretens].1  
                                                
1 GS, vol. 7, p. 156, or prefer to my translation here that of Robert Hullot-Kentor, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel 
Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 101. Here I have rendered 
“auftritt” as “appears” and “Auftreten” as “appearance,” thus using the translations usually reserved for 
“erscheint” and “Erscheinung.” Adorno is playing on the multiple meanings of “Auftreten.” On one hand, he 
evokes the Hegelian opposition of appearance (Erscheinung) and essence. On the other hand, he evokes the 
Marxian opposition of exchange value and use value within the commodity. For Auftreten is also appearance in 
the sense of “dramatic appearance,” and “als was das Kunstwerk auftritt” can thus also be rendered as “what role 
the artwork plays.” It is a question here of the artwork’s function in the whole world of values versus its intrinsic 
quality. Adorno intimates that aesthetic inconsistency, the split between function and quality, is the contemporary 
artwork’s negation of commodification, which depends on the pretense that the function is quality—or, in other 
words, that exchange value can be consumed. 
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In the long passage leading up to this expression of the general form of aesthetic contradiction, 
Adorno lays out the transformation that has resulted in the contradictory music of “today.” 
The “great music such as that of Beethoven,” by contrast, shows a play between opposites.2 
On one hand, the artwork is a “whole” that seeks to reduce its developments into what has 
already been heard—“motif or theme”—, taking refuge in “set definition”; on the other hand, 
it is made up of “differentiated partial forms” only, and is nothing but “pure Becoming” and 
“process”: the constant production of the new and unassimilated.3 These contradictions do not, 
however, remain on the level of the incomprehensible and merely paradoxical, but the great 
artworks relate the sides in a dynamic logic of mutual contestation. The tendency of the whole 
and the detail to contest one another in a process of mutual transformation may be termed their 
mediation.  
 The great music of Beethoven distinguishes itself from mere empirical reality by the 
mediated, autonomous relation of whole and part: “Only by dint of the separation from 
empirical reality, which allows art to shape the relation of whole and part according to its own 
need, does the artwork turn into Being raised to higher power.”4 In the twentieth century, 
however, art is less and less able to determine the relation between whole and part as it sees 
fit, so less able to retain its autonomy: society’s demand for unity creeps into the aesthetic 
sphere, resulting in the “culture industry.”5 Popular music might well exhibit outstanding 
                                                
2 GS, vol. 7, p. 154, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 100. 
3 GS, vol. 7, p. 155, or prefer to my translations here Aesthetic Theory, p. 101.  
4 GS, vol. 7, p. 14, or prefer to my translations here Aesthetic Theory, p. 4.   
5 In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno characterize modern culture as a system based on the 
“false identity of general and particular” (GS, vol. 3, p. 141, in my translation). The culture industry “kills both 
whole and parts” of the work because, “uncontrasted and unconnected, whole and detail bear the same traits” 
(GS, vol. 3, p. 147, in my translation). Deborah Cook has noted four characterizations of commodified culture 
that recur in Adorno’s work, all of which destroy whole-part mediation: “standardization, pseudo-individualism, 
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details, but these have no effect on the patterns, forms and genres numbly adopted. The use of 
past forms in itself does not make a work a mere product of the culture industry. When serious 
art music employs antiquated dance forms, reveilles, fiddle tunes, children’s rounds and other 
tropes, these are fully decomposable and play into the construction of the piece, just like any 
other stable element. Their capacity both to break apart and go beyond themselves is what 
makes them capable of evoking a whole. The use that popular music makes of past forms is 
merely parasitic, according to Adorno. In his essay “On Popular Music,” Adorno clarifies the 
distinction of mediated, autonomous use of past material from merely parasitic copying with 
reference to the third movement of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony in C Minor (“Allegro”).6 
While this movement adheres to the old minuet dance form in various respects—Adorno 
names its time signature, symmetry, contrasting themes, major trio and minor reprise, among 
others—, its specific deployment of the form has consequences for the whole symphony, of 
which it is only a part. The minuet refers less to some supposed original, pure minuet form 
buried in the past than it does to the movement that follows directly: “The whole movement is 
conceived as an introduction to the finale in order to create tremendous tension, not only by its 
threatening, foreboding expression but even more by the very way in which its formal 
development is handled.”7 This tension is created largely by departures from the traditional 
minuet form. Adorno names two such innovations. Rather than introducing and developing 
each of the two themes separately, as tradition would dictate, Beethoven presents them in 
                                                                                                                                                    
schematization and stereotypes.” Deborah Cook, The Culture Industry Revisited: Theodor W. Adorno on Mass 
Culture (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), p. 39. 
6 Theodor W. Adorno, with the assistance of George Simpson, “On Popular Music,” in Essays on Music, ed. 
Richard Leppert (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 437-469. The essay appeared originally in 
English in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, 9 (1941), pp. 17-48. References here are to the Leppert 
volume. 
7 Ibid., p. 440.  
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quick succession and then puts them into dialogue. Furthermore, the second rather than the 
first theme ends up prevailing: “The end of the scherzo part is actually marked, not by the 
first, but by the second theme which has overwhelmed the first musical phrase.”8 In fact, the 
second theme is presented straightaway as the dominant one, as much by the vast dynamic 
contrast as by the piercing timbre of the horn, sounding like a call. In the development, the 
second theme proves to be a somewhat rude interlocutor, in places talking over the delicate 
first theme in a petty, sniping way.9 But the pre-eminence of the second theme here is not an 
arbitrary rebellion against protocol, for its repeated four-note motif is closely related to the 
opening four-note motif of the first movement. The opening unison figure thereby poses the 
enigma of the undecidable. G and E-flat could just as well be the mediant and tonic of E-flat 
major as they could be the dominant and mediant of C-minor. To the ear, the symphony’s first 
note, reproduced aright, could just as well fall on or off the beat. Adorno reads an accent into 
the note, which does in fact fall off the beat.10 Such an interpretation would create the 
impression of a downbeat and so intensify the ambiguity of the opening statement. An 
interpretation that raises the ambiguity of the opening statement also raises questions about the 
reality or unreality of it. After such an opening, the first movement seems more like the mind 
catastrophizing, a morbid imagination wildly multiplying consequences of its favourite idée 
fixe, than anything imminently life-threatening. The possibility of the initial four-note motif 
turning out major after all suggests that the spiralling terror of the minor movement is no brute 
                                                
8 Ibid.,  p. 441. 
9 Ludwig van Beethoven, Symphony No. 5 in C minor, op. 67, ed. Jonathan Del Mar (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 2001) 
III, p. 48, mm. 101-108; mm. 111-114.  
10 Theodor W. Adorno, Zu einer Theorie der musikalischen Reproduktion: Aufzeichnungen, ein Entwurf und zwei 
Schemata, herausgegeben von Henri Lonitz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001), p. 99, translated by Wieland 
Hoban as Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction: Notes, a Draft and Two Schemata, ed. Henri Lonitz 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006), p. 75. 
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fact, but a certain projection of awful possibilities. But by augmenting the initial rhythm and 
shifting it to the downbeat in a slower, unambiguously minor context of the third movement, 
Beethoven gives substance to the initial idea: the motif, originally something oblique and 
fleeting, now faces the listener directly, much closer. Its regal, conquering bearing, broad 
tones and body leave less doubt about the reality of the threat. The second theme takes up 
almost the entire section after the Trio, albeit in a dematerialized, wispy voice, as if sinisterly 
whispering its wicked designs. In this way, the dominance of the second theme in the third 
movement, while weighing against the hopes manifested by the opening motif, prepares some 
terrible resolution of the doom. However, this tension is real only for whomever has 
imaginatively conjoined the secondary theme with the ambiguity of the opening statement and 
expects to be able to follow it in its unfolding. And indeed, the statement of the opening motif 
in C major in the finale appears as the fulfilment of potentialities latent in the very beginning 
of the symphony.11 Yet the surprising incursion of a fragment of the second theme from the 
third movement into the re-transition of the Finale, mirroring the major trio of the minuet, 
once again opens the question of the status of the feared object.12 A haunting reminder or a 
new danger to be vanquished, the insidious rhythm returns as ambivalent as the symphony’s 
opening gesture. The adjustments that popular music makes to worn forms—for example, 
word substitutions, tempo changes, stylization of rhythms, solo improvisations, digital 
manipulation, even their agglutination in medleys or mixes—are not similarly autonomous. In 
mass-produced popular music, these deviations refer primarily to an absent original, parodying 
it, instead of dynamizing a whole that is greater than the borrowing. The old forms have no 
musical consequences in popular music, and it is precisely this that makes it heteronomous: 
                                                
11 Beethoven, Symphony No. 5, IV, p. 68, mm. 48-50. 
12 Ibid., IV, pp. 85-88, mm. 153-206. 
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“In the hit song…the schemata are separated from the concrete course of the music in such a 
way that everything can stand for [eintreten] for something else.”13 In great art music, 
something transpires with the old forms and recognizable patterns: the small progressive 
changes in the set patterns and recognizable forms are due to the individual elements 
protecting their own interests, seeing their differences through to the end. In popular music, by 
contrast, the schemata go uncontested: this is why everything in popular music can “stand for” 
or “advocate for” something else. Hit songs are easy to recuperate for extra-aesthetic ends 
because they agree that nothing happens to dominating patterns, and this is exactly the 
thinking that dominating patterns require for their continued and increasing domination. Hit 
songs do not encourage autonomy in the listener. Rather, popular music “hears for the 
listener,” as Adorno puts it, because it has pretences to being the construction itself, ready-
made out of a given material.14 The “whole” corresponds simply and immediately to the 
duration of the song. This implies that the whole, society, is a ready-made, given reality to be 
accepted. However, fully decomposable music with a rich potential for inner connections 
demands that it be constructed by the listener, and so teaches that wholes in general are 
constructions. As such a construction, society could be differently configured, but this requires 
not mockery of its norms, but imaginative reassembly. But to find one’s way to the “could be 
different” demands grasping the relation of whole and part as an antinomy, as a mutually 
contesting pair.  
 To resist the social demand for total unity, it is not enough, however, to prefer 
Beethoven to popular music. For the schemata of popular music are so clear and plain, and 
                                                
13 GS, vol. 14, p. 208, or prefer to my translation here that of E. B. Ashton, Introduction to the Sociology of 
Music (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), p. 29. 
14 Adorno, with the assistance of Simpson, “On Popular Music,” p. 442. 
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popular music so pervasive, that the classical forms become increasingly difficult for even a 
good listener to pick out of a symphony.15 The depth of inner connections that distinguishes 
great works from popular music is never discovered. The works in which part and whole are 
mediated sound unstructured to most types of listeners16—the music beads into isolated aural 
effects. Such “atomization” is exactly what Adorno disparages in “Little Heresy,” where he 
clearly indicates that mature aesthetic comprehension connects the moments rather than just 
taking pleasure in them for themselves: 
Musical understanding, musical cultivation with a human dignity that means more than 
mere information content, is tantamount to the ability to perceive musical contexts, 
ideally developed and articulated music, as a meaningful whole. This is what is meant 
by the concept of structural listening, whose demands, critical of everything that is 
mired in the momentary, of bad naïveté, are emphatically and acutely with us 
nowadays. Atomistic listening, which loses itself weakly, passively, in the charm of 
the moment, the pleasant single sound, the easily graspable and recollectable memory, 
is pre-artistic.17 
                                                
15 This may be inferred from the starting level of first-year university “music appreciation” textbooks. See, for 
example, Joseph Kerman and Gary Tomlinson, with Vivian Kerman, Listen, 7th edition, (Boston: Bedford/St. 
Martin’s, 2012).   
16 See GS, vol. 14, pp. 178-198. Adorno created a typology of listeners in Introduction to the Sociology of Music: 
the expert listener, the good listener, the culture consumer, the emotional listener, the “static” or “resentment” 
listener, the entertainment listener and the indifferent listener. The first two listening types, the educated expert 
listener and good listener, are “adequate listeners” and would be more resistant to the culture industry. In light of 
this typology, Cook might moderate her statement that Adorno failed to identify what kinds of recipients would 
be resistant to manipulation by the culture industry: “By failing to identify what peoples and classes are not 
covered by the concept [of narcissistic pseudo-culture], Adorno makes short work of his analysis of the resistive 
potential in reception” (Cook, The Culture Industry Revisited, p. 119). But cf. ibid., p. 120, where Cook rightly 
signals the lack of education as a condition for narcissistic tendencies of those lacking resistance toward the 
culture industry. 
17 GS, vol. 17, p. 297 as translated by Susan H. Gillespie, “Little Heresy,” in Essays on Music, p. 318. Cf. Rose 
Rosengard Subotnik, “Toward a Deconstruction of Structural Listening: A Critique of Schoenberg, Adorno, and 
Stravinsky,” in Deconstructive Variations: Music and Reason in Western Society (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 148-176. In her attack on structural listening, Subotnik attributes much to Adorno 
that cannot be substantiated in the relevant work. First, she equates structural listening with listening for a certain, 
predefined structure that is culturally valued: “Structural listening looks on the ability of a unifying principle to 
establish the internal ‘necessity’ of a structure as tantamount to a guarantee of musical value” (ibid., p. 159). 
Second, she suggests that the structure that ideally corresponds to “developmental listening” (ibid.) is, for Adorno 
and Schoenberg, Brahms’s developing variation (ibid., p. 156). Third, she claims that structural listening 
universally discovers a structure that is already there in the music: “Based on an assumption that valid structural 
logic is accessible to any reasoning person, such structural listening discourages kinds of understanding that 
require culturally specific knowledge of things external to the compositional structure, such as conventional 
associations or theoretical systems” (ibid., p. 150). Much evidence from Adorno’s essay can be cited against the 
false attributions. Against the charge of formalism may be levied statements such as “the true musical whole does 
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Adorno’s critique of aesthetic pleasure is tied to his conviction that art bears the memory of 
suffering. The recipient who takes pleasure in the immediacy of the passing moment cannot at 
the same time be emotionally touched by the suffering expressed in the work of art: Adorno is 
therefore opposed to any kind of aesthetic reception that closes itself off to the pain of the 
other.18 Atomistic listening is more than just an attention to the immediate detail as it presents 
itself, but also implies the listener’s naïve enjoyment of the isolated, sensuous sound. 
Furthermore, Adorno is critical of the technical means that encourage the disintegration of the 
artwork into discrete, isolated moments. In “The Radio Symphony: An Experiment in Theory” 
                                                                                                                                                    
not impose a blind dominance of so-called form” and “there are no longer any overarching forms to which the ear 
could entrust itself blindly” (GS, vol. 17, p. 301 as translated, “Little Heresy,” p. 321 and p. 322). Structural 
listening is the effort to experience the story of the musical work as it goes by, and includes asking oneself if a 
certain distinctive sound will repeat itself, noticing that an established element has changed, realizing that the 
main theme has suddenly returned mid-phrase, recognizing that a distinctive timbre varies in intensity, 
remembering that a previous harmonization of a theme had been denser, noticing that a certain passage has 
nothing whatsoever to do with what goes on before or after (a “fenêtre” in the language of Walter Boudreau). 
Subotnik seems to have missed the irony in Adorno’s title “Little Heresy” and, as Lydia Goehr points out, his 
critical motivations:  
I think the defense of the ‘classical’ or ‘serious’ form of listening is not his point, even if it 
serves as a dialectical (Subotnik says ‘utopian’) point of reference. His interest, rather, is in 
providing in concrete terms a critique of the administration of technology; its deceptive ways 
of stereotyping, streamlining, standardization, and simplification; its deceptive support of easy 
listening. His interest in listening always reflects his concern with the present state of society’s 
exchange categories, its totalizing form. To provide a concrete critique, one has to engage in 
the actual practice of music that exists. And no practice apparently reveals the dialectical play 
between truth and deception better than that of serious music. However, that this practice 
developed in a society that required and allowed other practices to develop alongside means a 
resembling dialectic will be found in them too.     
Lydia Goehr, “Dissonant Works and the Listening Public,” in The Cambridge Companion to Adorno, ed. Tom 
Huhn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 222-247, here p. 237.   
18 On art’s memory of suffering versus the culture industry’s erasure of memory, see Mary Anne Franks, “An-
aesthetic Theory: Adorno, Sexuality and Memory,” in Feminist Interpretations of Theodor Adorno, ed. Renée 
Heberle (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), pp. 193-215. According to Franks, 
the culture industry is an “an-aesthetic” that turns emotions and experiences into commodities. Emotionally 
disengaged pleasure prevents the recipient from putting up resistance to the suffering in the world: “According to 
Adorno’s political aesthetics, art’s duty is to oppose itself to the suffering that takes place in reality. This cannot 
be accomplished if suffering is presented as an object of consumption” (ibid., p. 194). While Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s relating of the culture industry to fascist torture may have seemed exaggerated to past readers of 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, Franks argues that sadism and culture have a point of convergence in the 
pornography industry—something that Adorno did not see. In an immanent critique, Franks brings evidence from 
Dialectic of Enlightenment against Adorno’s “simplistic, misogynist” defense of pornography elsewhere (Franks, 
“An-aesthetic Theory,” p. 211).  
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of 1941, Adorno warns that radio reproduction of a Beethoven symphony plays into atomistic 
listening, principally by its compression of the dynamic range, its shrinking of sound 
architecture to a maquette, which, too small to be entered, falls under the listener’s tinkering 
and manipulation. The radio symphony refers to a missing context. In this way, music 
perceived as something already detached from its context shifts the burden of meaning from 
the whole to the parts: “The weight which falls upon the isolated detail conveys to it an 
importance that it never has in its context. And it is this air of importance that makes it seem to 
‘signify’ or express something all the time, whereas in the original the expression is mediated 
by the whole.”19 The early radio symphony changes the detail’s structure of reference: its 
dynamical contours obscured, the detail no longer seems to refer to other details. For 
perceiving the work as a “meaningful whole” implies that the smallest elements of the work be 
retained in memory, compared and contrasted against one another and related backwards and 
forwards. This aspect is de-emphasized if not altogether suppressed if fine differences in 
dynamics and timbre are not reproduced.20 In the radio symphony of the early forties, the 
hierarchical reference takes precedence: damaged details cannot refer to one another properly 
when the question of the original becomes too distracting. The radio implies a one-to-one 
relationship between present sound and absent original, and this tends to isolate the individual 
detail. This precisely is what makes the radio symphony easy to recuperate for extra-musical 
                                                
19 Theodor W. Adorno, “The Radio Symphony: An Experiment in Theory,” in Essays on Music, p. 265. The 
essay appeared originally in English in Radio Research 1941, ed. Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Frank N. Stanton (New 
York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1941), pp. 110-139. References here are to the Leppert volume. 
20 See esp. Beethoven, Symphony No. 5, I, p. 13, mm. 210-232. Hearing distinctions as fine as piano, più piano 
and pianissimo, as well as the contrast of qualities that these identical intensities produce on string instruments 
versus woodwinds, is crucial in this passage preparing the surprise return (ff!) of the motif at rehearsal letter [C] 
of the first movement. If the fine distinctions in dynamics and timbre are not heard, then the rhythm predominates 
and the entire work threatens to become mere repetition. Granted, Adorno deliberately chooses for his example a 
symphony in which intensity and colour are primary in building up the musical whole; nonetheless, the 
symphonic form itself implies work with dynamics and timbre. 
 89 
ends: it seems to be a symbol lacking a meaning. The listener who is unfamiliar with the work 
cannot solve the mystery of themes loaded with pseudo-significance by charting their 
development in the work, as good listeners traditionally would: unreadable or poorly 
reproduced elements are equally helpless before the “social authoritarianism” of the radio.21 
Furthermore, many contexts in which radios are played interfere with structural listening: 
ambulance sirens, clanking dishes and creaking floorboards can drown out entire passages of 
music, while the demands on the multi-tasking listener to concentrate on the more immediate 
activities of driving or housework distract from the task of listening. To compensate for the 
listener’s distraction, radio installs a mind to animate and subordinate the phenomena 
scattering under its control—the radio announcer. The radio symphony is diffuse. By contrast, 
the live symphony is intense—or can be, when its details are imaginatively delivered from 
sheer immediacy through the efforts of the listener, rather than by blanket technical means. 
Structural listening folds an entire movement into “virtually one moment” when it forms 
solidarity among the details.22  
 Adorno’s contention that the goal of listening is to perceive music as a “meaningful 
whole” is a “little heresy” against his unstinting defense of the particular, summarized in his 
oft-quoted catchphrase, “The whole is the untrue.”23 This contradiction is expressive of a 
change in epoch. The great artwork of the past is actually indifferent to the side from which 
one enters its illusion: disillusionment is produced whether one moves from the whole to the 
part, from the thing to the process, from the fixed motif to the developing variation, or the 
inverse. The reversibility of the process indicates that there is no ultimate disillusionment: 
                                                
21 Adorno, “The Radio Symphony,” p. 264. 
22 Ibid., p. 256. 
23 GS, vol. 4, p. 55 § 29, or prefer to my translation here that of E. F. N. Jephcott, Minima Moralia: Reflections 
on a Damaged Life (London: Verso, 2005), p. 50. 
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illusion is structural. This illusion draws the artwork into relation with the dubious external 
reality that it spurned when it took itself, and not that “reality,” as the index of true and false. 
What seemed to mark the artwork’s separation from contradictory empirical reality, its 
autonomous activation of all merely static opposites into a process of disillusionment, does not 
actually get rid of every illusion. Art is just an illusion after all. The reversibility of its illusion 
suggests that illusion really is bottomless, and so art is different from the reality it rebukes. 
This is why Adorno affirms that “art has truth as the illusion of the illusionless.”24 There is no 
incontrovertible proof that the artwork is really a fragmented process of becoming and not the 
unbroken, fixed whole that it might equally be. Reversible illusion makes the dispelling of all 
illusions—whole, detail, thing, process, gapless unity and dispersing cloud—seem possible, 
but actually the reversible structure of illusion in equally weighted pairs of opposites indicates 
that illusion in general is structural. This is how the great autonomous music of the past was 
able to stand in critical relation to reality. But by the writing of Aesthetic Theory, according to 
Adorno, this situation had changed: “reality” had become the predominance of the social 
whole over the particular. Art responds to this change by making a finer distinction in its 
critique of that reality. Since art criticizes reality through illusion, it finds its illusory character 
thus affected: “The illusory character of artworks has narrowed into the claim to be a 
whole.”25 Whereas the great music of Beethoven criticized the realistic attitude by way of a 
fine balance amongst all its pairs of mediated opposites, such that the good listener would 
necessarily become disillusioned with whatever presented itself as the music’s ultimate 
reality—whole, part, motif, development, sensuous particular, spiritual form, genius, 
technique and so on—, music at some point after Beethoven tended to concentrate the illusion 
                                                
24 GS, vol. 7, p. 199, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 132.   
25 GS, vol. 7, p. 155f., or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 101. 
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on one pair of opposites in particular—that of whole and part—and to direct the movement of 
disillusionment from the whole to the part. Whereas, before, balance was a mark of aesthetic 
illusion, in Adorno’s time “aesthetic inconsistency” is expressive of this illusion. 26 In the 
music of Beethoven, either side of the aesthetic illusion could stand in as “what it appears as” 
or as “what it is.” But where the artwork can appear as a whole but be a swarm of details or 
just as well appear as a confused mass of details but be a whole, then function and quality 
come down to the same thing. If the artwork claims to be a whole, but turns out to be a mass 
of details just as well as it claims to be singular details, but turns out to be a whole, then it 
does eventually make good on its claims, in a roundabout way. Adorno claims that the music 
of his time, by contrast, makes good on its claim to essence “only negatively.”27 In what sense 
is a work that claims to be a whole and appears to be a whole, but turns out to be mere details, 
nonetheless essentially a whole, albeit “negatively”? Suggested in this passage is that the 
artwork is a whole only by inference, only by conjecture from the “positivity” of its 
expression, with its “pathos” and “gesture” toward the transcendent, positivity that the 
aesthetic sphere, as the dedicated sphere of illusion, qualifies as illusory. Art as a whole does 
not claim to be real; it claims to be illusory. In this art is distinct from everything extra-
aesthetic, which, while suffering from a structural illusion, claims to be reality. At the same 
time, art must grasp that art as a whole is not the whole; the whole would be real reconciliation 
between these conflicting and competing spheres. This is why art does not totally detach itself 
from the reality that it opposes.  
                                                
26 GS, vol. 7, p. 156 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 101. 
27 GS, vol. 7, p. 156, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 101. 
{Chapter III}  According to Adorno, the criterion of truth—the determinacy of the 
negation of illusion rather than a positive result—holds good for art as well as for philosophy. 
He claims that “two kinds of truth”—an artistic truth and a philosophical truth, for instance—
“would be incompatible with the idea of the true.”1 The determinateness or qualified character 
of illusion is the criterion of truth, for, under a system of exchange, illusion is disguised by its 
indeterminacy, and the false resides precisely in the indifference toward qualities in exchange. 
Art is not exempt from the universal delusional context of reification, so when it aims at the 
truth, it should find itself in the same aporia as philosophy does. On one hand, its general 
situation is one of falsehood; on the other hand, the Skeptics’ solution to a false world, 
equipollence and the suspension of judgement, ends up reinforcing the status quo—the blind 
acceptance of the delusional context, no matter the suffering it causes. Art, however, makes it 
seem as if it were exempt from the universal context of delusion—and this delusion gives it a 
peculiar illusory character of its own, artistic aesthetic illusion. It is therefore an open question 
whether the determinateness of the negation of illusion is also the criterion of truth in art, 
considering art’s unusual relation to the delusional context. Adorno declares that there is “no 
truth of artworks without determinate negation,” which would support the thesis that art has 
the same standard of truth as philosophy—the specificity of the illusion dissolved.2 But for the 
artwork to negate its own specific illusion—the self-deception that it refuses reification, which 
nothing can escape—, it would either have to affirm itself to be the reified thing that it really is 
or else show itself to be the mere illusion that it is reified, and so the illusion of un-reified life. 
This might make art-truth a different kind of truth: nowhere else in a context of delusion 
                                                
1 GS, vol. 6, p. 397, or prefer to my translations here those of E. B. Ashton, Negative Dialectics (1973; repr., 
New York: Continuum, 1997), p. 405 and p. 406.  
2 GS, vol. 7, p. 195, or prefer to my translation here that of Robert Hullot-Kentor, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel 
Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 129.  
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should affirmation and illusion be considered truth. Yet, Adorno suggests in Negative 
Dialectics that truth is not content to stop with negation: it belongs to the idea of truth not only 
that illusion will disappear, but also that something will be left behind. While for Marx truth 
means reality,3 truth for Adorno presupposes a metaphysical experience whose gains somehow 
converge with the utterly thingly:  
But the surplus in excess of the subject that subjective metaphysical experience will 
not be talked out of and the moment of truth in rem are extremes that touch in the Idea 
of truth. For this would be so little an idea of truth without the subject who escapes 
from illusion as without what is not subject and from which truth gets its prototype.4  
 
It may seem an odd concession to Idealism to have an idea of truth. Idealism, however, does 
not consist in merely having ideas, but rather in subordinating reality to them or else in taking 
them for reality—the real Idealism is not to have an idea of truth, but to have an idea of truth 
such that it controls reality. A non-Idealist concept of realization—“Verwirklichung”—would 
have to restrict itself to the realization of what was unintended and unimagined by theory, just 
as a non-Idealist theory would refrain from giving positive solutions: Adorno praises Marx for 
shying away from “describing classless society in positive terms.”5 Despite this, Adorno 
indicates that Marx’s thesis that the point of philosophy is to change the world “missed” its 
realization—“the transformation of the world went wrong.”6 Although the Cold War, the 
Siberian gulag and, later, the Khmer Rouge, were unintended by Marx’s theory, they do not 
realize philosophy: all of these fall short on the subjective side of idea of truth, which implies 
that subjects escape from illusion. On the other hand, truth is not reached when subjective 
                                                
3 “The question whether human thinking is fit for objective truth is not a matter of theory, but rather a practical 
question. Human beings must demonstrate truth—i.e., reality and power—the world-boundedness of their 
thinking in practice. The quarrel over the reality or unreality of thought—isolated from practice—is a purely 
scholastic question.” Karl Marx, “[Thesen über Feuerbach] 1. Ad Feuerbach,” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
Werke [MEW] (Berlin: Dietz, 1959-68), vol. 3, pp. 5-7, here p. 5, These II (my translation). 
4 GS, vol. 6, p. 368, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 375. 
5 GS, vol. 10.2, p. 780 and p. 781 (my translations).  
6 GS, vol. 6, p. 17, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 3. 
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escape from illusion leaves things as they are. Adorno may have had no illusions about what 
happens when philosophers try to change the world; at the same time, however, there remains 
of this disillusionment a different philosophical practice, which is decidedly interpretation—
fixed in writing, reified though it may be, and so no less free of the delusional context than is 
art.   
 To claim, with Rüdiger Bubner7 and Gilles Moutot,8 that art as a sphere is really free 
from the pervasive illusion of reification is to fall victim to the artistic aesthetic illusion itself, 
to deny that the artwork is a product of organized labour and to buy into the conventional 
wisdom that the artwork is an outpouring of natural genius or of a super-individual who does 
not rely on a highly specialized division of labour. Both Bubner and Moutot misinterpret 
Adorno because they do not see that he applies the category of labour to artworks. They take 
art’s veiled or broken meaning to be freedom from reification, which in Bubner’s case takes 
on irrationalist allures. Bubner’s assumption that in a total context of delusion “we can…only 
place our hopes in a different form of expression, namely in art”9 leads him to conclude that 
for Adorno only what is “beyond our rational capacities” is also “safe from any danger of 
ideological contamination,” in a beyond that he situates in “the pseudo-reality of art.”10 
Bubner contends that Adorno bridges the chasm between art and reason in claiming that the 
autonomous artwork prompts the critic to reveal the universal context of illusion: “It is only 
from a third position, beyond the reification of everyday life and artistic production alike, that 
                                                
7 Rüdiger Bubner, “Kann Theorie ästhetisch werden? Zum Hauptmotiv der Philosophie Adornos,” in Materialien 
zur ästhetischen Theorie Theodor W. Adornos, Konstruktion der Moderne, ed. Burkhardt Lindner and W. Martin 
Lüdke (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), pp. 108-137. In English, see “Can Theory Become Aesthetic? On 
A Principle Theme of Adorno’s Philosophy,” trans. Nicholas Walker, in Theodor W. Adorno, 4 vols., ed. Simon 
Jarvis, Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory (London: Routledge, 2007), vol. 1, pp. 14-39.  
8 Gilles Moutot, Adorno: Langage et réification (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2004).  
9 Bubner, “Kann Theorie ästhetisch werden?,” p. 112 as translated, “Can Theory Become Aesthetic,” p. 18. 
10 Bubner, “Kann Theorie ästhetisch werden?,” p. 117 as translated, “Can Theory Become Aesthetic,” p. 22. 
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this context is effectively revealed in its own right. It is this position which the critical thinker 
claims to occupy.”11 The critical thinker, however, is barred from reproducing this insight in 
the “unshrouded,” and therefore, on Bubner’s account, ideological, language of critique if his 
claim is to have truth: in a reversal of the Hegelian sublation of art by philosophy, “theory 
passes over into aesthetics” in Adorno.12 Bubner’s argument rests on the premise that art is 
free of ideology because it is beyond what subjects can reasonably master. He grants, 
however, that artworks can be more or less advanced and gives rational criteria for what would 
count as a progressive work: “consummate technique and endorsement of the proper course of 
history.”13 Setting aside the question of whether progressively-minded works can be reduced 
to these two criteria, we may conclude that in Bubner’s sense progressive works are not 
beyond “rational capacities”: they have already been submitted to rationality, judgement and 
decision, both during the composition process and in criticism, in order to come out as the 
progressive, supposedly non-ideological works. Finally, Bubner presumes that the standpoint 
of the aesthetic critic guarantees truth uncontaminated by ideology. However, from his lofty 
“third position,” Bubner’s aesthetic critic is not “beyond the reification of everyday life” 
because his material, language, is a thing that expresses by virtue of the past human labour 
implicit in it. Critique may make the past work on particular concepts explicit, but there is 
                                                
11 Bubner, “Kann Theorie ästhetisch werden?,” p. 122 as translated, “Can Theory Become Aesthetic,” p. 26. 
12 Bubner, “Kann Theorie ästhetisch werden?,” p. 131 as translated, “Can Theory Become Aesthetic,” p. 34. 
Jimenez repeats this trope without crediting Bubner, but contrary to him, suggests that a theory that is itself 
aesthetic is simply ideological. Jimenez gives no textual evidence to support his position: “il semble qu’un 
moment arrive où la critique se replie sur soi, où le discours s’érige non plus, par exemple, en discours sur 
l’esthétique, mais en discours esthétique lui-même, où la théorie ‘devient’ esthétique. De la critique, la théorie ne 
conserve plus que la forme et, critique de l’idéologie, elle sombre elle-même dans l’idéologie, finalité en soi et à 
soi, c’est-à-dire sans fin.” (It seems that at a certain point, theory withdraws into itself, discourse no longer 
purports to be a discourse on aesthetics, for example, but rather purports to be aesthetic discourse itself, and 
theory ‘becomes’ aesthetic. All that theory retains from critique is the form, and, as ideology critique, it sinks to 
the level of ideology itself, an end in itself and for itself—that is, endless.) Marc Jimenez, Adorno et la 
modernité: Vers une esthétique négative (s.l.: Éditions Klincksieck, 1986), p. 61. 
13 Bubner, “Kann Theorie ästhetisch werden?,” p. 120 as translated, “Can Theory Become Aesthetic,” p. 25. 
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always an unreflective, congealed side to the language that it takes up. Since the objective 
state of language, the damage that it wears as a result of its use as a vehicle of instrumental 
communication, is insuperable by mere consciousness, the critical writer cannot entirely free 
himself from reified daily existence by taking up some standpoint beyond that existence. 
Adorno explicitly claims that negative dialectics is not a standpoint.14 Like Bubner, Moutot 
places his hopes for theory in the veiled quality of art. Although Moutot indeed recognizes, 
with Lukács and Marx, the spread of reification to language, he considers Adorno to have 
adopted the equivocal aspect of art in order to counter the all-embracing reification. Adorno’s 
“minor philosophy” would, on Moutot’s reading, be “musical.” According to Moutot, the term 
musical means “le lieu d’une tension extrême entre ‘matériau’ et ‘signifiant’, entre mimèsis et 
sens” (the site of an extreme tension between “material” and “signifier,” between “mimesis” 
and “meaning”).15 In other words, Adorno’s “musical” language seems to refer only to itself, 
like art, yet it cannot entirely break free of all reference to communication. Moutot sees such 
musicality as Adorno’s challenge to reification: “l’ultime ‘riposte’ d’Adorno à la réification 
pourrait bien…faire corps avec un tel usage [musical] de la langue: se faufiler entre les 
mécanismes de domination en travaillant à produire du sens en mode mineur” (Adorno’s 
ultimate ‘riposte’ to reification could well…be at one with such [musical] use of language: to 
slip through the mechanisms of domination by working to produce meaning in a minor 
mode).16 While Moutot does not want to call Adorno’s philosophy aesthetic outright—he 
claims that Adorno’s styles resist the “hermetic gesture” and occasion transformations of 
                                                
14 GS, vol. 6, p. 17, or translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 5. 
15 Moutot, Adorno: Langage et réification, p. 120. 
16 Ibid., p. 121. 
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language that are only “like” the tensions of aesthetic illusion—,17 Moutot’s determination of 
the concept of “the musical” as an extreme tension between the material and signifier gives 
itself away as an aesthetic answer to reification. This is because Christoph Menke, whom 
Moutot credits,18 characterizes the aesthetic object in this very way: as an oscillation between 
material and signifier.19 And indeed, Moutot claims that the philosopher can resist reification 
by taking as his models the enigmatic parables of Kafka20 and the paratactic syntax of 
Hölderlin.21 From this we are to conclude that for Moutot what is capable of resisting 
reification is ultimately art. But Moutot’s claim to have found a hidden power against 
reification in “the musical” falls flat for the same reason that the aesthetic sphere on its own 
failed to save Bubner’s critic from the reification of everyday life: something’s being 
enigmatic, hidden, undecidable, veiled or somehow beyond rational mechanisms does not 
alone save it from being reified because reification comes about wherever there is hidden 
labour, and labour can be dissimulated under all of these forms. It is even best dissimulated 
under these forms. Adorno states outright that “the musical” implies reification: “What is 
called ‘musical’ in everyday parlance refers precisely to this idiomatic character, to a 
relationship to music in which the material, by virtue of its reification, has become second 
nature to the musical subject.”22 Adorno’s adoption of writing strategies developed by Kafka 
and Hölderlin does not serve as some ultimate “riposte” to reification because parables and 
                                                
17 Ibid., p. 124 and p. 125 (my translations). 
18 Ibid., p. 122. 
19 See Christoph Menke, The Sovereignty of Art: Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and Derrida, trans. Neil 
Solomon, (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1998), pp. 33-45.   
20 Moutot, Adorno: Langage et réification, p. 121. 
21 Ibid., p. 122f. 
22 GS, vol. 18, p. 161, as translated by Susan H. Gillespie, “On the Contemporary Relationship of Philosophy and 
Music,” in Essays on Music, ed. Richard Leppert (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 135-161, 
here p. 145. 
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parataxis are conventions, which imply forgotten labour, whether in art or not. Art’s lack of 
clear use value may be grounds for the argument that labour is the wrong category to apply to 
artworks. Since production for the sake of production makes the labour stored up in ordinary 
commodities seem useless and worthless, the status of the labour needed to produce 
emphatically useless objects, artworks, is open to an even greater mystification. Adorno 
maintains, against Marx, that the labour contained in useless things does indeed count as 
labour, for usefulness cannot be clearly recognized. On one hand, any thing, even an artwork, 
can be used to expand value; on the other hand, the expansion of value as an end in itself is the 
complete opposite of use—as far as human beings and their needs are concerned—, and labour 
today is organized toward the expansion of value. The artwork’s apparent lack of use-value is 
thus no reason to think it exempt from reification: artworks are ideological because they 
actually “participate in the universal delusional context of reification” and “necessarily reflect 
a relation of living labour as though it were objective [gegenständlich].”23 Yet reification in art 
is different, according to Adorno: “Only through its social power of resistance does art keep 
itself alive; if it does not reify itself, then it becomes commodity.”24 By this, Adorno means 
that if art does not blank out the living labour of society from memory, hiding it in a dead, 
congealed, thingly appearance, then it is helpless to resist its use by capitalism for purely 
instrumental ends of expanding profit.25 Whether artists are aware of the social relations active 
                                                
23 GS, vol. 7, p. 252, or prefer to my translations here Aesthetic Theory, p. 168f.  
24 GS, vol. 7, p. 335, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 226.   
25 See, for example, Marcel Proust, Le Côté de Guermantes, édition présentée par Thierry Laget, établie et 
annotée par Thierry Laget et Brian Rogers (s.l.: Gallimard, 1988), p. 486, or translated by Mark Treharne, The 
Guermantes Way (London: Allen Lane, 2002), p. 501, where Proust compares the outmoded language of the 
Duchess of Guermantes to the savoury dishes seasoned with authentic salt from Guérande, which appear in 
Pampille’s Les Bons Plats de France as presently on offer for the palate to discover, but which are in reality rare. 
In making allusion to Guérande sea salt, Proust admits the work of the “hommes de sel” (salt harvesters) into his 
novel. He does not represent the work of the salt harvesters, as Soviet music “represents” automated labour, but 
work is implicit in À la recherche du temps perdu as it is implicit in all fetishes. Proust’s literature lives off the 
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in their artworks is a matter of indifference. Art is social because the artist cannot produce 
everything on which the artwork depends for its existence. In the coffee that the composer 
drinks to aid concentration, in the train that takes him to premieres in distant capitals, in the 
crab pastries that fuel his intellectual exchanges with other musicians and in the Wurst that he 
eats to sustain himself between rehearsals, in the manuscript paper on which he traces the 
calligraphy of his music, in the mountain villa that frees him from distractions, in the shaving 
kit that prepares his public face and in the wood, gut, hair, skin, felt, brass, reed and silver that 
bring his composition to realization, others’ time has been expended, and it would be wrong to 
believe that their energy does not contribute to the artwork. Contrary to the other piece of 
popular wisdom—that the artwork is a pure, natural expression of individual life—, the life 
that the artist puts at the service of his works is fundamentally reproduced by society, whether 
the artist is conscious of this or not: “The labour in the artwork is social through the 
individual, but without the individual being necessarily conscious of society in the process—
all the more so, perhaps, the less conscious the individual is.”26 The artwork is the thing that 
ultimately reflects as a thing the relation of living labour in every thing that passes through an 
individual’s hand. Even when the artist’s role is reduced to a minimum, even when he does 
nothing but present a curator with a piece of charred willow that he has found by the river, as 
John Catto in fact did in 1975, this does not escape the fact that a society-wide organization of 
labour must obtain in order for things with no clear utility to be, even if not produced and 
distributed, then at least presented and indefinitely conserved. Kettle’s Yard in Cambridge, 
                                                                                                                                                    
work of society, and not only because Proust himself was a rentier supported by uncompensated labour: Proust’s 
elaborate comparison between the Duchess’s speech and fine regional specialties would not be without the 
unmentioned work of those who actually rake up, clean, dry out, package and distribute Brittany sea salt. The 
artwork is truly reified in that it dissimulates this social labour as the individual Marcel Proust’s immediate, 
spontaneous genius for similarities. 
26 GS, vol. 7, p. 250, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 167.  
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England, where St. Edmund is on permanent display, is financed by a number of granting 
bodies and foundations that presuppose a system of capital accumulation and administration—
so, labour relations.27 Yet the artwork dissimulates these relations of labour with its thingly 
appearance, hence its ideological character. While art is ideology’s “accomplice,” art itself 
does not “slump to ideology,” indistinguishable from every other kind of social illusion.28 
Artworks are necessarily reifying because this is how they are able to generate a contradiction 
between what they appear to be and what they are: “Reification is essential [essentiell] to 
works and contradicts their essence-as-appearing [ihrem Wesen als Erscheinendem].”29 
Traditionally, philosophers defined the essence of artworks as appearance—as fleeting, 
changing play, manifesting itself here and now. This is what artworks give themselves to be. 
But artworks are things. However, their mute, fixed thinghood relates to society-wide 
processes that artworks themselves dissimulate and would prefer not to have discussed. 
Artworks generate an internal logic of disillusionment despite themselves, but only because 
they are reified despite themselves. This “dialectic despite itself” is what opens the work onto 
truth. Truth is not accidental to the successful artwork, for “only failed ones [artworks] are 
untrue.”30 Nor is success accidental to the artwork, for “the concept of the artwork implies that 
of success” and “failed artworks are not artworks.”31 Yet the production of truth content is not 
concurrent with the production of the work, but is only ever decided after the fact, in 
interpretation: “The need of works for interpretation—insofar as it is the production of their 
                                                
27 See the endmatter of the Kettle’s Yard House Guide: “Kettle’s Yard is an institution of the University of 
Cambridge, regularly supported by East England Arts and the Arts Council of England, Cambridge City, South 
Cambridgeshire District and Cambridgeshire County Councils, Museums Service East of England and The Henry 
Moore Foundation.” Kettle’s Yard House Guide, foreword by Jim Ede (Cambridge: Kettle’s Yard, 2002), [p. 48]. 
28 GS, vol. 7, p. 203, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 134. 
29 GS, vol. 7, p. 153, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 99.  
30 GS, vol. 7, p. 196, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 130. 
31 GS, vol. 7, p. 280, or prefer to my translations here Aesthetic Theory, p. 188. 
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truth content—, is stigmatic of their constitutive insufficiency.”32 Since works must be true to 
be art, Adorno implies that a work does not fully become art in being made. With this move, 
Adorno situates the deciding factor of art as far away from the artist’s intentions as possible. 
For if artists conferred the status of art onto their works, then painted chancel screens, 
Turner’s preparatory watercolours and perhaps the entire bundle of writings that Kafka had 
instructed Max Brod to burn would not be artworks, while a self-published volume of purple 
prose would be. The artist’s intention to make an artwork cannot at any rate be certified, and 
not even the makers’ explicit instructions as to the handling of their works can be simply taken 
as direct, sincere expressions of their intentions. At the same time, Adorno also avoids 
pegging truth to some conditions relating to the work’s origins. If a work’s being art were 
entirely decided in its creation, then aesthetics would amount to historiography, the seeking-
out of evidence for a set of invariable art-indicators present at the beginning. Adorno 
challenges originalist and historicist definitions of art in maintaining that artworks always 
arrive without titles, and so require interpretation to make the case that they are art. 
 Since artworks each require interpretation to be art, this then raises the question as to 
whether art does not depend on philosophy and other forms of discursive criticism to make its 
truth claim. An assumption of art’s dependence on philosophy is perhaps what moves Albrecht 
Wellmer for one to claim that art does not have truth, but a mere truth potential.33 Yet 
Wellmer proceeds “on the basis that we can only speak of the truth of art if we already know 
what is meant by truth independently of this specific context,” where “truth” is taken “in the 
                                                
32 GS, vol. 7, p. 194, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 128.  
33 Albrecht Wellmer, “Wahrheit, Schein, Versöhnung: Adornos äesthetische Rettung der Modernität,” in Zur 
Dialektik von Moderne und Postmoderne: Vernunftkritik nach Adorno (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), pp. 
9-47, or translated by David Midgley, “Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation: Adorno’s Aesthetic Redemption of 
Modernity,” in The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics, and Postmodernism (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press, 1991), pp. 1- 35.  
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sense of being faithful to reality.”34 The idea of truth as actual, non-artistic truth, which risks 
affirming whatever is, is a standard that art as art, being unreal, can never attain. Wellmer’s 
reading, however, is not adequate to the aesthetic theory of Adorno, who on occasion suggests 
that art’s truth is its negativity: “In art, a non-being is true.”35 If one admits such a thing as the 
total delusion-context of reification—and Wellmer does—, then mere reality cannot be the 
measure of truth. When reality is a necessary illusion, truth has to do something other than 
merely be faithful to reality: it must negate some aspect of it.36 But rather than conclude from 
the condition of social illusion that truth can no longer be conceived positively as “fidelity,” 
Wellmer concludes that truth is fidelity to a “real utopia,” which he links with non-violent 
communication.37 But Wellmer errs in reducing the intimation of aesthetic “speech” at the 
close of Aesthetic Theory to human communication, because there Adorno clearly states that 
the artwork brings social content “to speech” only by returning to itself, in deepening art-
specific techniques.38 It does not seem, therefore, as though art needs discourse to determine 
and negate some aspect of the all-encompassing illusion—its pretences of wholeness, its 
fixity, and so on. Yet Adorno is split over Hermann Lotze’s gloss on Hegel—“Die 
Wissenschaft der Kunst ist uns daher mehr Bedürfniß als die Kunst selbst” (Scholarship of art 
                                                
34 Wellmer, “Wahrheit, Schein, Versöhnung,” p. 16 and p. 43 as translated, “Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation,” 
p. 9 and p. 35. 
35 GS, vol. 7, p. 198, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 131. 
36 The negativity of truth is what leads Simon Jarvis to assert: “The truth content of works of art, like that of 
philosophy, inheres in the determinate negation of untruth. It cannot be thought of as a kind of kernel which is 
inside the shell of the work of art and needs to be got out with philosophical nutcrackers [!].” Simon Jarvis, 
Adorno: A Critical Introduction, New York: Routledge, 1998, p. 104. 
37 Wellmer, “Wahrheit, Schein, Versöhnung,” p. 29 as translated, “Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation,” p. 21. 
38 For a rebuttal of Wellmer’s attempt to situate Adorno’s aesthetics within Habermas’s theory of communicative 
action, see Donald A. Burke, “Adorno’s Aesthetics of Reconciliation: Negative Presentation of Utopia or Post-
metaphysical Pipe-Dream?” in Donald A. Burke et al. (eds.), Adorno and the Need in Thinking: New Critical 
Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), pp. 233-260. Martin Jay long ago showed Adorno’s (and 
Benjamin’s) theory of intentionless truth to be incompatible with the “communicative notion of truth as an 
intersubjective construct” defended by Habermas. Martin Jay, Adorno (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1984), p. 77.  
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is thus more needful to us than art itself).39 On the one hand, Adorno criticizes the gloss for its 
“hierarchical view of the relationship of the intellectual domains to one another”; on the other 
hand, he sees “prophetic truth” to it, in that art “needs philosophy for the sake of its own 
content’s unfolding.”40 This split is reproduced in statements scattered throughout Aesthetic 
Theory. On one hand, Adorno re-activates the subordination of art to philosophy in Hegel’s 
system. For instance, he states that “genuine [genuine] aesthetic experience must become 
philosophy or it is not at all.”41 He claims that art’s truth content “is to be gained only through 
philosophical reflection.”42 On the other hand, Adorno suggests that truth content is non-
discursive. He proposes that some art—like that of Wagner—is true as an “expression of a 
consciousness false in itself,” but then goes on to claim that the “merely adequate expression 
of false consciousness” cannot be separated from what is true in itself.43 All art, not just that of 
Wagner, is “the merely adequate expression of false consciousness” because “to date, correct 
consciousness has not existed, and neither likewise one in which such separation would be 
offered to view from a bird’s eye perspective”; rather, “perfect delivery [vollkommene 
Darstellung] of false consciousness is the name for it and itself truth content.”44 Since Adorno 
states that art’s “expression opposes expressing something,”45 then a subjective genitive 
should be read into the phrases “expression of a consciousness false in itself”46 and “perfect 
delivery of false consciousness.”47 It is important to note that false consciousness is not the 
                                                
39 Hermann Lotze, Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland (München: Cotta, 1868), p. 190 (my translation). 
40 GS, vol. 7, p. 141, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 91.   
41 GS, vol. 7, p. 197, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 131. 
42 GS, vol. 7, p. 193, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 28.  
43 GS, vol. 7, p. 196, or prefer to my translations here Aesthetic Theory, p. 129 and p. 129f. 
44 GS, vol.,7, p. 196, or prefer to my translations here Aesthetic Theory, p. 129f. and p. 130.  
45 GS, vol. 7, p. 171, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 112. 
46 GS, vol. 7, p. 196, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 129. 
47 GS, vol. 7, p. 196, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 130. 
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content of art’s expression; rather, expression is itself content. And since neither expression 
nor delivery necessarily implies concepts, then it seems that artworks can be true 
independently of philosophical reflection. 
 The contradiction over whether art requires philosophy to make its truth claim does not 
stem from an oversight or some confusion on Adorno’s part.  
 In the paragraph entitled “Art and Philosophy; Collective Content of Art” in Aesthetic 
Theory, he clearly lays out the contradiction. The goal of this paragraph is to find the point of 
convergence between art and philosophy.48  
 Adorno first posits the thesis that “philosophy and art converge in their truth 
content.”49 He then offers a philosophical history that traces the formation, flourishing and 
dissolution of the thesis. The relating of art and philosophy through truth content begins at the 
moment when philosophy seizes the truth of art’s autonomy and attempts to copy it. And so 
Idealist systems are born: “The unified, internally self-circling totality of Idealist systems is 
read out of artworks.”50 However, philosophy does not possess art’s autarky because it 
necessarily works with concepts, which bear on reality. And so the grand Idealist systems’ 
self-sufficiency is eventually unmasked as a sham. But the disillusionment with Idealism also 
                                                
48 Cf. Benedetto Croce, What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel, trans. Douglas Ainslie, 
from the original text of the third Italian edition, 1912 (London: Macmillan, 1915), p. 88-95. Croce accuses Hegel 
of not distinguishing between the theory of opposites and the theory of distincts: art and philosophy are distinct 
from one another, not opposites, which means that, even on Hegel’s own terms, philosophy should not surpass art 
(ibid., p. 94) as they do in Hegel’s system—in what Croce has called an “abuse of the triadic form” (ibid., p. 97). 
Hyong-Won Min reads into Adorno’s relating of art and philosophy in the rescue of illusion a systematicity that 
finds little support in his corpus: “Aesthetic theory is…on balance, the result of Adorno’s entire theoretical effort, 
which he relays to diverse areas, from philosophy of history and social theory to epistemology, up to 
philosophical aesthetics. Adorno makes this systematic kind of linkage between aesthetics and the other 
disciplines because sociologically he ties art to the idea of reconciliation and epistemologically he ties art to truth, 
which gets lost in the present universal context of delusion.” Hyung-won Min, Zur Kritik und Rettung des 
Scheins bei Th. W. Adorno: Der Zusammenhang der Gesellschafts-, Erkenntnistheorie und der Ästhetik 
(Frankfurt am Main: R. G. Fischer, 1992), p. 159, in my translation.          
49 GS, vol. 7, p. 197 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 130.  
50 GS, vol. 7, p. 197, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 130. 
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plays into the truth of art’s autonomy because the identity that philosophy postulates with art 
is effective, and so “the progressively self-unfolding truth of the artwork is none other than 
that of the philosophical concept.”51 After this, art has to register the falsehood of grand 
Idealist systems, which it can do by disrupting its own autonomy, since its autonomy has 
become the cipher for Idealist systems. Art thus disrupts its autonomy by tying itself to the 
purely commercial ends in the production of surplus value—or, alternatively, to political 
ends.52 At the same time, however, the in-itself of art truth, of which Idealist truth was a 
derivation, does not disappear without a trace. The works themselves are traces of their 
disappeared truth. But commercial products of the culture industry and social realist works, in 
their retroactive negation of aesthetic autonomy, considerably trouble their own interpretation: 
in negating aesthetic autonomy, they also unfortunately negate the relation to philosophy, 
which would provide keys to unriddling the negation of autonomy. Art’s rupture with 
philosophy means that the contemporary consciousness, formed in the school of the culture 
industry, fails to see the precise object of aesthetic heteronomy’s critique. Normal 
consciousness of today thus fails to make critical distinctions, and simply refuses all dealings 
with art, which it considers, to use a popular epitaph, elitist: “The contemporary 
consciousness, fixated on what is blatant and unmediated, obviously finds it the hardest thing 
of all to recover this relation to art, whereas without this relation, art’s truth content does not 
open itself up.”53 The Hegelian-sounding statement that “genuine aesthetic experience must 
become philosophy or it is not at all” draws the consequence of art and philosophy converging 
                                                
51 GS, vol. 7, p. 197, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 130. 
52 Wellmer’s somewhat instrumental reading of the artwork as creating a potential for the “real utopia of non-
violent communication” might be understood as a reflection of the contemporary disruption in art’s autonomy. 
“Wahrheit, Schein, Versöhnung,” p. 29 as translated, “Truth, Semblance, Reconciliation,” p. 21. 
53 GS, vol. 7, p. 197, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 131.   
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in their truth content.54 Yet art’s traditional dependence on philosophy may be comprehended 
only in the contemporary incomprehension towards works of art, only when philosophy and 
art have diverged. According to the philosophical history outlined, the traditional convergence 
of art and philosophy in their truth content was not struck up by mutual agreement, but rather 
initiated by Idealist philosophy: and so it is in effect philosophy that dominates in the 
relationship based on truth content. —  But the force of this consequence is reversed by a dash 
that immediately follows it. Adorno then posits the antithesis: “The condition for the 
possibility of the convergence of philosophy and art is to be found in the element of 
universality that art has in its specification—as a language sui generis.”55 If the dash is read as 
signalling a reprise, then what follows takes the form of a new beginning and a new relation of 
art and philosophy. At the fall of Idealist systems, the truth of autonomous, monadic existence 
looks dubious in philosophy and in art alike. Furthermore, in a total context of delusion, art’s 
truth in-itself, which philosophy so envied, is not as pure as it seemed: “The separation 
between a thing that is true in itself and the merely adequate expression of false consciousness 
is not to be maintained.”56 So, the hermetic, autonomous artistic truth in itself that philosophy 
was imitating and whose imitation opened artistic truth to philosophical interpretation has 
transformed. Truth is no longer understood as what remains once all partial perspectives have 
been removed, but it is now an adequate expression from one of those partial perspectives. 
Now if truth content is the merely adequate expression or the perfect delivery expressed or 
delivered by a false consciousness, philosophy and art can no longer converge in truth content, 
for these expressions and deliveries are medium-specific particulars. The commonplace notion 
                                                
54 GS, vol. 7, p. 197, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 131. 
55 GS, vol. 7, p. 197, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 131. 
56 GS, vol. 7, p. 196, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 129f. 
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of an identical, universal truth content that is poured into various containers is unsustainable 
because truth is no longer what is expressed—as we took it to be in high bourgeois art’s 
positive “meanings” of freedom, autonomy, humanity, justice or harmony, which turned out to 
be just the aspirations of the unfolding philosophical concept. When the domination by 
concepts becomes questionable, it also becomes clear that the locus for truth in art is to be 
found in the particular expression: “The philosophical interpretation of the truth content must 
steadfastly construct it in the particular.”57 What is expressed, art’s “meaning,” turns out to be 
only an illusory reflection of Idealist philosophy. Art language is in this way language sui 
generis, expression that does not express something. The artwork’s inseparability of truth in-
itself from perfect delivery of a false consciousness cuts both ways, making expression or 
delivery into an in-itself: “Being-for-other so greedily devours expression, with which art 
locks itself away from it, to speak in itself: this is art’s mimetic enactment.”58 The idea here is 
that art locks itself in from the inside. Expression is the key to art, but held within it, safe from 
the outside heteronomy. Art opens itself to interpretation, but only when the interpreter 
refrains from instrumentalizing expression, which would leave art to be consumed. In other 
words, the “key,” expression, cannot serve the purpose of communication—expressing 
something. Art language thus differs from signifying language, whose elements communicate 
things, and which attains to universality in the subsuming of particulars under more or less 
stable concepts. Yet art language also possesses an element of universality, which Adorno 
claims should be the model for philosophical universality.59  
                                                
57 GS, vol. 7, p. 198, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 131. 
58 GS, vol. 7, p. 171, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 112. 
59 Cf. Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or, the Persistence of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 2007). 
Jameson equates “modern art” with “nominalistic art” (ibid., p. 157). This was not a position that Adorno 
adopted, for example, in his statement that “by means of construction, art desperately wants to escape from its 
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 The demonstration of the way in which an individual expression can have universal 
force takes up the second half of the paragraph on art and philosophy. The goal of the 
demonstration is to show that the particular artistic expression does not need to borrow the 
universality necessary for truth from the concept. In other words, art would have no mere truth 
potential waiting to be actualized by philosophy. 
 The question of how something can have universal weight without a concept might be 
the original aesthetic problematic, formulated by Kant. Kant denies that a concept of beauty is 
operative in the judgement of taste. In saying that a thing is beautiful, we are not picking out 
and bringing together certain marks that all beautiful things share—for example, their being 
small, smooth, gradually varied, delicate and either clear-hued or colour-balanced, as in 
Edmund Burke’s definition of beauty.60 Yet Kant wants to save the judgement of taste from 
relativism, whereby it would be merely the expression of conventions, fashion, habits or 
                                                                                                                                                    
nominalistic situation, to extricate itself by its own power from a sense of accidentalness and attain what is 
overarchingly binding, or, if one will, universal” (GS, vol. 7, p. 91 as translated Aesthetic Theory, p. 57). It is the 
situation that is nominalistic, not the art, which is critical of the situation. Moreover, Jameson suggests that 
Adorno himself participates in Modern art’s “repudiation of the universal” (Late Marxism, p. 157). Jameson 
states that “Adorno must also argue against himself” (ibid., p. 159) because he sees Adorno’s supposed 
nominalism entering into conflict with “his single-shot description formal category,…that of construction” (ibid., 
p. 159). Jameson offers no textual support for the apparent hegemony of construction in Adorno’s aesthetics. 
More importantly, he ignores Adorno’s emphatic statements on nominalism. Adorno’s resistance towards 
nominalism can be traced to 1926, when he defended himself to Alban Berg against Schoenberg, who bristled at 
Adorno’s recourse to the word “truth” in the essay on Berg’s Wozzeck (GS, vol. 18, pp. 456-464). That 
Schoenberg and his circle were adherents of Karl Kraus is well known. While seeking to establish some common 
ground with Schoenberg’s Kraussian outlook, Adorno also makes it clear to Berg that he does not wish “to argue 
with him over the depth and the problems of Kraus’s nominalism [Krausschen Nominalismus],” over its 
“intention to eradicate the great universals in our language.” Adorno to Berg, Frankfurt am Main, January 6, 
1926, in Theodor W. Adorno and Alban Berg, Briefwechsel, 1925-1935, herausgegeben von Henri Lonitz 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), p. 58 as translated by Wieland Hoban, Correspondence 1925-1935 
(Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 2005), p. 38.  
 In Negative Dialectics, Adorno claims that “nominalism has passed into ideology” and that “the relation 
of genuine critical philosophy to nominalism is not fixed; it changes historically with the function of skepticism” 
(GS, vol. 6, p. 59n).  
60 Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, edited 
and with an introduction by James T. Boulton (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), pp. 113-117.  
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personal inclination. The reason why Adorno does not consider Kant’s own solution adequate 
will become clear with a brief outline of the Kantian argument.  
 Kant’s determination of aesthetic as subjective, right at the outset of the first part of the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment, poses a remarkable challenge to his methodology, which 
so far has accorded priority to the object:  
In order to decide whether or not something is beautiful, we do not relate the 
representation by means of understanding to the object for cognition, but rather relate 
it by means of the imagination (perhaps combined with the understanding) to the 
subject and its feeling of pleasure or displeasure. The judgement of taste is therefore 
not a cognitive judgement, hence not a logical one, but is rather aesthetic, by which is 
understood one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective.61 
 
Despite his identification of the aesthetic with the subjective, Kant wishes to distinguish 
between a satisfaction that is merely limited to this or that person, involving merely his or her 
private likes and dislikes, and one that accompanies the decision that something is beautiful. 
Kant claims that the judgement that something is beautiful has universal validity. At the same 
time, this element of universality cannot come from what usually grants universality—the 
concept—, for concepts necessarily connect to objects, whereas “nothing at all in the object is 
designated” by means of feelings of pleasure and displeasure.62 Another way to put this is to 
say that in the aesthetic judgement, the object’s existence is a matter of indifference.63 Kant’s 
doctrine of aesthetic disinterestedness, which does not refer to a phlegmatic psychological 
state of the subject, but rather to the absence of relation between the representation and the 
                                                
61 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5:203. The pagination given here and throughout corresponds to 
the Academy of Sciences edition of Kant’s works (Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: G. Reimer/ W. de 
Gruyter, 1902-), and appears in the margins of Guyer and Matthews’s translation. Bold typeface in the translation 
is reproduced here in italics. 
62 Ibid., 5:204.  
63 Ibid., 5:209.  
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object, then raises the question as to how aesthetics can be scientific. Kant lays out the stakes 
of his aesthetics in these terms:  
But [aesthetic] universality cannot come from concepts. For there is no transition from 
concepts to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure (except in pure practical laws, which 
however bring with them an interest of the sort that is not combined with the pure 
judgement of taste). Consequently there must be attached to the judgement of taste, 
with the consciousness of an abstraction in it from all interest, a claim to validity for 
everyone without the universality that pertains to objects, i.e., it must be combined 
with a claim to subjective universality.64 
 
While Kant asserts here that there is no passage from concepts to feelings, one of his most 
fundamental tenets is that there must be a passage from the faculty of the understanding to the 
faculty of reason in order for a freely determined end to appear in nature, which is not itself 
free.65 It is the faculty of judgement that coordinates the faculty of the understanding with the 
faculty of reason so that theory may pass over into practice in this way. Besides coordinating 
the other two higher faculties, the faculty of judgement does what all higher faculties do, 
which is to constitute the a priori principles for its lower faculty, which in this case is the 
feeling of pleasure and displeasure.66 As part of its legislating role for the other two higher 
faculties, the faculty of judgement attributes its a priori principle (purposiveness) to nature, 
and so makes it legitimate for the power of the understanding to know nature by introducing 
into its order a unity of principles.67 The purposiveness that we observe in nature is therefore 
                                                
64 Ibid., 5:211f. 
65 See ibid., 5:168; 5:176-79 and 5:197f.  
66 See ibid, 5:196-98, esp. 5:197f: “In regard to the faculties of the soul in general, insofar as they are considered 
as higher faculties, i.e., as ones that contain an autonomy, the understanding is the one that contains the 
constitutive principles a priori for the faculty of cognition (the theoretical cognition of nature); for the feeling of 
pleasure and displeasure it is the power of judgement, independent of concepts and sensations that are related to 
the determination of the fauclty of desire and could thereby be immediately practical; for the faculty of desire it is 
reason, which is practical without the mediation of any sort of pleasure, wherever it might come from, and 
determines for this faculty, as a higher faculty, the final end, which at the same time brings with it the pure 
intellectual satisfaction in the object” (boldface type in Guyer and Matthews’s translation, denoting Kant’s 
Fettdruck, here reproduced as italics). Cf. “First Introduction,” in Critique of the Power of Judgment, 20:246. 
67 Kant, 5:187. 
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not actually a property of the object, but subjective, introduced by the faculty of judgement.68 
The faculty of judgement leaves a trace of its work legislating for cognition in the pleasure felt 
whenever the architectonic of reason gains in elegance.69 For the faculty of judgement also 
constitutes the principle for its lower faculty that the attainment of every aim will be combined 
with pleasure.70 To unify heterogeneous laws under a higher one attains an aim, only 
suggested by the purposiveness of nature, and so is accompanied by pleasure.71 The pleasure 
that we experience, then, in a representation of the purposiveness of nature itself is a pleasure 
of peculiar kind. It is not of the kind that accompanies the attainment of an aim: the beautiful 
is “purposiveness without an end [Zweck, purpose].”72 This pleasure merely refers us back to 
the faculty of judgement, which is the origin of the “concept” of purposiveness. For 
purposiveness precedes concepts: it in fact makes concepts possible. The purposiveness of 
nature is indeed what spurs the subject to know nature and to make of the entire body of 
knowledge an organic whole, like an “animal body.”73 For Kant, the judgement of taste has 
universal validity because, although the quality of the beautiful, the purposiveness, is not a 
quality of the object of the judgement, it is the attribute that makes every experience possible:    
By contrast, the pleasure in the beautiful is neither a pleasure of enjoyment, nor of a 
lawful activity, and not even of a contemplation involving subtle reasoning in 
accordance with ideas, but of mere reflection. Without having any purpose or 
fundamental principle for a guide, this pleasure accompanies the common 
apprehension of an object by the imagination, as a faculty of intuition, in relation to the 
understanding, as a faculty of concepts, by means of a procedure of the power of 
judgement, which it must also exercise for the sake of the most common experience: 
                                                
68 Kant, 5:189. 
69 Kant, 5:187f.  
70 Kant, 5:187. 
71 Kant, 5:187f.  
72 Kant, 5:241, as translated except where indicated. 
73 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), A833/B861. The pagination given here and throughout, with “A” and “B” 
editions noted, corresponds to the Academy of Sciences edition of Kant’s works (Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, 
Berlin: G. Reimer/ W. de Gruyter, 1902-) and appears in the margins of Guyer and Wood’s translation. 
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only in the latter case it is compelled to do so for the sake of an empirical objective 
concept, while in the former case (in the aesthetic judging) it is merely for the sake of 
perceiving the suitability of the representation for the harmonious (subjectively 
purposive) occupation of both cognitive faculties in their freedom, i.e., to sense the 
representational state with pleasure. This pleasure must necessarily rest on the same 
conditions in everyone, since they are subjective conditions of the possibility of a 
cognition in general, and the proportion of these cognitive faculties that is required for 
taste is also requisite for the common and healthy understanding that one may 
presuppose in everyone.74  
 
By means of a transcendental argument, then, Kant grounds art’s universality in the conditions 
of the possibility of experience—conditions found, to be sure, in the faculties. Although not 
everyone may actually agree that the object of the judgement of taste is beautiful, the 
judgement does indeed concern everyone, for it discovers on the object the reflection of what 
makes any cognition possible for anyone, without however itself being a cognition. 
Furthermore, this discovery could in principle be communicated to everyone.  
 Adorno, however, doubts that “the judgement of taste is…not a cognitive judgement, 
hence not a logical one, but is rather aesthetic, by which is understood one whose determining 
ground cannot be other than subjective.”75 According to Adorno, this thesis runs 
immediately into a contradiction: aesthetic judgement is not supposed to be logical; yet Kant 
claims on the same page that the aesthetic judgement about the beautiful takes certain 
moments into consideration, and that these correspond to logical functions. Kant claims that 
the judgement of taste is concerned with quality first.76 But Adorno thinks that if the 
judgement of taste is concerned first and foremost with quality, then this implies a pre-
judgement about which logical function concerns it the most. He does not think that it makes 
sense for Kant to claim that the judgement of taste “is not a logical one”: “On the one hand, 
                                                
74 Kant, 5:292f. 
75 Kant, 5:203. 
76 Kant, 5:203n. 
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Kant treats the judgement of taste as a logical function and thus attributes this function to the 
aesthetic object to which the judgement would indeed need to be adequate; on the other hand, 
the artwork is said to present itself ‘without a concept,’ a mere intuition, as if it were simply 
extra-logical.”77 But while Kant states that the judgement of taste is not a logical judgement, 
his use of the logical functions is merely a heuristic or guide in pursuing the question of what 
is “required for calling an object beautiful.”78 But Adorno wants to claim that, since quality,79 
quantity,80 relation81 and modality82 are all required for calling an object beautiful, Kant 
contradicts himself in asserting that the judgement of taste is not necessarily logical, and 
objective, other judgements.83  
 Kant’s attempt to secure the judgement of taste’s universality by relating it back to the 
faculties of mind and mental functions makes it unacceptable to Adorno, who considers the 
appeal to the faculties Idealist.  
 While Adorno rejects Kant’s solution to the problem of aesthetic universality on the 
grounds that it does not allow for the subject to relate to beautiful artworks as objects and to 
                                                
77 GS, vol. 7, p. 149, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 97. 
78 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:203n. 
79 Ibid., 5:203. 
80 Ibid., 5:211. 
81 Ibid., 5:219. 
82 Ibid., 5:236. 
83 Adorno’s strategy is to show that there is a contradiction between functions and qualities in Kant’s account of 
the aesthetic judgement so that he may then claim that Kant’s aesthetics registers the split between exchange 
value and use value that characterizes the commodity, and is thus advanced. But the attempt to derive a critique 
of the commodity structure in a rote Lukács-type treatment of the judgement of taste remains formalist and, as 
such, unconvincing as long as it suppressses the historical background for Kant’s assertion that the beautiful 
object is “without a concept.” Kant’s aesthetics is progressive because it directly challenges the conservative 
Burke’s concept of the beautiful, which is a collection of pre-determined empirical characteristics. In Kant, logic 
serves as a clue or guide to look into aesthetic judgements in general, whereas Burke’s definition of the beautiful 
renders the judgement of taste the mere result of a logical procedure. In Burke’s aesthetics, the rose is beautiful 
because beautiful things are small, smooth, delicate, clear-hued and gradually varied and the particular rose falls 
under the definition. In Kant’s aesthetics, the judgement of taste is not logical and cannot be reached by way of 
Burkean bureaucratic proceduralism. 
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make judgements on them that can be true or false, he nonetheless admits the Kantian thesis 
that what is beautiful is “purposive without a purpose.” Kant himself turns out not to be the 
great systematizer that he is often made out to be. His formulation that the beautiful is what is 
“purposive without a purpose” indeed, by expressing an aesthetic contradiction, goes beyond 
the needs of the system to be a completely self-relating whole. For, according to Kant, 
purposiveness observed in nature does not exist in itself, but is a principle added to nature by 
the subject to achieve the ends of forming concepts and making of knowledge an organic 
whole; purposiveness in the beautiful object is different because it achieves no concept and 
does not introduce any unity of principles into the architectonic of knowledge. The purely 
empirical observation of reality never really discovers proof that nature in itself naturally gives 
itself to human knowledge. The empirical observer might argue that the proof that nature gives 
itself to be known is that it actually provides us with the fruits of wisdom—in other words, it 
is purposive. But the proof of the pudding is not necessarily in the eating. Purposiveness 
reveals itself to be a subjective addition to nature only in the experience of beauty, where there 
is pleasure, yet without the subject attaining the aims of achieving a concept and introducing 
unity into reason. The conclusion to draw from an experience of beauty is that, in itself, there 
is no necessary, objective, essential connection between purposiveness, on the one hand, and 
the systematicity and conceptuality of knowledge, on the other. Kant and Adorno are agreed 
that purposiveness is a principle that the subject inserts into reality to serve its own needs, but 
the two thinkers depart when they try to rescue purposiveness—in other words, when they try 
to read more out of the thing, so that it cannot just be dismissed and ignored as something 
trifling, just false or merely contingent. Kant reads out of it the subjective freedom of the 
faculties, whereas Adorno reads out of it the objective constraint of society. For Kant, 
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purposiveness is what we add so that we can understand nature (through concepts). For 
Adorno, any need for knowledge to appear as an organic whole is properly a social necessity 
and any appearance of purposiveness in nature, socially necessary illusion. According to 
Adorno, Kant does not remain true to the aesthetic antinomy “purposiveness without purpose” 
because ultimately he refers the lack of concepts in art back to the faculty of judgement, which 
legislates for the other two higher faculties, so to the a priori condition for the possibility of 
concepts. Kant considers that referring the judgement of taste back to the faculty of 
judgement, so, indirectly, to all three higher faculties, as good as secures the artwork’s 
necessity and universality, since he views the faculties as static, permanent features of human 
mind on which all cognitions, past, present and future, depend. According to Adorno’s 
definition, this move is Idealist, and ultimately makes an apology for purposiveness—and so, 
for organicism—since, in Kant’s system, human minds are naturally set up in such a way as to 
produce the principle of purposiveness, and could not form concepts, and so, cognition, 
without it. Adorno cannot accept the claim that the faculties are just set up in such a way that 
the subject must strive to make of knowledge an organic whole or else know nothing at all. He 
rejects the way in which Kant resolves the paradox. The judgement of taste is rational for Kant 
because ultimately it refers to the way in which our faculties are set up in general, so that the 
particularity of the judgement is subordinated to features of all minds. Adorno wishes to avoid 
such Idealism and therefore brings out the dynamic, historical, socially-determined dimension 
of the faculties. His aesthetics make the case for art, and especially for music, as knowledge 
without concepts.84 In this way, Adorno remains true to the objective aesthetic contradiction 
                                                
84 See Martin Zenck, Kunst als begrifflose Erkenntnis, Theorie und Geschichte der Literatur und der schönen 
Künste, herausgegeben von Max Imdahl et al., vol. 29 (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1977), esp. Kapitel 3, 
“Erkenntnischarakter der Musik,” pp. 93-162. Zenck does well to contrast the relatively inferior position that 
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expressed by “purposive without purpose.” He glosses Kant’s formulation as follows: 
“[Works’] purposiveness, divested of practical purposes, is their language-like-ness; their 
‘without purpose,’ their lack of concept—their difference from significative language.”85 
 Adorno reads the paradox “purposive without a purpose” as expressive of an epoch-
making event in the history of language—the arrival of concepts—, for he elsewhere 
translates this contradiction as “that of its spiritual and mimetic essence.”86  
 Mimesis is an antique form of cognition based on likenesses and once took the form of 
communicative language. Now it becomes tempting to conclude that artworks, despite their 
status as particulars, are universal because their mimetic side engages some universal human 
capacity for recognizing similarities. However, Adorno is not making this claim, which would 
merely substitute one form of Idealism for another. No doubt the primary source for Adorno’s 
concept of mimesis, Walter Benjamin’s essay “On the Mimetic Faculty,” observes “the 
increasing decay of the mimetic faculty.”87 Adorno’s interpretation goes in this sense: “Art is 
refuge of mimetic conduct.”88 Art, then, does not gather its moment of universality from some 
active or ready capacity belonging to a priori structures of consciousness—and not from 
logical functions or a conceptual schema, either. As Benjamin suggests, the mimetic faculty 
cannot be taken for granted in every individual. What is universal in artistic expression, on 
                                                                                                                                                    
music holds in Kant’s aesthetics to the priority treatment that it receives in Adorno’s aesthetics (ibid., p. 102f.). 
This invites the thought that Adorno’s defense of art as knowledge without a concept may be a false 
generalization from the art that he knew best: music. Adorno considered music to be furthest removed from 
concepts (see GS, vol. 7, p. 148; GS, vol. 10.1, p. 447). 
85 GS, vol. 7, p. 211, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 140. 
86 GS, vol. 7, p. 149, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 97.  
87 Walter Benjamin, “Über das mimetische Vermögen,” in Gesammelte Schriften, unter Mitwirkung von Theodor 
W. Adorno und Gershom Scholem, herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann Schweppenhäuser, 6 vols. 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972-1987), vol. 2.1, pp. 210–213, here p. 211 as translated by Edmund 
Jephcott, “On the Mimetic Faculty,” in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1986), pp. 333-336, here p. 334.  
88 GS, vol. 7, p. 86, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 53.  
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Adorno’s reading, cannot be use of a more original form of cognition. Rather, the artwork 
draws its universality from a memory-trace of the social upheaval that was the occasion for the 
collective dying-out of the mimetic faculty, in a world dominated by the concept. Memory 
does not destroy the artistic contradiction, for in it past and present language, forms of 
cognition and faculties can arrive at the same time—as historical, not as purely and simply 
illogical.   
 According to the mimetic theory of language, the mimetic faculty made 
communicative language possible less in that speakers needed the ability to reproduce others’ 
speech exactly than in that the gift enabled recognition of a great diversity of expressions’ 
similarity to the thing, even in utterly different sensuous mediums, as in the recognition of the 
similarity of certain combination of sounds to the visual aspect of a thing. Thus, the sort of gift 
of similarity capable of language is the gift of “nonsensuous similarity.”89 Any number of 
expressions can bear a resemblance to the thing, diverging however wildly from one another. 
The truly mimetic adept would be able not only to recognize the thing in all the variants, but 
also to produce quite spontaneously still others liable to be recognized, and is much closer to a 
winner at charades than to Peter Sellers. One can speculate that in its early stages, language 
was a state of constant mimetic improvisation and divination. This raises the question as to 
how there could come to be something like a sign out of an overwhelming number of 
expressive variants.  
 According to anti-mimetic theories of language, what preceded signs was the utterly 
undifferentiated, not an utter diversity of distinctions corresponding to the thing. The scene in 
John Mighton’s Possible Worlds in which two men handle a rudimentary language whose 
                                                
89 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2.1, p. 212 as translated, “On the Mimetic Faculty,” p. 334.  
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functional vocabulary comprises only the words “slab” and “block” would, to such theories, 
recreate the starting point of language, rather than stage an allegory of its ultimate conclusion 
in binary code.90 Ferdinand de Saussure’s influential semiological theory of linguistics is one 
such anti-mimetic theory.91 Saussure conceives of linguistics as a branch of a not-yet-existing 
science of signs, which he calls “sémiologie” (semiology)92 because, for him, language 
necssarily implies the sign: “A language is a system of signs expressing ideas.”93 Furthermore, 
clear and distinct ideas depend upon signs:  
Philosophers and linguists have always agreed that were it not for signs, we should be 
incapable of differentiating any two ideas in a clear and constant way. In itself, 
thought is like a swirling cloud, where no shape is intrinsically determinate. No ideas 
are established in advance, and nothing is distinct, before the introduction of linguistic 
structure.94  
 
Saussure claims not only that thought is “chaotic by nature,”95 but also that sounds on their 
own, “in themselves,”96 are not any more delimited than thoughts are. Language—la langue—
would be the product of mutual determination within the mass of thought as much as within 
                                                
90 John Mighton, Possible Worlds (Toronto: Playwrights Canada Press, 1997), pp. 41-43. The language also 
includes a third word, “hilarious,” which is functionless (ibid., p. 42). In Mighton’s play, the Guide expounds 
three theories of the civilization whose language has only three words: “Some say they were once an advanced 
civilization. There was a war. Somehow their memories were selectively destroyed. Only three words survived. 
Others say they’re a very primitive civilization. They learned the first two words by trial and error, and somehow 
stumbled on the third…a tourist perhaps. Other say they’re an ordinary civilization but very concise. It would 
take fifty encyclopaedias to translate the meanings of “slab” and “block” into our language” (ibid.). Mighton 
parodies Wittgenstein’s “complete primitive language,” which consists of four words: “block,” “pillar,” “slab” 
and “beam.” See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophische Untersuchungen=Philosophical Investigations, trans. 
G .E. M. Anscombe, 3rd ed. (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2001), p. 3 §2.  
91 Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de linguistique générale, publié par Charles Bally et Albert Séchehaye avec la 
collaboration de Albert Riedlinger, édition critique préparée par Tullio de Mauro (Paris : Payot, 2005), translated 
by Roy Harris as Course in General Linguistics (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1986).  
92 Ibid., p. 33. The pagination given here and throughout corresponds to the standard page numbers in use since 
the second edition and appears in brackets in the margins of Harris’s translation. 
93 Ibid. “La langue est un système de signes exprimant des idées…” 
94 Ibid., p. 155. “Philosophes et linguistes se sont toujours accordés à reconnaître que, sans le secours des signes, 
nous serions incapables de distinguer deux idées d’une façon claire et constante. Prise en elle-même, la pensée est 
comme une nébuleuse où rien n’est nécessairement délimité. Il n’y a pas d’idées préétablies, et rien n’est distinct 
avant l’apparition de la langue.” 
95 Ibid., p. 156. “La pensée, chaotique de sa nature, est forcée de se préciser en se décomposant.” 
96 Ibid., p. 155. 
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the mass of sound.97 The linguistic sign is the fusion of a conceptual element, the signifié 
(signified), with a material, acoustic element, or signifiant (signifier).98 Perhaps the most 
important characteristic of Saussure’s theory is that the linguistic sign is arbitrary, in the sense 
of unmotivated (immotivé ): nothing necessarily links the signified to “reality.”99 Saussure 
claims language to be “a social product”100 and the sign, “social by nature.”101 In another 
sense, language as a social product implies that signs are not arbitrary—they are attached to 
reality, social reality, shaped by specific practices of social control. Saussure in fact takes a 
contradictory view of the social character of language. On one hand, language “exists only in 
virtue of a kind of contract agreed between the members of a community”102 and signs are 
“associations, ratified by collective agreement.”103 On the other hand, Saussure fully admits 
that language is not freely entered into by contract, but rather socially imposed: 
The community, as much as the individual, is bound to its language. A language 
cannot therefore be treated simply as a form of contract, and the linguistic sign is a 
particularly interesting phenomenon to study for this reason. For if we wish to 
demonstrate that the rules a community accepts are imposed upon it, and not freely 
agreed to, is is a language which offers the most striking proof.104 
 
                                                
97 Ibid., p. 156. 
98 Ibid., p. 99. Harris’s translations of “signification” for “signifié” and “signal” for “signifiant” are seldom used.  
99 Ibid., p. 101. 
100 Ibid., p. 25. “C’est à la fois un produit social de la faculté de langage et un ensemble de conventions 
nécessaires, adoptées par le corps social pour permettre l’exercice de cette faculté chez les individus.” 
101 Ibid., p. 34. Saussure qualifies the sign as social by nature (“le signe, qui est social par nature”) in the context 
of a critique of a psychological approach to language.  
102 Ibid., p. 31. “Elle n’existe qu’en vertu d’une sorte de contrat passée entre les membres de la communauté.” 
103 Ibid., p. 32. “Les signes  linguistiques, pour être essentiellement psychiques, ne sont pas des abstractions ; les 
associations ratifiées par le consentement collectif, et dont l’ensemble constitute la langue, sont des réalités qui 
ont leur siège dans le cerveau.” 
104 Ibid., p. 104. “Non seulement un individu serait incapable, s’il le voulait, de modifier en quoi que ce soit le 
choix qui a été fait, mais la masse elle-même ne peut exercer sa souverainté par un seul mot ; elle est liée à la 
langue telle qu’elle est. La langue ne peut donc plus être assimilée à un contrat pur et simple, et c’est justement 
de ce côté que le signe linguistique est particulièrement intéressant à étudier; car si l’on veut démontrer que la loi 
admise dans une collectivité est une chose que l’on subit, et non une règle librement consentie, c’est bien la 
langue qui en offre la preuve la plus éclatante.” 
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Despite defining language as a social institution—“institution sociale”—, Saussure considers 
it far less in its social aspects than this element of coercion in language would demand.105 This 
puts his theory at risk of sanctioning a second nature—of sanctioning the merely conventional 
character of language that he observes. Saussure openly declares the bias of his linguistics 
toward internal factors of language as opposed to external ones: “Our definition of a language 
assumes that we disregard everything which does not belong to its structure as a system; in 
short everything that is designated by the term ‘external linguistics’.”106 Elements that might 
be regarded as external to the “organisme linguistique interne” (inner linguistic organism)107 
are cultural mores, colonization, language laws, literary production and social institutions such 
as school, church, the salon, the court and academies.108 Given the thoroughly social character 
of language, separating internal and external factors in language does not look viable, yet 
Saussure nonetheless offers the following definition: “Everything is internal which alters the 
system in any degree whatsoever.”109 In other words, linguistics is concerned with external 
elements of language only insofar as the whole of language is affected. Yet the organicist 
terms in which Saussure casts this “system” recalls that, in Kant, the need to make of all 
knowledge a whole was a merely subjective principle introduced into nature by the faculty of 
judgement. As Adorno has pointed out, this principle does not secure universality for the 
judgement of taste in Kant—nor, we can add, does it secure universality for language in 
Saussure’s theory of linguistics.  
                                                
105 Ibid., p. 33. 
106 Ibid., p. 40. “Notre définition de la langue suppose que nous en écartons tout ce qui est étranger à son 
organisme, à son système, en un mot tout ce qu’on désigne par le terme de ‘linguistique externe’.” 
107 Ibid., p. 42 (my translation; Harris translates “organisme linguistique interne” as “internal structure of the 
language itself”). 
108 Ibid., p. 40f. 
109 Ibid., p. 43. “Est interne tout ce qui change le système à un degré quelconque.” 
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 According to the mimetic theory of language, the concept did not make a distinction in 
a cloudy idea-soup, creating reason where before there was none; rather, it replaced a form of 
rationality. This was not a natural evolution, but a social transformation. The prehistoric shift 
from mimetic communication to a sign system would have marked the ascendancy of social 
forms over objects’ qualities. Signs are not decided by common accord: “Language, as is 
evident, is not an agreed system of signs.”110 The first signs may have been just the mimetic 
expressions invented by the dominant group or by the dominant individuals. But the social 
authority seeking to establish its expressions universally would have to have not only imposed 
these particular linguistic forms on the community in no uncertain terms, but would have also 
delivered it an injunction to forget its mimetic capacities, so as to make it dependent on the 
one and unique, decreed, fixed expression for each idea. Speakers would have faced strong 
pressure not merely to uphold the socially dominant linguistic forms, but also to repress their 
gift for recognizing and producing similarities. The best defense against the mimetic faculty, 
which makes everyone into a language generator, is the arbitrariness of signs. The result of the 
sign’s arbitrariness is a society of speakers who confront a bizarre language-mass, established 
before them, on which they cannot improvise, but which they simply obey. The arbitrariness 
of signs is thus a political move to split the subject from the object, so as to make the subject 
dependent on the social authority. However, the split between subject and object itself does 
not usually appear as the tactic of social authority: its social basis is forgotten. The 
                                                
110 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2.1, p. 212 as translated, “On the Mimetic Faculty,” p. 334. This 
appears to be a direct contestation of Saussure’s definition of language as “un ensemble de signes fixés par un 
accord des membres de cette société” (“a set of signs fixed by agreement between the members of that society”).  
Ferdinand de Saussure, Troisième cours de linguistique générale (1910-1911) d’après les cahiers d’Emile 
Constantin=Saussure’s Third Course of Lectures on General Linguistics (1910-1911) from the Notebooks of 
Emile Constantin, French text edited by Eisuke Komatsu, English translation by Roy Harris (Oxford: Pergamon 
Press, 1993), p. 9/9a. This leaves only the question of whether and how Benjamin would have had access to this 
material left out of the 1916 edition of the Cours de linguistique générale.  
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arbitrariness of signs thus takes on a natural appearance, rarely ever striking us with the 
absurdity that it has. 
 The small child merely points to the cupboard where the biscuits are kept, sticks out 
his tongue and makes an aspirate from the back of his throat, moves his hand horizontally with 
the palm sideways while opening and closing the fingers, lifts his arms up toward his father, 
presents his mother with his shoes, his tumbler or the bath plug, makes up a nonsense name 
for his blanket. But one day, these signs stop working: his parents refuse him his wishes, 
feigning incomprehension, until he expresses what he wants in common words, even though 
he makes himself perfectly understood to them. Children’s impulses to generate language out 
of the things themselves never have the chance to develop into communicative mimetic 
language, but, even if they are successfully suppressed by the parental authority and later by 
the educative one, something of the injustice of this common experience must remain. For if 
signifying language is first of all communicative language, then the child who finds a way to 
express some thing without recourse to his mother tongue is closer to articulating a language 
than when he started to say “mama” to all people and “duck” to all small objects. The child 
who, under the evaluating eyes of the parent, correctly names all the animals figuring in a 
picture book does not grasp language. 
 Despite its overthrow in the field of communication, mimesis has managed to survive 
by finding a terrain where it is not in direct competition with the sign, whose linkage to a thing 
is decided by social and historical forces, rather than by the degree of resemblance to that 
thing. But when mimesis leaves the sphere of communication to take refuge in the sphere of 
art, it in fact abandons its original purpose of expressing something. In so doing, art also 
abandons the objective criterion of mimetic conduct: the thing to be expressed. At first glance, 
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mimesis in art does exactly the opposite of what Adorno claims it does. Mimesis appears not 
to secure the artwork’s universality, but only to turn art into self-expression. It appears as 
though absolutely nothing justifies the exhibition and performance of artworks: they appear to 
be essentially private languages of concern only to their makers. 
 Adorno’s solution to the old problematic of art’s universality does not at first seem like 
a solution. It would be artists’ “sense of form” or “feeling for form” (Formgefühl) that 
“delivers the mediating category to the Kantian problem of how art—to him, glaringly non-
conceptual—nonetheless subjectively bears that moment of the universal and necessary, 
which, according to the critique of reason, is reserved only for discursive cognition.”111 But in 
what way does this peculiar feeling aspire to universality? The sense of form is hardly a sensus 
communis: only rare individuals possess it. So how could a feeling, particularly the feeling of 
a rare individual, the artist, ever give a particular thing universal force? Adorno appears to 
justify art on the basis of a chance or occult quality. 
 The artist’s sense of form is on the most general level a sense of illusion, for Adorno 
called (artistic) illusion “form in its broadest understanding.”112 While mere social illusion is a 
support for existing reality, in art, illusion needs to be supported itself. It is supported by a 
behaviour that is positioned simultaneously against existing reality and within it—mimetic 
behaviour. This marks a fundamental difference between mere social illusion and artistic 
aesthetic illusion: social illusion supports reality, and this conditions individuals’ behaviour; 
artistic aesthetic illusion is supported by a behaviour that takes a stand against reality. But 
once mimetic behaviour begins to serve illusion, art in turn serves mimesis: art expresses the 
position that mimetic behaviour takes toward reality. Adorno expresses this mutually-serving 
                                                
111 GS, vol. 7, p. 175, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 114.  
112 GS, vol. 7, p. 169, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 110.  
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relationship between mimesis and illusion in terms that almost evoke propaganda: “Mimetic 
behaviour, a position on reality this side of the fixed opposition of subject and object, is seized 
with illusion, captivated by art, the mouthpiece of mimesis since the mimetic taboo, and, in 
complement to the autonomy of form, practically becomes illusion’s vehicle [Träger].”113 
Mimetic behaviour that has been overcome with illusion implies a contradiction between what 
it is and what it appears as. From this passage, it can be surmised that contemporary mimetic 
behaviour does not in fact get beyond the fixed opposition between subject and object. Yet, in 
art, it appears to. Mimesis in art appears to be the individual artist’s movements living in the 
work, mimetic behaviour. Indeed, the artwork does depend upon a rare individual’s living 
mimetic behaviour, which is only at the time of making. But at the same time, if the artist 
succeeds, then a work is produced that freezes movement. The work’s coming into existence 
makes the artist’s surviving mimetic skill into mimesis past, something dead and frozen, not 
surviving at all. In other words, artists direct mimetic manners of behaving into the work, 
which stands as a kind of substitute for them. As a substitute for living mimetic behaviour, as 
its concretization, the work actually unburdens the mimetic faculty itself, the active mimetic 
skill. Each work attempts to rescue mimesis by capturing it in some way, but this relieves its 
full exercise, just as noting something down eases the demands on memory. For mimesis 
really to survive, really to be, not just to appear, the mimetic urge would have to survive the 
particular work that it goes to produce. If mimesis could do that, it would destroy the illusion 
of mimesis in the work. Then the work would no longer be just dead forgotten mimesis and 
dead time, but remembered time, living memory of mimesis that carries itself beyond, despite 
                                                
113 GS, vol. 7, p. 169, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 110.  
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the particular immobilization of mimesis in the particular work. But the mimesis that has not 
been fixed appears as other than it is—as a collective “bearing in mind” or remembrance: 
The memory-trace [Erinnerungsspur] of mimesis, which every artwork seeks, is 
always…an anticipation of a condition beyond the split of individual from all others. 
Such collective remembrance [Eingedenken] in the artwork is however not khôris from 
the subject, but happens rather through the subject; in the subject’s idiosyncratic 
stirring, the collective form of reaction announces itself.114   
 
 The unusual word “Eingedenken” would have been familiar to Adorno from the works 
of Walter Benjamin. It occurs in an important passage from material Benjamin read to Adorno 
in 1929: 
Dialectical structure of awakening: remembering and awaking are most intimately 
related. Awakening is namely the dialectical, Copernican turn of remembrance 
‹Eingedenken›. It is an eminently composed [durchkomponierter, through-composed, 
as opposed to strophic] reversal from the world of dreaming to the world of waking. 
For the dialectical schematism at the core of this physiological process, the Chinese 
have found, in their fairy tales and novellas, the most radical expression. The new, 
dialectical method of doing history teaches us to pass in spirit—with the rapidity and 
intensity of dreams—through what has been, in order to experience the present as [a] 
waking world, a world to which every dream at last refers.115  
 
The sort of collective remembering in artworks is not borrowed from the fact-finding work of 
historiographical science. Rather, Adorno’s concept goes back to Benjamin’s “new, dialectical 
method of doing history” that takes for its model the remembrance (Eingedenken) of art, 
notably of Chinese literature and of Proust.116 According to Benjamin, the goal of doing 
history should not be to position ourselves in a lost past, but to free ourselves from our present 
illusions.  
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  While Benjamin was presenting his new method of doing history to his friends and 
peers, Sigmund Freud was preparing Civilization and its Discontents for publication. Freud 
opens his book by responding to a criticism voiced against his 1927 publication The Future of 
an Illusion. The question is whether wish-fulfilment is an adequate characterization of 
religious belief, considering that an important dimension of religious experience is personal 
religious feeling. Certain individuals might believe in eternity because they have an “oceanic 
feeling” of eternity, not because they want eternity to such an extent that they subscribe to the 
institution that requires them to believe in it. 117  Freud bases his criticism on “religious 
doctrine.”118 But the subjective feeling of eternity does not reduce to “an article of faith.”119 
Freud takes up this criticism by evoking his theory of the memory-trace, which is “that in 
mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish—that everything is somehow 
preserved and that in suitable circumstances (when, for instance, regression goes back far 
enough) it can once more be brought to light.”120 Freud does not deny that people have 
feelings of being at one with the universe, but explains these feelings as remnants surviving 
from an earlier stage of the individual121—the text suggests that it is the infant stage, in which 
there is no clear differentiation of the ego from the external world.122 While Freud’s insight 
into the infant’s sense of self may well be a belief motivated by wish-fulfilment no less than 
the faithful’s belief in eternity—expressing, say, Freud’s wish-fulfilment that he is already just 
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more mature than religious people who have such feelings of eternity—, nonetheless he, 
seemingly by chance, proposes that religious illusion be dissolved by the memory-trace. To 
elucidate what he means by the memory-trace, Freud compares the human mind to the city of 
Rome: 
Now let us, by a flight of imagination, suppose that Rome is not a human habitation but a 
psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past—an entity, that is to say, in which 
nothing that has once come into existence will have passed away and all the earlier phases 
of development continue to exist alongside the latest one. This would mean that in Rome 
the palaces of the Caesars and the Septizonium of Septimius Severus would still be rising 
to their old height on the Palatine and that the castle of S. Angelo would still be carrying 
on its battlements the beautiful statues which graced it until the siege by the Goths, and so 
on. But more than this. In the place occupied by the Palazzo Caffarelli would once more 
stand—without the Palazzo having to be removed—the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus; 
and this not only in its latest shape, as the Romans of the Empire saw it, but also in its 
earliest one, when it still showed Etruscan forms and was ornamented with terra-cotta 
antefixes. Where the Coliseum now stands we could at the same time admire Nero’s 
vanished Golden House. On the Piazza of the Pantheon we should find not only the 
Pantheon of to-day, as it was bequeathed to us by Hadrian, but, on the same site, the 
original edifice erected by Agrippa; indeed, the same piece of ground would be 
supporting the church of Santa Maria sopra Minerva and the ancient temple over which it 
was built. And the observer would perhaps only have to change the direction of his glance 
or his position in order to call up the one view or the other. 
 There is clearly no point in spinning our phantasy any further, for it leads to 
things that are unimaginable and even absurd. If we want to represent historical sequence 
in spatial terms we can only do it by juxtaposition in space: the same space cannot have 
two different contents. Our attempt seems to be an idle game. It has only one justification. 
It shows us how little far we are from mastering the characteristics of mental life by 
representing them in pictorial terms.123  
 
This passage suggests that mental life does not respect historical phases: the psychical entity 
does not move on and build in a new place when the era shifts, so as to make space correspond 
to time, but rather builds on what was destroyed, all the while believing that the old structures 
still exist, so as to inhabit, to borrow a term form Michel Foucault, “heterotopias”: places with 
multiple contents.124 Freud’s thesis that religion is wholly illusory depends on an argument for 
the existence of the memory-trace; however, the demonstration takes the form of a baroque 
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analogy of the psyche with something physically impossible: a city in which two things can 
occupy the same place at the same time. Yet it seems no more illusory to believe in eternal life 
than in two things occupying the same place at the same time. Although Freud ultimately 
rejects his own analogy, it is telling that he compares the psyche to a city having suffered 
multiple destructions. The memory-trace is memory of something destroyed. But it must not 
be conscious of itself as memory, since it treats the remembered content as if it were still 
present. With his concept of the memory-trace, Freud wants to dissolve a very specific 
illusion, then: the illusion that a structure from a past historical period exists superimposed on 
the present one. Historically juxtaposing the psychically superimposed contents should 
dissolve the illusion that the past is really present. But giving up this illusion implies 
remembering the destruction of the old structures as well, and perhaps also the upheaval that 
ended a historical phase. It is thus not surprising that the mind clings to its illusion of being an 
“eternal city” in which nothing is ever lost. The question then is why Freud would single out 
the religious feeling of eternity as illusory when, according to his thesis, the psyche as a rule 
behaves as if the past were present, which is actively regressive. For, although he finds no way 
of supporting his theory of the memory-trace, Freud still takes the position that “it is rather the 
rule than the exception for the past to be preserved in mental life.”125  
  Benjamin’s “new, dialectical method of doing history” addresses the problem on which 
Freud was also working—namely, the fusion of past and present in the memory-trace. 
Benjamin believes that the conditions for memory (Erinnerung) have been destroyed by the 
repetitive character of modern existence, and that any fusion of past and present is a remnant 
from Epic times; nonetheless, forgetting may still be countered through transformed memory, 
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either through reminiscence (Gedächtnis), which is itself a repetitive form, or through 
remembrance (Eingedenken), which is concerned only with the unique event.126 Benjamin’s 
method of doing history is based on remembrance (Eingedenken). The aim of his method is to 
experience the present as expected, rather than as the past that has continued unconsciously. 
Benjamin opposes waking not to sleeping, but to dreaming: the opposite of remembrance is 
not void, but a substitute. This is no ordinary forgetfulness, but a delusional state provoked by 
a social injunction to forget.  
   Adorno employs the Freudian category of the memory-trace critically when he 
introduces it into the sphere of art, as the memory-trace of mimesis. The As-If character of 
Freud’s concept indeed justifies this displacement. Adorno qualifies the concept of memory-
trace further: the memory-trace of mimesis is also “anticipation” of a state beyond the one that 
mimetic conduct resists from within, beyond the fixed opposition of subject and object. With 
these modifications, memory-trace translates into the Benjaminian concept of collective 
Eingedenken. Memory-trace as Eingedenken is memory that bears in mind that it is memory, 
remembrance of the unique event of memory’s destruction. Every artwork seeks the “memory-
trace of mimesis” because art retains some trace of the suffering endured when rationality 
through concepts replaces mimesis. The point is not to restore an ancient form of rationality on 
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a universal scale, but to have it engage a dialectical reversal that will awaken us here and 
now.127  
 In an important note toward his theory of musical reproduction, Adorno states a thesis 
that he and Horkheimer would sign in Dialectic of Enlightenment—“All reification is a 
forgetting.”128 He includes musical notation among the reified objects: “Musical notation is a 
wad of discipline. It expropriates the memory [Gedächtnis] by backing it.”129 He goes on to 
make an even stronger claim—not merely that something is always lost in recording oral 
tradition, but that this loss is actually socially commanded: “The cultic dances and songs are 
cut off from the unity of memory [Erinnerung] and change. They are to be forgotten in order 
to be fixed, established, they are to pass into identical repetition, which characterizes the 
music of barbaric cultures.”130 By “the music of barbaric cultures,” Adorno likely means the 
recorded music of the culture industry first and foremost, for—to make a point of 
comparison—he claims that the music of so-called primitive peoples—and, to some extent, 
jazz—is rhythmically so complex that “the most highly trained musician” of the scores-
tradition cannot exactly reproduce its models.131 Imitation in scores evokes the time of 
unsupported memory; the musician is to create the illusion whereby whatever departs from the 
model seems like the collective freedom expressed in cultural variants, when, really, it must be 
closer to the historical illustration of what a weakening musical memory sounds like: it starts 
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on the wrong note, misjudges intervals slightly here and there, mixes up the order of notes or 
sections, alters the rhythm. It expresses the crisis in memory [Erinnerung], or, reification.    
 Reification in music is not something totally other than reification in other domains: 
whether it takes the form of musical notation, the linguistic sign or the commodity, reification 
implies social domination.132 The artwork is, however, a different sort of fixed thing that 
commands forgetting. Its existence is also a spur to contesting the social injunction to forget. 
Gerhard Schultz relates the experiences of his teacher Sándor Végh playing performances of 
Bartók’s compositions inspired by Hungarian folk idioms. Invariably, those familiar with the 
folk songs would complain to Végh of their inaccuracy. It is true to say that in writing down 
what a community knew from heart and reproduced in perhaps hundreds and thousands of 
variants, Bartók was replacing a living multiplicity with a fixed, singular authority. In a sense, 
something really was lost when Bartók began to draw from folk songs. But on the other hand, 
with Bartók it became clear that each variant of a particular folk song was already exercising 
an authority: this must have been the case for so many people to have complained so 
vehemently to Sándor Végh that their music was not rendered correctly. What Bartók did in 
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using folk music as his material, especially in his most advanced handling of it, in the 
energetic, impetuous, almost Mozartean combinations of the Dance Suite, was to put the 
traditional authority behind folk songs into a form in which it could be contested. An adequate 
performance of music based on folk songs refuses to take the oral tradition as its authority and 
repeat clichés, but challenges the social authority, which, thanks to musical notation, has been 
clearly identified and isolated.  
 Adequate musical performance in general converts reified objects back into 
experience, into life and flowing time, into singular acts however different from the artists’ 
acts. Music draws its universality from disturbances in the seeming temporal unity of the 
work. The work seems to be “of it time.” But time in music does not behave according to 
universal physical laws because music is illusion: “In the contradiction between its curdled 
state in writing, and the liquid state it implies, music has a part in the illusory character of 
mature art.”133 On the one hand, the implication of life in lifeless scores is pure affirmative 
illusion. On the other hand, illusion is not purely affirmative because it splits open unitary 
time, the everlasting present. The score points out of the enduring present in an ambivalent 
fashion, at once backward toward the reactions of the composer and forward toward the 
reactions of an interpreter. An interpreter able to read a score adequately reads it through this 
illusion.  
 Aesthetic illusion is form in the widest sense, so results from artists’ feeling for form, 
and this feeling is idiosyncratic. Nevertheless, Adorno claims that the category of artists’ 
feeling for form secures art’s universality, without however relying on the concepts of 
signifying language. For artists’ feelings are not just arbitrary, but are reactions directed both 
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against the norms that have been established in the past and forward in time: “Idiosyncrasies 
of artists condense into the canon of prohibitions, but these idiosyncrasies are in turn 
objectively binding, where aesthetically the particular is literally the universal.”134 These 
idiosyncrasies are at the time unconscious, theoretically uninformed and resistant to definition: 
they are, in other words, non-conceptual, although not absolutely impervious to all 
conceptualization and definition. A reaction may one day reach formulation in a new aesthetic 
prohibition, which will in turn colour works. Yet an idiosyncratic prohibition can be just as 
binding without any clear formulation at all: Adorno gives the example of kitsch.135 As 
prohibitions may be broken and reinstated any number of times, it is senseless to read artists’ 
idiosyncratic reactions as merely following the continuous, linear path of time, as 
“development”: “It does nothing to stick a gnomon or a little hour-hand from without onto 
these norms.”136 We have rather a canon of prohibitions not grounded in any natural or 
practical matter and whose transformations are not the results of justifications or reasoning 
through concepts. The canon is the result of and results in blind, individual feelings, but 
feelings that take the specific form of reactions against the established norm. Since 
idiosyncrasies resulting can themselves become norms, an identical element can be 
conformism or an idiosyncrasy, and chronology is no aid at all. Idiosyncrasies refute the 
notion of a homogeneous time continuum, pointing beyond themselves forward and backward 
in time, beyond the here and now. Art’s universality shows up as a resemblance to language: 
“Universals are strongest in art where it comes closest to language—says something that, in 
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being spoken, goes beyond its here and now.”137 What goes beyond the here and now opposes 
the social injunction to forget; it defends the right of the collective to remember what it has 
suffered and to work towards a reality different from the here and now.  
 The idiosyncratic movement opposes not merely this or that particular norm, but the 
norm, the current form of universality, which wants neither a reminder of the past relation of 
individual and collective, nor anticipation of a changed relation, in which an individual desire 
for the happiness that the world does not give would no longer be a threat to the social order. 
Such a language element may be detected not in the work’s “meaning,” not in its laws or 
norms, but rather in its gesture against what has been universally imposed: 
The language-like moment of art is its mimetic one; art becomes eloquently universal 
only in the specific movement, flickering to life, away from the universal. The paradox 
that art says it yet does not say is rooted in this: the way by which art says it, that 
mimetic moment, as something opaque and something particular, at the same time puts 
up opposition to Saying.138  
 
Like language, art has particular material elements that are more than what they are. 
Signifying nothing, these particular elements nonetheless make claims that carry universal 
weight. Namely, these particular elements contest what signifying language makes pass for 
universality: the “agreement” of members of a society that something represents an object, 
rather than the adequacy of a great number of representations to their object. Art’s universality 
resides in its demonstration that universality is not equivalent to norms. A norm is only the 
illusion of consensus; it is not true universality. What would dissolve the illusion of 
universality in norms is not real consensus, but the true universality of a representation’s 
adequacy to its object. However, as art, cut off from the sphere of communication, does not 
express any thing, it seems that there can be no universality as adequacy, only the false 
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universality of unattainable inter-subjective agreement. If art were mere expression, this would 
be the case. But art is not mere expression; it is “only adequate expression.”139 Unlike sign 
systems, art does not forego the need of adequacy; there is just not any external criterion for 
the adequacy of artistic expression: “Nothing external to artworks decides over their standing 
or quality. They—certainly not their authors—are their own measure, or, as Wagner put it, 
their self-posited rule.”140 The question of adequacy in art is whether expression is adequate to 
itself. But the question of an expression’s adequacy, which is really the question of the truth of 
the work, cannot be answered by merely articulating a norm. For expression is precisely what 
does not uphold the norm, precisely what behaves by generating its own language instead of 
using the normal, prescribed language. It seems that all of art would be true insofar as it 
refuses the norms of signifying language: it refuses to express something. It may be recalled, 
however, that mimesis only survives by not communicating; not expressing some thing is a 
mere survival strategy for art and is not its virtue. For the injustice in signifying language lies 
not in its representation of objects, but in its coercion of individuals to represent objects in 
identical, predetermined ways that have nothing whatsoever to do with what is represented. 
What art refuses of signifying language is its pseudo-collective, its externality, its substitution 
of social might for adequacy. As simply avoiding signifying language does not exclude the 
possibility of arbitrariness, which is the real failing of present signifying languages, non-
signification in itself does not constitute a sufficient critique of signifying language. Thus, an 
expression qualifies as art not merely by refusing the norm of signifying language, but, in 
addition, by making its critique of signifying language specific. But to aim its critique squarely 
at the merely posited character of signifying language, art has to work with norms in some 
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way. Art admits of norms and therefore risks being false by admitting of norms; but it thereby 
establishes its need to be true.  
 When art upholds the universality of adequacy to itself in order to unmask signifying 
language’s front of intersubjective agreement as a sham universality, as mere conformity 
under duress that the dominant subjects exert on all the other subjects, art does not thereby 
deny that universality can be subjective. But true universality on the side of the subject cannot 
be constituted as long as some subjects hold power over other subjects, as long as the 
particular class interests or standpoints or whims of some subjects are imposed on all subjects. 
The “I” omnipresent in lyric poetry is only “the illusion that poetic subjectivity is self-
explanatory.”141 Although the mimetic element in art seems to be the immediate, present 
suffering of the artist, the expressive subject that speaks out of art can only be a collective 
subject: “not a Me but a We speaks out of artworks, even the so-called personal ones.”142 
Adorno gives precise indications as to how the anticipation of a collective subject comes 
through in art. In music, it comes through precisely in the way one would not think, neither in 
the massive forces of working men’s choirs nor in the total orchestral participation in banner 
themes. The collective subject appears in music rather as diversity and as the distinction of the 
individual lines, but, since this diversity and plurality of voices is never a literal totality of all 
the diversity there is, but always a choice out of the whole, the collective subject cannot be 
read as simply literal. Adorno names “the harmonic dimension of depth,” counterpoint and 
polyphony as the relays of the We of choric cults, which marked universal experiences.143 
Neither harmonic depth nor counterpoint nor polyphony would be possible without the clarity 
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of the individual voices, achievable by contrast, whether that of dissonance or syncopation or 
even that of colouristic or dynamic variation.  
 The point of mimesis in art is not to exhibit the atavism of a few rare individuals, but 
to recall through the atavism of these few individuals the suffering that everyone endures, 
dominated and dominating, when concepts replace mimesis. The expression of suffering 
seems accidental to language: it is thought that little children have language when they know a 
number of words, not when they put across with sometimes idiosyncratic expressions that they 
are hungry or that their scarves have been tied too tightly. The arbitrary sign-system is unjust 
not simply because it is imposed, but particularly because it usurps a language that essentially 
expresses the suffering of the subject. It relegates suffering to the zone of the abject and 
“unspeakable.” Thinkers who claim language for Being run the risk of conferring on 
speechless suffering the status of unreality. This ignores the split in language, whereby 
signifying language becomes detached from the real things to be expressed—the needs and 
feelings of the subject—and attaches itself to social power. Instead of loading existing 
signifying languages with all hopes for a just society and truth, critical philosophy works 
counter to the aims or intentions of signifying language, which had to cover up its founding 
injustice. “The need to let suffering speak eloquently,” as Adorno declared in Negative 
Dialectics, “is condition of all truth. For suffering is objectivity, which weighs upon the 
subject; what the subject experiences as its most subjective, its expression, is objectively 
mediated.”144 The need to let suffering speak eloquently is akin to what Benjamin called “the 
elimination of the unspeakable,” in a letter from which Adorno quotes in Aesthetic Theory: 
“‘And if I here disregard other forms of effective action—as poetry and prophecy—, it is that 
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time and again it appears to me that the crystal-clear elimination of what is unspeakable in 
language is for us the given and most obvious form of acting within language and, in this 
respect, through language.’”145 Now here Benjamin was discussing the criterion of political 
writing. But art is aimed at the elimination of the unspeakable, too, not by representing the 
very suffering that the arbitrary sign-system rendered mute, but by making a language that is 
again the continuum of the subject’s suffering, which is objectivity itself, the suffering of the 
whole society at the loss of expressive, mimetic language and, more generally, at 
domination—both domination of self and domination of the other—that is its condition. This 
leads Adorno to say that in art the terms subjective and objective are “equivocal.”146 This 
equivocalness is evident in the subject’s structure, which happens to take the forward and 
backward structure that the object has.  
 Mimesis in art is a “collective reminder” in the double sense: both a souvenir of the 
past and a string around the finger that points to something to be done in the future.147 Insofar 
as it is memory, music’s Eingedenken is not the preservation of tradition, but rather the 
memory of the oppressed, defended time and again by the great works of the tradition, 
whether the oppressed non-quartal harmony defended by Guillaume DuFay’s “Du tout 
m’estoie” (1450) or the oppressed quartal harmony defended by Arnold Schoenberg in his 
Chamber Symphony, Op. 9 (1906). Memory in music is a memory of past suffering. For 
Aesthetic Theory ends with the challenge: “But then what would art be, as the writing of 
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history, if it shook off the memory of accumulated suffering.”148 But while mimesis appears in 
art as the collective memory of the imposition of social norms on the individual in the past, it 
also appears as a collective reminder to open up a different relation between the individual and 
the collective.149 It anticipates a further transformation of society, a “condition beyond the 
split of the individual from all others.”150 For a collective subject has yet to be realized: 
“While art is tempted to anticipate a nonexistent total society, of which a non-existent subject, 
and in this respect is not purely ideology, at the same time this subject’s non-existence is a 
defect that remains with art.”151 The subject was born along with domination: in its splitting 
off from the object, the subject became the social authority that now decides in the place of 
adequacy. Yet art leaves a place for a different subject, not yet existing, an expressive 
collective subject.  
 Artworks become spiritual, objective, true and universal subjectively and mimetically. 
This is the conclusion to Adorno’s unfolding of the thesis that philosophy should model its 
moment of universality on that of art, on art’s non-communicative, self-generated mimetic 
language: “On the strength of their subjectively mimetic, expressive moment, artworks flow 
into objectivity; they are neither sheer movement [Regung] nor its mould, but rather the 
solidified process between the two, which is social.”152 Adorno leaves the reader to draw the 
conclusion that philosophy should also be a “solidified process” between subjective urge and 
collective solidarity that has arrived to protest against the imposed norm, and so should serve, 
like art, as a collective reminder that in freedom subject and object would coincide. But art and 
                                                
148 GS, vol. 7, p. 387 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 261. 
149 As Karla L. Schultz puts it, “Mimesis is memory, anamnesis, not of Plato’s perfect forms of the mind but, ex 
negativo, of a reconciled existence.” Mimesis on the Move, p. 180. 
150 GS, vol. 7, p. 198, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 131.  
151 GS, vol. 7, p. 251, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 168. 
152 GS, vol. 7, p. 198, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 131. 
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philosophy cannot converge in their universal moment without parting ways when it comes to 
their search for truth.  
 A changed relation between art and philosophy, no longer based on truth content, 
suggests that new art strikes out on its own to seek truth. Indeed, the new art seeks truth not 
through mediation, like philosophy, but in immediacy. The art that specifically seeks 
“illusionless” truth in subjective movement, in new language and in “the immediacy of the 
expression” is musical Expressionism.153 With Expressionism, immediacy becomes a moment 
of increased tension between art and philosophy, for in Negative Dialectics Adorno notes that 
a specificity of philosophy, by contrast to art, is that it “clings to nothing immediate.”154  
 The question now becomes whether Expressionism is successful in its search for 
illusionless truth in immediacy. 
                                                
153 GS, vol. 18, p. 60, or prefer to my translation here that by Wieland Hoban, “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles 
on New Music,” under “Musical expressionism,” in Night Music: Essays on Music, 1928-1962, ed. Rolf 
Tiedemann (London: Seagull, 2009), pp. 269-321, here p. 275. 
154 GS, vol. 6, p. 27, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 15. 
{Chapter IV}  In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno describes the movement of modern art as the 
illusory attempt to rid itself of illusion: “To a large extent, the dialectic of modern art is that it 
wants to shake off the illusory character like an animal a grown set of antlers.”1 Thus the 
“rebellion against illusion” produces illusion.2 In Philosophy of Modern Music, Adorno 
associates this rebellion with Schoenberg, claiming that “Schoenberg takes a polemical stance 
just as much towards play as towards illusion,” and even goes so far as to speak of the 
“negation of illusion and play” in this connection.3 There Adorno reads aesthetic illusion 
specifically as the illusory reconciliation between the universal and the particular: 
“[expression’s] subsumption under the placatory universal makes up the innermost principle 
of musical illusion.”4 Schoenberg does not fall victim to this illusion, according to Adorno: 
“His music denies the claim that universal and particular are reconciled.”5 In other words, in 
Schoenberg’s music, expression refuses to be placated under a merely normative schema or 
convention, which, implicitly, makes universalist claims. The innovation of Schoenberg’s 
music, according to Adorno, is not that it has a lot of harsh noises, but rather that its 
dissonances are not ultimately placated by a full cadence, normally required at the end of each 
section or piece. Final dissonance is a characteristic that separates Schoenberg from other 
composers considered to be Modern—for instance, Paul Hindemith. The first movement of 
Hindemith’s Third Sonata for Violin and Piano in E Major is full of harsh noises, but it ends 
on a very pretty consonance; the sonata affirms reconciliation of individual and universal 
                                                
1 GS, vol. 7, p. 157, or prefer to my translation here that of Robert Hullot-Kentor, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel 
Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 102. 
2 GS, vol. 7, p. 154, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 100. 
3 GS, vol. 12, p. 46, or prefer to my translation here that of Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster, 
Philosophy of Modern Music (New York: Seabury Press, 1980), p. 41. 
4 GS, vol. 12, p. 45, or prefer to my translation here Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 40. 
5 GS, vol. 12, p. 45, or prefer to my translation here Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 40. 
 142 
when its tonic chord appears for the last time, free of dissonance.6 In Modern music, 
dissonance plays a central, even structuring, role: “Dissonance is the focal point 
[Kristallisationspunkt] of all new tendencies of harmony, becoming central in the tone 
language of almost all musical schools, and, in the end, even the new structures of the 
harmonic context derive from it.”7 The dissonance of Modern music is total, as opposed to 
free-standing, dissonance. Free-standing dissonance within the course of a piece cannot be 
attributed to Schoenberg, according to Adorno, who suggests that “the independence of 
dissonance occurred during the Romantic period,” with Richard Wagner.8 By this Adorno 
means that even by the late Romantic period, rules for dissonance treatment relaxed. The ear 
was able to recognize dissonant aggregates of notes as distinct sonorities, so there was no need 
for Wagner to “treat” them—by framing the dissonances in such a way that they could be 
recognized as passing tones, neighbour tones, added sixths or as some other convention. What 
is new about Modern music is not the possibility of unresolved dissonance, but its necessity: 
“The totality of dissonance was first enforced with Schoenberg.”9 On this reading, Schoenberg 
is not concerned with creating a harsh effect on the public’s ears, but he is rather reacting 
specifically against what is regressive in the most progressive harmony, the harmony of Jean-
Philippe Rameau, whose harmonic ideal is a chain of dissonances that resolves in the cadence. 
Schoenberg demands that chords take a necessarily non-triadic structure and that cadences be 
                                                
6 Paul Hindemith, Sonate in E für Geige und Klavier (Mainz: B. Schott’s Söhne, 1935), I, p. 6, 10 measures after 
rehearsal letter [F]. The final E major triad of Movement I is consonant, despite appearing in the “expectant” 
second inversion. 
7 GS, vol. 18, p. 73, or prefer to my translation here that of Wieland Hoban, “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles on 
New Music,” under “Dissonance in New Music,” in Night Music: Essays on Music, 1928-1962, ed. Rolf 
Tiedemann (London: Seagull, 2009) pp. 269-321, here p. 297. 
8 GS, vol. 18, p. 73, or prefer to my translation here “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles,” p. 197. 
9 GS, vol. 18, p. 74, or prefer to my translation here, with emphasis added, “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles,” p. 
199. 
 143 
avoided. In other words, unusual aggregates of tones must not be reduced to familiar 
consonances.  In demanding dissonance precisely where the listener expects consonance, 
Schoenberg contests the illusion of happy reconciliation: “Dissonance is the most essential 
vehicle of expression, symbol for pain and sorrow.”10  
 Of the “characteristic schools of new music” that Adorno names, Expressionism is the 
first to appear, although he goes on to say that the “radical folkloric tendencies,” whose 
innovations “have nothing in common with the blood-and-soil romanticism of the Fascist era,” 
can also be counted as a school of Modern music.11 This would possibly put Leoš Janáček 
ahead as the first Modern composer. Adorno however thinks that it is only “in a certain sense” 
that Janáček can be attached to radical folklorism, and does not name particular works of his 
that would be candidates for Modernism.12 Adorno does, however, leave an important clue to 
Janáček’s Modernism: “It is the tradition of any official music whatsoever that is suspended 
by Janáček’s diction modelled after speech, amidst all the triads.”13 Janáček used “speech 
melody” notably in his opera Jenůfa, which had its premiere in 1904. It could be argued that 
what is new in Janáček’s music is not the use of Moravian folk songs, but speech melody—or 
else that his use of folk songs is new to the extent that they become an extension of prose 
speech, “idiom.” Janáček musically notated everyday conversations so that he could draw on a 
repertoire of affective tropes in setting the prose texts for his operas.14 These tropes were 
perhaps peculiar to the Czech spoken in Moravia, but they served no political purpose in 
                                                
10 GS, vol. 18, p. 73, or prefer to my translation here “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles,” p. 197. 
11 GS, vol. 18, p. 81, or prefer to my translation here “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles,” under “New Music,” p. 
311. 
12 GS, vol. 18, p. 81 as translated, “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles,” p. 311. 
13 GS, vol. 12, p. 42 Amn., or prefer to my translation here Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 36 n5. 
14 See Paul Wingfield, “Janáček’s Speech-Melody Theory in Concept and Practice,” Cambridge Opera Journal 
4, no. 3 (November 1992): pp. 281-301.  
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Janáček’s music; rather, he was interested in innovating a true musical language developed out 
of expression as it presented itself in everyday conversations. Despite Janáček’s discovery of 
an expressive language new to music, however, Adorno considers “the first fully Expressionist 
work” to be Schoenberg’s “Drei Klavierstücke, op. 11 (1909), whose third piece,” Adorno 
affirms, “contains a canon of Expressionist prohibitions.”15 This choice of first Expressionist 
work concords with Adorno’s dating elsewhere of the sea-change in art: according to him, 
“the revolutionary art movements ventured out on the sea of the never-foreseen around 
1910.”16  
 Expressionism is the movement that, in music, strives for the individuality of the voice 
not through traditional means—not through any means at all, but by directly expressing. 
Adorno claims that the Expressionist movement aims at destroying the universality of musical 
language, which lifts the moment out of the here and now: “Expressionist music seeks to 
eliminate all of traditional music’s conventional elements, everything formulaically rigid, 
indeed all generality [Allgemeinheit, universality] of musical language that supersedes the 
unique moment and its character—in analogy to the literary ideal of the ‘scream’.”17 This 
suggests that the modern Expressionist movement no longer wishes to maintain the 
equivocalness of subject and object in a language where idiosyncrasies can be read as new 
norms and norms traced back to idiosyncrasies, where individual impulses form universal 
experiences of memory and anticipation. At the same time, according to Adorno, 
Expressionism prioritizes subjective suffering rather than bringing it into balance with the 
                                                
15 GS, vol. 18, p. 62, or prefer to my translation here “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles,” under “Musical 
expressionism,” p. 278. 
16 GS, vol. 7, p. 9, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 1. 
17 GS, vol. 18, p. 60, as translated except where indicated in square brackets, “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles,” 
under “Musical expressionism,” p. 275.  
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objective side of the artwork, its adequacy. Prioritizing of any sort determinately negates 
aesthetic illusion: “The artwork must aspire to balance, without having a complete command 
of it: an aspect of the aesthetic illusory character.”18 While artworks traditionally seem to 
make a compromise between expression and adequacy, living time and thing, subject and 
object, no artwork in fact achieves it because this harmony nowhere exists: “Balance by form 
[Gestalt] must fail within because it does not exist without, meta-aesthetically. Antagonisms 
unsettled in reality will not have themselves settled in the imagination; they effectively reach 
the imagination and are reproduced in inconsistency [Unstimmigkeit] of the imagination’s 
own.”19 Since neither the individual artist nor the work can exit the total delusional context of 
reification to occupy a place where subject and object would be in balance, their balance in the 
artwork “is an aspect of the aesthetic illusory character.”20 Expressionist music, for its part, 
does not even make the pretence of balance between expression and adequacy; it “seeks the 
undisguised, un-transfigured, illusionless truth of subjective feeling.”21  
 Expressionism is supposed to be the first of Modernist movements; however, 
Schoenberg’s “first fully Expressionist work” meets competition from Robert Schumann’s 
“Der Dichter spricht” (The Poet Speaks), which Adorno calls, “one of the earliest models of 
Expressionist music.”22 Having an antecedent stands in complete contradiction to the claims of 
Expressionism. Expressionism seeks to eliminate the universal moment of musical language, 
its mimetic moment, which lifts the work out of the here and now. This implies that it cannot 
                                                
18 GS, vol. 7, p. 249, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 166. 
19 GS, vol. 7, p. 252f., or prefer to my translation cited here Aesthetic Theory, p. 169. 
20 GS, vol. 7, p. 249, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 166. 
21 GS, vol. 18, p. 60, or prefer to my translation here “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles on New Music,” p. 275.  
22 GS, vol. 7, p. 252 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 168. 
 146 
have models. For the universality of musical language lies in the possibility of the unique 
moment to refer back to past works and forward to future works. 
 Expressionist works, then, do not eliminate the universality of musical language; they 
are part of that language—they take up Robert Schumann’s idiosyncrasies in “Der Dichter 
spricht,” the thirteenth and final piece of Kinderszenen (Scenes from Childhood), op. 15.23  
 One can point to three such idiosyncrasies.  
 Firstly, during the foray into A minor (ii of the home key, G major), Schumann twice 
leaves the leading tone (G-sharp) unresolved: a dissonant vii°6, 5 chord is followed by an 
incomplete i6 chord in each case.24 Schumann also delays resolution. In the brief D major 
passage, he leaves the G-natural of the viiø7 chord hanging until the D-major triad following 
the intervening V6,4 chord.25 An idiosyncrasy in Schumann, unresolved dissonance, becomes 
the norm in Expressionism.  
 Secondly, Schumann’s is an aphoristic form. It is a piece in pieces rather than a 
movement, working with a motif rather than a melody or theme. Its silences do not indicate 
ends of progressions, phrases or sections, but a kind of difficulty. The compression of themes 
into motifs and silences is also a trait of Expressionist music.26 Webern especially excels at the 
pithy, fragmenting form. On the surface, Berg’s aphoristic Four Pieces for Clarinet and Piano, 
                                                
23 Robert Schumann, “Der Dichter spricht (The Poet Speaks),” Kinderszenen=Scenes from Childhood, op. 15, 
ed. Holger M. Stüwe (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 2011), p. 17. 
24 Ibid., m. 6 and m. 18. 
25 Ibid., mm. 3-4 and mm. 15-16. This passage is unusual also in that this first cadence is not in the home key of 
G major, but in D major: the tone G is set up to be the goal of the first phrase, not its dissonant, interfering factor. 
26 Cf. Fredric Jameson, Late Marxism: Adorno, or, the Persistence of the Dialectic (London: Verso, 2007), p. 
170f. Jameson is not wrong to suggest that the aphoristic statements of the music of 1911 evoke by their brevity 
extra-aesthetic expressions of suffering or cries of pain; however, he is not authorized to infer from this that the 
opposite of Expression, illusion, is simply reducible to the opposite of brevity, duration: “Fictionality, in music, is 
then simply temporal duration, which is also the Schein or aesthetic appearance of the musical work” (ibid., p. 
170). 
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op. 5, (1913) are unusual in his oeuvre, the least flowing.27 Yet the three-note “sigh” motif (A 
– B-flat – A-flat), which first appears in the piano part,28 structures the pieces in a way 
characteristic of his thematic handling right from his Piano Sonata, op. 1 (1908/09), whose 
prime motif, properly lyrical, is only longer and articulated in itself, extending to a whole 
phrase.29 Schoenberg’s Expressionist pieces are harmonically denser and more richly 
orchestrated than those of his pupils, and some, like the Five Orchestral Pieces, op. 16, and 
Erwartung (Expectation) are large-scale works. Schoenberg’s Expressionism comes out in 
abrupt shifts and hurtling reversals rather than in nervous or difficult silences in the intimate 
sphere. By their broken-up forms, Webern and Berg express more often a shell-shocked, 
fragile psyche, living an aftermath, whereas Schoenberg more closely approximates the ideal 
of immediacy, expressing cascades of reactions without perspective or distance, inescapable 
states of a mind locked in the grips of overwhelming events or suffocating atmospheres. In the 
Second Viennese School composers, discontinuity has a psychological motivation—extreme 
inhibition or fits of impulsiveness interrupt the rational carrying-out of musical intentions. Yet 
Schumann’s brokenness is related more to the insufficiency of what passes for language, of 
what passes for rational schemas, and exhibits the Romantic character of dissolution. For 
example, the unusual V4,2 – I6 progression that opens “Der Dichter spricht” repeats directly 
after this first period cadences in A minor.30 The progression is “the same,” but the music is 
not the same: the chords are figurated, yet their unfolding in time, their fleeting quality, goes 
uncaptured by the root progression. Root progression no longer tells the whole story; root 
                                                
27 Alban Berg, Vier Stücke für Klarinette und Klavier, op. 5 (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1924). 
28 Ibid., I, p. 2, m. 2. 
29 Alban Berg, Sonate für Klavier, op. 1, herausgegeben von Klaus Lippe (Vienna: Universal Edition, 2006), p. 
2, mm. 1-4.  
30 R. Schumann, “Der Dichter spricht,” m. 9.  
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progression, as history written by the victors, is contradicted by recitative. Schumann’s 
contestation of root progression was pushed to its extreme by the Second Viennese School, 
who uprooted it.   
 Thirdly, Schumann presents an instrumental recitative that comments on what has 
already been presented. The beautifully variegated middle section of “Der Dichter spricht,” the 
last of the thirteen pieces for solo piano, adopts the recitative style usually reserved for 
voice.31 In opera, the open, expressive line, travelling through vastly differing imaginary 
landscapes, breaking free of periodic phrasing and meter, could be justified by the signifying 
narration that had to be told. The recitative brings the audience up to date on un-staged events 
that will serve the plot. In the recitative bar of “Der Dichter spricht,” the freedom of the line, 
passing spontaneously in a matter of instants through different key colours hinting at E minor, 
B minor and D minor, is not a function of a narration whose difference at every point is itself 
merely the function of the moving action that it needs to relate.32 The poet’s recitative follows 
no words at all, yet it no longer needs words to justify a suddenly reversing, novelistic—as 
opposed to melodic—top line. The wordless recitative suggests that what “speaks” to the 
listener is not signifying language, but the breakdown of meaningful units. The recitative bar 
is unmetered and combines two sizes of print. The notes in small print may be understood as a 
gloss or interpretation of the notes in regular print. More specifically, the small notes take 
apart a short motif that appears, in regular-size print notation, within the recitative, and which 
fragments under their analytical scrutiny.33 The middle section is a comment on the rising first 
                                                
31 Ibid., mm. 9-12. 
32 Ibid., m. 12. 
33 Rudolph Reti has remarked that the notation in bold type refers to the opening thematic material of “Der 
Dichter spricht”—and, ultimately, of Kinderszenen as a whole. He, however, draws attention to the notes in large 
type at the end of the recitative (A-sharp – B – C-sharp/E – A-sharp). These notes reproduce the contour of the 
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three notes of the opening melody: (F-sharp – G – C).34 It reproduces these verbatim,35 then 
presents them transposed down a minor third (D-sharp – E – A).36 Then, amidst the notes in 
small type, only the first two tones of this transposition appear an octave higher, in large 
type.37 The final E ultimately gives way to the opening theme, suggesting perhaps that poet 
does not “speak” (spricht) but rather “complies” (entspricht) with formal requirements.38 Yet a 
recitative that does not advance the plot, but which merely returns the audience to the same 
scene, which is played out a second time note for note, does not comply with the formal 
requirements of the recitative. Furthermore, it may be asked in what sense “Der Dichter 
spricht” is a childhood scene, considering that its most striking passage is a recitative, which, 
traditionally, is supposed to stand in for missing scenes or else to set the scene for action. The 
specific relation between the thematic material and the recitative here, however, as that of text 
and commentary, changes the function of the repeated bars. A re-read text is not identical after 
it has been subject to analysis and consideration. In this readerly aspect, Schumann’s recitative 
differs from its important antecedents, which it audibly resembles: the Largo and Adagio 
sections from the first movement of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata No. 17, op. 31, no. 2, and the 
passage marked “Recitativo” from the third movement of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata No. 31, 
                                                                                                                                                    
opening theme far less exactly than the long-value, large-type notes stemmed up in bars 9-12. Schumann tended 
to write notes that he wished to emphasize with stems up. Rudolph Reti, “Schumann’s ‘Kinderszenen’: A ‘Theme 
with Variations,’” chap. 2 in The Thematic Process in Music (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1951), here p. 
52 and ex. 79 on p. 51.  
34 R. Schumann, “Der Dichter spricht,” mm. 1-2, r.h., top line. 
35 Ibid., mm. 9-10, r.h., top line.  
36 Ibid., mm. 11-12, r.h., top line. 
37 Ibid., mm. 12-13, r.h. 
38 To Don McLean may be owed this suggestion, and the play on words. Don McLean, “Der Dichter entspricht: 
Conforming and Deforming Formenlehre chez Schoenberg et son école” (paper presented at the symposium 
“Schoenberg’s Legacy on Form,” McGill University, Montréal, May 2008).  
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op. 110.39 The recitative in “Der Dichter spricht” aims to fragment the unitary, sign-like 
aspects of what has happened; it is memorial, like opera recitative. The composer Elliott 
Carter has noted instrumental recitative to be an important feature of the music of the Second 
Viennese School:  
The use of equally intense melodic shapes, often broken up into short, dramatic 
fragments, joins with a very varied rubato rhythmic technique to produce a new kind 
of what might be called instrumental recitative. The rapid increases and decreases of 
harmonic tension, quick changes and register, and fragmented, non-imitative 
counterpoint are also worthy of note.40 
 
Indeed, Schoenberg gave the fifth movement of his Five Pieces for Orchestra, op. 16, the title 
“Das obligate Rezitativ – The Obligatory Recitative.”41 This accompanied recitative, however, 
is one in which the speaker never makes an entry. 
 “Der Dichter spricht,” then, presents at least three important idiosyncrasies, yet these 
idiosyncrasies were able to become norms, the norms of the Expressionist music that was to 
follow some three-quarters of a century later. Furthermore, the movement in turn had an 
influence on the music beyond the decade in which Expressionist works were composed 
(1910-1920). Adorno, writing in 1942, affirms: “The most serious and radical forces in music 
drove it towards Expressionism, and one can hardly imagine great music today in which 
Expressionist elements [Motive] do not play a decisive part.”42 In all these respects, then, 
Expressionist music presents the universality of musical language in its canonization of certain 
of Schumann’s compositional reactions. 
                                                
39 For a list of works making use of instrumental recitative, see Grove Music Online, s.v. “recitative,” by Dale E. 
Monson, Jack Westrup and Julian Budden, accessed December 9, 2013, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com 
/subscriber/article/grove/music/23019, under the heading “3. Instrumental recitative,” by Jack Westrup. 
40 Elliott Carter, “To Be a Composer in America,” in Collected Essays and Lectures, 1937-1995, ed. Jonathan W. 
Bernard (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1997), pp. 201-210, here p. 207. 
41 Arnold Schoenberg, Five Pieces for Orchestra, op. 16, new version=Fünf Orchesterstücke, rev. ed., reduced 
for normal-sized orchestra by the composer (New York: Peters, 1973), p. 46. 
42 GS, vol. 18, p. 61 as translated, “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles,” p. 277. 
 151 
  “Der Dichter spricht” is thereby more than just a Romantic artwork; it is also active in 
perhaps the most profuse, dynamic and decisive changes in the history of Western music. 
Something “more” exceeds the mere work and disturbs its seeming repose. In an address to the 
Hochschule für Musik und Darstellende Kunst in Frankfurt in 1969, Adorno called this 
“more” the work’s truth content.43 Truth content is the “plus” breaking in from the future or 
surging forward from the past that is added to what seems poised to continue just as it is, to 
what seems to be everything that is. When a detail of a seemingly finished work becomes 
charged with associations, that work is evidently not all the maker put into it, but more. Yet 
the “more” can come entirely from other artworks: “The truth content of artworks is fused 
with their critical content. That is why works are also critics of one another.”44 What stands 
out most in “Was will die einsame Träne?” of Schumann’s Myrten song cycle composed in 
1840 are its Debussyst harmonies, but what loads these moments with a charge heavier than 
any other and upsets the appearance of perfect balance is the music of Debussy.45 
Reciprocally, in light of “Was will die einsame Träne?” the music of Debussy ceases to be the 
independent, original, self-actualized, balanced creation that it seemed to be, for what in 
Schumann appears as a nuanced and sensitive use of suspensions looks like overuse of seventh 
and ninth chords in Debussy. 
 As long as works have aesthetic illusion, they are illusions of balance, illusions of 
being fully achieved wholes, so illusions of being closed and fully actualized: “The illusory 
                                                
43 Theodor W. Adorno, “Zum Probleme des musikalischen Analyse,” Frankfurter Adorno Blätter 7 (2001): pp. 
73-89, here p. 80. The talk became available in print in 1982 in an English translation by Max Paddison, who had 
made the recording, in Musical Analysis 1, no. 2 (July 1982): pp. 169-187. See Paddison’s own revision of his 
1982 translation “On the Problem of Musical Analysis,” in Essays on Music, ed. Richard Leppert (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002), pp. 162-180, here p. 169. 
44 GS, vol. 7, p. 59 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 35. 
45 Robert Schumann, “Was will die einsame Träne,” Myrten, in Lieder für eine Singstimme mit Klavierbegleitung 
nach den Handschriften und Erstdrucken, Originalausgabe, herausgegeben von Max Friedlaender (Frankfurt: C. 
F. Peters, s.a.), pp. 49-50, esp. p. 49f., mm. 10-25, with pick-up. 
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character of artworks has narrowed into the claim to be a whole.”46 But the illusion of being 
their own fully realized possibilities is an illusion dissolvable by other works, antecedent and 
subsequent to them, which show, on one hand, that the seemingly fully realized work did not 
realize all the possibilities that it opened and, on the other, that what it did realize was not its 
potential, but a potential opened by what came before. The artwork turns out not to be 
complete in itself. For artists’ impulses go beyond the artworks that they made, into other 
artworks, and as soon as an artist’s impulses are taken up by other artists, the seeming closure 
of the particular artwork is upset. This is why art does not need philosophy to be true. Modern 
art, however, strives to make a truth claim without positing and then negating specific 
illusions. It attacks the equivocalness of the artwork whose every element can stand equally as 
an illusion and as the negation of some other illusion. For in actuality the whole predominates 
over the partial element, the fixed thing over the process, being over becoming. Aesthetic 
illusion, which attempts to create balance where there really is none, to solve unsolved 
antagonisms by pure imagination, cannot succeed: “Today every element of aesthetic illusion 
bears aesthetic inconsistency, contradictions between what the artwork appears as [als was das 
Kunstwerk auftritt] and what it is.”47 With Modernism, art advances to the point where it 
discovers the source of such inconsistency: reality. Art can no longer turn its back on the pain 
and suffering of a distorted, unbalanced world, so it abandons the beautiful illusion of 
perfection. However, if art does not even make the claim to be a balanced whole, then it makes 
no (false) claim that can be negated by another artwork. It has no illusion to be redeemed. 
Unless its expression of suffering is truth, unless it can be true to a false world, then it has no 
hope of truth. Yet this problem does not present itself for the first time in Expressionism. 
                                                
46 GS, vol. 7, p. 155f., or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 101. 
47 GS, vol. 7, p. 156, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 101. 
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     To describe Modern music as a “rebellion against illusion” and associate its inception 
with Expressionism weakens the case for its newness because it is not the first such revolt, and 
Adorno admits as much: “Because [the traits of expression], as artworks, however indeed 
remain illusion, the conflict between illusion—form most broadly understood—and expression 
has not been had out and fluctuates historically.”48 The statement “The emancipation from the 
concept of harmony reveals itself as a revolt against illusion” might not even express anything 
particular to Modern music.49 The concept of harmony cannot be reduced to triadic harmony 
or even to consonance. Harmony is a loose, centuries-old concept: 
In music, the concept of harmony has included, since the early Middle Ages: (1) 
the combining of tones into a sequence of tones, or even groups of tones into a 
melody; (2) the agreement of the two tones in a dyad, or of the tones and intervals 
in a triad; (3) the connecting of dyads into an intervallic progression; (4) the 
relationship among the voices of a polyphonic composition; and (5) the joining 
together of chords into a chord progression.50 
 
The element of reconciliation in the concept of harmony can be very strong—for instance, 
when the aspect of “agreement” predominates in the concept. Dahlhaus singles out Gioseffo 
Zarlino for having constructed the concept of harmony in a particularly balanced way: 
“[Zarlino’s] concept of harmony, which embraces all the factors of composition, admits of no 
one-sided interpretations that allude to a precedence of voice leading or chord progressions, of 
dyads or triads.”51 Adorno, however, suggests that Modern music protests not against a 
balanced concept of harmony, but against an imbalanced one, which has reduced simply to the 
end resolution of dissonances: “Harmony, which, insofar as result, denies the tension that 
                                                
48 GS, vol. 7, p. 169, or prefer to my translation Aesthetic Theory, p. 110. 
49 GS, vol. 7, p. 154, or prefer to my translation Aesthetic Theory, p. 100. 
50 Carl Dahlhaus, Untersuchungen über die Entstehung der harmonischen Tonalität, in Gesammelte Schriften in 
10 Bänden, herausgegeben von Hermann Danuser (Laaber: Laaber-Verlag, 2000-2008), vol. 3, pp. 11-307, here 
p. 23, lines 15-21; as translated by Robert O. Gjerdingen, Studies on the Origin of Harmonic Tonality (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990) p. 18f.  
51 Dahlhaus, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, p. 26, lines 2-4 as translated, Studies, p. 22. 
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rallies within it, thereby becomes something disturbing, false, dissonant, if one will. The 
harmonistic view of the ugly falls to protest in the Modern period.”52 When the aspect of 
agreement is all that remains of the concept of harmony, manifested in the cadence as the end 
result of the chord progression, then emancipation from the concept of harmony requires only 
a baby step. Emancipation from the concept of harmony and not just determinate negation of 
one of its aspects would be new; as a “rebellion against illusion,” however, it is just another 
demonstration of expression, which comes in historical waves. The formulation “The 
emancipation from the concept of harmony reveals itself [enthüllt sich] as a revolt against 
illusion” suggests that the revolt against illusion is the mere appearance, the outer 
manifestation or shell, of what is really different and specific: the emancipation from the 
concept of harmony.53 Since Adorno denies that essence is appearance, the new emancipation 
from the concept of harmony is not simply the same old historical struggle between illusion 
and expression. Adorno claims that it is different and new, distinct from the crisis of illusion, 
which can take completely banal forms, such as the practice of “Hamlet in tails”—
Shakespeare productions without theatre’s trappings of illusion—without a set, period 
costumes, props, stage curtains or even a stage.54 Modern music’s emancipation from the 
concept of harmony has little if anything to do with such stunts as flooding the stage with real 
water, as in the Bayerische Staatsoper 2012 production of Alban Berg’s Wozzeck. The 
rebellion against illusion can just as well be a sign of boredom with the inner details of the 
work, of an incapacity to interpret the text, of the tendency to privilege everyday life over the 
inner sphere of the artwork, as it can be the manifestation of the deepest immersion in the 
                                                
52 GS, vol. 7, p. 75, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 46. 
53 GS, vol. 7, p. 154, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 100. 
54 GS, vol. 7, p. 156, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 102. 
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problems of musical language. The emancipation from the concept of harmony is not, finally, 
something we ever come across in everyday life, like water or a fancy suit, and Adorno is right 
to distinguish it from its outer appearance as a periodically-recurring irritation with art’s 
showiness and artifice. The claim to twentieth-century musical Expressionism’s newness, 
however, can be challenged, with recourse to resources even within Adorno’s body of work.  
 The question is whether Robert Schumann did not achieve emancipation from the 
concept of harmony before Arnold Schoenberg. This is difficult to determine, for the two 
composers were not working with the same concept of harmony. Schumann never enforced 
unresolved dissonance, although he left dissonances unresolved. He negated the narrow 
concept of harmony, harmony as result, in, for instance, the fourth piece of Kinderszenen, 
“Bittendes Kind,” which ends on a dissonant dominant seventh chord.55 But the concept of 
harmony was not narrow when Schumann was writing. Furthermore, it is not clear what 
counts as emancipation from the concept of harmony—whether it is the possibility of 
unresolved dissonance or whether it is the necessity of unresolved dissonance. The attempt to 
date the beginning of tonal harmony back to the emancipation of the third falls into this exact 
antinomy of necessity and possibility. As Dahlhaus argues, “The granting of independence to 
imperfect consonance and the tendency toward ricchezza dell’harmonia [harmonic richness] 
did not, however, completely invalidate the concept of interval progression as a category of 
musical perception.”56 For, while Adam von Fulda in the late fifteenth century argues against 
obligatory treatment of the third—so for the possibility of an untreated third—, and Zarlino in 
                                                
55 Robert Schumann, “Bittendes Kind,” Kinderszenen=Scenes from Childhood, ed. Holger M. Stüwe (Kassel: 
Bärenreiter, 2011), p. 5, m. 17. 
56 Dahlhaus, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, p. 90, lines 10-12 as translated, Studies, p. 92, or, preferring to keep 
the dialectical language: “The gain of independence for imperfect consonance and the tendency towards 
ricchezza dell’harmonia sublated the concept of interval progression as a category of musical hearing but not 
without a remainder [nicht restlos ausgehoben].”  
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1558 argues for obligatory triads—so for the necessity of untreated thirds—, neither, 
according to Dahlhaus, really overcame modal harmony:  
The fact that a chord is immediately conceived as a unity does not mean that its 
individual tone and intervals “fuse,” that is, blend together so completely that a listener 
can barely distinguish them. Instead, it means that the chord relates to the preceding 
and succeeding chords as a whole and not through individual interval progressions 
standing out from the sonorities. The criterion for the chordal character of sonorities is 
the principle of connecting the sonorities by root progressions. What contradicts the 
concept of the chord is not the independence of the voices, but the method of linking 
sonorities through interval progressions. The categories “chord” and “root progression” 
are in a reciprocally dependent relationship.57 
 
These observations on chords suggest that, in a parallel fashion, the independent sonorities 
that constitute the music of total dissonance can nonetheless carry with them associations of 
harmony if movement between individual tones of the aggregates suggests V – I relations. 
Even if dissonance is used throughout, a cadence can nonetheless be intimated by the voice-
leading. The perception of resolution may be created, despite dissonance, by downward 
movement by a fifth or upward movement by a fourth in the bass, by a half-step up or a whole 
step down in the upper voice or, to a lesser extent, by a falling third or rising second in the 
middle voices. Final reconciliations are suggested in works that Adorno includes within the 
extremely small canon of “Expressionist pieces in the strong sense.”58 The cello’s last 
statement in Anton Webern’s Sechs Bagatellen für Streichquartett, op. 9, (1913) makes a 
cadential gesture: this half-step up in the highest voice alone is marked “sehr zart” (very 
tenderly).59 The following dissonance created out of the viola’s G-natural/A-natural trill and 
first violin’s G-sharp eighth-notes on the bridge has the character of a phosphorescence or 
vanishing aura emanating from the cadence—a coda of sorts. The piano’s last statement in 
                                                
57 Dahlhaus, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, p. 91, line 28-p. 92, line 7 as translated, Studies, p. 93. 
58 GS, vol. 18, p. 62, or prefer to my translation here, “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles,” p. 277. 
59 Anton Webern, Sechs Bagatellen Op. 9 für Strechquartett (1913) (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1924), VI, p. 8, 
m. 9. 
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Alban Berg’s Four Pieces for Clarinet and Piano is a major seventh chord, which, although 
dissonant, forms a V – I relation with the clarinet’s impressive series of ornamented G-
naturals ascending in four octaves—a strong emphasis on this note.60 The brutal, dissonant 
chord built up progressively deep in the piano’s range at once disrupts and creates the cadence. 
For it produces the tonic C as a quasi-flageolet major seventh chord that should, once the 
pedal is re-applied with the depressed keys held, shine through in the clarinet’s (fermata) rest 
preceding the concluding recitative.61 Distantly related to the key of C Major, the recitative 
detaches from the work as a whole. It traces a light, ornamented figure whose prominent notes, 
a-flat' – e-flat'' – a-flat (in concert pitch) suggest a I – V – I cadence.62 One would be hard-
pressed, however, to find overt tonal references in Schoenberg’s Five Pieces for Orchestra, 
known for its Klangfarbenmelodien.63 The cellos, in the final moving line of the work, rise out 
of their C-major motif a dramatic half-step to C-sharp (IV).64 The phrase does not finish there, 
but rather chokes; in the next instant, the D-sharp (V) surges up strongly.65 In staggered 
entries, the entire orchestra, with the exception of horns and double-basses, fade in and out of 
this tone, forming altering, softly-massed dissonances.66 A corresponding tonic G-sharp (I), 
moving from English horn to solo cello to first flute, might be picked out from within this 
billowing cloud head.67 In the last entry of the Five Pieces for Orchestra, the G-sharp is 
                                                
60 Berg, Vier Stücke für Klarinette und Klavier, IV, p. 10, mm. 16-20. 
61 Ibid., IV, p. 10, mm. 17-18. 
62 Ibid., IV, p. 10, mm. 18-19, cl. 
63 The third movement is called “Summer Morning by a Lake (Colors).” Schoenberg, Five Pieces for Orchestra, 
III, p. 31. 
64 Schoenberg, Five Pieces for Orchestra, V, p. 60, m. 461, vcl. 
65 Ibid., V, p. 60, m. 462, vcl. 
66 Ibid., V, p. 60, mm. 462-466. 
67 Ibid., V, p. 60, mm. 463-465, E. H.; mm. 464-465, vcl. I Solo; mm. 464-466, fl. I. 
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prominent, owing to both the register and piercing timbre of the flute.68  It becomes part of an 
enormous, dissonant, iridescent aggregate that can be analyzed as a G-sharp minor seventh 
chord with added ninths and elevenths.69 The tuba, however, sits on a contra G-natural, a note 
that falls out of the chord.70 This dissonance occurs precisely in the voice where the tonic is 
expected.  
 Of Berg, Webern and Schoenberg, then, Schoenberg is the most resistant towards the 
aspect of agreement, but not because his music is more dissonant. Dissonance, even total 
dissonance, is not necessarily free of the (narrow) concept of harmony, since the idea of 
placation can still be operative in very subtle suggestions of the IV – V – I root progression. 
Schoenberg is the most fastidious about suppressing hints of cadences suggested by voice-
leading. While Schoenberg may have achieved emancipation from the (narrow) concept of 
harmony, whether this emancipation was progressive in 1910 is quite another matter. 
 In suppressing the narrow concept of harmony, Schoenberg may have inadvertently 
restored regressive aspects of the broader concept of harmony. When Adorno judges the 
critique of harmony to be the criterion of great art in different eras, he takes into account the 
changing concept of harmony. In his discussions of the Second Viennese School, Adorno 
focuses on dissonance; in his discussion of Schumann, he speaks rather of disintegration, 
disagreement, disconnection and dissociation. What earns Schumann the title of great 
composer is not only the lack of accord in the sonority, dissonance, but also his resistance 
toward connection, joining and synthesis, which are aspects of a broader concept of harmony: 
Romantic art hopes to conserve the mimetic moment, insofar as Romantic art does not 
mediate it by way of form; through the mimetic moment, the whole says what an isolated 
                                                
68 Ibid., V, p. 60, mm. 464-466, fl. I (G-sharp) entering with fl. II, cl. I and bsn. I. 
69 Ibid., V, p. 60, mm. 464-466. 
70 Ibid., V, p. 60, mm. 463-466. 
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thing can scarcely say anymore. Despite this, Romantic art cannot simply ignore the 
compulsion to objectivation. It reduces what the synthesis objectively denies itself to 
something dissociated. Romantic art may break itself up into details, but it inclines no 
less to abstract formal qualities—to be distinguished from surface ones. In one of the 
greatest composers, Robert Schumann, this quality is essentially allied with a tendency 
toward disintegration. The purity with which his work presses out unreconciled 
antagonism lends it the power of its expression and its rank.71  
 
Here Adorno emphasizes the forces of repulsion and disintegration in Schumann’s music, and 
these appear to set his Romantic critique of harmony apart from twentieth-century 
Expressionist music: “Expressionist music had remained ‘organic,’ a language, subjective and 
psychological. That drives it back to totality. If Expressionism did not act radically enough 
against the superstition of the organic, then the liquidation of the organic re-crystallized the 
idea of the work; the Expressionist heritage is necessarily passed on to works.”72 In this last 
sentence Adorno indicates that Expressionism itself failed to criticize organicism, but he 
suggests that this did not end up being fatal to it—as works, so, as the products of labour, 
Expressionist pieces are inorganic despite themselves; however, the superstitious belief in 
organic unity is somehow embedded in them.73 In a footnote, Adorno elucidates further by a 
comparison with Surrealism, which he calls “anti-organic,” a quality reflected in its form: “Its 
form is that of montage. This is completely foreign to Schoenberg.”74 It was indeed montage 
that brought attention to “the work” as a category of aesthetics in general.75 This may save 
                                                
71 GS, vol. 7, p. 275 (my translation). 
72 GS, vol. 12, p. 54f. (my translation). 
73 Cf. Lisa Yun Lee, Dialectics of the Body: Corporeality in the Philosophy of T. W. Adorno (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), p. 175 n51. Lee here enlists Adorno’s discussion of organicism in Philosophie der neuen 
Musik as evidence for her claim that “the ‘organic’ is a recurring motif in Adorno’s thought that appears and is 
used, much of the time to refer to a materiality and spontaneity of the body and in contrast to the lifelessness 
associated with reification” (ibid., p. 135). She provides no other evidence for this claim but the passage from 
Philosophie der neuen Musik, of which she ignores Adorno’s critique of Expressionist organcism.   
74 GS, vol. 12, p. 54 n11, or prefer to my translation here Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 51 n15. 
75 See Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, mit einem Nachwort zur 2. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1980), pp. 76-80. Chapters 1-4 translated by Michael Shaw as chapters 2-5 in Theory of the Avant-
Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), here pp. 55-59. 
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Expressionist works as inorganic; yet Expressionism cannot be understood without 
interpretation of their content, of their “inner strife,” which Adorno puts down to “organic 
irrationality.”76 Elsewhere Adorno will affirm, in the context of a discussion of Schoenberg’s 
Expressionist works, “however much this music owes its origin to plant-like impulses, 
however much even its irregularity resembles organic forms, in no way is it totality.”77 Its 
claim to truth through the immediacy of expression is illusory, for the works are indeed given 
to analysis and philosophical reflection. If one denied them this, they would indeed be merely 
plant-like, irrational. However, one cannot deny them this once the most regressive forces in 
society claim the organic as “truth.” To save Expressionist works, it is necessary to negate 
their claims to truth in immediacy, whether in reflecting on them philosophically or in taking 
up their impulses in subsequent composition, thereby negating their negation of musical 
universality. 
 Schoenberg’s organicism raises the question as to whether montage was not indeed a 
more critical advance than musical Expressionism. Mahler had already realized montage 
musically by 1910, in the second movement of his Ninth Symphony, although he would not 
live to conduct it or to hear it performed: “The Ländler main section is probably the first 
exemplary case of musical montage, anticipating Stravinsky both by its quotation-like themes 
and by its decomposition and lop-sided reunification.”78 To defend montage as advanced 
would in a way mitigate Adorno’s judgement against Stravinsky as “restoration.”79 
Considering, however, the invalidity of organicism, advanced music must not only be 
                                                
76 GS, vol. 12, p. 54 n11 as translated, Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 51 n15. 
77 GS, vol. 12, p. 45, or prefer to my translation here Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 40. 
78 GS, vol. 13, p. 304 as translated by Edmund Jephcott, Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 161. 
79 GS, vol. 12, p. 127 as translated, Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 135. 
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dissonant, but also anti-organic.80 Schumann’s work does not go the path of organicism: not 
only is it unreconciled; it is also inorganic, according to Paul Bekker: 
Schumann was no logician, neither in terms of thought nor emotion. This characteristic 
[Eigenheit, idiosyncrasy], closely connected with the nature [Charakter] of his talent, 
led him to the sketch, the small aphoristic form, permitted him the more extensive ones 
only in rhapsodic terms, but forbade him all wide-ranging, organically closed 
structures [großlinigen, organisch geschlossenen Gestaltungen].81 
 
Adorno and Bekker both associate the organic with totality: Adorno, with an irrational totality; 
Bekker, with a logical totality, a system, which just as well amounts to an irrational totality in 
Adorno’s eyes: the totally administered society. Romanticism and Modern Expressionism 
have different reactions to the whole. Romanticism, argues Adorno, evokes the whole as a 
gesture in the “mimetic moment” that it wants to conserve; Expressionism, however, is 
concerned with the whole as totality, as a logical system, which it attacks: “In its Expressionist 
phase, music quashed the claim to totality.”82 Despite this, Adorno, as we have seen, does not 
think that Expressionism escapes from totality: “Expressionist music had remained ‘organic,’ 
a language, subjective and psychological. That drives it back to totality.”83 Adorno likely 
believes that Expressionism remained organic because it bears traits of innerness, which he 
associates with systems organized along organic principles. 
                                                
80 Cf. Anne Boissière, La pensée musicale de Theodor W. Adorno: L’épique et le temps (Paris: Beauchesne, 
2011). While Boissière’s claim that Adorno neglected the montage-aspects of Mahler’s form is surprising (ibid., 
p. 25), she rightly draws a polarity between Mahler and Stravinsky: Stravinsky’s “body art,” dance beat, vitalism 
and biologism (ibid., p. 95) are at the extreme of Mahler’s un-danceable dances, ironic distance, deathly 
foreboding and juxtapositions stilled with the remove of memory. 
81 Paul Bekker quoted in Thomas Alan Brown, The Aesthetics of Robert Schumann (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 183 n3, as translated by Thomas Alan Brown. I have consulted a digitized version of 
the University of Toronto copy of Paul Bekker, introduction to Gesammelte Schriften über Musik und Musiker by 
Robert Schumann (Berlin: Wegweiser, 1922), pp. 5-54, here p. 33, 
http://www.archive.org/details/22gesammeltesch00schu. 
82 GS, vol. 12, p. 54, or prefer to my translation here Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 51. 
83 GS, vol. 12, p. 54f., or prefer to my translation here Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 51. 
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 Schoenberg’s negated aesthetic illusion in withholding even the merest of cadential 
gestures, thereby suppressing hopes of an eventual reconciliation. He also negated play, 
avoiding the kind of “ironic play with forms whose substantiality has vanished,” which, for 
instance, Mahler practiced in montage.84 Adorno, while critical of Schoenberg’s relaxed 
reactions towards organicism, nonetheless associates him with “progress.”85 Yet since 
montage is anti-organic and since the most regressive forces to gather in the twentieth century 
were emphatically organicist, Schoenberg’s critique seems to have missed the mark.  
 The question now is whether montage was not the more critical technique towards 
1910; whether the characterization of Modernism as anti-organic is not more advanced than 
Adorno’s characterization of it as the crisis of aesthetic illusion.  
                                                
84 GS, vol. 12, p. 45, or prefer to my translation here Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 40. 
85 GS, vol. 12, p. 36 as translated, Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 29. 
{Chapter V} Expressionism and montage seem to be vying with one another for first place in 
the competition of the most advanced artistic consciousness, yet Ernst Bloch described 
Expressionism as a “higher order” of montage, because Expression had started as image-
explosion: “Expressionism in its original form was image-explosion, was torn-up surface even 
starting with the original, namely with the subject which violently tore up and cross-
connected.”1 Bloch considered image-explosion to be an advanced aspect of an advanced art 
movement, Expressionism, which he defended on several occasions, famously against 
Lukács.2 According to Bloch, Lukács fails to grasp the implications of montage: “Because 
Lukács has an objectivistically-closed concept of Reality, he therefore opposes, apropos of 
Expressionism, every artistic attempt to chop to pieces a world-picture [Weltbild] (even if the 
world-picture is that of capitalism).”3 Montage, then, is hardly incompatible with 
Expressionism. Yet what Bloch understands to be montage actually covers quite a lot: jazz, 
revue, der Blaue Reiter, James Joyce, Pablo Picasso, Bertolt Brecht and Surrealism. Adorno in 
certain moods also understands montage broadly—for instance, when he suggests that it is the 
tendency of all new art: “The aesthetic principle of construction, the stark primacy of the 
methodically planned whole over the details and over their interconnection inside the 
microstructure, forms the complement to [the disrupted faith in organic continuity]; insofar as 
the microstructure is concerned, all new art should be called montage.”4 In their 
characterizations of montage, both Bloch and Adorno remark on the construction of a second 
                                                
1 Ernst Bloch, Erbschaft dieser Zeit, erweiterte Ausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1962), p. 224, as 
translated by Neville and Stephen Plaice, Heritage of Our Times (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 
p. 204. 
2 See Bloch, Erbschaft dieser Zeit, pp. 255-278, or translated, Heritage of Our Times, pp. 234-253. 
3 Bloch, Erbschaft dieser Zeit, p. 270 as translated, Heritage of Our Times, p. 246. 
4 GS, vol. 7, p. 233, or prefer to my translation here that of Robert Hullot-Kentor, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel 
Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 155. 
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structure, criss-crossing the large-scale structure, and formed out of individual connections 
amongst tiny, torn pieces. Expressed this way, montage is not only an artistic technique, but 
also resembles a form of reception: the peculiar process of breakdown and reconstruction of 
the artwork that the listener or reader makes in scholarly interpretation. Image-explosion has a 
distinctly cognitive character in the work of both thinkers. 
 According to Bloch, montage can bring forth the separation of whole and part, but does 
not do so necessarily—an “organic” montage does not: 
Even in the human body, skin, internal organs are transplanted; but at best the 
transplanted organ performs in its new place only what is appropriate to that place, 
nothing else. In technical and cultural montage, however, the context of the old surface 
is decomposed, a new one is formed. It can be formed as a new one because the old 
context increasingly reveals itself as illusory [scheinhafter], brittle, as one of surface.5 
 
As opposed to the corresponding organic montage—organ transplant—, technical and cultural 
montage show that inner is not the same as outer; part is not the same as whole. In the kind of 
montage that interests Bloch, the whole has no intrinsic essence that reaches down deep into 
each part: for in such montage, a part can leave the whole and become part of a different 
whole, to function in a completely different way. The old whole, or “context,” did not really 
determine each part inside and out; the whole turns out to be only “surface.” Now Bloch 
differentiates amongst even more sorts of montage, so, while Adorno seemed prepared to 
write off montage once he noted the general lack of shock effect, the shock or “jolt” for Bloch 
was not the decisive aspect of montage—for, as the first fragment of his chapter on montage, 
“Jolt,” suggests, the shock effect was only the most immediate, most subjective aspect of 
montage, the aspect least enlivened by progressive energies.6 The shocks of montage may 
have worn off, then, but this does not damage Bloch’s argument for montage as an advanced 
                                                
5 Bloch, Erbschaft dieser Zeit, p. 221 as translated, Heritage of Our Times, p. 202. 
6 Bloch, Erbschaft dieser Zeit, p. 207 as translated, Heritage of Our Times, p. 189. 
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art form because shock is not what he considers to be the most advanced about montage at any 
rate. It is rather the open character of mediate montage that is progressive. Bloch claims that 
immediate montage, on the other hand, the “sealed bottle” or “castle-restoration” of 
“bourgeois empty montage,” merely reproduces the same old world, and is hence 
contemporaneous, not progressive.7 The sort of montage that Bloch considers to be advanced 
does not smooth over the rifts in its disturbed surface. It is easy to see why he thinks this kind 
of montage is advanced: the cracks in the surface of montage show that innerness differs from 
the surface, which itself is no longer “of a piece.” Furthermore, the transitional aspect of 
mediate montage is progressive:  
Montage is inclined towards the interim, towards new ‘passage-forming’ through 
things and towards the display of what has previously been extremely remote; in other 
places, for example in many remarkable experiments by the Surrealists, from Max 
Ernst to Aragon, it is a kind of crystallization on the chaos that has come, attempting to 
mirror in a bizarre way the coming order.8 
  
Montage does not destroy all notion of the whole, nor free the part from the domination of the 
whole, but it merely suggests a state of things in which the individual parts really would be 
able to step out of the whole: “Only in and after the revolution can particulars themselves be 
raised out in montage.”9 Mediate montage is more advanced than closed, immediate montage 
in that it presents a transitional state between the domination of the part by the whole and the 
part’s liberation. Mediate montage does not actually accomplish this state, but nor does it 
claim that it does. Mediate montage shows the give within the whole, whereas immediate 
montage seals up all cracks between the pieces that it passes in “revue.” The primary intention 
                                                
7 Bloch, Erbschaft dieser Zeit, p. 223; p. 222 and p. 222, respectively, as translated, Heritage of Our Times, p. 
203. 
8 Bloch, Erbschaft dieser Zeit, p. 227 as translated, Heritage of Our Times, p. 207. 
9 Bloch, Erbschaft dieser Zeit, p. 226 as translated, Heritage of Our Times, p. 206. 
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behind montage may have been to shock the recipient, but montage does not become false in 
missing its intention, nor in realizing its intention in a completely unforeseen way.  
 While Bloch sees inorganic, mediate montage as the advanced Modern form, Walter 
Benjamin considers shock to be the peculiarly Modern contribution of art to progressive 
consciousness. 
 Bloch’s characterization of montage as image-explosion, however, is suggestive of 
shock. Shock might not be detachable from montage, in which case, montage, even as the 
avant-garde form by definition, may be a spent form—as Peter Bürger argues.10    
 The question now is whether shock is the advanced effect in Modern art.     
 According to Benjamin, modern art, particularly the poetry of Charles Baudelaire, 
registers a fundamental change in society—“the disintegration of aura in the experience of 
shock.” Baudelaire, Benjamin claims, 
indicated the price for which the sensation of the modern age may be had: the 
disintegration of the aura in the experience of shock. He paid dearly for consenting to 
this disintegration—but it is the law of his poetry, which shines in the sky of the 
Second Empire as ‘a star without atmosphere.’11 
 
This passage concludes the twelfth and final section of “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in 
which Benjamin draws a parallel between the dilemma of the modern artist and the strange 
dilemma that confronted the poet character in the prose-poem “Perte d’auréole” (Lost Halo): 
                                                
10 Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, mit einem Nachwort zur 2. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1980), p. 108, or translated by Michael Shaw, Theory of the Avant-Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press), 1984, p. 80f. Please note that only chapters 1-4 of Theorie der Avantgarde are translated in Theory of the 
Avant-Garde (as chapters 2-5). 
11 Walter Benjamin, “Über einige Motive bei Baudelaire,” in Gesammelte Schriften, Unter Mitwirkung von 
Theodor W. Adorno und Gershom Scholem, herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann 
Schweppenhäuser, 6 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), vol. 1.2, pp. 605-653, here p. 653 as translated 
by Harry Zohn, “Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” in Illuminations, edited and with an introduction by Hannah 
Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), pp. 155-194, here p. 194. 
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whether or not to retrieve his halo, which has landed in the mud on a chaotic boulevard.12 In 
the posthumously published version of the poem in prose, the poet fully rationalizes leaving 
the halo where it fell, jolted off his head as he was dodging traffic. Going undecorated is 
preferable to having one’s bones crushed, and besides, without this mark of distinction, one 
can frequent all sorts of disreputable places. Dignity is boring, whereas the halo might even be 
a source of amusement if some mediocre poet ever finds it and, idiotically overjoyed, crowns 
himself with it. But Benjamin notes that there also exists a variant of “Perte d’auréole” in 
which the poet puts his halo back on. The dilemma represented by these two possible endings 
is any poet’s own: for if through some sort of accident, poetry has lost its magic, the poet is 
left with either trying to restore it, or else going more deeply into this accident, into jolts and 
turmoil, mud, low places and degradation. Baudelaire himself chose not to restore art’s halo or 
aura. Yet he did not thereby submit to the shocks of modern life, nor merely reproduce them. 
 Baudelaire has achieved something quite remarkable, according to Benjamin: 
“Baudelaire has given the weight of an experience (Erfahrung)” to “something lived through 
(Erlebnis).”13 Benjamin describes what is merely “lived through” in Proustian terms: “Only 
what has not been experienced explicitly and consciously, what has not happened to the 
subject as an experience, can become a component of the mémoire involontaire.”14 Benjamin 
then translates this Proustian concept into Freudian terms. What can become a component of 
the mémoire involontaire is a particularly strong stimulus, which the ego has screened out so 
as to protect itself. Shock, then, is just the failure of the ego to screen out overwhelming 
                                                
12 Charles Baudelaire, Œuvres complètes, texte établi, présenté et annoté par Claude Pichois, 2 vols. (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1975), vol. 1, p. 352. 
13 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.2, p. 652f. as translated, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” p. 194. 
14 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.2, p. 613 as translated, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” p. 160f. 
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stimuli: “The threat from these energies is one of shocks.”15 If aura is nothing but the 
“associations which, at home in the mémoire involontaire, tend to cluster around the object of 
a perception,” then the loss of aura is not so much the falling away of these associations as 
their incursion into the ego.16 Following a certain implication in Freud’s work, Benjamin then 
concludes that the multiplication of shock effects in art would act almost as a kind of negative 
reinforcement, conditioning the recipient to register his experiences more consciously, so as to 
avoid trauma, for “the more readily consciousness registers these shocks, the less likely are 
they to have a traumatic effect.”17 The less likely the shocks are to have a traumatic effect, the 
more able the subject is to have an explicit and conscious experience (Erfahrung).  
 In “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Benjamin advances that 
Dada created a demand for shocks precisely in the interests of strengthening the ego against 
what it would have to confront in modern life. Benjamin claims that film montage, which he 
thinks realized the demand for shocks created by Dada, necessitates a greater consciousness 
on the part of the spectator if he is to survive the onslaught of stimuli: “The spectator’s process 
of association in view of these images is indeed interrupted by their constant, sudden change. 
This constitutes the shock effect of the film, which, like all shocks, should be cushioned by 
heightened presence of mind.”18 Benjamin however conflates this heightened presence of 
mind with political consciousness, arguing that the shock effects of film turn the recipient into 
                                                
15 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.2, p. 613 as translated, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” p. 161. 
16 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.2, p. 644 as translated, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” p. 186. 
17 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.2, p. 613 as translated, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” p. 161. 
18 Walter Benjamin, “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkiet ‹Zweite Fassung›,” in 
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.2, pp. 471-508, here p. 503 as translated by Harry Zohn, “The Work of Art in the 
Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations, pp. 217-251, here p. 238. 
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a critic19 and set art on a political basis.20 Benjamin understands the modern artwork’s basis in 
politics to be its progressive feature. 
Peter Bürger rightly recognizes the disjunction between the feeling of shock in the 
viewer and determinate political action: “The problem with shock as the intended reaction of 
the recipient is that it is generally non-specific. Even a possible breaking through the aesthetic 
immanence does not insure that the recipient’s behaviour is given a particular direction.”21 
Bürger is however aiming this criticism at the wrong target. He seems to think that Adorno 
attributes political effectiveness to shock, when it is rather Benjamin who fits this description 
and to whose Baudelaire essay Bürger directs the reader in a footnote—though he declines to 
analyze the account of shock there.22 Bürger associates shock with specific aesthetic 
procedures, of which montage. He borrows from Adorno the idea that montage scrambles the 
recipient’s usual engagement with the work of art, which is to search for its meaning.23 But 
Adorno does not claim that montage conveys the recipient toward taking political action. 
While Adorno indeed claims that art and life—or sooner, what he calls “the aesthetic and the 
extra-aesthetic”—are connected,24 he does not suggest that montage has a revolutionary 
political effect extra-aesthetically. On the contrary, he criticizes montage: “Montage is the 
                                                
19 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.2, pp. 492-494, or translated, “Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” 
p. 231f. 
20 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.2, p. 482 and p. 508, or translated, “Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction,” p. 224 and p. 242. 
21 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 108 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 80. 
22 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 116 n35, or translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 118f. n35. 
23 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 106, or translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 79 
24 See Murray Dineen, “Adorno and Schoenberg’s Unanswered Question,” The Musical Quarterly 77, no. 3 
(Autumn 1993): pp. 415-427. Whether the forms of life are necessarily linked to changes in music is the subject 
of this elegant essay. Replying to the “unanswered question” that they are, Dineen traces Schoenberg’s 
destruction of the musical medium, tonal space, in Opus 11 to the denial of internal and external sanction to the 
ego to express itself in life at all. Schoenberg’s music is the response to the form of life whereby the “synthesis of 
ego and a larger social existence is denied in society and in works of art” (ibid., p. 423).   
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inner-aesthetic capitulation of art in the face of what is heterogeneous to it.”25 Montage divests 
art of its critical bearing on reality rather than making this critique operative in reality. 
Furthermore, Adorno was perfectly aware that the shocks of montage quickly wear off, and 
this well before Bürger announced that shock had become “institutionalized.”26 While Bürger 
interprets the neutralization of shock as the definitive failure of Dada and Surrealism to change 
life, Adorno states merely that montage technique no longer suffices to open the aesthetic 
totality: 
As a campaign against the organic unity obtained by devious means, the principle of 
montage was set to shock. Since the desensitization to shocks, what goes into montage 
tends to revert to merely indifferent matter; the procedure no longer suffices to ignite 
the communication between the aesthetic and the extra-aesthetic, and the interest of it 
is neutralized into a cultural-historical interest.27  
 
Adorno here suggests by way of metaphor that the goal of montage was not to unite life and 
art, but to use the already-existing communication between the two to create an explosion; 
successful detonation, however, would mean that the line or path between the aesthetic and 
extra-aesthetic, would have been consumed, much in the way that a detonation also consumes 
the detonating cord. Montage served as a trigger installed from the side of what passed itself 
off as art to blow up what passed itself off as life (organic unity). Montage does not work 
against the pseudo-organic unity, however, because, Adorno suggests, its specific shock-effect 
has worn off. Bürger, by contrast, blames the non-specificity of the shock intention for the 
failure of early montage to engage the recipient politically. This also makes montage 
vulnerable to recuperation by the art institution, in which objects have a representational 
function, not a political one. Bürger suggests that Bertolt Brecht was able to correct this failing 
                                                
25 GS, vol. 7, p. 232, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 155. 
26 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 108 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 81. 
27 GS, vol. 7, p. 233f., or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 155f. 
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of montage by giving his nonorganic works political contents, which, no longer subordinated 
to the whole, could detach themselves from the work to become available for praxis: “On the 
basis of the nonorganic work, a new type of engaged art thus becomes possible.”28 But the 
nonorganic, politically-engaged work only goes so far, for according to Bürger the art 
institution is in full control of the political efficacy of individual works: “It is art as an 
institution that determines the measure of political effect avant-garde works can have.”29 For 
something to qualify as a successful avant-garde manifestation, it would somehow have to 
eliminate the art institution by negating its bourgeois function, reception and production, 
something which Bürger claims the avant-garde cannot do as long as they exhibit their ‘works’ 
in a museum or the theatre.30 In other words, although the universal no longer dominates the 
particular in the particular work of art, in montage, the universal still dominates the particular 
in life. So, Bürger concludes, the universal still dominates the particular work of art; therefore, 
even works that contest the universal do so only inner-aesthetically and thus necessarily fail to 
affect the domination of the universal over the particular in life. He appears to see art as a 
sealed subset of life to be unsealed. Bürger closes his study with a call for scholarship, 
following the definitive failure of Dada and Surrealism; but at the same time, he doubts 
whether aesthetics is still possible at all, given Adorno’s observation on the irrationality of 
society in general: “Adorno’s notion that late-capitalist society has become so irrational…that 
it may well be that no theory can any longer plumb it applies perhaps with even greater force 
to post avant-gardist work.”31  
                                                
28 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 127 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 91. 
29 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 128 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 92. 
30 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 68f., or translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 50f. 
31 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 131 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 94. 
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One might ask if the object of Adorno’s aesthetics is a lost object. Indeed, Adorno’s 
striking use of the preterite tense in connection to aesthetic experience is a sign of an 
unsurpassable block between the theory and its object: “Up to the phase of total 
administration, the subject who beheld, heard, read a work (Gebilde) was supposed to forget 
himself, to lose his self-interest, to be quenched in it.”32 The situation of art, on Adorno’s 
reading, is far more serious than Bürger thinks: not only shock effects, but every aspect of the 
artwork has been not merely institutionalized, but administered. For Bürger, the failure of the 
historical avant-garde movements demonstrates that the institution of art cannot be eliminated, 
and that it is not possible for art to be integrated into life praxis. At best, artists can strive to 
change the function of the art institution, as Brecht strove to do in making fun the object of the 
theatre.33 For Adorno, by contrast, the entire forming of works by the culture industry and by 
the cultural administration actually comes between the work and the recipient, and this is what 
makes the possibility of aesthetic experience and aesthetic theory entirely uncertain. For 
Adorno holds that one has no aesthetic experience unless immersed in a particular artwork, to 
the exclusion of all else. The neutralization of shock effects does not re-establish the status 
quo because art was never the status quo: aesthetic experience was an entirely different 
experience, without comparison, not religious contemplation.  
 Bürger’s theory in some ways coincides with George Dickie’s institutional theory of 
art.34 Indeed, what for Bürger disqualifies a work from being avant-garde today is just what 
for Dickie qualifies a work as an artwork. Just as being “accepted as an object that deserves a 
                                                
32 GS, vol. 7, p. 33, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 17.  
33 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 124, or translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 88f. 
34 Marie-Noëlle Ryan has also remarked the convergence between Peter Bürger’s notion of the art institution and 
George Dickie’s institutional theory of art. See Marie-Noëlle Ryan, “Penser l’art depuis les avant-gardes: 
Problèmes de l’esthétique contemporaine après Adorno” (PhD diss., Université de Paris I: Panthéon-Sorbonne, 
1993), microfiche, p. 20f. and p. 153. 
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place in a museum” is enough to distinguish an artwork from a provocation for Bürger,35 for 
Dickie, “an artifact’s hanging in an art museum as part of a show or a performance at a theatre 
are sure signs that the status [of a candidate for appreciation] has been conferred,” and that the 
artifact is therefore art.36 Although Dickie affirms the art institution while Bürger criticizes it, 
the concept of institution enables both theorists to define art safely from the outside: it is the 
particular work’s place in society, not the movement of its inner laws, that makes it art. While 
Bürger at no moment claims that the art institution is a fixed, eternal, singularly valid concept 
that defines art absolutely, he nonetheless applies philosophical universality to artworks. 
Particular works are art because they fall under the social institution of art: they are currently 
subject to formalized educational and museological policies, articulated through concepts. 
How they came to be included under the heading “art” may not be transparent. But the 
traditional theorist sees as his task not to debate whether the objects on display in museums are 
art or not art, but rather to explain how it is that they are art. Such traditional philosophical 
universality, through which particulars fall under abstracted qualities, contrasts with the 
universality of art language, which is constituted in the particular when it unmasks the sham 
consensus of norms and conventions. It is no surprise that institutional theories of art come on 
the scene when art language and aesthetic illusion are in peril. Institutional theories respond to 
the problem that illusionless works pose, which is really that truth and legitimization of works 
as art have taken place only through aesthetic illusion, through the negation and rescue of 
aesthetic illusion, which is a negation and rescue that particular artworks can effect; yet 
institutional theories simply seek the truth and legitimization of art on other grounds, by 
having the universal take over the role of the particular. In a certain sense, the failure of 
                                                
35 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 71, as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 52. 
36 George Dickie, Aesthetics: An Introduction (Indianapolis: Pegasus, 1971), p. 102. 
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particulars to constitute the universal, art, negatively, through the determinate negation of 
aesthetic illusion, is perfectly reflected by institutional theories. Defining art from the top 
down, these theories ignore or fail to recognize the role of aesthetic illusion as a condition for 
constituting universality in the particular. In so doing, institutional theories cover up an 
important break in history: the decline of illusion.  
 Although Bürger engages reflections on illusion, interpreting “avant-garde” techniques 
such as montage and defamiliarization as the work’s refusal to create illusion, his 
understanding of the concept as affirmative is largely informed by Marx and Marcuse:  
In bourgeois society, art has a contradictory role: it projects the image of a better order 
and to that extent protests against the bad order that prevails. But by realizing the 
image of a better order in fiction, which is semblance (Schein) only, it relieves the 
existing society of the pressure of those forces that make for change.37  
 
Although Bürger expresses doubts over whether Marx’s critique of religion in Critique of 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right can be applied to literature,38 he nonetheless endorses Marcuse’s 
view that autonomous art is “affirmative”—that is, the illusion of a better world in art, even 
while enfolding the real misery of this world as its content, is so much consolation that art 
actually prevents a better world from coming about.39 Since Schein has a dual character—at 
once a satisfying lie that actually annuls a better world and truth about the misery of this 
world—, we would, on this view, be missing something if we simply destroyed the illusion in 
art. Rather, the real content of illusion, the misery of the world, should be exposed in an 
                                                
37 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 68 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 50. Michael Shaw’s 
translation of “semblance” for “Schein” has been retained here, as this is Bürger’s preference when he translates 
his own text. 
38 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 13. Please note that Michael Shaw’s translation includes neither the 
introduction (“Einleitung: Vorüberlegungen zu einer kritischen Literaturwissenschaft”) nor the first chapter 
(“Theorie der Avantgarde und kritische Literaturwissenschaft”) of Theorie der Avantgarde, but substitutes 
closely-related essays from Peter Bürger’s Vermittlung – Rezeption –Funktion (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1979) for these: respectively, “Theorie der Avantgarde und Theorie der Literature” (pp. 9-17) and “Hermeneutik 
– Ideologiekritik – Funktionsanalyse” (pp. 147-159). See Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. iv. 
39 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 68, or translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 50. 
 175 
ideology critique.40 In other words, on Bürger’s reading, it is up to aesthetics and to literary 
criticism to expose the miserable conditions that produce illusion and which stand in 
contradiction to it. The notion of art as merely “affirmative” ignores, however, art’s ability to 
destroy its own illusions. Artworks are illusions that destroy the illusion of wholeness and 
balance of some other works. The advanced works throughout history destroy the seeming 
organicity and poise of certain others: “One artwork is the mortal enemy of another.”41 Yet, as 
Bürger does not consider aesthetic Schein to be soluble by Schein itself, illusion to be able to 
destroy illusion, he thinks that the revolutionary works are those that forego Schein 
altogether.42 He considers the advanced aspect of montage to be its failure to create the 
illusion of reconciliation: “According to Adorno, it is the characteristic of the non-organic 
work using the principle of montage that it no longer creates the semblance (Schein) of 
reconciliation. Even if one cannot accept in every detail the philosophy lying behind it, one 
will not fail to endorse this insight.”43 This is, properly speaking, a misreading of Adorno, who 
leaves in doubt to what extent the revolt against illusion is effective, and claims that what is 
“legitimate” and what is “illusory” in this revolt are mixed up with each other.44 As Bürger 
later clarified his position, the revolt against illusion and aura was advanced because it 
                                                
40 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 10. 
41 Quoted in GS, vol. 7, p. 59, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 35.  
42 Bürger sees the attempt to redeem illusion and to maintain the separation between art and life praxis as “the 
core of Adorno’s anti-avant-gardism”: “Since he cannot conceive of the attempt to return art to praxis as a 
necessary step in the development of art in bourgeois society, but can only proclaim a regression into barbarism, 
his critique of idealist aesthetic categories ends in their recovery. This is equally true for the category of 
semblance.” Peter Bürger, “Adorno’s Anti-Avant-Gardism,” Telos, no. 86 (Winter 1990-91): pp. 49-60, here 
p. 56, or in German, Peter Bürger, Zur Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), 
p. 71. Nota bene: Bürger’s self-translated essay in English “Adorno’s Anti-Avant-Gardism” does not exactly 
correspond to the excursus from Zur Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik entitled “Zum Anti-Avantgardismus 
Adornos” (pp. 128-135). Certain passages, such as the one quoted, are revised translations of passages appearing 
elsewhere in Zur Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik.      
43 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 105, or translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 78. Michael Shaw’s 
translation of “semblance” for “Schein” has been retained here, as this is Bürger’s own preference. 
44 GS, vol. 7, p. 158 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 103. 
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attacked the categories (such as genius) so easily recuperable by Fascism;45 Adorno’s criticism 
of Benjamin’s theory of advanced art as based on the loss of aura had to be, according to 
Bürger, “a false sublation of aesthetic semblance.”46 Bürger considers Schein to be an 
ideological category of German Idealism insofar as it legitimizes the dissimulation of labour, 
and he even goes so far as to suggest that montage in itself de-legitimizes this dissimulation.47 
Yet Schein cannot be an ideological category purely and simply because, as Norbert Rath, 
points out, “Adorno shows that the concept of illusion is dialectical in itself, that it has itself a 
dialectical structure.”48 This dialectical structure means that Schein cannot be dismissed out of 
hand as an Idealist, ideological category. Bound up in antinomies, the concept of illusion must 
have limited power in legitimizing anything. This dialectic demands reflection, not wholesale 
rejection, and Rath therefore commends Adorno’s approach: “Adorno’s reflections on illusion 
avoid a simple negation of art as a purely ideological sphere.”49 Aesthetic illusion itself 
wakens critique. It is no coincidence that, as Bürger himself admits, the “historical” avant-
garde movements, Dada and Surrealism, lose art’s critical power along with art: “An art no 
longer distinct from the praxis of life but wholly absorbed in it will lose the capacity to 
criticize it, along with its distance.”50 Yet this happens not for the reason that Bürger thinks: 
art is critical not because it projects a better world, distinct from this world, but because it 
                                                
45 Bürger, Zur Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik, p. 70. 
46 Ibid., p. 71 (my translation, retaining Bürger’s preference of “semblance” for “Schein). 
47 Bürger suggests that any determinate negation of the hidden work-character of illusion as ideological today 
owes itself to the peculiar “development” of art in bourgeois society since at least the historical avant-garde 
movements, claiming that “the work of the producers becomes obvious in montage” (ibid., p. 62). He makes an 
exaggerated claim for montage. Although it might be clear to recipients how the artist produced the montage, it is 
by no means clear to them how the individual elements of the montage—buttons and tickets and so forth—were 
produced. 
48 Norbert Rath, “Dialektik des Scheins—Materialien zum Scheinbegriff Adornos,” in Kolloquium Kunst und 
Philosophie, herausgegeben von Willi Oelmüller, vol. 2, Ästhetischer Schein (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1982), 
pp. 51-61, here p. 61 (my translation). 
49 Ibid. (my translation). 
50 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 68 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 50. 
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disillusions through illusion. If the disillusioning character of aesthetic illusion is not properly 
grasped, art is not properly grasped; if art is not properly grasped, the failure of the avant-
garde is not properly grasped. If the failure of the avant-garde were merely the failure to unite 
art and life praxis and the failure to destroy art as an institution, then the consequences would 
be limited. Bürger admits as much: on the side of art, the institution of art is merely 
strengthened and enriched by the wider range of materials and forms made available to it;51 on 
the side of life praxis, nothing is changed: student protests beginning in 1968, which he thinks 
take up from Russian Futurism, leave hopes for a more democratic society “unfulfilled,” as he 
surmises in the post-script to the second German edition of Theory of the Avant-Garde.52 But 
the historical avant-garde movements do not fail merely to unite art and life; their attempt to 
unite art and life fails to create a better world. Unaware that art is itself a disillusioning force, 
the avant-gardes sought to disillusion art from the outside. But in so doing, they destroyed 
art’s critical edge: not only art’s critique of society, but its capacity to determine what it is 
itself through self-criticism. In a certain sense, the institutional theory describes reality: 
lacking language, lacking adequacy, contemporary installations and ready-mades cede their 
legislation to the dubious third-party management and pseudo-consensus of committees and 
curators. If the institutional theory holds any weight at all, it lies in art’s real devolution to a 
mere administrative category. But Bürger’s theory articulates this change poorly. In collapsing 
art into the art institution, Bürger also collapses artistic aesthetic illusion into mere social 
illusion, the autonomy of art into the functioning of institutions and concludes from the 
enduring of museums, literary criticism and art education that art endures. Bürger thus sees the 
                                                
51 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 130, or translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 94. 
52 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 134 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 95. 
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continuity of art, specifically as concerns its autonomy, where Adorno observes a profound 
rupture: 
Nothing remains of the autonomy of art—that artworks should be considered better 
than they consider themselves to be arouses indignation in culture customers—other 
than the fetish character of the commodity, regression to the archaic fetishism in the 
origin of art: to this extent the contemporary attitude to art is regressive.53 
 
Bürger does not however acknowledge this decisive shift in the character of culture in the 
reduction of autonomy to an “ideological category that joins an element of truth (the apartness 
of art from the praxis of life) and an element of untruth (the hypostatization of this fact, which 
is a result of historical development as the ‘essence’ of art).”54 Bürger is correct to read art’s 
separation from society as an aspect of aesthetic autonomy, yet its truth lies not in 
correspondence to a real state of affairs, but rather in its critique of social illusion, from which 
every artwork wishes to detach itself. Autonomy’s moment of untruth, however, is aesthetic 
illusion: art really cannot detach itself from illusion, which is why it has made itself a realm of 
emphatic illusion. Bürger’s view of autonomy is consistent with his view of organic art as 
merely affirmative, to which he may contrast a negative and critical avant-garde. But where 
autonomy is understood merely as the art institution’s relative independence from other 
institutions or as the specialization of art’s social functions or, at the limit, as a critical yet 
ultimately compensatory utopian vision, it then becomes very difficult to understand why 
Adorno thinks that aesthetic autonomy is desirable. But aesthetic autonomy for Adorno is not 
something identified and established, like a museum or a university programme: “Only in the 
progress of reflection does the principle of identity prove to be illusory in the artwork as well, 
because ‘Different’ constitutes its autonomy; in this respect, certainly not even artworks admit 
                                                
53 GS, vol. 7, p. 33 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 17. 
54 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 63 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 46. 
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of positive negation.”55 Autonomy refers not only to art’s critique of other spheres, but also to 
its self-criticism: art was able to determine itself only by negating its own rules, in ways that 
were themselves able to become rules. Art is autonomous in that it defines itself not only 
against the false universality of communicative language, but also against what has become 
normal in its own domain. Art defines itself against the pseudo-consensus of sign systems, of 
arbitrary unions of concepts and acoustical images imposed on the collective at the expense of 
their individual expression. Art’s critique of sign-systems indeed separates it from other 
spheres, yet its solution, its language, remains at an extreme distance from communicative, 
non-art language, and so cannot be easily imported into life praxis. Bürger’s theory of the 
avant-garde does not address autonomous art’s self-criticism. If the avant-gardes negated art’s 
autonomy, then they really negated art’s negativity: its critical power and ability to self-
correct, its freedom to define itself, its impulse to break up what had rigidified into mindless 
laws and habits.56 It negated precisely what allows artists to make advances for the whole 
without fear of reprisals against them individually. This is clear in the cases of Mozart, 
Beethoven and Mahler. Mozart paid no personal price for withholding clear indications of key 
for many measures at the opening of his String Quartet in C Major, K. 465 (1785).57 Rather, 
                                                
55 GS, vol. 7, p. 478, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 323. 
56 Rose Rosengard Subotnik associates aesthetic autonomy with its resistance towards musical analysis and 
verbal exegesis, suggesting, somewhat surprisingly, that “perhaps…Adorno is right in his underlying suggestion 
that nineteenth-century music is not autonomous, either as a sensuous or as a structural medium. Such a lack of 
autonomy might do much to explain why as far back as the criticism of E. T. A. Hoffmann and of Schumann, 
attempts at dealing separately with the musical content and with the poetic or philosophical content of post-
Enlightenment music have so often been unconvincing; why connections between these two types of critical 
discussion, when clearly separated, have so often seemed nonexistent or arbitrary; and why the purely musical 
passages in such criticism have so often seemed its least satisfactory, least explanatory element.” Rose Rosengard 
Subotnik, “Why Is Adorno’s Music Criticism the Way It Is? Some Reflections on Twentieth-Century Criticism of 
Nineteenth-Century Music,” in Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in Western Music (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. 42-56, here p. 50f. 
57 Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, Quartet, C Major for 2 Violins, Viola and Violoncello, Köchel, No. 465, 
Composed 1785, revised and with Foreword [1930] by Rudolf Gerber (London: Ernst Eulenburg, s.a.), I, p. 1, 
mm. 1-13. In his excellent article on musical allegories of “pre-consciousness” or amorphous states of 
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all of society was released from the necessity of keys being stated unequivocally at the 
beginning of each work. Beethoven was not persecuted when he began to write in the 
fractured, fragmentary style of his late period.58 Rather, all of society was released from the 
necessity of smooth transitions and uniformization of working materials secured through 
steady tempi. Mahler did not face social exclusion for suspending sonata form in a most 
unconventional manner in his First Symphony,59 developing the second subject gradually 
through the development section to “produce” it at the recapitulation rather than presenting it 
in the exposition as was the norm.60 Rather, all of society was released from the sonata 
principle. The autonomy that makes these advances, and others, possible is not incidental to 
art: art must be autonomous, according to Adorno. Thus he is often portrayed as an elitist 
Eurocentric with a very narrow conception of what counts as art. His interest, however, lies 
precisely in those instances of permitted resistance and divergence within a system set to 
perpetuate itself. It is worth remembering that Adorno was active at a time when 
“autonomous” was a pejorative term cast on art that did not conform to the Soviet doctrine of 
socialist realism.61 Given the number of left-leaning intellectuals who were taken in by 
                                                                                                                                                    
consciousness, Marshall Brown argues against Charles Rosen that it is only from bar 13 that the key becomes 
explicit. Marshall Brown, “Mozart and after: The Revolution in Musical Consciousness,” Critical Inquiry 7, no. 4 
(Summer 1981): pp. 689-706, here p. 699, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343145. 
58 See, for example, Ludwig van Beethoven, Quartett für 2 Violinen, Bratsche und Violoncell, Op. 131, Quartett 
No. 14  (1863; repr. New York: Dover, 1970), esp. IV. Andante, ma non troppo e molto cantabile, pp. 9-19. 
International Music Score Library Project, Petrucci Music Library, 
http://petrucci.mus.auth.gr/imglnks/usimg/4/44/IMSLP04768-Beethoven_-_String_Quartet_No.14_Dover.pdf. 
59 Gustav Mahler, Symphony No. 1 (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1906), I, pp. 3-47, mm. 1-450, International 
Music Score Library Project, Petrucci Music Library, http://petrucci.mus.auth.gr/imglnks/usimg/d/dd 
/IMSLP17070-Mahler-Symph1fs.pdf. 
60 GS, vol. 13, p. 161 as translated by Edmund Jephcott, Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press), p. 13. Adorno places the return of the tonic at rehearsal number [26]. The theme, which 
appears fully for the first time at the recapitulation (!), enters at the pick-up to rehearsal number [27]—Mahler, 
Symphony No. 1, I, p. 36, pick up to m. 364. 
61 The Oxford Companion to Music Online, s.v. “formalism,” by Jonathan Walker, accessed February 9, 2014, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/opr/t114/e2625. 
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Stalinism, even in his own circle,62 it is understandable that Adorno championed the 
“autonomy” of Western composers over the restriction endured by their Eastern counterparts, 
Dmitry Shostakovich and Sergey Prokofiev. The very serious consequences that the charge of 
“formalism” could bring in the Soviet Union damaged these composers’ production and hung 
over their lives. The culture industry and McCarthyism in the United States in the same era 
exercised a similar control as Soviet authorities, providing livelihood only to those who made 
no attempt to advance art. Where artists have not been prevented from resolving the 
infinitesimal problems that art presents itself, no art is born. Adorno’s deep conviction that art 
should be autonomous is the least accepted of his theses.63 But it is important to appreciate just 
how unusual progressive bourgeois European art music was in Europe, or anywhere. 
Throughout history, individuals have indeed overthrown norms with gestures, but, unlike 
artists of autonomous artworks, they never had the right to do so. Advances in the non-
aesthetic realm have always been made at personal cost to individuals who act critically 
                                                
62 See Adorno to Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Frankfurt am Main, July 21, 1958, in Theodor W. Adorno and Alfred 
Sohn-Rethel, Briefwechsel, 1936-1969, herausgegeben von Christoph Gödde, Dialektische Studien (Munich: 
edition text +kritik, 1991), pp. 120-124. Adorno cites Ernst Bloch’s Stalinism as one reason for their falling out 
(ibid., p. 121). Adorno’s opposition to the Eastern Bloc comes across very clearly as he dehorts Sohn-Rethel from 
accepting an invitation to speak at Humboldt University, then in East Berlin. 
63 See Lambert Zuidervaart, “The Social Significance of Autonomous Art: Adorno and Bürger,” The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 48, no. 1 (Winter 1990): pp. 61-77 and Nikolas Kompridis, “Amidst the Plurality of 
Voices: Philosophy of Music After Adorno,” Angelaki 8, no. 3 (December 2003): pp. 167-180. Zuidervaart 
charges that “Adorno misreads the autonomy of art and systematically neglects heteronomous art” (“Adorno and 
Bürger,” p. 61) while Nikolas Kompridis states: “Adorno’s obsession with the putative ‘technical laws of 
autonomous art’ led him astray” (“Plurality of Voices,” p. 176f.). Both of these authors, however, deign to correct 
what they perceive as the exclusivity of Adorno’s aesthetics through normative measures. Zuidervaart proposes a 
“complex normativity” (“Adorno and Bürger,” p. 74). Kompridis aims to create a “shift of normative 
perspective” within Adorno’s own thought that would successfully link the aesthetic and the rational, which he 
says Adorno failed to do (“Plurality of Voices,” p. 170). But their normative solutions to expand the scope of art 
are arbitrary. Adorno himself argues emphatically against the thesis that works are art by dint of their conformity 
with a norm or with certain norms. This presupposes that the universality claimed by norms is true and legitimate. 
On the contrary, norms are “badly universal” according to Adorno: “Yet as negation of the bad universal of the 
norm, art does not admit of normal works and nor therefore of average ones, which either correspond to the norm 
or else gain their status through their distance from the norm” (GS, vol. 7, p. 280, or prefer to my translation here 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 188). Not even Zuidervaart’s notion of complex normativity gets around the problem of the 
arbitrary, external, merely posited nature of these norms.  
 182 
against the status quo: social exclusion, loss of livelihood, weakening or destruction of 
capacities, imprisonment or house arrest, torture, rape and execution are expected 
consequences. Reprisals may be legal or extra-legal, but there is probably not a single material 
advance in the history of humanity that has not come with individual suffering and sacrifice 
for its sake. Art is a precursor to freedom in a generally unfree society, where freedom “would 
obtain for the particular that right that today announces itself, aesthetically, nowhere else but 
in the idiosyncratic compulsions [Zwängen] that artists have to obey.”64 This right amounts to 
the assured absence of social reprisals when the particular, needing to refuse a rule for the sake 
of material advancement,65 makes a gesture against this rule, for “as long as the particular and 
the universal diverge there is no freedom.”66 The courageous individual who acts against 
social injustice does not have the right of the particular artist who reacts idiosyncratically 
against the norm or a rule in art. Idiosyncrasies in art are already collective because the subject 
is not punished for them: “In [the subject’s] idiosyncratic flicker of reaction the collective 
form of response announces itself.”67 If there is something of art that can be translated into life 
praxis, it is not its critique of communicative language, which makes it autonomous in one 
                                                
64 GS, vol. 7, p. 69, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 42. 
65 Cf. Peter Bürger, “Das Altern der Moderne,” in Adorno-Konferenz 1983, herausgegeben von Ludwig von 
Friedeburg und Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), pp. 177-197, esp. 181, or in David J. 
Parent’s English translation, “The Decline of the Modern Age,” Telos, no. 62 (Winter 1984-85): pp. 117-130, 
esp. p. 120. Adorno’s support for the advance of the musical material is not the chimerical enterprise that Bürger 
and others make it out to be. None of Adorno’s critics would deny that an advanced society is one in which all 
members benefit integrally from its material comforts, rationally gained. No one would intellectually sanction the 
current situation, in which some people have access to highly refined material (burning so-called ethical oil in 
driving 1000 km weekends to, from and around second homes in Canmore), while others live in abject poverty 
(suffering from tuberculosis in overcrowded and substandard reserve housing without potable water, cut off from 
modern hospitals). Philosophy, the teaching of the right life, demands that we make qualitative distinctions within 
material, that we be able to recognize that the material state of the reserve system is a regression behind the 
material state of North American peoples here 500 years ago. The demand to make qualitative distinctions within 
the material is not suspended in the field of art, and it is no coincidence that the greatest Modern visual artists are 
all Native—a Wassily Kandinsky always secretly wants to be an Alex Janvier.      
66 GS, vol. 7, p. 69 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 42.  
67 GS, vol. 7, p. 198, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 131. 
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sense, but this right to oppose the norm, which makes it autonomous in another sense. For 
what would be revolutionary would be not for art to become non-autonomous, but for life, the 
life of the subject, to become autonomous—self-determining—, which it never has been. 
Instead, individuals fall under categories of persons (or, worse still, under the category of non-
person) and are held at the mercy of the administration. The great works of art that Adorno 
considers at least reacted against the structure of oppression—against the social reprisals 
destined for the individual who dares to be different—and opened a world where what does 
not fit in is esteemed. Art is autonomous because it decides itself the particular content of what 
does not fit in. The importation of particular “political content” into art prioritizes certain 
instances, types or forms of oppression over others and in fact limits the impact of the artwork. 
Bürger and Benjamin are wrong to assume that political content encapsulates advanced 
consciousness: an advanced politics can still be—and as a rule is—regressive with respect to 
the state of theory. Benjamin, however, considered advanced art to be not only based on 
politics, but also able to produce an experience that went against the general deficiency in 
experience, so against the unconscious social processes at the root of this deficiency.    
  To Benjamin, Baudelaire’s solution to the loss of experience (Erfahrung) was to treat 
mere, unconsciously-imprinted stimuli in such fashion that they might be consciously 
experienced: in poetry—yet Benjamin’s answer is ambiguous on the point of Baudelaire’s 
poetical solution to a real problem. On one hand, Benjamin suggests that Baudelaire was 
perfectly attuned to the processes of modernity, and that these processes were transferable to 
poetry. While Baudelaire did not have direct or even passing experience with factory work, 
according to Benjamin, and did not treat it thematically in his poetry as such, that very poetry 
nonetheless absorbed the experience of repetitive, mindless labour. Baudelaire expresses 
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alienated labour by way of “types”: the idler, jostled in the crowd, and the gambler. 
Benjamin’s hunch that functional equivalences between the passer-by and the unskilled 
labourer and between the gambler and the unskilled labourer turns out to be propitious to 
understanding why shock stands at the centre of Baudelaire’s work. Life had become shock 
for the millions who found themselves suddenly slotted into a new and seemingly promising 
situation, yet forced to adopt unnatural positions for hours without the proper recompense. 
Benjamin’s passage linking the idler, the labourer and the gambler merits full quotation: 
 [Baudelaire] was…captivated by a process whereby the reflecting mechanism which 
the machine sets off in the workman can be studied closely, in a mirror, in the idler. If 
we say that this process is the game of chance, the statement may appear to be 
paradoxical. Alain puts it convincingly when he writes: ‘It is inherent in the concept of 
gambling…that no game is dependent on the preceding one. Gambling cares about no 
assured position….Winnings secured earlier are not taken into account, and in this it 
differs from work. Gambling gives short shrift to the weighty past on which bases 
itself.’ The work which Alain has in mind here is the highly specialized kind (which, 
like intellectual effort, probably retains certain features of handicraft); it is not that of 
most factory workers, least of all the unskilled. The latter, to be sure, lacks any touch 
of adventure, of the mirage that lures the gambler. But it certainly does not lack the 
futility, the emptiness, the inability to complete something which is inherent in the 
activity of a wage slave in a factory. Gambling even contains the workman’s gesture 
that is produced by the automatic operation, for there can be no game without the 
quick movement of the hand by which the stake is put down or a card is picked up. 
The jolt in the movement of a machine is like the so-called coup in a game of chance. 
The manipulation of the worker at the machine has no connection with the preceding 
operation for the very reason that it is an exact repetition. Since each operation at the 
machine is just as screened off from the preceding operation as a coup in a game of 
chance is from the one that preceding it, the drudgery of the laborer is, in its own way, 
a counterpart to the drudgery of the gambler. The work of both is equally devoid of 
substance.68  
 
The rude jolts delivered by the jostling crowd in the street and the fateful “blows” or throws of 
the dice in the gambling hall are akin to the jolts of the machine that the factory worker’s 
quick, automatic movements reflect. The figures of the gambler and the idler are thus manners 
of speaking about the unskilled factory worker, who has become inured to shocks, to the 
                                                
68 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.2, p. 632f. as translated, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” p. 177. 
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blows of fate, to the point that he is hardly capable of feeling his own disappointment. Yet 
these are manners of speaking not just about the unskilled factory worker, but about everyone. 
The shocks that the unskilled labourer lives through epitomize modernity. Baudelaire does not 
choose to write about the paradigmatic case, but expresses the shocks as experience, the 
modern experience, rather by way of different modern “types.” The isolated shocks then have 
explicit and conscious import: they are indicative of the modern experience. According to 
Benjamin, Baudelaire’s work is significant because it grasps the soulless activity that 
continues without accomplishment or even progress—as modernity. In the image of the 
gambler, Baudelaire condenses general, abstract, diffuse social processes that were lurking 
invisibly like a spreading damp—the incompleteness, futility and repetitiveness that 
characterize the gambler’s gestures are finally not specific to a particular class or type. Yet, on 
the other hand, Benjamin suggests in the above passage that, unlike factory work, “highly 
specialized” work and “intellectual effort” do not lend themselves to a comparison with 
gambling. Philosophers and critics would thus be spared from the withering of experience in 
the neutralization of shocks. On this point, Benjamin departs noticeably from Lukács, who 
claims, as we have seen, that features of capitalism are inherent in all forms of labour. The 
consequence of affording the critic a privileged position is that art then needs to be saved by 
signifying language, and the traditional subordination of art to discursive forms of reason is 
repeated. Yet Benjamin’s thesis is contradicted by the positivism that is nearly everywhere the 
norm. Even intellectual workers screen moments off from one another, as they are screened 
off in an assembly-line, so that the tensions pulling each phenomenon in opposite directions, 
the past hopes and present disappointments, are not really experienced. The tendency even in 
the humanities and social sciences is to organize research into verifiable facts, while situating 
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each work or phenomenon in a closed historical period or context. The historical collisions 
within works and phenomena are ignored or else minimized. This tendency in intellectual 
work is part of the industrial process that closes everything off into repeatable units, thereby 
suppressing whatever leads out of the immediate instant. Experience that goes beyond the 
present is just about as difficult to realize in the domain of intellectual labour as it is in the 
domain of physical labour. Adorno for his part does not hold that any one type of worker, by 
dint of some supposedly deeper feeling of alienation, is in a privileged position to overcome 
mindless repetition and to make experience in the strong sense possible again. A close reader 
of Proust such as Benjamin should not either.  
 In reading Proust, Benjamin would have no doubt seen through the false absolutization 
of social milieux. For one of the arguments in À la recherche du temps perdu (The 
Remembrance of Things Past, In Search of Lost Time) is no doubt that the continuity of a 
class over time is far more illusory than the ruptures between the classes at a given time. The 
Proustian hero mistakes a grand duke for a bourgeois from Combray because something in the 
elderly man’s gestures and manners remind him of his own family milieu. But what seems to 
be the physiognomy of a certain class turns out to be the physiognomy of a certain generation. 
The discovery of this error causes the narrator to formulate the following theory: 
The truth is that the similarity in dress, and the spirit of the age as it is echoed by the 
face, occupy so much more significant a place in someone than their caste, which 
occupies a large place only in the person in question’s self-esteem and in the 
imagination of others, that, to be made aware that a great nobleman of Louis-
Philippe’s time differs less from a bourgeois of Louis-Philippe’s time than from a great 
nobleman of the time of Louis XV, that there is no need to walk the galleries of the 
Louvre.69 
                                                
69 Marcel Proust, Sodome et Gomorrhe, À la recherche du temps perdu, vol. 4. (s.l.: Gallimard, 1989), p. 81 as 
translated by John Sturrock, Sodom and Gomorrah, In Search of Lost Time, vol. 4 (London: Allen Lane, 2002), 
p. 87. “La vérité est que la ressemblance des vêtements et aussi la réverbération par le visage de l’esprit d’une 
époque tiennent, dans une personne, une place tellement plus importante que sa caste, qui en occupe une grande 
seulement dans l’amour-propre de l’intéressé et l’imaginaire des autres, que pour se rendre compte qu’un grand 
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Here Proust expresses a division between outer and inner aspects of the individual. The inner 
aspect is not so much consciousness as it is false consciousness—the identification of 
individuals with particular social milieux. The narrator suggests that social milieux are far less 
important that we think. Strong self-identification with a particular social milieu is egotism, 
while strong association of others with social categories belongs properly to the unreal zone of 
the imagination, remaining subjective in the bad sense. When the narrator goes wrong in 
trying to judge an individual’s social milieu from his appearance, he perceives himself induced 
in this common error. He surmises that what is far more decisive in determining the outer 
appearance—all one can read off a portrait—is the era. In Minima Moralia, Adorno interprets 
the Proustian narrator’s inability to distinguish between people of different social milieux by 
sight as a sign of society’s relentless process of forming and habituating: 
Proust’s observation that in photographs, the grandfather of a duke or of a middle-class 
Jew are so alike that we forget their difference of social rank, has a much wider 
application: the unity of an epoch objectively abolishes all the distinctions that 
constitute the happiness, even the moral substance, of individual existence.70 
 
In an unreconciled world, social rank is a condition of the fragmentary happiness of individual 
existence; the vast and swift changes of modernity do not respect social rank, but this does not 
reconcile the social divisions in a togetherness that would be the whole happiness; it destroys 
the conditions for individual happiness. Adorno suggests that individuals have become 
unconscious products of their age, formed by blind forces of history and imprinted with a 
behavioural code that announces their era with the precision of a punch clock. The problem is 
not that multi-millionaires dress like everyone else—today, in T-shirts and jeans—, but that 
                                                                                                                                                    
seigneur du temps de Louis-Philippe est moins différent d’un bourgeois du temps de Louis-Philippe que d’un 
grand seigneur du temps de Louis XV, il n’est pas nécessaire de parcourir les galeries du Louvre.” 
70 GS, vol. 4, p. 28 §6 as translated by  E. F. N. Jephcott, Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life 
(London: Verso, 2005), p. 26f. 
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people are uniformly formed in ways that they do not realize. According to Benjamin, an era 
is a state of similarity, whether “in actions, physiognomies or speech mannerisms.”71 A 
person’s outer aspect cannot be reliably connected to anything properly individual or even to a 
personal identity or specific background; it indicates the solid chunk of time to which the 
individual belongs, time in its regular aspects, not changing history as the individual actually 
lives it. Proust’s defense against this repetitive structure of existence, the era, cannot be a 
narrative because, according to an insight with which Benjamin credits Max Unold, that would 
be like narrating a dream. Benjamin takes this to mean that an era in a state of similarity is a 
dreaming era. What resembles itself resembles a dream, which is uncanny. Proust renders this 
uncanniness by way of the image.72 
Absolute temporal homogeneity is not simply truth to the illusion of absolute class 
divisions, but illusion in its turn: the wishes and desires of the past do occasionally surface in 
the present in what Benjamin calls “a painful shock of rejuvenation.”73 Benjamin understands 
shock in Proust to perform a fundamentally disillusioning role, as he maintains it does in film 
and Dada. But unlike film and Dada works, À la recherche du temps perdu (Remembrance of 
Things Past, In Search of Lost Time) does not repel the charge of the past, for the field of 
Proust’s research is the mémoire involontaire (involontary memory), which encompasses both 
the aura and shock. Aura and shock turn out to be two characters of mémoire involontaire: that 
of (image) accumulation and that of labour. On one hand, the mémoire involontaire harbours 
aura, because aura is actually nothing but associations that crowd around objects;74 but, on the 
                                                
71 Walter Benjamin, “Zum Bilde Prousts,” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2.1, pp. 310-324, here p. 313 as 
translated by Harry Zohn, “The Image of Proust,” in Illuminations, pp. 201-215, here p. 204. 
72 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2.1, p. 314, or translated, “The Image of Proust,” p. 205. 
73 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2.1, p. 320 as translated, “The Image of Proust,” p. 211. 
74 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.2, p. 644 as translated, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” p. 186. 
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other hand, shock is really the work of the mémoire involontaire, which is the “rejuvenating 
force” that is able to pull the past into the present.75 This converges more closely with what 
Adorno understands by explosion: the shocks of the most recent artworks, or, what he calls 
“the explosion of their appearance [die Explosion ihrer Erscheinung],”76 are the confrontations 
of historical differences within each one, within the individual artwork that seems to be a pure 
expression of its time, to be the appearance of an essence in time: “What appears in the 
artwork is its own inner time; the explosion of the appearance blasts open the continuity of this 
inner temporality [deren Kontinuität, i.e. die Kontinuität seiner inneren Zeit, the continuity of 
the artwork’s inner time.]”77 Proust’s work does not itself aim to shock: shock is assumed in it 
and the question becomes rather whether, or how, shock can be experienced, in the sense that 
shock, which normally repels the past and future, be comprehended in terms of memory and 
anticipation. Proust, in other words, works on the question as to whether something lived can 
be given the weight of experience. Benjamin in turn analyzes the shock experience like this: 
When the past is reflected in the dewy fresh “instant,” a painful shock of rejuvenation 
pulls it together once more as irresistibly as the Guermantes way and Swann’s way 
become intertwined for Proust when, in the thirteenth volume, he roams about the 
Combray area for the last time and discovers the intertwining of the roads.78 In a trice 
                                                
75 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2.1, p.  320 as translated, “The Image of Proust,” p. 211. 
76 GS, vol. 7, p. 131 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 84.  
77 GS, vol. 7, p. 132 as translated except where indicated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 85. Berthold Hoeckner reads 
“Explosion der Erscheinung” in this sentence as a subjective genitive (it is the appearance that explodes the 
continuity of the artwork’s inner time), whereas it makes better sense to read it as an objective genitive (the 
explosion that explodes the appearance blasts open the continuity of art’s inner time), since traditionally 
appearance does not explode “what appears” (essence). Adorno’s aim is to show explosion to be a category of 
Modern art that changes the relation between essence and appearance. Berthold Hoeckner, “On Apparition,” 
preface to Apparitions: New Perspectives on Adorno and Twentieth-Century Music, ed. Berthold Hoeckner (New 
York: Routledge, 2006), pp. vii-xiii, here p. ix-x.    
78 The hero’s discovery that the two customary rambles that he used to take with his family are actually joined 
occurs at the end of Albertine Disparue, so in the thirteenth volume of the 1925 Gallimard edition in 16 volumes, 
not in the thirteenth volume of the 13-volume first edition, to which Benjamin refers at the opening of the essay: 
“The thirteen volumes of Marcel Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu are the result of an unconstruable 
synthesis in which the absorption of a mystic, the art of a prose writer, the verve of a satirist, the erudition of a 
scholar, and the self-consciousness of a monomaniac have combined in an autobiographical work.” Benjamin, 
Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.2, p. 310 as translated, “The Image of Proust,” p. 201. 
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the landscape jumps about like a child. “Ah! que le monde est grand à la clarté des 
lampes! Aux yeux du souvenir que le monde est petit! ” Proust has brought off the 
tremendous feat of letting the whole world age by a lifetime in an instant. But this very 
concentration in which things that normally just fade and slumber consume themselves 
in a flash is called rejuvenation. À la recherche du temps perdu is the constant attempt 
to charge an entire lifetime with the utmost awareness. Proust’s method is 
actualization, not reflection. He is filled with the insight that none of us has time to 
live the true dramas of the life that we are destined for. This is what ages us—this and 
nothing else. The wrinkles and creases on our faces are the registration of the great 
passions, vices, insights that called on us; but we, the masters, were not home.79 
 
In the passage of the Recherche that Benjamin has in mind here, the narrator’s return to the 
Combray area does not in any way recapture or rekindle the happiness that the places evoked 
in him as a child. The narrator feels nothing at all in climbing the steep little path by the 
hawthorn where he first encountered Gilberte Swann, then a little girl, who emerged from the 
bush as if part of it, hair strawberry-blond of the blossoms and eyes black of the bark. This 
return jolts him from the illusions he holds about the region and about Gilberte. The 
impassable distance between the walking path by Swann’s (le côté de Méséglise-la-Vineuse) 
and the walking path on the way to the Guermantes (le côté de Guermantes) turns out to be a 
mere product of a childish reason, which concluded from the habit of his family to walk either 
one circuit or the other that some barrier between them existed in reality. The narrator’s initial 
impression of Gilberte as impudent turns out to be rooted in this same illusion of absolute 
separation between the two strata. The strangers who make their way into Combray are, 
according to the narrator’s aunt, people whom they “did not know at all,” and whom the 
family assumes come from Méséglise.80 The young hero thus interprets Gilberte’s gesturing to 
him with her hand as being perfectly indecent, offensive beyond belief, since it comes from 
                                                
79 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2.1, p. 320f. as translated, “The Image of Proust,” p. 211f. 
80 Marcel Proust, Du côté de chez Swann, À la recherche du temps perdu, vol. 1 (s.l.: Gallimard, 1988), p. 132 as 
translated by Lydia Davis, Swann’s Way (London: Penguin Books, 2004), p. 137. 
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someone whom he does not know, probably someone from Méséglise.81 But when Gilberte so 
much later reveals that what she actually intended by her movement was to invite the narrator 
to follow her to the ruined dungeons of Roussainville, to play with all the country children, the 
narrator is shocked. He could have been happy, had he not been so thoroughly informed by the 
univocal meanings of his “petit dictionnaire de civilité,” his “little dictionary of manners,” that 
he could not interpret Gilberte’s behaviour, or had he not been so inculcated by mores of his 
family and so convinced by the rumours surrounding the kind of children who played in the 
dungeons of Roussainville that he avoided the spot.82 From the top of his aunt’s house in 
Combray, he would spy the tower, rising from the forest into which he would often descend, 
obsessed with the idea of the trees being somehow alive with Roussainville or Méséglise 
peasant girls, whom he thought to be able to conjure out by staring hard into the distant trunks 
disappearing into the dusk: 
I would stare endlessly at the trunk of a distant tree from behind which she was going 
to appear and come to me; the scanned horizon would remain uninhabited, night 
would fall, hopelessly my attention would attach itself, as though to aspirate the 
creatures they might harbor, to that sterile ground, to that exhausted earth; and it was 
no longer with a light heart, but with rage, that I struck the trees of the Roussainville 
woods, from among which no more living creatures emerged than if they had been 
trees painted on the canvas background of a panorama, when, unable to resign myself 
to going back to the house without having held in my arms the woman I had so 
desired, I was nevertheless obliged to continue along the road to Combray admitting 
to myself that there was less and less chance that she had been placed in my path.83 
  
                                                
81 Proust, Du côté de chez Swann, p. 139f., or translated, Swann’s Way, p. 144. 
82 Proust, Du côté de chez Swann, p. 140; Swann’s Way, p. 144. 
83 Proust, Du côté de chez Swann, p. 156, or translated, Swann’s Way, p. 162, from “Je fixais indéfiniment le 
tronc d’un arbre lointain, de derrière lequel elle allait surgir et venir à moi ; l’horizon scruté restait désert, la nuit 
tombait, c’était sans espoir que mon attention s’attachait, comme pour aspirer les créatures qu’ils pouvaient 
recéler, à ce sol stérile, à cette terre épuisée ; et ce n’était plus d’allégresse, c’était de rage que je frappais les 
arbres du bois de Roussainville d’entre lesquels ne sortait pas plus d’êtres vivants que s’ils eussent été des arbres 
peints sur la toile d’un panorama, quand, ne pouvant me résigner à rentrer à la maison avant d’avoir serré dans 
mes bras la femme que j’avais tant désirée, j’étais pourtant obligé de reprendre le chemin de Combray en 
m’avouant à moi-même qu’était de moins en moins probable le hasard qui l’eût mise sur mon chemin.” 
 192 
The young narrator’s association of peasant women emerging from trees is rooted in his 
experience of encountering Gilberte in the hawthorn, who, although not a peasant girl, makes 
a gesture that brings up associations of all that is uncouth, ill-bred and backward, which 
condenses in the name “Roussainville,” but only because the narrator has learned these 
associations from his social and family milieu. Yet at the time he took these associations to be 
natural. Roussainville wood seems to be moved by spirits, while the Roussainvillageoises 
seem to be outcroppings of nature itself: “For at that time everything which was not I, the 
earth and other people, appeared to me more precious, more important, endowed with a more 
real existence than they appear in grown men. And I did not separate the earth and the 
people.”84 This glow of specialness that connects creatures with the earth, but which at the 
same time eludes the hero, is what Benjamin means by the aura. The jolt or shock that the 
narrator feels in thinking about the caverns of Roussainville years later is the destruction of the 
aura as it is revealed to be not a natural phenomenon intrinsic to creatures and the earth, but a 
mass of associations that society projects onto objects. The life of adventure, drama and 
pleasure that the young hero longed for and searched for in the Roussainville forest ended up 
passing him by because he was so well brought-up that that the associations that society 
projected on objects seemed to him entirely natural, qualities of the things themselves. 
Benjamin reads the lines of withered faces as the expressive short-cuts taken by individuals 
lacking the time to live the life of variety and drama promised, lacking the time to find 
experiences so varied that their faces would never take on the same expression twice. Faces 
crease and wrinkle only there where there is habit, and this is why Benjamin calls creases and 
                                                
84 Proust, Du côté de chez Swann, p. 155, or translated, Swann’s Way, p. 160, from “Car en ce temps-là tout ce 
qui n’était pas moi, la terre et les êtres, me paraissait plus précieux, plus important, doué d’une existence plus 
réelle que cela ne paraît aux hommes faits. Et la terre et les êtres je ne les séparais pas.” 
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wrinkles unrealized passions. The physiognomy of a generation, of what seems to be a solid 
continuum of time, turns out to be the result of a loss of time. It seems too late for these 
wizened individuals, whose experiences have “set.” Yet, according to Benjamin, Proust’s 
work aims at constructing the shock that is able to rejuvenate, to come to a realization about 
experience, to realize life. Shock-construction is also the technique that Beckett, an early 
interpreter of Proust, carries to extraordinary lengths in Endgame. When Clov, responding to 
Hamm’s queries as to whether his seeds have come up, utters an exclamation of violent 
despair—“They’ll never sprout!”—Beckett provokes a shock of realization in the beholder: 
any nourishing plant that really sprouts after Beckett is not just a common vegetable or a stalk 
of wheat, but life that has (so far) escaped global disaster.85 The question is whether it is 
possible to make everything stand out with the same clarity. If only it were possible to live 
now with the perspective of a lifetime, as if the taste of every morsel—and not just that of 
madeleines dipped in linden tea—, as if the smell of every blossom—and not just that of 
hawthorn blossoms—, as if the regard of every person—and not just that of an aged duke—
were the explosion of its pale, vague impression in memory. An entire life charged with 
“utmost awareness” would be one liberated from all that merely continues—from habit. This 
sounds promising. Adorno, however, detects in Proust a strain of idealism absent from 
Beckett’s work:  
Yet art’s imago is precisely what, according to Bergson’s and Proust’s thesis, seeks to 
awaken involuntary remembrance [unwillkürliche Erinnerung, involuntary memory, 
mémoire involontaire] in the empirical, a thesis that proves them to be genuine 
idealists. They attribute to reality what they want to save and what inheres in art only 
                                                
85 Samuel Beckett, “Endgame: A Play in One Act,” followed by “Act Without Words: A Mime for One Player,” 
translated by the author (New York: Grove Press, 1958), p. 13. The corresponding passage in “Fin de partie,” 
suivi de “Acte sans paroles” (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1957), p. 28, differs from the English translation, 
which has an exclamation point and a stage direction—“(Violently).” 
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at the price of its reality. They seek to escape the curse of aesthetic semblance [Schein, 
illusion] by displacing its quality to reality.86 
 
According to Adorno, attributing being to mind is Idealism. Proust treats remembrance as if it 
were a real being inhering in empirical things, in the madeleine infused with linden tea or in 
the grand duke’s gesture, which the aesthetic image is capable of bringing out.87 But memory 
is a quality of aesthetic Schein. Benjamin does not address this problem. Furthermore, Adorno 
strongly criticizes Benjamin for the over-determination of shock in his account of progressive, 
modern works and new media. Adorno had no great hopes for mechanical reproduction. He 
considered movies to be not the realization of a demand for shocks created by the so-called 
historical avant-garde, but rather the exhaustion of effects that really were shocking in high 
modernism: “From photographs and movies, one knows the effect produced by the modern 
grown old, an effect originally used by the surrealists to shock and subsequently degraded to 
the cheap amusement of those whose fetishism fastens on the abstract present.”88 Shock is 
inherent to film because, whether it employs montage or pictorial continuity, it is spliced 
together from trimmed shots. Alfred Hitchcock’s Rope is an exception, not the rule. Spectators 
do not necessarily demand that film be continuous or even that a remaining element of one 
shot make the transition into the next. Certainly the big-industry films of the 1980s, music 
videos, were montage. It is doubtful that nowadays an editing “mistake” such as crossing the 
axis would be jarring to the normal viewer. One film shot does not raise any particular 
expectations for the subsequent shot; no moment of the film raises expectations at all. 
                                                
86 GS, vol. 7, p. 200, as translated except where indicated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 132. 
87 See Marie-Andrée Ricard, “Proust et le nouveau: une lecture anti-platonicienne de son œuvre,” Symposium 16, 
no 1 (Printemps 2012): pp. 3-29. As Marie-Andrée Ricard remarks, this conception of memory is a point on 
which Proust diverges sharply from Plato. It should be noted that Ricard does not argue for Proust’s anti-
Idealism, but establishes his anti-Platonism otherwise—with reference to the place that the category of the New 
and the senses hold in his work. 
88 GS, vol. 14, p. 45 as translated, “On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening,” in Essays 
on Music, edited by Richard Leppert (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 288-317, here p. 311. 
 195 
Benjamin characterizes the dwindling of the aura as unfulfilled expectation (“What is involved 
here is that the expectation roused by the look of the human eye is not fulfilled…”89). The 
adaptation to such lack of fulfilment is indeed the movie, the eyes of whose spectators “have 
lost the ability to look.”90 Movie spectators are little different from unskilled factory workers: 
entirely sunk into the moment, recipients no longer work forward and backward from the 
individual moment so as to lift it out of its here and now, so as to find the crevices in time 
through which progress is made. While Benjamin does not claim that movies enslave their 
public, his work on shock makes the character of unskilled labour perceptible in the reception 
of movies.  
 Unlike “image-explosion,” “shock” has specific psychological connotations: it seems 
that consciousness as a psychological category must be distinguished from the notion of 
political consciousness before the progressiveness of shock claimed by Benjamin can be 
considered.  
 True aesthetic experience is becoming a thing of the past, according to Adorno, 
because this implies a strong ego able to see through its own illusion of substantiality. The 
aesthetic experience itself should convince the ego that its substantiality is merely the denial of 
its own nature and the sacrifice of nature’s otherness. To be shocked, the individual must 
already differentiate well enough between inner and outer to be able to have an explicit 
experience of otherness. The ego that reacts to shocks by neutralizing the aspect of 
invasiveness that is a mark of nature’s otherness is weak, for in its denial of otherness, it 
conflates outer and inner. In industrialized modern life, the ego constantly faces impulses as 
threats, but as Adorno suggests, the proliferation of the new media, photography and film, 
                                                
89 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.1, p. 648 as translated, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” p. 189. 
90 Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1.1, p. 648 as translated, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” p. 189. 
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only bring artistic reception into line with the general mode of response, which is to have no or 
little response to shocks.91 In Studies in the Authoritarian Personality, Adorno, with co-
authors R. Nevitt Sanford, Else Frenkel-Brunswik and Daniel J. Levinson, connects ego 
weakness with conventional thinking:  
There is some reason to believe that a failure in superego internalization is due to 
weakness in the ego, to its inability to perform the necessary synthesis, i.e., to integrate 
the superego with itself. Whether or not this is so, ego weakness would seem to be a 
concomitant of conventionalism and authoritarianism. Weakness in the ego is 
expressed in the inability to build up a consistent and enduring set of moral values 
within the personality; and it is this state of affairs, apparently, that makes it necessary 
for the individual to seek some organizing and coordinating agency outside of himself. 
Where such outside agencies are depended upon for moral decisions one may say that 
the conscience is externalized.92 
 
In ego weakness, the individual is governed by the “outside agencies” of social norms, 
conventions and institutions. This is because the ego cannot determine itself: it is not capable 
of modifying, rejecting or critically taking up for itself whatever norms and conventions are at 
first just imposed on it from outside, but nor is it capable of organizing its energies itself, to its 
own benefit. The weak ego is consistent with a lack of shock effect: the ego that does not 
recognize that its “conscience is externalized” is not likely to have a conscious experience of 
something external—shock—as external and as directed towards it from without.  
 The link made in Studies in the Authoritarian Personality between a weak ego and 
authoritarianism suggests that the psychological category of consciousness is not something 
totally different from political consciousness.   
 The interest in a conscious experience of shock no doubt lies in its bringing about the 
separation of inner from outer, of particular self from general social norms, of part from 
                                                
91 GS, vol. 14, p. 45, or translated, “On the Fetish-Character in Music,” p. 311.  
92 GS, vol. 9.1, p. 201f. 
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whole, of detail from planned structure, because their conflation goes along with conventional 
thinking and authoritarianism. The demand of art for a strong ego is political.   
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Max Horkheimer and Adorno associate the present form 
of rationality with a certain psychological structure. As it is, the ego denies sacrifice. While it 
would be nothing but “the deceit of a priestly rationalization of death” to encourage the 
individual to commit self-sacrifice for a cause; on the other, the individual is possible at all 
precisely because individuals have learned to commit self-sacrifice, and this constitutes the 
dialectic of enlightenment: 
The representative character of sacrifice, glorified by fashionable irrationalists, cannot 
be separated from the deification of the sacrificial victim—from the fraudulent priestly 
rationalization of murder through the apotheosis of the chosen victim. Something of 
this fraud, which elevates the perishable person as bearer of the divine substance, has 
always been detectable in the ego, which owes its existence to the sacrifice of the 
present moment to the future. Its substance is as illusory as the immortality of the 
slaughtered victim.93  
 
The Enlightenment principle of the bourgeois individual is the principle of self-preservation—
the continuation of what exists here and now over into the future, and so the denial of 
sacrifice; yet there would be no individual were it not for the sacrifice of the here and now to 
some unknowable point in the future. The ego is a permanent defense against a possible 
danger in the future, maintaining itself even in the absence of threats; its function is protective, 
which presumably it exercises even when its environment presents no danger. The individual 
                                                
93 GS, vol. 3, p. 69 as translated by Edmund Jephcott, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, 
with Max Horkheimer, edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 40. 
Research by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr suggests that Adorno is mainly responsible for the first excursus of 
Dialektik der Aufklärung, “Odysseus oder Mythos und Aufklärung” (GS, vol. 3, pp. 61-99, or in English 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 35-62). See the afterword by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, “Die Stellung der 
»Dialektik der Aufklärung« in der Entwicklung der Kritischen Theorie: Bemerkungen zu Autorschaft, 
Entstehung, einigen theoretischen Implikationen und späterer Einschätzung durch die Autoren,” in  Max 
Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von Alfred Schmidt und Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, 19 vols. 
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1985-1997), vol. 5, pp. 423-452, esp. pp. 425-430, translated as “Editor’s 
Afterword: The Position of ‘Dialectic of Enlightenment’ in the Development of Critical Theory,” in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, pp. 217-247, esp. pp. 219-224.     
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is bound to miss out on non-threatening aspects of the here-and-now, since the ego sacrifices 
enjoyment of the present moment for the sake of self-preservation. Yet, oddly, Adorno sees 
sacrifice of the present in a good light. In a radio discussion with Hellmut Becker, “Erziehung 
zur Mündigkeit” (Education for Maturity), Adorno associates maturity with “a certain strength 
of ego, of the ego-bond,” for which the “bourgeois individual” is the model.94 A strong ego 
protects itself against its environment rather than adapting itself to it, and this makes for an 
individual able to resist the authoritarianism that is the norm. Impulses that have set into a firm 
ego lose their immediacy, leaving the individual free to “risk unscreened thoughts” and to gain 
distance from the forming and shaping exercised from without, by the environment or culture, 
which, in the Modern era, is the economic-administrative system.95 But it should not be denied 
that such a self, which seeks to preserve itself, is at the same time in some sense inured to 
sacrifice: “Bargaining one’s way out of sacrifice by means of self-preserving rationality is a 
form of exchange no less than was sacrifice itself.”96 The individual who denies sacrifice 
raises an absolute barrier between the self, which is to be preserved, and the other, which is 
expendable—between the intact human self and ephemeral nature. The denial of sacrifice thus 
amounts to the denial of the natural in the human. The human becomes the total ossification of 
what is in defense against an endless flux of nature. While the ego developed by sacrificing 
the present to the future, its subsequent tendency to rigidity amounts to renunciation of the 
future for a stagnant present—this is why Horkheimer and Adorno claim that the denial of 
sacrifice is also exchange. While the sacrifice of the non-existent future to the present might 
                                                
94 Theodor W. Adorno, “Erziehung zur Mündigkeit,” in Erziehung zur Mündigkeit: Vorträge und Gespräche mit 
Hellmut Becker, 1959-1969, herausgegeben von Gerd Kadelbach (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 143 (my 
translation). 
95 Ibid., p. 135 (my translation). 
96 GS, vol. 3, p. 71 as translated, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 42. 
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seem like the sacrifice of nothing at all, it does show up—to reason—as the increasing 
irrationality of society. An irrational society in fact goes hand in hand with an ego that denies 
all sacrifice and so cannot sacrifice the present moment for the sake of a rationality to come. 
Adorno and Horkheimer claim that the irrationality of the twentieth century was already latent 
in the denial of nature that was the condition for the possibility of reason:  
This very denial, the core of all civilizing rationality, is the germ cell of proliferating 
mythical irrationality: with the denial of nature in human beings, not only the telos of 
the external mastery of nature but also the telos of one’s own life becomes confused 
and opaque. At the moment when human beings cut themselves off from the 
consciousness of themselves as nature, all the purposes for which they keep themselves 
alive—social progress, the heightening of material and intellectual forces, indeed, 
consciousness itself—become void, and the enthronement of the means as the end, 
which in late capitalism is taking on the character of overt madness, is already 
detectable in the earliest history of subjectivity.97 
 
Some have found such paradoxical formulations highly problematic.98 But the paradox of 
irrational rationality appears not because the authors suffered from some weakness in their 
thinking, but because they are following the object of these contradictions in its dynamic, 
which has still not terminated, neither in absolute, total and irrevocable insanity nor in truly 
                                                
97 GS, vol. 3, p. 72f. as translated, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 42f. 
98 See Jürgen Habermas, “Die Verschlingung von Mythos und Aufklärung: Horkheimer und Adorno,” in Der 
philosophische Diskurs der Moderne: 12 Vorlesungen (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1985), pp. 130-157, or 
translated, “The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno,” in The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1990), pp. 106-130. Habermas claims that since the aporia concerns reason itself, Horkheimer and Adorno 
remain locked in a “performative contradiction inherent in an ideology critique that outstrips itself” (Habermas, 
“Horkheimer und Adorno,” p. 154 as translated, “Horkheimer and Adorno,” p. 127). According to Habermas, this 
position is untenable, for the text’s own claims of being reasonable are subject to the critique of reason that it 
develops, critique which it cannot transcend: the authors are thus driven inevitably into skepticism. Habermas 
concludes that since there is no way out of this performative contradiction, there is only “the way back”: a 
descent into the nihilism, irrationality and myth that he associates with Nietzsche (Habermas, “Horkheimer und 
Adorno,” p. 155 as translated, “Horkheimer and Adorno,” p. 128). Habermas fails to grasp the performative 
contradiction dialectically—i.e., as a clue to an open reality. Moreover, he equates the philosophy that admits of 
open reality—whether Nietzsche’s “abysmal thought” or Horkheimer and Adorno’s dialectic of reason—as pure 
unreason. As Karin Bauer has pointed out, Habermas, in his insistence that reason be grounded in value 
judgements, misses that an “ungrounded critique” such as Nietzsche’s has an object—instrumental reason. In 
refusing to recognize this object, Habermas exposes his own theory to the dangers of instrumental reason. See 
Karin Bauer, Adorno’s Nietzschean Narratives: Critiques of Ideology, Readings of Wagner (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 33-34.   
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universal enlightenment. As long as the contradiction persists, the fate of reason is undecided; 
it is still possible to reflect on the rationality or irrationality of society. Furthermore, 
Horkheimer and Adorno do not argue that all reason is really insanity, but they determine the 
irrational part of reason very precisely: what is irrational in reason is the denial of nature. 
Horkheimer and Adorno can speak about social progress and a materially improved life 
because this denial of nature in the human is not total and fatal. Moreover, the authors do not 
persist in the contradiction. They are clearly against the sacrifice of the individual life. This 
does not however force them to deny sacrifice. Rather, out of their work on the contradiction 
emerges a new idea, that of sacrifice against sacrifice itself: 
But society’s predicament is that the person who escaped the universal, unequal, and 
unjust exchange, who did not renounce but immediately seized the undiminished 
whole, would thereby lose everything, even the meager residue of oneself granted by 
self-preservation. All the superfluous sacrifices are needed: against sacrifice.99  
  
Horkheimer and Adorno have clearly denounced “fraudulent priestly rationalization of 
murder,” so would be giving themselves priestly airs if they were here proposing that the way 
to a just society would be for individuals to offer each other up for the sake of the whole.100 
This is the usual way in which social progress has been won in the past. The suffering or 
sacrifice of individuals who act toward a just society has rendered every step toward justice 
profoundly unjust. Horkheimer and Adorno propose a model of progress whereby the 
individual sacrifices the present for the sake of an uncertain and perhaps unattainable future in 
which no individual would need to put his or her life, or anyone else’s life, on the line. They 
thus distinguish between sacrifice of the present moment in the case of ego-construction 
(sacrifice in the first instance) and the sacrifice of the individual life (sacrifice in the second 
                                                
99 GS, vol. 3, p. 73 as translated, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 43. 
100 GS, vol. 3, p. 69 as translated, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 40. 
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instance). According to Horkheimer and Adorno, Odysseus is such a one who would perform 
a sacrifice against sacrifice itself: time and again, he restrains himself from acting immediately 
on his instincts and desires; yet he saves the life he failed to live by remembering it.101 They 
claim that Odysseus is an enlightenment thinker, in that he achieves the journey by ultimately 
subordinating passing temptations and pains to the goal, and that Odysseus’ self-control is the 
model for abeyance of the on-going social coercion: “His lordly renunciation, as a struggle 
with myth, is representative of a society which no longer needs renunciation and domination—
which masters itself not in order to do violence to itself and others but for the sake of 
reconciliation.”102 The objection may be raised against Horkheimer and Adorno, however, that 
Odysseus does not perform a sacrifice against sacrifice because he exercises surplus 
domination. There is no real reason for him to kill the suitors, and in such vicious fashion, 
once he has arrived home to Ithaca. A true sacrifice against sacrifice aims to preserve the lives 
of everyone in the whole society. It represents the end of surplus repression of the ego against 
itself, in the aim of ending surplus domination in society. What makes sacrifice against 
sacrifice a way out of the aporia of reason and not a way back into the compulsion and 
dissoluteness of myth is that it implies a transformation of the ego. 
 Against the prevailing ego-weakness, montage is a form of art adequate to bourgeois 
reception, to the strong ego and to the bourgeois individual, who, in the shock that shakes the 
clear division between inner and outer, self and other, sees through the illusion of the ego and 
its unnecessary, surplus repression. The bourgeois subject must already have a strong ego 
formation in order to receive the artwork as a shock. But, more than that, in order for the 
bourgeois subject to experience the shock—to learn in it—this reception must be a cognitive 
                                                
101 GS, vol. 3, p. 73f., Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 43. 
102 GS, vol. 3, p. 74 as translated, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 43. 
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one. Given the normally non-cognitive character of shocks, experiencing shocks requires a 
changed cognitive model. 
Adorno’s grave doubt about shock’s productivity for advancing consciousness in 
contemporary art and new media should not be mistaken for resignation; in another context, he 
defends the shock experience—for knowledge. Shock is a distinctive quality of negative 
dialectics.103 As submitting individuals to shocks may only reinforce the lack of ego-feeling so 
easy to recuperate for authoritarian social structures, negative dialectics is a propaedeutic for 
shock. Ego-weakness is a hindrance for knowledge: when no part of the object falls on the 
ego, rigid structures stand in for subject-object mediation.  
Adorno’s endeavour in theory to make the shock-experience possible again opens the 
question whether the shock experience may happen in art now, or whether, as Bürger claims, 
shocks have worn off forever and montage can never again advance consciousness.  
To test whether this question has really opened requires an interpretation of the 
passage on cognitive shock: “To produce a yield, cognition throws itself away on the objects à 
fonds perdu. The dizziness that this causes is an index veri; the shock of the open, appearing 
                                                
103 See Roger Foster, Adorno: The Recovery of Experience (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007). 
Foster indeed does well to connect the “shock of the open” to the shock experience associated with Proust’s 
mémoire involontaire. Foster, however, does not adequately defend Proust against Idealism, which is essential if 
he wishes to argue that the materialist Adorno made cogent use of the writer’s techniques in the form of negative 
dialectic (ibid., p. 143) and that “the notion of experience in involuntary memory, as opposed to the everyday 
work of habitual classification, can be seen as a model for the recovery of experience in Adorno’s theory of 
philosophical interpretation” (ibid., p. 149). Although Proust does not argue for a realm of ideas separate from 
reality, as in Platonic Idealism, he subordinates Being to mind, which would be idealism in Adorno’s sense: 
“Idealism is a philosophy that either simply attributes Being to mind or else subordinates any being, insofar as it 
is not mind, to mind” (Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Leo Löwenthal et al., “Wissenschaft und Krise: 
Differenz zwischen Idealismus und Materialismus Diskussionen über Themen zur Vorlesung Max Horkheimer” 
(Meeting of January 19, 1932), in Max Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 12, p. 380, in my translation). As 
far as Adorno is concerned, Proust is an Idealist. See GS, vol. 7, p. 200, or translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 132.  
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necessarily as negativity within what has been screened and what is ever-same, is untruth only 
for the untrue.”104  
The first idea here is that cognition is a heady business venture, which, to gain 
anything at all, must expect to lose its capital investment. According to a rationalized business 
model, such an investment would be unwise: money is money, and there is no difference 
between “fonds” and “fruits.” Yet the business paradigm seems to have been adopted by 
“traditional thinking and the habits of healthy human understanding,” which want to hold on 
to what they started with—a “frame of reference,” which may come in the form of “dogmatic 
axioms,” and through which all thoughts are screened.105 To this business-school paradigm, all 
knowledge is the same, and consequently it is irrational and impulsive to attempt to gain some 
small insight if it means risking losing in the process the cognitive model, scientific method 
and research framework, all secure foundations and safe assumptions. The point of cognition, 
however, is not the quantitative amassing of bits of knowledge. There is a qualitative 
difference between the framework with which one starts and the insight that explodes it. 
Adorno advances that cognition must risk losing everything that it started with. To the 
business-school paradigm of knowledge, the “shock of the open” would be the equivalent of 
financial failure; the loss of the underlying assumptions and foundations in which cognition is 
invested, “untruth.” But when Adorno speaks of an irrational society, it is not a sudden loss of 
structure that he has in mind. This distinguishes him from Bürger, who seems to read the lack 
of structure in art (and in society in general) as a problem for theory. Bürger supposes that a 
theory of very recent art may not be possible because he assumes that “a field must have a 
                                                
104 GS, vol. 6, p. 43, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 33.  
105 GS, vol. 6, p. 43, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 32. 
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structure if it is to be the subject of scholarly or scientific understanding.”106 Yet if theory had 
to abandon its object whenever the criterion of rationality was not fulfilled, no knowledge 
would be possible at all. This is what Adorno implies by a cognition that “throws itself away 
on the objects”: knowledge abandons itself—cognition abandons an inadequate theory—rather 
than abandoning the object. The self-relinquishment that Adorno advances does not imply the 
sacrifice of the individual for the sake of the universal, but consists in a change in 
comportment of the individual thinker toward the objects of study, which are unlike the 
subject and which require the subject to liquidate the secure possessions of the intellect and to 
transform itself. Self-divestiture is at the same time investiture in the objects. Bürger abandons 
his object rather than theory, which he understands as the repetition of logic already in its 
object. But clearly knowledge must be more than just the repetition of its object (insofar as 
this is already structured) if Bürger can claim that Adorno’s theory is not adequate to the “total 
availability of material and forms characteristic of the post avant-gardiste art of bourgeois 
society.”107 Bürger notices that Adorno’s aesthetics did not exhaust post-war art. But for 
Bürger’s insight to be at all possible, cognition must also be the cognition of inadequacy, the 
contradiction between theory and the object—in this case, between Adorno’s aesthetic theory 
and post-war art. In critique, interpretation goes ahead even when there is a lack of structure or 
unity in a certain field, which is why exhaustiveness cannot be a criterion for it.  
In Negative Dialectics, Adorno suggests that philosophy should seek infinite diversity 
without an underlying structure: 
If it were delicately understood, the changed philosophy itself would be infinite in the 
sense of scorning solidification in a body of enumerable theorems. Its substance 
[Gehalt, content] would lie in the diversity of objects that impinge upon it and of the 
                                                
106 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 131 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 94. 
107 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 130 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 94. 
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objects it seeks [oder die sie sucht, or which it seeks], a diversity not wrought by any 
schema; to these objects, philosophy would truly give itself rather than use them as a 
mirror in which to reread itself, mistaking its own image for concretion.108  
 
In the absence of mediation with the object, the cognitive subject lacking an ego-feeling tends 
to produce schemata—or images. Images stand between what is to be reconciled—between 
subject and appearances, between ego and repressed material, between reality and utopia. 
Images, for Adorno, obstruct the work of mediation, whether that be dialectical subject-object 
mediation, “working through” the past in psychoanalytic interpretation or right philosophical 
practice. Images are “third things” that screen off or veil one opposing side from its other, and 
so get in the way of interpretation. It is not enough to take the veil away; the veil actually has 
to be exploded, which means that the historical tensions in the immediate image have to be 
worked on until it springs apart. An unexploded veil can be put to the same use again and 
again, and the repetitive structure of reified reality reproduced. But where the screen or veil is 
exploded, by contrast, it cannot be put to the same use—that of concealing. What remains, the 
fragments, must have a different function if they are to be re-used. The new functions of the 
fragments are released to work towards a future reconciliation of the opposed sides. Mere 
unveiling not only leaves the opposed sides unreconciled, but also withdraws the resources for 
coping with the object or repressed material that the veil hid away.  
 Adorno proposes the idea that “philosophy would truly give itself” to objects as an 
alternative to the Kantian schemata, which merely posit the likeness between subject and 
object, coordinating them in a shot.109 It is perhaps because Bürger retains something of the 
Kantian model of knowledge, rather than considering such transformed knowledge, which 
“throws itself away on the objects,” that he despairs of aesthetic theory ever grasping art in an 
                                                
108 GS, vol. 6, p. 25 as translated except where indicated, Negative Dialectics, p. 13.  
109 GS, vol. 6, p. 25 as translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 13. 
 206 
increasingly irrational society. At a different moment in history, Kant expressed the real 
divergence of mind and the given as the problem of categories’ applicability to appearances: 
“This question, so natural and important, is really the cause which makes a transcendental 
doctrine of the power of judgement necessary, in order, namely, to show the possibility of 
applying pure concepts of the understanding to appearances in general.”110 Since Kant states 
at the outset of the chapter that there must be at least an element of likeness for this to be 
possible, whereas categories and appearances are inhomogeneous, the categories having 
nothing empirical mixed with them, he solves the problem by positing a “third thing,” which 
would mediate between the category and the appearance: the schema.111 This is precisely what 
Adorno denies, even while supporting Kant’s contention that there is a rift between pure 
reason and the given in general. Adorno reads all rifts in The Critique of Pure Reason, or what 
he terms the “Kantian block,” as the expression of real social alienation caused by the 
exchange relation: 
I believe I observed at one point that this Kantian block can be understood as a form of 
unmediated Cartesian dualism that is reflexive, that reflects upon itself. It is a dualism 
in which a great chasm yawns between inner and outer, a chasm that can never be 
bridged. This chasm is the chasm of the alienation of human beings from one another, 
and the alienation of human beings from the world of things. This alienation is in fact 
socially caused; it is created by the universal exchange relation. Through the idea that 
our knowledge is blocked Kantian philosophy expresses as an experience the state of 
philosophy at the time. In particular, it expresses the idea that in this universally 
mediated society, determined as it is by exchange, in this society marked by radical 
alienation, we are denied access to existing reality as if by a blank wall. […] I believe 
that it is important in this context for you to realize that this idea of a block, of 
unbridgeable chasms between different realms, is in fact ubiquitous in the Critique of 
Pure Reason; it does not refer simply to the single point where it first makes its 
                                                
110 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), A138/B177. The pagination given here and throughout, with “A” and “B” 
editions noted, corresponds to the Academy of Sciences edition of Kant’s works (Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, 
Berlin: G. Reimer/ W. de Gruyter, 1902-) and appears in the margins of Guyer and Wood’s translation. Boldface 
type in the translation, reproducing Kant’s Fettdruck, appears here in italics. 
111 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A138/B177. 
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appearance, namely the question of the unknowability of the so-called things-in-
themselves.112 
 
Kant’s demonstration of how pure concepts may be applied to appearances in general seizes 
the problem quite exactly as that of social alienation. He reasons that, given that time makes 
appearances possible in general, if the pure concepts of the understanding can be presented as 
different determinations of time, then there is reason to believe that there can in fact be such a 
translator of these two heterogeneous elements, the appearance and the pure concept. Thus, he 
proceeds to present each of the twelve categories in terms of time, in what he calls their 
“schemata.” One finds the following among the schemata: “The schema of necessity is the 
existence of an object at all times.”113 In this, according to Adorno, Kant exactly expresses the 
contradiction between the fixed, seemingly eternal commodities and the living labour time, 
considered in its abstraction, needed to produce them. Kant is correct to read this chasm as a 
problem. Despite his great admiration for Kant’s perspicacity and courage to see and to 
articulate this problem, Adorno rejects his solution. According to Kant, the schemata are 
simply inborn, making the resolution of the tension between the realms of mind and the given 
a natural component of every healthy human understanding. Schematism might well explain 
how the human being is able to harmonize vast contradictions in his experience, “behind the 
back of consciousness,” as Hegel would say, but this is a profound failing of reason, according 
to Adorno, because these two realms really are unlike.114 Clearly, Kant was aware that the 
pure concepts and the appearances were unlike, and he is utterly correct to distinguish 
                                                
112 Theodor W. Adorno, Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft” (1959), herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), p. 263f., as translated by Rodney Livingstone, Kant’s “Critique of Pure 
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113 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A145/B184. 
114 G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Theorie-Werkausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969-71), 
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subjective conditions for understanding from objectivity, but if he himself could even think 
this deep chasm between appearances in general and the pure concepts that were supposed to 
apply to them, then this shows that mind still can work with heterogeneity in some way: in the 
form of critique. But then this requires effort from each individual consciousness to mediate 
contradictions in experience. Kant’s packaging of mediating consciousness in a third thing 
probably appeared to Adorno as unconvincing as the conclusion of Fritz Lang’s Metropolis, in 
which the conflict between the workers and the administrators is to be solved in the person of 
Freder, “the mediator,” who is supposed to go between the realm above and the realm below 
to ensure the smooth functioning of the whole: “In truth, the subject is never quite the subject, 
and the object never quite the object; and yet the two are not pieced out of any third [aus 
einem Dritten, out of a third thing] that transcends them. The third [Das Dritte, the third thing] 
would be no less deceptive.”115 The Kantian schema is like a screen between the subject and 
object. A necessary but insufficient condition for alienation to be overcome in fact is for every 
individual to be capable of thinking contradictions critically and consciously, which is by no 
means a universal or natural capacity. But this also means thinking particular contradictions in 
the concrete, rather than translating static categories into “time-determinations,” which are just 
as abstract as units of labour time. A true critique of the chasms that separate people from one 
another and people from things would have to seek to overcome the idea of time as a form in 
general, which is the condition for these rifts.  
 In contrasting “the screened (das Gedeckten)” to “the unscreened thought (der 
ungedeckte Gedanke),” Adorno, thereby evoking the Freudian concept of the screen memory 
                                                
115 GS, vol. 6, p. 177 as translated except where indicated, Negative Dialectics, p. 175. 
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(Deckerinnerung), suggests that in productive cognition, the ego yields its defenses.116 A 
screen memory is a substitute memory aimed at protecting the ego from repressed material by 
making a more acceptable image of the past.117 Freud explains that the indifferent, almost 
inconsequential, character of childhood memories is due to a defensive “process of 
displacement” aimed at managing a traumatic content of the past: “As the indifferent 
memories owe their preservation not to their own content but to an associative relation 
between their content and another which is repressed, they have some claim to be called 
‘screen memories,’ the name by which I have described them.”118 A screen memory is thus the 
opposite of an involuntary memory. A screen memory aims at protecting the ego and 
maintains illusions about the past; involuntary memory points to the ego’s failure to build 
itself up against nature and has a disillusioning function about the past. On its own, mémoire 
involontaire cannot change philosophy because by definition its content has only been lived 
through, not experienced consciously and explicitly. Adorno’s negative dialectic attempts to 
put the “Chockerlebnis” of involuntary memory into a form so that it may be experienced in 
this way.  
 Despite his objection to Proust’s Idealism, Adorno’s “changed philosophy” 
nonetheless owes much to mémoire involontaire. In involuntary memory, an overwhelming 
moment returns without its immediacy—as past. The interest of mémoire involontaire is that it 
indicates to the ego an instance of its own failure to screen out some overpowering feature of 
the environment. The ego exists to preserve the individual; the preservation of the individual 
                                                
116 GS, vol. 6, p. 43, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 33. 
117 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 6 The 
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despite the failure of the ego to screen out stimuli raises severe doubts about the substantiality 
of the ego and its monopoly on experience, as well as doubts about the dangerousness of the 
environment and the standing need to preserve the self against it. Adorno speculates on what a 
form of knowledge that draws the philosophical consequences of involuntary memory would 
be like. It would be a cognition that realizes that the individual can survive despite the ego’s 
failure to set itself rigidly against ever-changing nature.119 Such cognition would thus not be 
afraid to “throw itself away on the objects.” 
 Dialectics, like Proust’s mémoire involontaire, is provoked by what is left over from 
the past, by what therefore stands out from the dull continuity that has seamlessly progressed 
around it. The etiolated grand duke, whose features express the spirit of the times in which he 
was brought up, whose kind manners seem destined to die out with his fading generation, 
actually breaks through the appearance of temporal homogeneity: these manners left over from 
another time, by their very rareness in a society that has adopted other gestures and other 
mores, stand out from all that has continued to decline, and for this are able to become 
something living in the present, far greater than the nostalgic memory of times past. This 
remainder is precisely Adorno’s concept of the non-contemporaneous, itself something left 
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over from Ernst Bloch that he carries forward in his 1958 lecture course on dialectics, and 
which is indeed the possibility of all dialectics from Hegel on:  
In the face of historical reality, it is perhaps one of the most profound pieces of luck 
that is offered to dialectical thinking that it does not even experience the non-
contemporaneous, what is left over, as some kind of disruptive element on the smooth 
path of historical progress, but that, for its part, it grasps [begreift] that which opposes 
this so-called progress or that which does not fit in out of the principle of development 
itself.120  
 
Adorno goes on to compare the remainder to a xenocryst. A xenocryst is a piece of crystal that 
was swept along by hot flowing magma, which then congealed around it, forming new igneous 
rock. A piece of the past, swept up in natural-historical processes, survives intact within the 
more recent structure, with the result that two clear geological eras can be taken in at a glance. 
Experience is rife with examples of these remainders, which can be as local and as seemingly 
inconsequential a phenomenon as empty beer bottles rattling in a delivery bicycle box on the 
streets of Montréal several decades after the North American shift to single-use containers in 
the 1970s—or as widespread and as significant a unit as the family, which still follows a more 
or less feudal model in its organization of labour within capitalist society, as Adorno illustrates 
in this lecture.121 Even whole disciplines, such as art and philosophy, might be understood as 
remainders, as practices that retained and might still retain certain archaic features of pre-
capitalist production, in, for instance, their generally non-rationalized, non-tabulated 
appointment of working hours. And it is in countries and regions that have not themselves 
developed their forces in line with the principle of maximization of profit that these not fully 
rationalized disciplines flourish. Adorno even postulates that Webern and Berg were able to 
pursue their art because they happened to be in Vienna, and Austria lagged behind the most 
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recent economic developments: “[Webern and Berg] only got by thanks to the economic 
backwardness of their homeland, which in many ways was still pre-capitalist and offered 
loopholes for activities that had no exchange-value.”122 The relative comfort in which Berg 
lived had to do with Vienna’s “rigorously enforced rent control” in an Austria that was “still 
not thoroughly capitalized.”123 It might be very seductive at this point to think that the way 
forward is the way back. Adorno nowhere suggests, however, that the illusion of expanding 
exchange value can be deflated and the real social costs of capitalism made good with a re-
feudalization of society, as if the solution to capitalism could be ontologized in returnable beer 
bottles, rent controls or the family economic unit, which have somehow endured into the 
present. Adorno holds that non-dialectical, superficial thinking looks on all that has not 
advanced as “relics.” Rather than thinking the family, for example, as a kind of hardened 
“residue” left over from feudal times, “one should wonder how it is actually possible that, 
despite this constantly growing rationality, the family keeps itself alive at all.”124 Identity 
thinking views the non-contemporaneous spheres of employment and family life as a 
simultaneity or “synchronicity.”125 But it is striking that there can persist families within high 
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capitalism, a living practice of bottle return amidst non-price product promotion, a practice of 
rent controls within a housing-driven economy, independent daily newspapers with large 
readerships in the context of immense media conglomerates, a crowded library offering the 
public free access to its four million documents, just down the street from big box bookstores, 
whose takings represent 40% of the sale of every book (compared to 10% for the author). The 
non-contemporaneous is not a museum piece or a costume that makes its appearance once a 
year, but is rather a fixture of daily life—a surviving practice that is out of sync with the 
prevailing practice. In the example of drink packaging in Québec, the returnable bottle system 
is restricted to beer, but, if one knows the culture a bit, one knows that it is neither a marginal 
alternative nor a fading memory—like that of the personal pint pots that used to be kept at the 
local pub in certain countries. Amidst the vast assortment of variously shaped, one-use drink 
bottles full of nutritionally negligible pops and fruit juices here in Québec, returnable beer 
bottles are the past living on into the present. The principles behind single-use containers and 
returnable bottles contradict one another. According to the principle underlying the first 
practice, the cost of product promotion should be assumed by society, in the form of garbage 
collection, recycling programmes, landfills and the healthcare able to respond to the increasing 
pollution-related illness.126 According to the principle underlying the second practice, the 
minimizing of social costs should take precedence over the maximizing of private profit; 
                                                                                                                                                    
primarily the dominance of the area of employment over the institution of the family, is reflected in the hierarchy 
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126 Heather Rogers, Gone Tomorrow: The Hidden Life of Garbage (New York: New Press, 2005), pp. 134-137. 
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private companies must take responsibility for the garbage and pollution that their products 
generate. The conclusions to draw from non-contemporaneous contradiction are, first, the 
specific problem that the two sides address has not been solved once and for all; and, second, 
the context in which the contradiction occurs, society, has not reached its right and just form. 
The thinking that recognizes the surviving life in the non-contemporaneous—as opposed to 
viewing them as Palaeozoic fossils or quaint dust-collectors—undergoes something analogous 
to the Proustian hero on his return to Combray: shock. Yet on an Adornonian reading of 
Proust’s Recherche, what the hero meets in Combray cannot really be his past, stored in the 
landscape like the departed souls of Celtic belief system, who migrate, at least according to 
Proust’s imprecise understanding of it, into trees and inanimate objects. What happens in 
Combray is not the return of the narrator’s past from the objects, not the recovery of what he 
experienced, not the regaining of lost time, but quite the opposite, according to Adorno: the 
explosion and fragmenting of solid time. What breaks through the appearance of absolute 
temporal homogeneity may wake us from the dream of the here and now, from the dull 
continuity of the same: may change life. If development were perfectly even, there would 
perhaps be no chance of changing its course. The non-contemporaneous is thus what starts 
progressive dialectics. The “chance” of dialectical thinking is that it grasps or conceives 
(begreift) remainders, as opposed to just running up against a conceptual wall. There are 
specific answers to the question that each remainder poses, but what the phenomenon of the 
remainder points to in general is that, for the moment, the situation remains open. In other 
words, we are dealing not with a thoroughly determined reality, but with the possible.  
 Adorno’s use of the expression “the shock of the open” brings with it the objective 
association of possibility, for it was in close connection with the concept of possibility that 
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Ernst Bloch developed the concept of the open, or what he more commonly calls “the 
unclosed.” Adorno’s phrase “the shock of the open,” not only evokes Bloch, along with the 
Blochian progressive utopian consciousness of a not-yet finished totality in the image-
explosion of advanced art, but also negates, through Bloch, the habitual form of shock, in 
which individuals suffering from ego-weakness, lacking any feeling for what is specifically 
outer and other, mindlessly submit to the existing conventional order. The section of The 
Principle of Hope entitled “Much in the World is Still Unclosed” is certainly a key source for 
grasping what the concept of the open brings with it: 
No thing could be altered in accordance with wishes if the world were closed, full of 
fixed, even perfected facts. Instead of these there are simply processes, i.e. dynamic 
relationships in which the Become [das Gewordene] has not completely triumphed. 
The Real is process; the latter is the widely ramified mediation between present, 
unfinished past, and above all: possible future. Indeed, everything real passes over into 
the Possible at its processual Front, and possible is everything that is only partially 
conditioned, that has not yet been fully or conclusively determined. Here we must of 
course distinguish between the merely cognitively or objectively Possible and the 
Real-Possible, the only one that matters in the given context.127 
 
Bloch will go on in fact to distinguish many layers within the possible, but his main concern is 
to argue that there is a kind of possibility that is more than that which is able to be conceived 
without contradiction: productive possibility as opposed to possibility that remains 
“unfruitful.”128 He wants to establish that there is the possibility to do something about the 
reality that is always too little compared to our hopes and dreams for it, and this is the real 
possible. But possibility itself is not widely recognized at any level:  
Already the fact that a Can-Be can be said and thought is by no means self-evident. 
There is still something open here, it can be meant differently than it was before, can 
                                                
127 Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, 3 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1959), vol. 1, p. 225 as translated 
by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight, The Principle of Hope, 3 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1995), vol. 1, p. 196. 
128 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 1, p. 259 as translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 1, p. 225.  
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be rearranged, connected differently, changed in moderation. Where nothing more can 
be done or is possible, life stands still.129  
 
When cynics and conservatives deny that appalling reality can change, it is because they are 
missing the specific notion of the real possible. Yet this problem is not limited to cynics and 
conservatives, for the denial of the real possible runs through the history of philosophy. Bloch 
sorts the philosophical suppression of the real possible roughly into two types: first, the logical 
kind of suppression, which reduces unclosed reality to unclosed knowledge about reality, then 
dismisses unclosed reality as simple ignorance, with the result that “the Possible is de-realized 
to the status of ‘fiction’”130 and, second, the static kind of suppression, which, positing a 
totality, fails to think the new, with the result that “this static positing has above all obstructed 
the space of the Open Possible.”131 Even “great thinkers”132 and “processive philosophers”133 
are guilty of a static understanding of possibility, according to Bloch. Earning the title of static 
philosophers are Kant, due to his conviction that possibility, as a category of modality, does 
not in any way enlarge the concept to which it is ascribed, and Hegel, for whom real 
possibility—or what he calls real possibility—“is wholly surrounded by the circle of reality 
that has already become.”134 In short, static philosophers’ denial of real possibility comes 
down to their equating the possible, even the real possible (as in Hegel), with something fully 
formed, but waiting in the material. According to Bloch, only Marxism understands the real 
                                                
129 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 1, p. 258 as translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 1, p. 224. 
130 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 1, p. 279 as translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 1, p. 242. 
131 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 1, p. 280 as translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 1, p. 242. 
132 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 1, p. 279 as translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 1, p. 242. 
133 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 1, p. 280 as translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 1, p. 242. 
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The Science of Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 484.  
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possible in terms of non-identity, and it is Marxism’s true understanding of possibility as 
process, and of the world as an “unenclosed world,” that lets it get at the problem of changing 
that world: “The real Possible, which is homeless in every contemplative-static philosophy, is 
the real problem of the world itself: as the still unidentical character of appearance and real 
essential being, ultimately of existence and essence within it.”135 It is noteworthy that what 
Bloch terms “the real Possible” converges with what Adorno calls “aesthetic inconsistency,” 
or, “contradictions between what the artwork appears as [als was das Kunstwerk auftritt] and 
what it is.”136  
 Given that the concept of the real Possible has been so deeply denied, even amongst 
great thinkers, Bloch sees himself confronted with the colossal task of showing that the real 
Possible is neither nothing nor just reality. Yet his “evidence” appears rather quixotic. 
According to Bloch, dreams and daydreams are indicative of unclosed reality: “The fact that 
we can…sail into dreams, that daydreams, often of a completely uncovered kind, are possible, 
indicates the great space of the still open, still uncertain life in man [im Menschen, in human 
being].”137 His multi-volume study of hope is the compilation of dreams, dreams of a better 
life, ordered according to their strength: first, the “wishful images in the mirror” such as ruins, 
English gardens, window displays and magic genies in lamps; then different species of utopias 
such as the social utopias of Plato and More and scientific ones like Bacon’s Ars inveniendi; 
the “wishful landscapes” of certain works of high art and philosophy such as Leonardo’s 
Mona Lisa, whose figure becomes a landscape herself, and Kant’s mature works, which 
defend progress towards the highest good possible; and finally the “wishful images of the 
                                                
135 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 1, p. 284 as translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 1, p. 246. 
136 GS, vol. 7, p. 156, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 101. 
137 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 1, p. 224f., as translated except where indicated, Principle of Hope, vol. 1, 
p. 195. 
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fulfilled moment” such as the motif-based, fragmentary music of Schoenberg and religious 
mysticism just as well as Marx’s secularism. Bloch maintains that wishful images are neither 
arbitrary fantasies nor merely subjective feelings, but extend what exists into what is better 
and are therefore concerned with the Real-Possible: 
And so the point is reached where hope itself, this authentic expectant emotion in the 
forward dream, no longer just appears as a merely self-based mental feeling…, but in a 
conscious-known way as utopian function. Its contents are first represented in ideas, 
and essentially in those of the imagination. In imaginative ideas, as opposed to those 
remembered ones which merely reproduce past perceptions and thereby shade off 
more and more into the past. And even these imaginative ideas are not ones which are 
merely composed of existing material, in arbitrary fashion (stony sea, golden mountain 
and so on), but extend, in an anticipating way, existing material into the future 
possibilities of being different and better. So that the thus determined imagination of 
the utopian function is distinguished from mere fantasizing precisely by the fact that 
only the former has in its favour a Not-Yet-Being of an expectable kind, i.e. does not 
play around and get lost in an Empty-Possible, but psychologically anticipates a Real-
Possible.138 
 
The distinction that Bloch wishes to draw here between the recombined past of fantasy, on the 
one hand, and progressive images that extend the existing into the future, on the other, is not 
sustainable in fact. For when Bloch includes the Greek myth of Jason and the Argonauts 
amongst the geographical utopias, where what is better tends to be farther, he locates utopia in 
the Golden Fleece, that “exotic wishful-dream treasure,” which hangs on an oak in remote 
Colchis.139 A piece of golden fleece somehow escapes the verdict of being merely arbitrarily 
combined out of existing material that “golden mountain” does not.140 Certainly the “forward 
dream” or progressiveness of the myth cannot reside in the Golden Fleece being in a distant 
                                                
138 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 1, p. 163f. as translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 1, p. 144. 
139 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 2, p. 883 as translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 2, p. 755. 
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place, for Bloch notes that “people believed they would find strange, useful things even at 
home,” albeit tucked away in some forgotten or mysterious corner.141 It is not even the wishful 
dream’s quality of being somehow displaced geographically, far away or in a forgotten depth 
at home, that makes it progressive, for geographical utopias are just one sort of dream of a 
better life. This is not to say that there is no dream of a better life in the myth of Golden 
Fleece. But Bloch pins the myth’s wishful content on the goldenness of the Fleece: “After all, 
the Fleece was originally the brilliant glow [der glänzende Schein] which surrounds the hero 
and which grants him victory.”142 One would think that, according to Bloch’s own criterion, 
the myth’s wishful content would lie in Jason’s promises of dethroning the usurper Pelias 
without recourse to violence and of governing justly from then on. If the Golden Fleece is 
indeed a wishful image and a progressive one, it is because its return to Pelias is supposed to 
open an era of just rule. But instead of governing justly, the first thing that Jason does upon his 
return is to avenge Pelias for the deaths of his parents, thus perpetrating violence against the 
very person he promised to spare. If the long quest for the Golden Fleece with its many perils 
was undertaken only to avoid founding a new regime upon violence, it did not serve its 
purpose. The quest is not even fruitful as a love adventure, for once back in Greece Jason 
betrays his helper and lover Medeia, who murders their two children.143 What the Golden 
Fleece promised was never realized, and in this sense the myth determines the idea of a just 
society as something yet to accomplish. From the myth of Jason we do not have any better 
idea of what a just kingdom would be: all we do know is that a bit of fleece in itself will not 
                                                
141 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 2, p. 882 as translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 2, p. 753f.  
142 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 2, p. 883 as translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 2, p. 755. 
143 Euripides, Medeia 1271-92. In the familiar schoolbook version of the myth, sympathies lie more with Medeia 
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get it. Bloch, however, condenses the utopian content in the image of the Golden Fleece, and 
this imagistic notion of utopia will spell the fundamental difference between him and Adorno. 
Bloch appears to be reinvesting in the auratic side of mémoire involontaire—namely, image 
accumulation: a strategy which is quite opposed to that of both Benjamin and Adorno, who 
were preoccupied with the shattering of these images by the work of mémoire involontaire 
(shock)—and even against his own defense of image-explosion in Heritage of Our Times.  
 Despite his advance of imageless materialism, Adorno recognizes the legitimacy of the 
project motivating Bloch’s defense of images: for Bloch, utopian images are supposed to 
demonstrate a category of possibility. Yet in claiming that utopia resides in images, Bloch in 
no way makes a case for the Real-Possible, which, as he knows, is just what is needed to make 
it reasonable for us to want to change the world. Bloch’s main complaint against the 
traditional understanding of possibility is that it reduces possibility either to nothingness or to 
what has already become. Yet in claiming to have discovered the Real-Possible in past images 
of a better life, he is guilty of both errors. On one hand, Bloch accuses logicians of de-
realizing possibility “to the status of ‘fiction’,”144 yet he chooses literal fictions as proofs of 
the Real-Possible. Clearly there is no such thing as the Golden Fleece, so why should it 
convince us that the Real-Possible is not a fiction? Would it not sooner confirm the belief that 
the possible is entirely unreal? On the other hand, if voyage to distant lands in search of 
treasure has become a daily reality, this only proves the possibility in the Greek myths of 
adventure by way of what has become. But Bloch cannot hold this view because it is exactly 
the error for which Bloch reproaches Bergson.145 For the imagined search for exotic treasure 
in no way makes the real search for exotic treasure something different and better, and Bloch 
                                                
144 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 1, p. 279 as translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 1, p. 242. 
145 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 1, p. 232, or translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 1, p. 202.  
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admits as much: “Discovering definitely wants and is able to change things. Even the 
obsession with profit, the curiosity about unknown distant lands drive us off into the 
unfamiliar.”146 If he thinks that only wishful images in the mirror can fall into the wrong 
hands, that only the weak daydreams of glossy magazines and circuses can be used for good as 
well as for evil, he is wrong, for even what he considers to be the pinnacle of utopian 
consciousness and the strongest and most deeply thought-out dreams for a better world, the 
writings of Karl Marx, can, as Bloch knew, be used as a justification for barbarism: the Soviet 
forced labour camp for political prisoners is just one example. If Bloch’s strategy is to show 
that imagining something new is just as good as creating possibility, he errs once again in 
concentrating his proof on images. For images are what has been imagined; even if imagining 
the new were as good as making possible, then all that such historic images as the Golden 
Fleece or The Land of Cockaigne prove is that possibility was there. Otherwise one confuses 
simple continuing in time of actual material objects, texts and paintings, with possibility, so 
mere reality with possibility. But possibility is neither the imagination nor reality. The image 
wants to be both, and this is why Adorno incisively attacks Bloch’s notion that utopia is 
concretized in images. Images in fact do no philosophical work. Bloch was actually much 
closer to an argument for real possibility when he hit upon the concept of the non-
contemporaneous. Yet he missed the moment of real possibility in his own philosophy because 
he ended up reducing the non-contemporaneous to myth, while “Communist language” earned 
the honour being “totally contemporaneous and precisely orientated to the most advanced 
economy.”147 From this starting point, he adopted a strategy completely the opposite to the 
model of dialectical thinking that Adorno would develop. While Adorno understands the task 
                                                
146 Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, vol. 2, p. 876 as translated, Principle of Hope, vol. 2, p. 749. 
147 Bloch, Erbschaft dieser Zeit, p. 112 as translated, Heritage of Our Times, p. 105. 
 222 
of dialectic to be the explosion of every immediate appearance, so of the illusion of total 
contemporaneous-ness, Bloch sees dialectic as the instrument for realizing 
contemporaneousness, for actually advancing all elements of society into the same present, the 
Marxist society that real non-contemporaneities have prevented: 
But even if now, after total proletarianization and insecurity, after the decline of the 
higher standard of life and all prospects of a career, the masses of employees do not 
join the Communists or at least the Social Democrats, quite the contrary, then there is 
obviously a reaction of forces which conceal the process of becoming a commodity not 
just in subjective-ideological terms (which was certainly solely the case with an 
unradicalized centre until after the war), but also in real terms, namely out of real non-
contemporaneity. Impulses and reserves from pre-capitalist times and superstructures 
are then at work, genuine non-contemporaneities therefore, which a sinking class 
revives or cause to be revived in its consciousness.148 
 
Bloch so reasons that the real persistence of pre-capitalist structures prevents employees from 
overthrowing capitalist structures. The worsening conditions of life do not appear to be a 
result of capitalism precisely because obfuscating mythical and irrational pre-capitalist 
elements persist. Their persistence creates continuity with the past, so masks the radical and 
destructive transition to capitalism taking place, something that is ultimately a benefit to 
capitalism, which must not be recognized if it is to succeed.149 These non-contemporaneities 
also serve capitalism in that the mere tolerance of mythological, magical or fuzzy thinking 
alongside the cold logic of maximization of profit excuses the real irrationality of capitalism, 
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in which everyone becomes a thing. The backward, regressive elements finally become so 
successful in supporting capitalism that they become an end in themselves, as in the case of 
Nazi Germany. Bloch sees a dialectical solution in the raising to consciousness of the 
contradiction between rationalized capital and the “demonic mythicizing” of the non-
contemporaneous: 
Petit-bourgeois horror and merely backward stupidity are a clear component in 
themselves, but it does not exhaust the entire National Socialist complex. Differently 
‘non-contemporaneous’ wildness and demonic mythicizing also exist and possibly 
have a dialectical hook, are at least in strange ‘contradiction’ to capital and the spirit of 
capital; this contradiction must be helped along.150 
 
Bloch blames vulgar Marxism for ignoring purely irrational elements in society. According to 
him, Nazism was able to seduce a great number of young people because it could appropriate 
the myth, dreaming, primitivism, religion and utopia left available by a Marxism that refused 
to deal with them in any way: 
It is not the “theory” of the National Socialists but rather their energy which is serious, 
the fanatical-religious strain which does not merely stem from despair and stupidity, 
the strangely roused strength of faith. This streak could in fact, like every recollection 
of “primitiveness,” also have turned out differently, if it had been militarily occupied 
and dialectically transformed, on the “enlightened” side, instead of merely being 
abstractly cordoned off. But since Marxist propaganda lacks any opposite land to 
myth, any transformation of mythical beginnings into real ones, of Dionysian dreams 
into revolutionary ones, an element of guilt also becomes apparent in the effect of 
National Socialism, namely a guilt on the part of the all too usual vulgar Marxism. 
Large masses in Germany, above all the young (as a strongly organized and mythically 
intertwined condition), were able to become National Socialist precisely because the 
Marxism which presents them does not also “represent” them at the same time.151 
 
Bloch sees the necessity of making a Marxist correlate for every aspect of society, no matter 
how backward or irrational, because he remains a thinker of totality. He claims that dialectic is 
an instrument of the “mastered final stage or totality,” although, he hastens to add, “naturally 
not of absolutely every one, but of the critical, the non-contemplative, the practically 
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151 Bloch, Erbschaft dieser Zeit, p. 65f. as translated, Heritage of Our Times, p. 60. 
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intervening one.”152 Placing dialectic in the service of such a totality nonetheless leaves Bloch 
in the difficult position of needing to transform and to integrate even irrational contents into 
the whole. As Adorno is not a thinker of totality, he does not see the necessity for “military 
occupation” and “dialectical transformation” of myth by Enlightenment. Dialectic may simply 
negate and dissolve irrational contents without recuperating them and re-appropriating them 
for the revolutionary ends of Marxism. The problem is not, as Bloch thinks, that beginnings 
remain “mythical” rather than “real” and that dreams remain “Dionysian” rather than 
“revolutionary”; the problem is that origins and dreams seem to be potentials, the seeds of 
what can really be, when in fact they prevent a robust, live thinking of possibility. Changing 
the kinds of dreams that we have or attempting “real” beginnings does not change the world 
one iota, but it would change the world to understand that dreams are not real potentials and 
that beginnings are just as abstract, empty and indeterminate as dreams, as Hegel argues at the 
opening of The Science of Logic.153 Once, however, one ceases to think the non-
contemporaneous as merely mythic, primitive, irrational, imaginary and unenlightened, it 
becomes the site for thinking possibility. Adorno sees the endurance of a non-
contemporaneous element as an occasion to reflect on how it is “in fact possible” for opposing 
practices to have a life in the same society.154 The non-contemporaneous indicates that a 
specific reality remains open. Thus, it does not point to some specific, concrete, positive, 
pictured future. An entirely negative and critical action, one which works merely to negate 
some existing practice, is not necessarily futile if what it seeks to negate contradicts some 
other existing practice. We are not necessarily wrong or irrational to act to change things that 
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lie in possibility, here and now. If our universities are run like businesses and, at the same 
time, administered like public institutions, then it is not necessarily “pseudo-activity” to work 
to negate aspects of higher education as it exists, even aspects of society as it exists, even in 
the total absence of any clear image of what a university ought to be or what a just society 
ought to look like. The openness of reality, the indication of possibility, is “imageless”: it is 
only that things can still always be otherwise.155 Adorno for his part claims that supplying an 
imagined content for the possible necessarily excludes utopia, “the consciousness of 
possibility.”156 This is clear in his statement that “it is the possible, never the unmediated real, 
that blocks the way of utopia; that is why in the midst of what prevails the possible appears 
abstract.”157 Consciousness of possibility, consciousness that things can still always be 
otherwise, cannot be reached as long as the alternative to the real is given a determinate 
content that can be grasped consciously. Only in art does possibility appear, but as illusion. 
Bloch, however, does not recognize the non-practical, memorial character of art. He pursues 
the idea that images transform nothingness into possibility. If in the artwork there appears a 
perfect matriarchy, a beautiful castle or just exchange, there is no reason for us to think that 
these are possibilities that we can realize here and now: the artwork is at any rate what has 
survived. As the enduring past that emphatically appears as the immediate, the artwork asks us 
not to realize the possibility it presents, but to explode its present image by showing it to be at 
the centre of historical tensions that were not fully resolved when it appeared. What Adorno 
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suggests by the expression “the shock of the open” is a philosophical, interpretative practice 
that would show each immediate, appearing image to be the site of historical contradictions, so 
indicative of the possible, which itself does not appear, and which has no image.  
 Ignoring Adorno’s clear case for an imageless materialism, Gunzelin Schmid Noerr 
attempts to synthesize Adorno’s position and Bloch’s.158 Schmid Noerr concludes his essay on 
the difference between the two thinkers by stating that critical-utopian thinking nonetheless 
needs images and imagelessness alike: “Critical-utopian thinking however needs images, with 
a view to giving object and theme reasons and direction, and at the same time needs the power 
of imagelessness in order to create freedom and distance with regard to each particular 
lifeworld.”159 Moreover, Schmid Noerr claims that Adorno’s philosophy admits of images—
“dialectical images.”160 This confusion over whether Adorno’s philosophy admits of images is 
understandable, since in “The Actuality of Philosophy” Adorno calls constellations “historical 
images”161 and “images out of the isolated elements of reality.”162 It should be noted, however, 
that the mature Adorno of Negative Dialectics abandons this vocabulary in connection with 
constellations. In the paragraph entitled “Materialism Imageless,” Adorno specifically argues 
that the production of images is a form of Idealism: “A consciousness interpolating images, a 
third element, between itself and that which it thinks would unwittingly reproduce 
idealism.”163 This is not just a critique of Kant’s schematism, but most palpably also a critique 
of Bloch. For Bloch, utopia is concretized in images, but these have their source in the 
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subject’s wishes, intentions and desires, which turns his materialist utopia into an Idealist one. 
A constellation is decidedly anti-imagistic in that it grasps an object independently of the 
concept that usually just subsumes it, so, independently of the acoustic image attached to the 
concept. The constellation is constructed in such a way as to resist the meaning-laden 
symbolic and intentional function that characterizes made images. Bereft of subjective 
meanings and intentions, the constellation negates the linguistic form of social control and the 
subjective arbitrariness on which it is founded, social control that takes the deceptive form of 
acoustic images. Schmid Noerr is certainly aware that Adorno upholds the ban against images. 
But he does not accurately articulate the grounds for it. According to Schmid Noerr, the ban 
against images has to do with Adorno’s defense of “hedonistic utopia.”164 The term 
“hedonistic” is not at all apt, for this implies that in utopia sensual pleasure would take 
precedence over spiritual happiness, whereas it is only spirit’s character in the current society 
as sublimated drive, as energy no longer seeking immediate, literal sensual enjoyment, that 
even gives us the notion of hedonism. In the paragraph entitled “Contemplation” in Negative 
Dialectics Adorno states that sensual fulfilment is not better than the happiness of spirit:  
Yet to uphold literal, sensual happiness as something better than the inadmissible one 
of spirit is to deny that, at the end of the historical process of sublimation, split-off 
sensual happiness will take on something regressive, in the way that children’s 
relationship to food disgusts adults. Not to be like children in this is a piece of 
freedom.165 
 
“Materialism Imageless” nonetheless confirms that the concept of utopia developed by 
Adorno implies physical fulfilment: “Only were physical urge stilled would spirit be 
reconciled and become what it for so long has only promised—as it denies, under the spell of 
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material conditions, the satisfaction of material needs.”166 Schmid Noerr would therefore be 
more correct to claim that this material dimension of utopia is what leads to the ban on 
images. For in the aesthetic experience of nature, possible only when material needs are 
satisfied, nature transforms itself from a resource to exploit into a beautiful appearing, an 
image: “…the aesthetic experience of nature is that of images. Nature, as appearing beauty, is 
not perceived as an object of action.”167 But this means that Adorno’s materialism does not 
have recourse to images to give grounds and orientation to action. Thus, critical theory does 
not need images “with a view to giving object and theme reasons and direction,” as Schmid 
Noerr contends, for true images are not practical.168  
 The image of reconciliation should form naturally, independently of volition, whenever 
instrumental reason has been suspended, so, should be the true sign of material fulfilment. A 
moment of closed, filled, consistent time truly appears when no longing opens it up to a 
future. The only genuine, objective image is the image that coalesces naturally uniquely when, 
untroubled by want and urge, we are free to behold beauty. Today clearly, as material needs 
are not in fact satisfied, as physical urges are not stilled, as yearning goes unextinguished, any 
created image plants false evidence from which we are to conclude that nature and spirit are 
reconciled. The made image thus only seems to indicate that we no longer suffer from thirst, 
hunger, fatigue, insecurity, distress, pain, longing, loneliness, boredom or from intellectual or 
material poverty. In a passage from Aesthetic Theory, cited by Schmid Noerr,169 Adorno 
claims that it is in fact impossible to make images: 
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168 Schmid Noerr, “Bloch und Adorno,” p. 69 (my translation). 
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That one should make no image, which means no image of anything whatsoever, 
expresses at the same time that it is impossible to make such an image. Through its 
duplication in art, what appears in nature is robbed of its being-in-itself, with which the 
experience of nature is fulfilled [sich sättigt, fills itself up].170  
 
The ban on images in a certain sense extends to art. A made image is necessarily a 
representation of the experience of nature free from domination and exploitation; a made 
image cannot be this experience of free nature itself, for such experiences are not made, but 
happen. Nature becomes a problematic subject matter for French impressionism, as Adorno 
indicates earlier in the paragraph cited, “Natural Beauty and Art Beauty Are Interlocked.” A 
depiction of a mountain or of a green forest, just by virtue of what it depicts, is liable to be 
mistaken for the experience of nature as reconciled with spirit. Painters who today take Corfu 
sunrises, Norfolk heath heather or misted Moraine Lake as their subject matter seem to be 
stacking the odds of their paintings’ success: viewers who suppose that the image-character of 
art has to do with representation will no doubt find these paintings beautiful. Advanced artists 
do not paint beautiful, living nature because they want to avoid appealing to the naïve viewer, 
who does not grasp the transition from natural beauty to art beauty as the control of nature’s 
seeming to say “more than it is”: 
Nature’s beauty lies in its seeming to say more than it is. The idea of art is to divest this 
“More” of its contingency, to gain control of its illusion, to determine it as illusion, to 
negate it, also, as unreal.171  
 
To the mythological, pre-artistic mind, there are no coincidences: the blind combinations that 
the physical world turns out—the array of stars, the colours in the dusk sky, the flight of owls, 
the dance of a flame, the rustling of oak leaves—are meaningful. The stunning chance events 
of nature seem to refer to something beyond themselves. Surrealism is anti-art in its 
                                                
170 GS, vol. 7, p. 106 as translated, except where indicated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 67.  
171 GS, vol. 7, p. 122, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 78. 
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recuperation of chance, regarding it to be not mindless physis, but somehow the 
correspondence of nature and human ends: André Breton defines chance as “the encounter of 
an external causality and an internal finality.”172 In L’amour fou (Mad Love), Breton attempts 
to substantiate this definition by matching details of his chance meeting with Jacqueline 
Lamba, who advances toward him, “scandaleusement belle” (scandalously beautiful),173 to 
elements of an automatic poem he had written about a decade prior.174 Mere coincidences 
between the poem and the nocturnal stroll through Paris are supposed to show that the meeting 
was foreordained. The St-Jacques steeple, which they pass on their wander, the colombophile 
stamp on the letter that Breton receives a few days after their meeting, the cricket he hears 
chirping—these are all supposed to be signs that refer to specific lines in the poem, and so, 
Breton thinks, are proof that the encounter was not blind luck, but meant to be. Yet this would 
seem to eliminate freedom from the resulting relationship. The inner compulsion under which 
André Breton composed the automatic poem would be the same as the outer necessity that 
drew him to Jacqueline Lamba. Surrealism reads more into what merely is, yet as necessity. 
Art is distinct from this tendency in Surrealism in that it finds fault not with the spirit that sees 
more in what is, but with spirit that attempts to draw meaning, fate or necessity out of 
something purely coincidental. The “idea” of art is to set apart a field of non-arbitrary 
referentiality, in light of which the intentional or meaningful depths of beautiful nature flatten 
out, and the immanence and contingency of nature appear. It is impossible to analyze any 
particular thing of natural beauty like an artwork. The interpreter of an artwork is not only 
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permitted to refer the isolated moment to something beyond it, but actually required to do so, 
or else no interpretation happens. The goal of art interpretation is indeed to get the artwork to 
say more than it is. In contrast to the “more” of natural beauty, which is just an illusion, the 
“more” of art is, or traditionally has been, truth-content. But this suggests that art, in negating 
the referential character of beautiful nature as illusion, supplies a referent for the “more” of 
nature: the “more” of natural beauty cannot help but evoke the “more” of art.175 Once the 
sphere of art has constituted itself, beautiful nature does in a way point beyond itself—to 
aesthetic illusion. But whenever aesthetic illusion becomes the beyond that nature evokes, at 
the same time it negates nature’s having a real beyond, because seeming is itself non-being. 
Aesthetic illusion saves the beyond of natural beauty by leaving it indeterminate. When a spot 
of exceptional natural beauty is made to say something determinate, that it is more than just a 
lake or a pond, its beauty is destroyed. A postcard of Moraine Lake destroys the beauty of 
Moraine Lake itself. The imitation of some spot of natural beauty produces kitsch, and the ban 
on kitsch is at the same time the recognition that natural beauty is destroyed in such works. It 
is easy to see why Adorno claims that “art imitates not nature, not individual natural things 
that are beautiful, but natural beauty in itself.”176 The beauty of works by Teniers, Steen, 
Rembrandt and van Ostade is not in Holland, as the protagonist of À Rebours realizes, 
returning bitterly disappointed from his systematic voyage to the Netherlands.177 Adorno 
would consider Des Esseintes’s disappointment to be an indication of the art of these Dutch 
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painters, for what they imitate is indeterminate, not ever really there: “The being-in-itself to 
which artworks are devoted is not the imitation of something real but rather the anticipation of 
being-in-itself that does not yet exist, of an unknown that—by way of the subject—is self-
determining.”178 Art’s model is natural beauty in itself: art imitates the self-determination of a 
nature to come, not any existing natural beauty, which nowhere determines itself. Nonetheless, 
nature is not thereby everywhere determined by its other; natural beauty is indeterminate. The 
indeterminacy of beauty leaves space for a self-determining nature, which does not yet exist. 
Adorno follows Nietzsche in his critique of the Scholastic tradition, which considered beauty 
to be a kind of being.179 Art is the illusory beyond of natural beauty, yet one that is produced 
historically. Adorno expresses the conversion of the “more” of natural beauty into illusion in 
the artwork as the mediation of the “more” in alienated social relations; like all made things, 
the artwork is a form of socially necessary illusion: “The image of nature survives because its 
complete negation in the artefact—negation that rescues this image—is necessarily blind to 
what exists beyond bourgeois society, its labour and its commodities.”180 While beauty in 
nature is the quality of seeming to refer beyond itself, art does not give itself to be the beyond 
of natural beauty: it is the beyond of natural beauty only when it turns its back on nature, 
reifies itself, seems to have nothing to do with nature. The made, reified side of artworks, their 
social illusion, separates art—and its aesthetic images—from nature and from what would 
count as an image in nature: from the reconciliation of nature with spirit. Aesthetic images in 
art do not offend against the ban on images because they are reified, closed in on 
themselves—not representations of the unrepresentable used as intermediaries, “third things” 
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between this world and what would be different. This is clear in the Paralipomena to Aesthetic 
Theory in which Adorno claims that artworks are actually imageless images: “As their 
sedimentation [the sedimentation of the subject’s experiences], artworks are imageless images, 
and these experiences mock representational depiction.”181 Artworks are images, appearances 
of momentary, solid inner time, only thanks to their having become made things, and the made 
thing is the exact opposite of nature as beautiful image. The image in Proust may seem like the 
concretization of the individual Proust’s own unique experiences at Illiers. But the “subjective 
experiences” conveyed by artworks are not the inward feelings originating in hypersensitive 
selves, in these selves’ peculiar histories, the formation of their psychological characters or 
with their specific filial or erotic relationships. The aesthetic image in art does not transmit 
some actual personal experience of nature in its appearing beauty, as if Proust had found a 
way to reconcile nature and spirit and to satisfy his material needs in life. For his work denies 
such satisfaction explicitly, as it registers the jolt of desire and regret in which the narrator 
realizes that happiness was denied him. Precisely in those moments in the novel where 
happiness is denied the narrator do what we think of as its images coalesce: in the image of the 
hawthorn, in the image of the Roussainville tower, in the image of the agate marble. The 
image in Proust is not the sign of a concordance between one’s writing and one’s essential life 
encounter, as it is for Breton, but it is the expression of the discrepancy between literature and 
life: “The image of Proust is the highest physiognomic expression which the irresistibly 
growing discrepancy between literature and life was to assume.”182 Thus, “the subjective 
experiences” sedimented in À la recherche du temps perdu are negative images, indications 
that spirit and nature are not reconciled. Expressed in aesthetic images, these moments of 
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happiness denied the individual, these eternally ruined possibilities of love, render all 
psychological explanations inadequate. The aesthetic image determines the individual’s 
unstilled longing as social: “Yet in aesthetic images is just what eludes the ‘I’, their collective 
aspect: therefore society is inherent in the truth content. The appearing, by which the artwork 
towers high above the mere subject, is the breakthrough of its collective essence.”183 What the 
Proustian narrator realizes on his return to Combray is not that a personal decision or character 
flaw prevented him from living, but that social illusion, the dumbly conventional and routine, 
came between him and happiness. Happiness was denied him by society, by the conventions, 
opinions and projections that fall on objects. While the Proustian narrator’s unhappiness is 
rooted in social conditions from which the whole collective suffers, the self is not therefore the 
source of happiness. Proust’s narrator aspires to that happiness that can only come from what 
is other than himself. He mentally composes the letter he would love to receive from Gilberte, 
but then realizes that just by imagining those lines, he excludes the very possibility of ever 
receiving them with the surprise and delight that must be part of the happiness that he seeks:  
Even if through an improbable coincidence it had been precisely the letter that I had 
invented that Gilbert on her own account addressed to me, recognizing my work in it I 
would not have had the impression of receiving something that did not come from me, 
something real, new, a happiness external to my mind, independent of my will, truly 
given by love.184 
 
Adorno goes further: happiness immanent to mind and dependent upon the subject’s will 
would be no happiness at all. Rather than being reconfirmed and duplicated in the outer 
realization of its inner dreams and projects, the self in happiness becomes other: “If the role, 
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the heteronomy prescribed by autonomy, is the latest objective form of an unhappy 
consciousness, there is, conversely, no happiness except where the self is not itself.”185 In 
inventing the letter that one pines to receive from the adored or in picturing the society in 
which one longs to live, one destroys in advance the surprise that these extremely unlikely 
events’ incredible coming-to-pass would ever bring with them. If happiness is never the 
fulfilment of what was already planned, thought, imagined, conceived, but what one receives 
from the other out of love and beyond all expectation, then the representation of future 
happiness in an image necessarily destroys possibilities of happiness, happiness which it 
misconceives. And Adorno avers that artworks do instil happiness. Yet this happiness is 
furthest from hedonism: 
The happiness gained from artworks [Das Glück an den Kunstwerken, the happiness in 
artworks] is that of having suddenly escaped, not a morsel [Bocken, bit or scrap] of 
that from which art escaped; it is accidental [stets nur akzidentell, always only 
accidental] and less essential to art than the happiness in its knowledge; the concept of 
aesthetic pleasure as constitutive of art is to be superseded [der Begriff des 
Kunstgenusses als konstitutiver ist abzuschaffen, the concept of aesthetic pleasure as 
constitutive is to be given up]. If in keeping with Hegel’s insight all feeling related to 
an aesthetic object has an accidental aspect, usually that of psychological projection, 
then what the work demands from its beholder is knowledge, and indeed, knowledge 
that does justice to it: the work wants its truth and untruth to be grasped. Aesthetic 
hedonism is to be confronted with the passage from Kant’s doctrine of the sublime, 
which he timidly excluded from art [das er, befangen, von der Kunst eximiert, which 
he in his bias excluded from art]: happiness in artworks would be the feeling they instil 
of standing firm. This holds true for the aesthetic sphere as a whole more than for any 
particular work.186 
 
In this passage Adorno contrasts the happiness in artworks and the happiness in their 
knowledge. As he clearly understands happiness to be Glück in both senses, both happiness 
and luck, it cannot be what makes a thing art. This is because art casts a critical eye on 
nature’s seeming to say more: what seems to mean in nature is really just accident, 
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meaningless coincidence and blind happenstance. Art could have made its critique of seeming 
in nature by shunning all seeming and illusion right from the start. But then it would not have 
been different from other spheres in bourgeois “enlightenment” society, all of which purport to 
be reality purified of illusion. But art really is different because it saves illusion rather than 
deluding itself about escaping it entirely. The wish animating mythological thinking, the wish 
for intelligible nature, is not wrong in itself, but it is distorted and fulfilled fictitiously when 
meaning is attributed to blind accidents. To avoid this temptation, art removes itself from blind 
accidents, transparent meaning and facile symbolism. It is therefore counter to the very idea of 
art for something contingent, a feeling, to be constitutive of the artwork. Art critically grasps 
that nature’s speech is not referential, not a sign that points to something outside itself, to 
human dealings, but is truly shut up in itself, “monodological confinement.”187 Artworks 
translate natural beauty’s language of the imprisoned into their own stringency: “What in 
artworks is gapless, structured, resting in itself, is afterimage taken of the silence out of which, 
there alone, nature speaks.”188 Here Adorno reworks a metaphor that Kant uses for the 
pictorial arts, that of the ectype.189 Rather than considering only the plastic arts and painting to 
be the imprints or expressions of aesthetic (aconceptual or indeterminate) ideas, Adorno 
considers such expression to be only one moment of artworks including but not, however, 
limited to the pictorial arts—the moment in which they are impressed by the silence of nature. 
This is why, for Adorno, expression and construction are bound up with one another: 
expression is the expression of suffering nature, which takes the character of a total system, 
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locked in on itself. Contrary to Kant, Adorno understands expression in art to be afterimage 
not of the spontaneous, human imagination, but rather of suffering nature that can voice no 
protest against human domination. The non-arbitrary, systematized serial compositions of the 
Second Viennese School are truer to happiness than is the music of chance, in that they make 
no pretense of supplying the lack of material happiness in this world. For happiness is also 
chance, and the music of chance confronts the problem of happiness with embarrassing 
naïveté: a world in which all is planned, administered and commodified excludes true 
happiness, as it is not possible to bottle true happiness, which has an element of surprise; yet 
the “canned chance” of John Cage, by contrast, is supposed to open a zone of possibility, 
where some randomly-generated notes hap to please. Emphasis on the happiness that artworks 
might occasion misses art’s double critique: critique of the false attribution of meaning to 
arbitrary nature on one hand and, on the other, critique of the society that reproduces nature’s 
confinement in wordlessness as a totally administered immanent system of packaged 
satisfactions. Consequently, correct reception consists not so much in being happy as in 
grasping what is non-arbitrary in the artwork. If grasping what is non-arbitrary in the artwork 
can yield a kind of happiness, then this second-order happiness, Adorno claims, is more 
essential to artworks than the happiness that the artworks themselves elicit. Here is why. 
 The happiness in the knowledge of artworks is nothing less than the explosion of their 
image character, image character which seems to say that we are happy, materially satisfied, 
blessed as gods.  
 The aesthetic image is the illusion of a happiness from which all contingency has been 
emptied—the illusion not of Glück, but of Seligkeit, blessed bliss. Image-explosion, which 
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Bloch associates with Expressionism as a higher order of montage, is the rejection of Seligkeit 
and the demand for material happiness, from which nature, as contingent, is not cut out. 
 The explosion of the aesthetic image swings the artwork back towards the expressive 
extreme, since expression and Seligkeit, which is closely associated with Schein, are polar 
opposites: “Bliss would be expressionless.”190 Montage is a vehicle for expressing 
dissatisfaction with a definition of aesthetic happiness that excludes contingency.  
 Shock became false in art because it had been reduced to the effect of a (historical) 
avant-garde technique, montage, whereas the avant-garde works of Modernism were 
advanced, according to Bloch and Adorno, not because they occasioned a shock response, but 
because they maintained a split between whole and part.  
 In other words, it is the negation of organicity, the seeming harmony between whole 
and part,—rather than montage or expression—that is advanced. This would be an adequate 
reading of Bloch, who claims that organic montage is not advanced.191 Likewise, the organic 
aspects of musical expressionism—its representation of different states of a living body—are 
not advanced. The negation of the artwork as a harmony between whole and part figures as the 
most advanced consciousness, but the ways in which organic unity may be negated are 
diverse.  
 In this light—advanced art of the Modern period as a negation of organicity—Peter 
Bürger’s theory on what constitutes the definition and claims of the avant-garde—advanced, 
Modern art—should be re-evaluated.  
 Bürger agrees that inorganicity characterizes the avant-garde work, but he interprets 
the avant-garde’s inadvertent renewal of the category of work as the seal of their failure: “The 
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category ‘work’ is not merely given a new lease on life after the failure of the avant-gardiste 
attempt to reintroduce art into the praxis of life; it is actually expanded.”192 Bürger’s abstract 
definition of the work as the “unity of the universal and particular” is itself complicit with the 
illusion that perpetuates the category of work.193 He implies that the unity of universal and 
particular is real. In the bourgeois society that Bürger admits as the context for the avant-garde 
work, any unity between the actual hours of living labour that go into the work, in their 
particularity, and the universal thing that emerges from them must, on the contrary, be ideal or 
a fiction. Works in exchange society are ideal, abstract unities, abstractions of concrete, living 
labour. To negate the category of work, it would be necessary to organize labour differently, 
so that the illusion of abstract labour dissolves. On one hand, the historical avant-garde 
movements (Dada and Surrealism) aimed to negate the category of work as such. But theirs 
was an abstract negation: live, spontaneous “manifestations” merely pose an abstract 
alternative to the work, because they assume that the work can only be dead and non-
spontaneous. This reinforces the illusion of the work as a mere inanimate thing, when it is 
really in contradiction with the particular labour that went into it—what the worker lived—, 
which is forced to take on a universal form—illusory convertibility into value. But on the 
other hand, as Bürger points out, the historical avant-garde movements did indeed produce 
works. So representatives of the historical avant-garde movements also determinately negated 
the category of the work: “The avant-gardist work does not negate unity as such….but a 
specific kind of unity, the relationship between part and whole that characterizes the organic 
work of art.”194 So, one could say that the historical avant-gardes failed to negate the category 
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of work as such, but succeeded in negating an aspect of it. Bürger, however, interprets the 
avant-gardes’ attempts to negate the work as such as attacks on art and on the institution of art, 
attacks which the institution countered by their recuperation. The shocks of the provocations 
may have quickly worn off, as Bürger explains, but a more likely reason for the failure of 
manifestations to negate the work as such is the abstract, non-specific character of their 
negation. It is not clear, in fact, whether these manifestations are aimed at the work-based 
character of the art institution or at works in general, both artistic and non-artistic, or at art in 
general. The historical avant-garde movements had to provide explanations—often in the form 
of manifestoes—to specify the targets of their abstract actions. According to Richard 
Huelsenbeck, “Dada is neither politics nor an art movement,” and “because Dada is the most 
direct and vivid expression of its times, it turns against everything that strikes it as obsolete, 
mummified, ingrained.”195 Dada, then, according to one of its actors, is directed against 
reification, not specifically against art. As Huelsenbeck goes on to say, “Dada has chosen a 
cultural realm for its activity, although it could just as well have chosen to make its 
appearance as an importer, stockbroker, or manager of a chain of cinemas.”196 The Dada 
manifestation, however, does not consider that reified reality admits of degrees, but blindly 
sets forth its own alternative, which, for a time, the world of conventions could safely 
ignore—until performance art showed that the “spontaneity” of the historical avant-gardes 
also admitted of degrees. As “happenings,” manifestations are reified, insofar as they are 
planned or recorded, and recognizable as an artistic genre in their own right within the 
institution of art. While Dada manifestations are directed against the work as such, which it 
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takes to be wholly reified, performance art happenings are implicitly directed against the anti-
art aspect of Dada manifestations. For art implies reification.   
 Bürger rejects the avant-garde theories of Adorno and Georg Lukács for failing to take 
into account what he believes is the historical avant-garde movements’ attack on the art 
institution;197 the exact object of the avant-garde attack, however, is most probably reification. 
The difficulty in specifying the object of the Dadaists and Surrealists’ critique has to do with 
their relation to that object—if reification is, in fact, that object. The Dadaists and Surrealists 
appear to be countering the fixed and unchanging character of reified reality with vague, 
variable gestures of a critique that is supposed to be involuntary, spontaneous, imaginative, 
immediate, direct, live, new and unsystematic—even a product of luck. Sheer opposition is not 
critique, however; it merely blocks the way from one extreme towards the other. The avant-
gardes’ pretences of detaching themselves completely from their object in criticizing it create 
confusion, if anything else. Their tendency to replace works by acts of provocation cannot be 
considered anti-artistic necessarily. While replacing works with acts certainly goes against the 
need of art to reify itself, the emphasis on acts is a broad tendency—existentialism and 
psychoanalysis are also currents of it. Bürger claims that the historical avant-garde movements 
liquidated the category of the work, which should leave open the question of whether Dada 
and Surrealism attacked artworks or works in general—i.e., all products of labour. It does not 
follow from his claim that the avant-garde movements evoked the category of work “by 
negation” that their critique was aimed at art as an institution.198 Manifestations such as the 
Dada excursion to an obscure, empty church, St. Julien le Pauvre, on April 14, 1921 and the 
Dada trial of Maurice Barrès (by proxy) on May 13, 1921 at the Salle des Sociétés Savantes 
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might negate the category of the work, but do not necessarily negate the category of artwork, 
and do not therefore necessarily attack the institution of art.199 These manifestations are 
activities that resemble labour in the domains of tourism and law, yet diversion and justice 
were not produced, and nor, it seems, was anyone paid. These manifestations aim to be 
provocative, not to fulfil a need or to produce some satisfaction. The works expected in these 
contexts are not artworks, but, respectively, a tourist sight and a juridical judgement. The 
institution of art was unlikely the target of these actions, although, in retrospect Dada, 
manifestations have been subsumed under the category of “art.”     
 Bürger’s strategy in Theory of the Avant-Garde can be guessed by the final chapter: the 
argument for the failure of the historical avant-garde to destroy the art institution allows 
Bertolt Brecht to emerge as the superior avant-garde hero. Since Brecht wished to change the 
function of the theatre, not to abolish it altogether, suggests Bürger, Brecht’s works are far 
more adequate to his claims for them than the works of the Surrealists and Dadaists are to their 
claims: 
What they [the representatives of the historical avant-garde movements] and Brecht 
share is, first, a conception of the work in which the individual elements gain 
autonomy [Selbständigkeit, independence]…and, second, the attention he devotes to 
art as an institution. But whereas the avant-gardistes believe they can directly attack 
and destroy that institution, Brecht develops a concept that entails a change of function 
and sticks to what is concretely achievable [entwickelt Brecht ein Konzept der 
Umfunktionierung, das sich an das real Mögliche hält, Brecht develops a concept, 
“change of function,” which holds fast to the real-Possible].200   
 
Bürger’s analysis is not exactly fair to the historical avant-gardes. While he freely draws on 
Brecht’s theoretical writings to measure the success of his theatre, he does not similarly draw 
on Dada and Surrealist manifestoes for the criterion of those movements’ success, but rather 
                                                
199 These manifestations, while not art, are described by RoseLee Goldberg in Performance Art from Futurism to 
the Present, revised and enlarged edition (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1988), p. 85f. 
200 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 124 as translated, except where indicated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, 
p. 89. 
 243 
interprets the possible intentions behind the provocations. What Bürger means by the avant-
gardes’ “failure” is their failure to realize their aims. Those aims, however, are far from 
clear—Huelsenbeck even claims a lack of aims for Dada: “Dada does not burden its actions 
with ‘goal’-oriented motives.”201 Meanwhile, Bürger considers Brecht’s effectiveness both as 
a theorist and as a practicing artist. Brecht’s effectiveness speaks for the concept of possibility 
that guides his theory and practice—the concept of the Real-Possible.  
 In the end, however, Bürger minimizes Brecht’s achievement when he claims that 
“engaged” works, of which Brecht’s, succeed only by becoming organic wholes (!). Despite 
Brecht’s theoretically avowed anti-organicism,202 Bürger claims: “The engaged work can be 
successful only if the engagement itself is the unifying principle that articulates itself 
throughout the work (and this includes its form). But this is rarely the case.”203 It is far from 
clear, however, in what sense Brecht’s works are “engaged.”  
 Brecht’s epic theatre is engaged without becoming an organic whole in the following 
way. 
 Epic theatre seeks to show that things can still always be otherwise, not necessarily to 
offer particular protocols for political action outside the theatre. As such, it takes aim at 
tragedy, which traditionally has been considered to be superior to epic.204 In his essay “Was ist 
das epische Theater?” (What Is Epic Theatre?), Walter Benjamin describes the preliminaries 
                                                
201 Huelsenbeck, introduction to Dada Almanach, p. 8 as translated, Dada Almanac, p. 13. 
202 In a short text from 1929, Bertolt Brecht attacked the notion of  “organic fame.” Criticizing the self-
preserving system of theatre renown, in which the public appears to be reduced to a bodily function, Brecht 
evokes the organic unity of the capitalist system (described by Marx in the Grundrisse). He concludes: “To think 
or write or perform a drama means…to alter society, to alter the state, to control ideologies…Organic fame (as 
credit) would never be adequate to such a task, but above all can never be obtained. For this (enormous) task 
fame must be organized.” Bertolt Brecht, “Gegen das ‘Organische’ des Ruhms, Für die Organisation,” in Werke, 
vol. 21, pp. 327-331, here p. 329, lines 34-39 (my translation). For Adorno’s criticism of the alternative proposed 
by Brecht, organized fame, see GS, vol. 7, p. 360, or translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 242. 
203 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde p. 125 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 89. 
204 Aristotle, Poetics 26.1461b26-1462b15. 
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of the writer of epic theatre as articulating the joins of source material, of the fable that gives 
itself to be an integral entity, gapless and all of a piece: “‘It can happen like this, but it can also 
happen in a completely different way’ is the basic position of one who writes for epic theatre. 
He relates to his fable like the ballet master to his student. The first thing that he does is to 
loosen up its joints to the limits of the possible.”205 The epic theatre writer discovers a range of 
movement in an old story, like a supple dancer discovers a range of movement of her limbs, 
like, one might add, dialectics first discovers a range of movement in a concept. The different 
ways in which something can happen in a fable are not real, of course, but imaginary. 
Although Brecht seeks to expose the articulations of fables, he is also true to the 
“monadological confinement” that is the inarticulate expression of natural beauty.206 As the 
77th thesis of his “Kleines Organon für das Theater” (Little Organon for Theatre) bears out, 
the sort of praxis proposed by his plays is not, as Bürger thinks, the adoption of specific 
political contents for the life outside, but aesthetic experience:  
The portrayals must, to be exact, recede before what is portrayed—the social life of 
human beings—, and the pleasure at the perfection of the portrayals should be 
heightened to a higher pleasure, the pleasure that the rules revealed in this social life 
are treated as temporary and imperfect. In this, the theatre lets the spectator be 
productive [produktiv], above the show. In his theatre, the spectator may enjoy his 
frightful and never-ending labours—which should give him sustenance [Unterhalt]—
but as diversion [Unterhaltung], and may enjoy them along with the fright of his 
unceasing transformation. Here he might turn himself out [produziere er sich] in most 
effortless fashion; for the mode of livelihood [Existenz] requiring the least effort is in 
art.207 
 
                                                
205 Walter Benjamin, “Was ist das epische Theater? Eine Studie zu Brecht (Erste Fassung),” in Versuche über 
Brecht, herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966), p. 15 (my translation, with 
gender-specific language preserved). 
206 GS, vol. 7, p. 108 as translated, Aesthetic Theory (1997), p. 69. 
207 Bertolt Brecht, “Kleines Organon für das Theater,” in Werke, herausgegeben von Werner Hecht et al., große 
kommentierte Berliner und Frankfurter Ausgabe, 30 vols. (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag; Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1988-2000), vol. 23, pp. 65-97, here p. 97, lines 20-31 (my translation, with gender-specific language 
preserved). 
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Here Brecht is making no exaggerated claim for his theatre. He does not imply that theatre 
gives the audience solutions that they can put into practice. He claims almost the inverse: he 
claims that life gives the audience frightful work that theatre might put out of practice. Epic 
theatre’s momentary exposure of itself as a perfect construction should show that not much is 
possible for the characters on the stage, who are forced to work by hardly perfect rules, and 
that not much is possible for the actors, who have a script to follow. The spectators enjoy 
being outside the rules and above the show, as they should. Even where the actors are totally 
powerless, things can still always be otherwise. First, epic theatre’s un-tragic hero “is nothing 
but a scene of contradictions, which make up our society.”208 These contradictions do not 
correspond to the ideal of an autonomous individual thinking and acting in free self-
determination. Where we find such objective contradiction the reality given must be open. A 
thing, however, cannot really be a and not-a. Where we find such objective contradiction, a 
and not-a, the thing can be other than what it is: it can have a new quality. Epic theatre’s 
contradictions merely evoke the not-yet existing quality, absent from the play and from 
society: Brecht does not determine the new as a possible, realizable this or that. Yet this is the 
beauty of epic theatre, in which beauty itself turns out to be political. No determinate quality 
makes a thing beautiful, just as no determinate quality would make society a utopia. Present 
society is not an irredeemable chaos, disconnected from utopia: its contradictions show it to be  
merely one possible order, not reality. Secondly, a particular form that Brecht hit upon to run 
whole and part into contradiction with one another was the “quotable gesture.”209 The text that 
                                                
208 Walter Benjamin, “Was ist das epische Theater? (Zweite Fassung),” in Versuche über Brecht, herausgegeben 
von Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966), p. 24 (my translation). 
209 Ibid., p. 26 (my translation). Walter Benjamin gives examples of “quotable gestures” from Happy End and 
Die Maßnahme (The Measures Taken), to which we may add a third from Threepenny Opera: the parents of 
Polly Peachum mock and belittle their daughter’s interest in the criminal kingpin Mack the Knife by reducing it 
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quotes itself, as Brecht’s texts do, seeks “to interrupt its context.”210 A play that cites gestures 
is not wholly closed, sealed, harmonious—a thing of its own—, but it models the 
comportment of scholarly reception, by taking the first step for the audience caught up in the 
here and now of the action: it breaks a first piece out of the play that seems to go rushing past 
according to consequential logic, and then drops it in a new spot. The scholarly reception of 
artworks requires analyzing the play into pieces and then re-assembling the elements in a new 
way. The spectator who lives “in art” in this way does not copy what the actors act out on 
stage, who must recite their lines and move where the director has blocked out the action for 
them. Rather, Brecht suggests that work be transformed so that life become as unlaboured as it 
is for spectators of a play, who freely rearrange it. Unlike the actors, the spectators are 
unaffected by what happens on the stage; universal decrees can be pronounced, terrible 
conditions created and horrific suffering and death threatened, but the audience should never 
react as though the universal decrees applied to them, that the terrible conditions affected them 
or that the threat of horrific suffering and death intended them. They are not swept along with 
the forward flooding out of the action, but, being outside it, they can still it and rearrange its 
sequence. This contrasts with the position of workers. Nuclear power plant workers are hardly 
spectators. They are forced to follow time’s arrow, and there is no going backwards from the 
point at which the damaged and burning nuclear plant starts to melt down: they are forced to 
take care of it over looking out for their own lives. The spectators of a play of epic theatre are 
not expected to copy the actions portrayed, but to adopt a critical stance toward the actions, so 
that they themselves not live tragically at every moment, so that they not live out the 
                                                                                                                                                    
to a number of functional but empty love-scene clichés, which Mack the Knife and Polly Peachum later recite in 
their love scene. Bertolt Brecht, Die Dreigroschenoper (Nach John Gays “The Begger’s Opera”), in Werke, 
vol. 2, pp. 229-322, here p. 239, line 26-p. 240, line 8 and p. 254, lines 18-23.   
210 Benjamin, “Was ist das epische Theater? (Zweite Fassung),” p. 26. 
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consequences of thinking that things cannot be otherwise, that it is so, and that “I” must 
absolutely do this one thing and only that. The livelihood that Brecht hopes for his audience is 
not currently practicable outside the theatre. For Brecht hopes that the audience will live in 
art; art, meanwhile, is critical of (current) practice, which is really unnecessary for human life, 
as Adorno has rightfully pointed out in his second thesis on theory and praxis: “Praxis was the 
reflection of the necessities of life; praxis is distorted where it would give these up. In this 
respect, art is critical of praxis as unfreedom; therewith begins its truth.”211 Praxis would be 
the undistorted reflection of the necessities of life. Only when human beings are liberated from 
anxiety, suffering and pain, fed, clothed and sheltered can they live in ease, as recipients, in 
art, where nothing is a matter of life and death, where nothing is forced, where the 
construction of the whole never leads to tunnel vision and drastic, destructive actions.  
 Brecht changed the institution of art from within by making production pass into 
reception and reception into production, much in the way that Marx mediated production and 
consumption in the introduction to the Grundrisse, in order to explode the middle terms 
“circulation” and “exchange” in the Robinsonades of Smith and Ricardo.212 The spectator, 
who, in bourgeois society, is supposed to consume the play, becomes “productive” according 
to Brecht’s model. Meanwhile, the writer for epic theatre is not just a producer, but also a 
recipient, the recipient of already-produced material—the fable—, which arrives as if 
completely finished and actual. The play of epic theatre is supposed to explode the normal 
procedures and schemata that the spectators employ to understand theatre in general.  
                                                
211 GS, vol. 10.2, p. 762, or prefer to my translation here that of Henry W. Pickford, Critical Models: 
Interventions and Catchwords (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 262.. 
212 Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (Berlin: Europäische Verlaganstalt, 1953), pp. 5-
31, esp. pp. 10-21, or translated by Ernst Wangermann, “Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58 (First Version of 
Capital ),” in Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, 50 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1975-
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 A side-effect of Brecht’s importation of Marx’s dialectical techniques into theatre is 
that the aesthetic illusion that Marx thereby aimed to exorcise from economic theory is also 
dispelled where it has its true place—art. As the audience becomes productive in reception 
while the playwright becomes receptive in production, the aesthetic illusion of independence, 
which Bürger criticizes in organic, bourgeois art, dissipates.213 Brecht demonstrates the mutual 
dependence of producer and recipient through their exchanging roles. To put it in Schiller’s 
terms, epic theatre allows the audience “to experience only pure illusion alone in the living 
thing” and to notice, rather than overlook, “the life in illusion.”214  
 That Schiller can even speak of life in aesthetic illusion and aesthetic illusion in living 
beings stands as evidence against Bürger’s claim that “the insights formulated in Kant’s and 
Schiller’s aesthetic writings presuppose the completed evolution of art as a sphere that is 
detached from the praxis of life.”215 Schiller presumes life in the aesthetic illusion, just as he 
presumes that dependent life, chained to reality (“living feminine beauty”) can be experienced 
as if it were independent and as if it sincerely renounced all claims to be real.216 “We” would 
have to have a high degree of aesthetic education to be able to see beautiful women as 
independent, whereas, according to the realistic attitude, feminine beauty is pleasing only 
insofar as women are actually dominated and subjugated. If Schiller himself considered art to 
be an entirely separate sphere, then there could be no experience of enslaved and subjugated 
                                                
213 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 64, or translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 48. 
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people as emancipated and independent, nor of practical things as liberated from use. These 
are aesthetic experiences. Some of the communicating paths between art and the praxis of life 
in Schiller’s aesthetics have already been charted by Ernst Bloch:  
For if indeed freedom from the reality of purpose was the objective correlate for the 
subjective illusion, then not even the theatre illusion is an illusion. In fact, this illusion 
may be the very least one, as we shall see soon, even if Schiller himself called it a 
“beneficial illusion [wohltätige Illusion].” However, here this beneficence neutralizes 
its illusionary character decisively, once and for all. “The theater, regarded as a moral 
institution,” is what is meant here: “We shall be given back to ourselves. Our feelings 
will awaken. Wholesome passion will shake our slumbering nature and our blood will 
well up anew.”—In the same sense, the alleged mere illusion settles in reality, 
refreshes it, and points toward a stronger one, a reality that can be set free. The 
effusive declaration by Schiller, quoted above, sparked his early essay about the 
program of the theater, which is rooted so little in illusion, the theater regarded as a 
moral institution, consequently not at all free from reality. But if the theater is such an 
institution and in that it is, then the character of illusion is incompatible with it, 
because no illusion activates the realizing will and the will to reality.217  
 
Bloch goes on to say that it was the bourgeoisie who detached art and reality, whereas both 
Schiller and Brecht considered theatre to be a moral institution—although, for Brecht, “moral” 
had to be in keeping with theatre’s basis in pleasure and fun. Epic theatre enlists a number of 
techniques to show the life in illusion—the lively movement between production and 
reception in a Brecht play is not illusion. But this does not seem any more a rebellion against 
illusion than Schiller’s demand for a theatre that is an awakening indicating a reality that is 
more than the merely existing one—a reality that “can be delivered.” Yet neither Brecht nor 
Schiller would destroy illusion completely—generally, art is making something other of 
reality, as opposed to receiving reality just as it is. An important premise on which Bürger’s 
defense of Brecht is based—that Brecht is writing after a gap in the history of bourgeois art, 
                                                
217 Ernst Bloch, Das Prinzip Hoffnung, 3 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1959), vol. 1, p. 491 as translated 
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the historical avant-garde218—loses all meaning. To defend this, Bürger would have to 
conceive of the history of bourgeois art as continuous up until the avant-garde movements, 
whereas Brecht is a reaction to and against Schiller no less than the “historical” avant-garde 
movements are. Bürger has determined the historical specificity that he claims for the avant-
garde (including the “engagement” of Brecht) in opposition to the separation of life and art in 
the so-called autonomous bourgeois artwork; one of the paradigmatic theorists of the 
bourgeois artwork, however,—Schiller—does not promote the autonomy thesis that Bürger 
attributes to him. Brecht might be closer to Schiller than to Dada.  
 At the same time, the “failure” that Bürger attributes to the historical avant-garde 
movements is far from self-evident. For Bürger also admits of failure on the side of avant-
gardist works’ interpretation.   
 Bürger interprets the continuing rift between inorganic montage works and their 
reception as a problem for methodology—rather than as an indication that the art institution 
cannot completely absorb and control the challenges made to it by individual works.
 Even while arguing for the control of the art institution over the political effect of the 
individual works, Bürger acknowledges the confusion of literary theory (which is part of that 
institution) when it is confronted with inorganic works:  
In the process of reception, the avant-gardist work…provokes a break, which is the 
analogue of the incoherence (inorganicity) of the work. Between the shocklike 
experience of the inappropriateness of the mode of reception developed through 
dealing with organic works of art and the effort to grasp the principles of construction, 
there is a break: the interpretation of meaning is renounced. One of the decisive 
changes in the development of art that the historical avant-garde movements brought 
about consists in this new type of reception that the avant-gardist work of art 
provokes. The recipient’s attention no longer turns to a meaning of the work that 
                                                
218 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 123 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 88. 
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might be grasped by a reading of its constituent elements, but to the principle of 
construction.219 
 
Bürger goes on to claim that non-organic works defy the hermeneutic method, which posits a 
harmony between whole and parts. He makes the further claim that the change to reception 
that inorganic works necessitate is a change to reception in general—not just to the reception 
of non-organic works. He goes wrong, however, and contradicts his earlier quite trenchant and 
perfectly just critique of Hans-Georg Gadamer,220 in speculating that the new mode of 
reception would be a synthesis between the hermeneutic and formal methods.221 A synthesis 
would not split the difference between hermeneutic and formal methods, but would end up 
being the hermeneutic method, which aims at unity and harmony. Brecht’s theatre itself 
models a different kind of reception altogether for the spectators—detached, analytic 
reception—which is itself a model for confronting the contradictory nexus of constraints 
outside the theatre, perhaps as something absurd and merely socially necessary, rather than as 
a reality in which we see ourselves and with which we identify. This detachment is quite 
practical outside the theatre, considering the mechanism of ideology, whereby false views that 
are effectively useful or even indispensable to the existing, external order are imposed on 
subjects who then see themselves in this order and appropriate the views, even though this 
goes against their interests, needs and real happiness.   
 Bürger was closer to an adequate appreciation of Brecht’s contribution when he 
attributed its superiority over Dada and Surrealism to Brecht’s fidelity to the Real-Possible—
even though he himself failed to grasp the rift between inorganic works and literary theory as 
an indication of the Real-Possible. As a result of this misunderstanding, Bürger claims that 
                                                
219 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 109 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 81. 
220 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 9f. 
221 Ibid., p. 110f. as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 82. 
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Brecht’s theory was more advanced than that of both Adorno and Lukács, who were, 
according to Bürger, “incapable of understanding the most important materialist writer of our 
time (Brecht).”222 Yet the Real-Possible is one of Adorno’s criteria for avant-garde art no less 
than it is Brecht’s—which is hardly surprising, considering that Brecht and Adorno moved in 
the same circles. The convergence of Adorno’s philosophy with Brecht’s epic theatre is 
especially striking. Bloch describes Brecht’s work as mediate montage, “without 
exploitation,” which “takes its parts from the surface chopped to pieces,” but which “does not 
put them into new closed unities,” so which avoids becoming a closed “kaleidoscope.”223 
According to this description, the shock that Brecht’s theatre pieces occasion would be a 
shock of the open, which, in Adorno, is a truth moment. Furthermore, quotable gestures—
idiosyncratic, non-referential movements that become language in their iterance—would 
qualify as language sui generis, hence as the universal element upon which Adorno suggests a 
convergence of art and philosophy.224 The sort of praxis that Adorno thinks artworks should 
aim at is not far off from the praxis for Brecht of “Kleines Organon für das Theater.” Quotable 
gestures have a cognitive character, in that they model the work of scholarly reception for the 
audience, and it is this implicit element of analysis that brings Brecht’s montage-art closer to 
philosophy. But Brecht’s theatre only suggests reception—reception which in important 
features goes beyond the present society and its imperatives to consume.  
 In contrast to Bürger, the conclusion that Adorno draws from the contradictions 
amongst methodological approaches is that non-organic works explode the secure methods, 
schemata and habits of reception that already exist, leaving the recipient on the open sea of the 
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possible. Adorno and Brecht, along with Bloch, are generally agreed that, in their time, 
advanced art and philosophy are “unclosed”: advanced art and philosophy allow an experience 
of division or of non-identity between opposites—part and whole, particular and universal, 
inner and outer, theory and object—and the anticipation of their eventual reconciliation.225 
Through them, the illusion of the work’s unity may be dissolved. No specific technique (such 
as montage) nor a specific reaction (shock) nor even a specific “open” form (such as the 
rondo) is advanced in itself or necessarily brings about the conscious and explicit experience 
of unclosed, contradictory reality. Yet the artist and the theorist are always dealing with 
specific techniques or methods, movements, schools, forms, particular details and different 
wholes. The artist and the theorist must present the most advanced consciousness in particular, 
but no particular element can “mean” advanced consciousness or the unclosed or the non-
identical. No particular artistic technique is advanced in itself because advances are made only 
where reality is unclosed, and this contradiction is not something that particular artistic 
techniques in themselves have or do not have.  
 Bürger claims that the invalidation of single forms or techniques as norms was a 
particular contribution of the historical avant-garde movements: “Once the historical avant-
garde movements revealed art as an institution as the solution to the mystery of the 
                                                
225 Cf. Marc Jimenez, Adorno et la modernité: Vers une esthétique négative (s.l.: Klincksieck, 1986). Jimenez 
neglects the utopian aspect of Adorno’s aesthetics in claiming that Aesthetic Theory “demeure très largement 
‘expérimentale’ et, de ce fait, non close, hostile à toute forme de réconciliation” ([Aesthetic Theory] remains 
“experimental” to a very large extent and therefore unclosed, hostile to any form of reconciliation, ibid., p. 28) 
and that “l’esthétique d’Adorno n’est pas une esthétique de la réconciliation” (Adorno’s aesthetics is not an 
aesthetics of reconciliation, ibid., p. 57). One could cite against this view Adorno’s statement from Aesthetic 
Theory that correct consciousness today, much more than “vague timeliness,” is “the most advanced 
consciousness of contradictions on the horizon of their possible reconciliation” (GS, vol. 7, p. 285 in my 
translation). Adorno does not exclude the possibility of reconciliation, but he does bar representing that state 
positively. 
 254 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of art, no form could any longer claim that it alone had either 
eternal or temporally limited validity.”226  
 Bürger begrudges Adorno the failure of his concept of the New to take into account the 
historical break that the avant-gardes made with art,227 for the result of this break, Bürger 
claims, is that “no movement in the arts today can legitimately claim to be historically more 
advanced as art than any other.”228 A correct appreciation of the historical avant-garde 
movements and their failure would, it would seem, render all discussion of a more or less 
advanced art null and void. The historical avant-garde movements, Bürger claims, made the 
entire gamut of techniques, materials and forms available for use in art, shattering the illusion 
of the absolute value of any one of them.229 Bürger sees Adorno’s category of the New not as 
the correlate to true artistic improvement and development, but rather as an ideological 
pendant to the planned, faddish novelty under commodity exchange. Collage placed all 
historical periods, all techniques, on the same level. Afterwards, any artwork that gives itself 
to be new, according to Bürger, is simply naïve—a fashion victim of capitalism. For Bürger, 
the “new” artwork is not an independent and honest illusion, but rather something that covers 
up the hard reality of globalized total capital, so, no better than the next commodity fetish. 
 Advanced art, however, is not necessarily New according to Adorno’s theory of 
Modernism. 
 While Bürger considers inorganicity to be a point of rupture that marked the historical 
avant-gardes out from everything that preceded them, Bloch and Adorno tend to see 
inorganicity not only as specific to Modernism, but also as part of a general tendency previous 
                                                
226 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 121 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 86. 
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to Modernism. For Adorno and Bloch, realization of an absolute historical break in art history 
would cut art off from all communication with the possible, but Bürger mistakes the lack of 
neat historical periodization for Adorno’s failure to develop his concept of the New 
historically and to establish it as a historical category.230 The contradictoriness of all concepts 
around the New, however, is a sign that the time of Modern art is not closed and sealed. On 
the one hand, inorganic art made its appearance well before Mahler, Dada, Surrealism, Brecht 
and other Moderns; on the other hand, inorganicity had its moment in the early part of the 
twentieth-century in Europe, and is bound up with a sweeping political situation particular to 
that setting. On the one hand, inorganic art and anticipations of it constitute the advanced form 
of art in every period; on the other hand, inorganicity was absolutely advanced only in 
Germany of the 1920s and 1930s, and it is by the light of this inorganic art that past inorganic 
art is advanced. On the one hand, inorganicity is something, a definite technique and form, 
montage; on the other hand, it is nothing, merely a negation of organicity. On one hand, it is 
New, and it is its newness that is advanced; on the other hand, it is Romantic, and it is its 
return to what was advanced that is advanced in present regression. On the one hand, 
inorganicity is something actual; on the other, it is only an indication of the Real-Possible. On 
the one hand, inorganicity awakens memory; on the other, it shakes free all the associations of 
the past, turns into something else. On one hand, inorganicity is so broad a category as to be 
meaningless; on the other hand, not everything fits into it. 
 Anti-organic art was not new at the beginning of the Modern period, but it was the 
most advanced art at that historical moment. It might still be. 
                                                
230 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 86 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 63. 
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 The Moderns’ adoption of inorganic montage is advanced not merely because it went 
back to the advanced art of another time: it also went against the most regressive current of its 
time: against Nazism. By as early as 1920, Alfred Rosenberg, who would be tried and hanged 
in Nuremberg in 1946, had codified the Nazis’ programme for German thought, in a pamphlet 
of anti-Jewish hate propaganda, Unmoral im Talmud (Immorality in the Talmud), where he 
prescribed the ways and forms of thinking that would enable the Nazis to become acceptable, 
to attain power and to carry out their anti-Jewish programme, unhindered by public 
opposition.231 Rosenberg explicitly denounced not only dialectic, but also the dialectical 
necessity to linger over little things and the inorganic content that set the dialectic in motion. 
More broadly, Rosenberg banned lengthy disputation and any philosophical writing that was 
difficult, obscure, bifurcating, ambiguous or complicated. Against this, he wanted to see 
promoted ideas such as the living unity, essence, meaning, authenticity and race: what he 
called the “authentic essence” of the “German mind.” Rosenberg retained much of the same 
vocabulary from Unmoral im Talmud in his best-selling book, Der Mythus des 20. 
Jahrhunderts (The Myth of the Twentieth Century), first published in 1930.232 In that tract’s 
concluding chapter, “The Unity of Essence,” Rosenberg contrasts “unfruitfulness”233 to 
“organic truth”234 and at one point maintains that “the authentically Germanic [das 
                                                
231 Alfred Rosenberg, Unmoral im Talmud (Munich: Deutscher Volksverlag, 1920), p. 11. This document was 
made available to me through the interlibrary loan service of the Université de Montréal. Please note that, as hate 
literature, it falls under sections 318 and 319 of the Criminal Code of Canada. Passages of it are cited here with 
the intention to point out, for the purposes of removal, matters that tend to produce hatred towards identifiable 
groups in Canada.  
232 Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts: Eine Wertung der seelisch-geistigen Gestaltenkämpfe 
unserer Zeit, 49.-50. Auflage (Munich: Hoheneichen Verlag, 1935). This document was made available to me 
through the interlibrary loan service of the Université de Montréal. Please note that, as hate literature, it falls 
under sections 318 and 319 of the Criminal Code of Canada. Passages of it are cited here with the intention to 
point out, for the purposes of removal, matters that tend to produce hatred towards identifiable groups in Canada. 
233 Rosenberg, Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts, p. 678. 
234 Ibid., p. 683.  
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E i g e n t l i c h-Germanische],” in its world of heroic gods, was resistant to the “decline” 
attributed to the influence of, in Rosenberg’s words, “the Eskimo race.”235 The notion of truth 
as organic was not incidental to Rosenberg’s programme against the people who did not 
correspond to his inflexible definition of the “authentically-Germanic.” In Der Mythus des 20. 
Jahrhunderts, Rosenberg, in denying Schopenhauer’s claim that “inner truth is a 
contradiction,” proposed “the idea of a completely different truth,” which, he declared, “I want 
to call organic truth and which this entire book is about.”236 Rosenberg named three parts to 
this supposed organic “truth”: a logical part (in which reason and understanding would be 
handled as tools), an intuitive part (supposedly self-evident in art, fairy tales and religious 
myths) and a part related to the representation of the will (in which ethical doctrines and forms 
of religion would be reduced to the mere function of symbolizing the will): “All of them—
when they are genuine [echt]—go in the service of organic truth, in the service of the national 
traditions [Volkstums] tied to race.”237 Rosenberg appealed to Goethe’s famous saying “What 
is fruitful, alone is true” to give his opinions resonance; he did not interpret the passage, but 
attributed a meaning to it: “the essence of all that is organic.”238 Further to that, Rosenberg 
equated the so-called organic German truth with the programme of the Nazi party: “Already 
today, the symbol of organic German truth is incontestably the black swastika.”239 Since 
Rosenberg would have the reader accept that ethics and religion be reduced to symbols of the 
will, he could not but have the intention of putting out of practice all non-voluntaristic aspects 
of moral doctrine and of religious law—for example, spontaneous compassion. At the same 
                                                
235 Ibid., p. 679.  
236 Ibid., p. 683.  
237 Ibid., p. 684.  
238 Ibid., p. 685.  
239 Ibid., p. 689.  
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time, he would have logic become entirely practical: thus he promoted the notion of a 
completely instrumental reason. Furthermore, Rosenberg denied art and storytelling any 
illusory character, but alleged each artwork, tale and myth really to be some self-evident 
display of real characteristics of a Volk. In Rosenberg’s schema, then, non-voluntaristic 
ethical doctrines and religion were to be put out of practice so that thinking would serve only 
the preservation of myths, which, in his entirely false thinking, would be reality. His strategy 
was to exploit both the population’s acceptance of the “Germanic Volk” as ultimately real and 
the underlying presumption that what is ultimately real cannot be challenged. Rosenberg 
employed the term “unity” to promote the identity of present and future with some völkisch 
mythic past:  
A people [Volk] is lost as a people and, as such, dead, even, if, in surveying its history 
and testing its will to the future, it no longer finds any unity. No matter what forms the 
past may have gone through, if the nation gets to the point where it actually and 
properly denies its parables of the first awakening, then it negates the roots of its Being 
and Becoming, and condemns itself to unfruitfulness.240 
 
Rosenberg was able to summon the regressive elements in Germany to Nazism by appealing 
to the widespread acceptance of organicism. Rosenberg did not merely co-opt past cultural 
figures such as Goethe for the purposes of Nazism; he strategically capitalized on the 
organicist current in the philosophy of his own times, taking advantage of the weak critical 
defenses of conservative Neo-Kantianism. Hans Vaihinger had already developed the concept 
of the organic in the first chapter of his general introduction to Die Philosophie des Als Ob 
(The Philosophy of “As If”) and in terms somewhat similar to those employed by Rosenberg, 
                                                
240 Ibid., p. 678.  
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with reference to the “purposefulness of the organism” and to the “soul.”241 Vaihinger 
claimed: “Logical thought, with which we are especially concerned here, is a spontaneous 
appropriation of the outer world, it is an organic, purposive processing of the material of 
sensation. Logical thought is therefore an organic function of the psyche.”242 Vaihinger 
unwittingly helped to create the context in which Rosenberg could make a notion of race pass 
as a wholly natural phenomenon, beyond question. Supported by the popularity of Vaihinger’s 
book, by popular acceptance for the thesis that thinking was essentially an organic and natural 
process, Rosenberg gave license to the marked savagery of his thought. Rejecting concepts 
altogether, Rosenberg replaced universals by “organic truth.” Such “organic truth” banishes 
the need to confront concepts with their claims because it eradicates all notion of claim: things 
simply are what they are. Rosenberg so entirely sheds the critical, anti-illusory aspects of 
Vaihinger’s thought. With Rosenberg, organicism becomes thoroughly uncritical. This makes 
it attractive to readers lacking in philosophical resources, but at the same time it positions 
them to accept anything. Rosenberg’s replacement of universals by some such “organic truth,” 
going unremarked by his readers, was instrumental in making that the notion of “race” pass as 
natural, as it circumvented not only inquiry into how Rosenberg had constructed that notion, 
but also inquiry into whether that notion actually captured what it claimed to capture. But it is 
not this most extreme consequence of organicism that makes it false; there is a hidden claim in 
organicism—the claim that it refers to something real—, and this is false. 
  The young Adorno was so sensitive a thinker that by late 1928, he had already 
claimed anti-organicism as an advanced artistic norm, publicly flagging his opposition to the 
                                                
241 Hans Vaihinger, Die Philosophie des Als Ob: System der theoretischen, praktischen und religiösen Fiktionen 
der Menschheit auf Grund eines idealistischen Positivismus, mit einem Anhang über Kant und Nietzsche, 7./8. 
Auflage (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1922), p. 1f. (my translations). 
242 Ibid., p. 3 (my translation). 
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real organicist current, while calling on truth’s need of dialectic, in is essay “Schubert.”243 It is 
likely that he would have come into contact with regressive organicism by way of 
Schoenberg’s text “The Relationship to the Text.”244 Arnold Schoenberg voiced an organicist 
view of the artwork even after having composed all his important Expressionist works up to 
Pierrot Lunaire: 
I concluded that work of art is the same as any perfect organism. It is so homogeneous 
in its composition that it reveals its true inner essence in each detail. If you cut any part 
of the human body, the same blood will flow. If you hear one verse of a poem, one 
measure of a piece of music, you are able to comprehend the whole. In the same way, 
one word, one glance, one gesture, the gait, even the colour of the skin is enough to 
distinguish the character of a man. I had completely understood Schubert’s lieder—
including the lyrics—through the music alone, Stefan George’s poetry through the 
sound alone.245 
 
Here, manifestly, organicism is inseparable from racism. Twentieth-century organicism is not 
just the idea that an artwork is like an organism; it contains the notion that outer is the same as 
inner—or, part is the same as whole. Implicit in this notion of the identity of inner and outer is 
that the “inner” is “truth” and “essence” and “character,” while the outer is appearance—for 
example, the appearance of a person’s skin. The consequence is that any single random 
exterior quality of a person can be picked out, isolated, then taken to be the sum total of the 
individual, his intrinsic, essential “character.” A single word is supposed to say everything 
                                                
243 GS, vol. 17, pp. 18-33, or translated by Wieland Hoban “Schubert,” in Night Music: Essays on Music, 1928-
1962, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (London: Seagull Books, 2009), pp. 19-46. “Schubert” first appeared in Die Musik in 
October 1928. Its particular political perspicuity may be owed, at least in part, to the influence of Walter 
Benjamin. In his letter of September 1, 1928, Benjamin acknowledges reception of Adorno’s Schubert essay and 
promises a word about it; however, his next surviving letter to Adorno is dated March 29, 1930. See Benjamin to 
Adorno, Berlin, September 1, 1928, in Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin, Briefwechsel, 1928-1940, 
herausgegeben von Henri Lonitz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), pp. 11-13. The reference to the essay is 
on p. 12. 
244 Adorno mentions Schoenberg’s text in his essay “Situation des Liedes” (GS, vol. 18, p. 347f.), which was 
first published in the November/December 1928 issue of Musikblätter des Anbruch, so, closely following the 
publication of “Schubert.”  
245 Arnold Schoenberg, “The Relationship to the Text,” in The Blaue Reiter Almanac, ed. Wassily Kandinsky 
and Franz Marc, trans. Henning Falkenstein, with the assistance of Manug Terzian and Gertrude Hinderlie 
(Boston: MFA Publications, 2005), p. 95 [p. 32f.]. 
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about the person: a person who happens to be saying “upstanding” while passing by would be 
upstanding; a person who happens to be saying “criminal” would be criminal. But this is 
arbitrary, and as arbitrary as any “meaning” or “essence” one would ascribe to a person’s skin 
colour. As organicism is the thinking that attempts to see each individual thing as continuous, 
homogeneous and everywhere animated by the same quintessence, organicism is helpless 
before truly regressive attitudes. For in order to recognize these lapses back into stages that 
humanity had abandoned for its own good, a thinker would have to wonder whether the 
present is not in fact heterogeneous: an aggregate of ideas, customs and behaviours that have 
not merely continued, but which have broken in from eras considered closed. Organicism can 
only lead to a naïve standpoint, for it balks at breaking up a text to consider the pieces in new, 
non-contiguous relations with one another, and to consider them in light of history and in the 
light of the world to come. Schoenberg’s intention was probably not to advocate 
discrimination, but to assert the equivalence of words and tones in successful Lieder, such as 
those of Schubert. Regardless, the opinion expressed in the passage is false, and, with it, the 
unity of lyric and its musical setting becomes false as an aesthetic criterion by which to judge 
any work. An advanced music critic will have to make his argument for Schubert’s greatness 
on the basis of inorganicity—wherever found in Schubert’s music.246 In his article “Schubert,” 
Adorno compared Schubert’s work with sonata form favourably to a “growing crystal,” 
claiming that a truthful analysis of Schubert’s form “would, before anything else, have to 
follow the dialectic that prevails between the sonata schema set in advance and Schubert’s 
                                                
246 In his eloquent essay on both Adorno’s “Schubert” and responses to it, Kofi Agawu evokes the suggestion 
that Adorno’s musical analysis was a form of protest: “As often with Adorno, it is not the overarching verdict—
about form, in this case—that matters, for anyone can cite counterexamples to undermine every one of his 
attributions; rather, it is the material contours of a particular characterization and the way those contours inspire 
dissent or rapture [rupture?] that matter….For Adorno, the site of description becomes the site of provocation.” 
Kofi Agawu, “What Adorno Makes Possible for Music Analysis,” 19th Century Music 29, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 
pp. 49-55, here p. 53. 
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second, crystalline form.”247 This essay, turning constantly around the theme of death, indeed 
prepared this metaphor of the crystal to direct it emphatically against organicism: “At the 
beginning [Schubert’s work] is already the inorganic, volatile, brittle life of stones, and for it 
death has sunk too deep for it to have to fear it.”248 Adorno expressly protests against the 
interpretation that claims Schubert for organic unity. He argues that the inorganicity of 
Schubert’s music comes across in its potpourri character—that is, in its tendency to collect 
together extremely dissimilar themes, which repeat rather than develop. Adorno claims that, 
rather than reduce music to mere pieces, Schubertian potpourri “wants to recover the lost unity 
of artworks on the off-chance [auf gut Glück].”249 Adorno, however, emphatically 
distinguishes the unity that Schubert’s music only hopes to come upon by chance from organic 
unity, which is necessary unity, inextricable progress: 
Now, admittedly, this seems like a way to get around the common conception of 
Schubert, which errs in its judgement on the lyrical—the conception, namely, that sees 
Schubert’s music as a plant-like unfolding essence, which grows out of itself and 
refreshingly blooms without regard for those preconceived forms—and perhaps 
without itself any form. Only it strictly denies such organological theory, precisely by 
way of the construction from potpourris. Such organic unity would necessarily be 
teleological: each cell in it would make the next necessary, and its inter-
relatedness [Zusammenhang] would be the moving life of the subjective 
intention, life that has died and whose restitution certainly is not in accordance 
with the meaning of potpourri.250 
 
The critique of organicism levied here applies back to Novalis. By employing the term 
organology, Adorno alludes to the “doctrine of instruments” that Novalis set down in an 
                                                
247 GS, vol. 17, p. 27, or prefer to my translation here, “Schubert,” p. 35. 
248 GS, vol. 17, p. 24, or prefer to my translation here “Schubert,” p. 30.  
249 GS, vol. 17, p. 22, or prefer to my translation here “Schubert,” p. 27. 
250 GS, vol. 17, p. 22, or prefer to my translation here “Schubert,” p. 27. 
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aphorism of his 1798 fragments on Goethe.251 Adorno associates organology with organicism, 
and is perhaps not wrong to do so insofar as Novalis is concerned. On one hand, Novalis 
claims that Goethe is not only “a completely practical poet,”252 but also an “applied practical 
philosopher, as every genuine artist down through the ages has been nothing but.”253 On the 
other hand, Novalis in his Miscellaneous Remarks of 1797 connects the intellect to the service 
of biological functions: “How can a human being have a feeling for a thing, without having 
the germ of it within [in sich]? What I shall understand must develop organically within me – 
and what I seem to learn is only food – stimulus [Incitament] of the organism.”254 He 
furthermore holds that truth itself is organic: “The difference between delusion [Wahn] and 
truth lies in the difference of their vital functions. Delusion lives off truth – truth has its life in 
itself.”255 According to Novalis, then, the understanding is practical in that it ultimately serves 
the organism, making “learning” an illusion; Novalis supposes that knowledge is in fact 
serving the organism’s drives. In 1928, Adorno turned his attention to a Romantic composer 
who could not be simply assimilated to Novalis’s organological-organicist theory. 
Furthermore, his essay points out the self-defeating character of organicism, by making the 
link between organology and organicism—that is, between instrumental reason and the 
demand for organic unity in art. From there, Adorno is able to point out that the organic 
artwork, which supposedly “blooms because it blooms,” would not be without reason, but 
would become part of the dominant form of reason, instrumental reason, as it would be 
                                                
251 Novalis, “[Über Goethe],” in Schriften, herausgegeben von Paul Kluckhohn und Richard Samuel, 2., nach den 
Handschriften ergänzte, erweiterte und verbesserte Auflage, 6 vols. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960-), vol. 2, 
pp. 640-647, here p. 644 § 458 (my translation).  
252 Novalis, Schriften, vol. 2, p. 644 § 458 (my translation). 
253 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 461 § 445 (my translation).  
254 Novalis, “Vermischte Bemerkungen,” in Schriften, vol. 2, pp. 412-470 (even-numbered pages), here p. 418 § 
19.  
255 Novalis, Schriften, vol. 2, p. 414 § 8 (my translation). 
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subservient to an end outside of itself—that of the biological organism.256 Goethe’s demand 
that truth be organically productive follows from his organology. Novalis compares Goethe’s 
works to Wedgwood plates, those English “commodities” known for their sturdy beauty. 
Attractive serviceableness turns out to be a perfect excuse for capital accumulation, for 
Goethe’s industriousness evokes natural economy—the natural industry of beavers—, which 
then conveniently excuses the aristocratic prestige of his works, because Goethe bought his 
title with the refinery of the fruits of his labours: “Like the English, he has a taste whose 
economy is natural and whose nobility was purchased by the intellect.”257  
 Adorno not only explicitly rejects organicist theories, but also adopts an inorganic 
form for his own text. Max Paddison shows that, in “Schubert,” Adorno works in a “montage 
or mosaic-like manner,” ‘setting’ a poem that Schubert himself set—Goethe’s “Grenzen der 
Menschheit” (Limits of Humankind).258 Paddison shows how Adorno’s montage works to 
negate the appeal to totality through an inversion of the original imagery. This interpretation 
could be pursued further: for as Goethe was a well-known proponent of organicism, the 
fragmentation and recomposition of one of his own poems, specifically, reads both as a protest 
against his organicism and as the attempt to rescue him from what organicist theory had 
become in the early twentieth century. Adorno’s political sense for language goes wrong, 
                                                
256 Angelus Selesius, “Ohne Warum” in Der cherubische Wandersmann in Sämtliche poetische Werke, 
herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Hans Ludwig Held, neu überarbeitete dritte Auflage (München: Carl Hanser, 
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however, when he claims that “the authenticity [Echtheit] of Schubert’s perspectival 
atmospheres is inseparably bound to the authenticity of the identical content that they revolve 
around.”259 The vocabulary here is too close to that of Rosenberg; the appeal to Echtheit 
carries the association of some essence of German mind. The thinking that emerges from this 
vocabulary is also false. The truth of Schubert’s music indeed resides in its profusion of 
diverse themes whose strikingness prevents the whole thing from dissolving into chaos. But 
Adorno is wrong to justify Schubert’s repetitions on the grounds of the authenticity of what he 
repeats, and wrong, too, to contrast Schubert’s use of repetition to the use of repetition in both 
of Robert Schumann and Richard Wagner.260 It is true that “Wagner’s music, established 
according to the image of the organic, does not admit of potpourris.”261 Wagner’s music works 
by way of Leitmotive, in a symbolic fashion, and this is what lends it so easily to semiotic 
analysis. The Leitmotive are supposed to guarantee the unity of the work, so, unlike the 
repetition in potpourri construction, their repetition is not gratuitous and not, therefore, joyful. 
Before Adorno, Proust had seen into Wagner’s organicism in a particularly penetrating 
fashion, and has his fictional narrator discover it at the piano in La Prisonnière (The Prisoner), 
first published, in French, in 1923. The Proustian narrator observes that Wagner’s themes do 
not so much repeat, as return: 
I realised how intensely realistic Wagner’s work is, as I recalled those insistent, 
fleeting themes which appear in one act, fade away only to return and, sometimes 
distant, muted, almost detached, are at other times, while still vague, so 
immediate, so pressing, so internal, organic, visceral that their return seems not so 
much that of a motif as of a nerve pain.… It was a double diversity. Just as the 
spectrum makes the composition of light visible to us, the harmonies of a 
Wagner, the colour of an Elstir let us know the qualitative essence of another’s 
sensations in a way that love for another being can never do. Then there is the 
                                                
259 GS, vol. 17, p. 26, or prefer to my translation here “Schubert,” p. 34. 
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261 GS, vol. 17, p. 22, or prefer to my translation here “Schubert,” p. 27. 
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variety within the work itself, achieved by the only means there is of being 
genuinely diverse: bringing together different individualities. Where a lesser 
musicians would claim he is depicting a squire or a knight, while having them 
sing the same music, Wagner, on the other hand, places under each name a 
different reality, and each time his squire appears, a particular figure, at once 
complex and simplistic, bursts, with a joyous, feudal clashing of lines, into the 
immensity of sound and leaves its mark there. Hence the fullness of a music 
which, in fact, is filled with countless different musics each of which is a being in 
its own right. A being, or the impression given by a fleeting aspect of nature. 
Even the thing which is most independent of the feeling it arouses in us, the song 
of a bird, the note of a huntsman’s horn, the tune a shepherd plays on his pipe, all 
these leave on the horizon the silhouette of their sound. Certainly, Wagner was to 
bring it closer to us, appropriate it, work it in to an orchestral score, subordinate it 
to the loftiest musical ideas, but while still respecting its original character, as a 
woodcarver does the grain, the individual essence of the wood he sculpts.262 
 
Here Proust brings together several elements of Wagner’s organicism. The narrator considers 
that what is “real” in Wagner’s work is the organic behaviour of the leitmotifs: they are 
“organic” because they come and go in the way of nerve pain. They return rather than repeat, 
just as the second appearance of a living individual is that person’s return, not repetition. The 
narrator is impressed by the diversity of Wagner’s work, but insists that it is a diversity in 
unity, the refraction of a single ray of light into its spectrum. This diversity has a 
phantasmagoric aspect: Wagner’s work is peopled with figures such as shepherds, hunters and 
                                                
262 Marcel Proust, La Prisonnière, éd. Pierre-Edmond Robert (s.l.: Gallimard, 1989), p. 149f. as translated by 
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son originalité première comme un huchier les fibres, l’essence particulière du bois qu’il sculpte.” 
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birds. Yet they serve “the highest musical ideas,” according to the narrator,—as, one might 
remark, commodities serve the idea of growth in presenting themselves as identical with their 
value. The narrator indeed evokes the motifs’ identity, which he thinks is assured by their first 
origins. The narrator compares Wagner to a cabinet-maker who respects “the grain, the 
particular essence of the wood he sculpts.” The essentialism of organicism is, then, service of 
diversity to the highest ideas, on one hand, and, on the other, the shaping of the individual in 
line with his or her origins. The Leitmotive are supposed to be like living characters in 
different situations or moods who nonetheless maintain identity. As such, they turn a blind eye 
to the reified, repetitive structure of reality. The same claim cannot be made about Schumann’s 
themes.  
 Schumann, who goes unnamed in Adorno’s slipshod allusion to Schubert’s “divine 
length”263—where we expect “heavenly length”264—wrote compositions whose inorganicity 
rivalled that of Schubert’s, not, however by way of potpourri assemblage, but rather in their 
brinks, in rifted structures of a seismic imagination that parted and distanced the similar, and 
which nonetheless created groundswells back towards it that changed the face of it. In his 
review of the Great C Major Symphony, Schumann was praising not so much the reach of 
Schubert’s phrases as the spontaneous eventfulness of his long work, that untiring spontaneity, 
which fed the spontaneity of the listener’s imagination, and which thus put its completion 
beyond itself, in what it, inspired, would inspire. Schumann was farthest removed from the 
notion of an artwork that took no notice of what lay before it and which anticipated no further 
artwork, but which grew only according to its own inner will until coming to a total fruition. 
                                                
263 GS, vol. 17, p. 31 as translated, “Schubert,” p. 43. 
264 Robert Schumann, “Die C-Dur-Sinfonie von Franz Schubert,” in Robert Schumann in Eigenen Wort, 
zusammengestellt und herausgegeben von Willi Reich (Zurich: Manesse Verlag, 1985), p. 396 (my translation). 
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Schumann would not be fooled by those who advertized the music-makers of his present, 
Wagner and Liszt, as “the musicians of the future.”265 Wagner’s irresponsible, symbolic usage 
of the diminished seventh chord would use it up completely, leaving nothing of it for the 
future generations, as Arnold Schoenberg bitterly begrudged him.266 The inorganicity of 
Schumann’s own music, its perfect brokenness that makes no image of completion, shows up 
later, in the music of the Second Viennese School, in the endless profusion of ideas that it 
inspired. Reaction to the total artwork, which has come to complete fruition, can only go 
backwards, not into the future: the regressive reaction to Wagner’s used-up diminished 
seventh chords was the culture industry, which, no more capable of carrying them forward 
than Schoenberg, accepted the sign system in which they had ended up, and so used them in 
film soundtracks to signify—usually something horrible, creepy or weird. The defense of 
Schubert’s potpourris, which had become a pejorative title, cannot be made by an appeal to the 
genuineness of its identical content, which Adorno finds lacking in Schumann and Wagner. 
Potpourri is the particular appearance of inorganicity in Schubert’s music. But Schubert’s 
music is inorganic in another way: it goes beyond itself, beyond its particular appearance as a 
delimited body of work. Schumann took up things that Schubert left undone, yet in a 
qualitatively different manner. Inorganicity goes counter to the notion of each composer as a 
singular, independent naturally blossoming genius whose work is a natural extension of 
himself. It should also go against the notion of Echtheit. The essay’s main thesis comes out 
damaged but recognizable. Despite its flaws, to which the mature thinker would freely 
                                                
265 “What you take to be musicians of the future, I consider to be musicians of the present, and what you take to 
be musicians of the past (Bach, Handel, Beethoven), seem to me the best musicians of the future.” Robert 
Schumann to Richard Pohl, Düsseldorf, February 6, 1854, in Robert Schumann in Eigenen Wort, p. 336 (my 
translation). 
266 Arnold Schoenberg, Harmonielehre (s.l.: Universal Edition, 1922), p. 288f. 
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admit,267 “Schubert” was resistant toward the regressive ideas of its time. Adorno’s response 
to the rise of Nazism did not end with this essay; his whole philosophy, in its sustained 
criticism of authenticity, meaning, essence, of any appeal to nature as the measure of true and 
false, of any appeal to a supposed unity of whole and part or of inner and outer, is a response 
to Nazism. Adorno’s adoption of dialectics was political, but as was his unapologetic refusal 
to simplify or to clarify ideas; political, too, was his inclusion of mundane objects for 
micrological interpretation and study, as was the criterion of inorganicity that served for both 
the form and content of his work; his resulting analyses were political solutions in their spirit 
of contestation, in their level of detail and in their style, which was resented far and wide for 
its brilliance and difficulty. For in each of these aspects of his philosophical politics, Adorno 
went directly against the specific Nazi prescriptions for thinking published by Rosenberg in 
Unmoral im Talmud. Doing philosophy in ways counter to the Nazis prescriptions—breaking 
their fetish concepts into pieces, while accentuating philosophy’s powerlessness and 
idleness—constitutes practice in the fullest, best sense of the term.268  
                                                
267 GS, vol. 17, p. 10. 
268 Axel Honneth, “Communication and Reconciliation: Habermas’s Critique of Adorno,” trans. Vincent Thomas 
and David Parent, Telos, no. 39 (1979): p. 45-61. Honneth finds fault with the lack of practical applications for 
Adorno’s philosophy: “His critical theory does not address any social group, nor can it provide a socialization 
model translatable into practice. Thus Adorno’s premises leave critical theory with both dogma and resignation” 
(ibid., p. 56). Furthermore, Honneth claims that Habermas succeeds where Adorno fails, for the reason that 
Habermas turns the lack of addressee for revolutionary theory (its “empirical indeterminacy”) into a theory of 
subjects who address one another: “While for Adorno this empirical indeterminacy gradually becomes 
resignation, Habermas confronts it with an historical and philosophical alternative. Using ‘interaction’ as a form 
of action viable in all social systems, and therefore also in the context of historical reification, Habermas is able 
to salvage the possibility of a theoretically guided political practice” (ibid., p. 58). Honneth fails to see, however, 
that, Adorno indeed recognized the particular context of domination in which he found himself in 1933 as 
determinate. It was a historical and philosophical context in which philosophy was expected to address a 
particular social group (so-called “Aryans”) and dictate theses that would translate into direct action against other 
social groups. It is true that Adorno’s critical theory “foregoes any theoretical claim concerning possible political 
solutions,” but, because philosophy was being co-opted for the ends of Nazism, philosophical practice itself had 
become political. Adorno’s philosophy was itself a practical solution, so did not need to make theoretical claims 
about the possibility of one. Honneth is also wrong when he claims that Habermas is justified in taking whatever 
of Adorno he finds useful to his theory of action: “Habermas can use Adorno’s theses systematically only by 
disregarding their historical and philosophical context” (ibid., p. 49). This implies, however, that the systematic 
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 With a remarkable political astuteness sharpened no doubt by his intellectual circle,269 
the 25-year-old Adorno closed his essay by blocking the reading that would equate the 
Schubertian landscape, the concept he had so consistently developed against the notion of 
“personality,” with a particular existing country or region, whether that be Austria, Germany 
or a frozen Northern land: “There is no homeland here except the remembered one.”270 
                                                                                                                                                    
development of Habermas’s theory of communicative action is more important than the ethical demand to 
consider whether anything of the historical and philosophical context of Nazism against which Adorno developed 
his theses has continued into the present era. For evidence supporting the claim that academic philosophy was 
part of the Nazis’ programme, see George Leaman, “Philosophy, Alfred Rosenberg and the Military Application 
of the Social Sciences,” Jahrbuch für Soziologiegeschichte (1992): pp. 241-260.   
269 This intellectual circle is formidable to say the least: “Beginning in 1927 Adorno spent much time in Berlin. 
He visited his future wife, Gretel Karplus, and their circle there included Walter Benjamin, Siegfried Kracauer, 
Ernst Bloch, Otto Klemperer, Moholy-Nagy, and, importantly, Bertolt Brecht and his friends: the composers 
Hanns Eisler and Kurt Weill and Weill’s wife, the actress Lotte Lenya.” Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of 
Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute. New York: The Free 
Press, 1979, p. 20.  
270 GS, vol. 17, p. 33, or prefer to my translation here “Schubert,” p. 45. 
{Chapter VI} The question as to whether montage is more or less advanced than expression 
collapsed with the introduction of the concept of image-explosion; anti-organicity was found 
to be the criterion of advanced, modern art. 
 The question now is whether any notion of advanced art or even art is possible, in light 
of challenges posed first by G. W. F. Hegel, then also by Adorno and Peter Bürger. 
 In the conclusion to Theory of the Avant-Garde, Bürger claims that the impossibility of 
advanced art after the failure of the historical avant-garde movements has already been 
registered by Hegel, in his criticism of the “prose” that characterizes the extreme form of 
Romantic art: “What we deduced for post avant-gardiste art from the failure of the avant-
gardiste intentions, the legitimate side-by-side existence of styles and forms of which none can 
any longer claim to be the most advanced, is already observed by Hegel with reference to the 
art of his time.”1 Bürger’s claim raises the interesting question whether the avant-garde 
movements were actually the rear-guard, straggling behind the theory of Hegel, who, in the 
third of the three parts of his lectures on aesthetics, articulates, as the outcome of the 
dissolution of the Romantic form of art, a system of art, where Symbolic, Classical and 
Romantic art exist on the same level, in the same historical moment, but as individual arts—
architecture, sculpture, painting, music and poetry. What characterizes the dissolution of the 
Romantic form is the appearance of art that “becomes not only what romantic art is more or 
less throughout, i.e. portrait-like,” which “completely dissolves into the presentation of a 
portrait, whether in the plastic art, painting, or descriptive poetry,” and which “reverts to the 
imitation of nature, i.e. to an intentional approach to the contingency of immediate existence 
                                                
1 Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, 2. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), p. 130, as translated 
by Michael Shaw, Theory of the Avant-Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 93. Please 
note that only chapters 1-4 of Theorie der Avantgarde are translated in Theory of the Avant-Garde (as chapters 2-
5). 
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which, taken by itself, is unbeautiful and prosaic.”2 For Hegel, it follows that one would 
wonder whether “such productions in general are still to be called works of art.”3  
 The “prosaic” works raise the question of their status because the standard of art is 
Ideal—the Idea of the beautiful. The question of the status of prosaic works can equally be a 
question of the standard of art. Whether the Ideal had to be abandoned completely and art 
made natural or whether the Ideal had to be fully embraced was the actual issue in 
contemporary art and aesthetics in 1828, which Hegel expressed by the question: “Is art to be 
poetry or prose?”4 Hegel’s question is rare and stirring, for it engages with the art that was 
currently on exposition in Berlin: paintings of the Düsseldorf school, which were poetic to the 
point of being, Hegel admits, “sugary and dull.”5 Yet the prose of genre Dutch paintings, on 
the other hand, struck the proponents of the Ideal as “vulgar.”6 Ideal beauty no longer looks 
essential to art once it reaches the point of ludicrous vacuity in the works of Wilhelm 
Schadow, whose senseless choice and flat treatment of tasteful subjects—such as a dancer 
performing an arabesque—renders them a mere calligraphy next to the works coming up on 
the horizon—epitomized in the drawings, engravings and, to a lesser extent, paintings by 
Adolph von Menzel, whose depth and sensitivity for everyday subjects has no equal.7 While 
Menzel flourished only after Hegel’s death, his would be a post-Romantic art modelled on the 
Dutch genre paintings that constitute the break with Ideal beauty. To appreciate how Hegel 
                                                
2 G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Theorie-Werkausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969-71), 
vol. 14, p. 223 as translated by T. M. Knox, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1975), vol. 1, p. 596.  
3 Hegel, Werke, vol. 14, p. 223 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 596. 
4 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 213 as translated, Aethetics, vol. 1, p. 161.  
5 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 214 as translated, Aethetics, vol. 1, p. 162.  
6 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 222 as translated, Aethetics, vol. 1, p. 168. 
7 On Menzel’s prose aesthetic, see Michael Fried, Menzel’s Realism: Art and Embodiment in Nineteenth-Century 
Berlin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), esp. chapter ten, pp. 140-165. 
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resolved the question of his day, on might consider where this debate fits into the structure of 
his lectures:  
PART I. THE IDEA OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY, OR THE IDEAL 
 … 
 Chapter I. CONCEPT OF THE BEAUTIFUL AS SUCH 
 … 
 Chapter II. THE BEAUTY OF NATURE 
 … 
 Chapter III. THE BEAUTY OF ART OR THE IDEAL 
  A. THE IDEAL AS SUCH 
   1. Beautiful Individuality 
   2. The Relation of the Ideal to Nature 
  B. THE DETERMINACY OF THE IDEAL8 
 
The discussion of prosaic artworks fits under the heading “The Relation of the Ideal to 
Nature.” And its heading, “The Ideal as Such [Das Ideal als Solches],” is special in that it has 
only two moments, “Beautiful Individuality [Die schöne Individualität]” and “The Relation of 
the Ideal to Nature [Das Verhältnis des Ideals zur Natur],” rather than the usual three. 
“Beautiful Individuality” is thus special in that it falls precisely between the chapter on natural 
beauty, which terminated in the rejection of nature as the ground for beauty that attains to the 
“freedom” and “infinity” implied in its concept,9 and the counter-movement, “The Relation of 
the Ideal to Nature,” art’s striving to rejoin the nature of which the Ideal purified itself. The 
unusual bipartite structure of “The Ideal as Such” makes a gesture toward a suspended 
moment in history, toward what in art was still open and undecided when Hegel was lecturing. 
Yet the whole of Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics can be read as his resolution of the conflict 
between poetry and prose: ultimately, he throws his weight behind poetry—the Ideal.10 As 
                                                
8 Hegel, table of contents to Aesthetics, vol. 1, pp. xv-xvi.  
9 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 201, or translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 151.  
10 In this chapter and the following one, I extend Adorno’s critique of the bourgeois, Hegelian Ideal of art into 
areas of art and aesthetics that he either did not consider or did not consider closely. For a critique of Ideal that 
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Bürger points out, Hegel was nonetheless able to think beyond his system in conceiving of a 
post-Romantic art.11 Post-Romantic art raises a different standard of beauty: “das Scheinen als 
solches für sich”12—as opposed to “das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee.”13 Dutch genre paintings 
are beautiful not in that the idea shines in them, but in that they are indeterminate shining, 
from which the Idea has departed: the fleetingness of shining on its own: 
The one thing certain about beauty is, as it were, appearance for its own sake, and art 
is mastery in the portrayal of all the secrets of this ever profounder pure appearance 
of external realities [Vom Schönen wird gleichsam das Scheinen als solches für sich 
fixiert, und die Kunst ist die Meisterschaft in Darstellung aller Geheimnisse des sich 
in sich vertiefenden Scheinens der äußeren Erscheinungen]. Especially does art 
consist in heeding with a sharp eye the momentary and ever changing traits of the 
present world in the details of its life, which yet harmonize with the universal laws 
of…appearance [mit den allgemeinen Gesetzen des Scheinens], and always faithfully 
and truly keeping hold of what is most fleeting. A tree, or a landscape, is something 
already fixed, independent and permanent. But the lustre of metal, the shimmer of a 
bunch of grapes by candlelight, a vanishing glimpse of the moon or the sun, a smile, 
the expression of a swiftly passing emotion, ludicrous movements, postures, facial 
expressions—to grasp this most transitory and fugitive material, and to give it 
permanence for our contemplation in the fullness of its life is the hard task of art at 
this stage.14  
 
It seems, then, that art can be given a new lease on life with a change to its concept. In the 
introduction to his lectures, however, Hegel suggests the opposite: “Art, considered in its 
highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past.”15 Why this is, according to Hegel, 
has to do with the arbitrariness and complete relativity that the prose aesthetic has made of all 
materials: “Bondage to a particular subject-matter [Gehalt] and a mode of portrayal suitable 
for this material [Stoff] alone are for artists today something past, and art therefore has 
                                                                                                                                                    
does not take into account Adorno’s work in the area, see Hans-Heino Ewers, Die schöne Individualität: Zur 
Genesis des bürgerlichen Kunstideals (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1978). 
11 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 129, or translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 93. 
12 Hegel, Werke, vol. 14, p. 227, or Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 598, where it is translated “appearance for its own sake.” 
13 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 151, or Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 111, where it is translated “the pure appearance of the 
Idea to sense.” 
14 Hegel, Werke, vol. 14, p.227 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 598f. 
15 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 25 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 11. 
 275 
become a free instrument which the artist can wield in proportion to his subjective skill in 
relation to any material [Inhalt] of whatever kind.”16 The modern artist is not bound to any 
particular form, material, period, art or theme, but draws freely from all. As Hegel says of Jean 
Paul’s work: “We see nothing develop, everything just explodes.”17 The cessation of historical 
development with Jean Paul’s “scarcely guessable combinations” of notions, and his orders 
“alien” to his whimsically collected material and meanings, oversteps the criterion set by the 
Dutch masters of genre painting: shining as shining for the sake of shining.18 Of the artists 
coming after Jean Paul (who died in 1825), there can be no avant-garde, because Jean Paul 
turned the whole idea of development and progress in art into utter meaninglessness. When 
Hegel, lecturing after Jean Paul’s death, saw the end of the “development of art,”19 he was not 
engaging in “speculation”—in the sense of crystal-ball-gazing, as Bürger distorts this 
philosophical term of art.20 As far as Hegel was concerned, post-Romantic art put all material 
and forms on the same level, whereas he wanted to show that they were steps in the necessary 
development of the concept. This is why art is a thing of the past to Hegel. With Jean Paul’s 
continual combination and recombination of the inorganic fossils of past art came the halt of 
art’s organic growth: art is dead. Bürger claims that Hegel predicted “what did not definitively 
occur until after the historical avant-garde movements”—i.e., the legitimacy of inorganic art— 
when in fact inorganic art was the art of Hegel’s time.21 That there could no longer be a more 
developed technique, theme, form or material after Jean Paul calls into question Bürger’s 
claims that Dada and Surrealist were avant-garde, and that their manifestations had levelled 
                                                
16 Hegel, Werke, vol. 14, p. 235 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 605. 
17 Hegel, Werke, vol. 14, p. 230 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 602. 
18 Hegel, Werke, vol. 14, p. 230 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 601. 
19 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 130 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 93. 
20 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 130 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 94. 
21 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 130 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 94. 
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the tradition. Claims for avant-garde art after Jean Paul would appear to be trailing behind 
Hegel’s theory of art. But there is no reason to accept Hegel’s theory of art history, which 
posits continual development, the historical unfolding of the concept. Adorno considers the 
history of art to be itself discontinuous, heterogeneous, inorganic and explosive. But Bürger 
dismisses Adorno’s theory as “historical” for allegedly not taking into account “the total 
availability of material and forms,” which, to Bürger, characterizes art after the historical 
avant-garde movements.22 Adorno’s aesthetic theory is not based upon the historical avant-
garde, as Bürger maintains. Its object is the art that takes historical discontinuity and 
inorganicity as its premises, and which indeed draws on whatever forms and styles of the past 
it needs. Adorno considers all great works of bourgeois art to presume the total availability of 
forms and styles, but also to make critical distinctions within this totality. At the same time, 
Adorno does not throw out the idea of advanced, progressive art, which results from the most 
advanced critical consciousness exercised in selecting from within that aesthetic totality: 
Truth content becomes historical by the objectivation of correct consciousness in the 
work. This consciousness is no vague timeliness, no kairos that would justify the 
course of a world history, that is not the development of truth [kein vages An-der-
Zeit-Sein, kein kairos, das gäbe dem Weltlauf recht, der nicht die Entfaltung der 
Wahrheit ist, not vague timeliness, not a kairos that would justify the course of the 
world, which is not the unfolding of truth]. Rather, ever since freedom emerged as a 
potential, correct consciousness has meant the most progressive consciousness of 
antagonisms on the horizon of their possible reconciliation. The criterion of the most 
progressive consciousness is the level of productive forces in the work, part of which, 
in the age of art’s constitutive reflectedness, is the position that consciousness takes 
socially. As the materialization of the most progressive consciousness, which 
includes the productive critique of the given aesthetic and extra-aesthetic situation, 
the truth content of artworks is unconscious writing of history bound up with what 
has until now been repeated vanquished. Admittedly, just what is progressive is never 
so obvious as the innervation of fashion would like to dictate; it too has need of 
reflection. The determination of what is progressive involves the state of theory as a 
whole, for the decision cannot be resolved on the basis of isolated elements.23 
                                                
22 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 130 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 94. 
23 GS, vol. 7, p. 285f. as translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor except where indicated, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel 
Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 191f. 
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In this passage, Adorno contrasts the “course of the world” (or, the “way of the world”)— 
which Hegel’s philosophy of history takes to be the “unfolding of truth”—with the 
unconscious historiography that is the truth content of artworks. The individual artist, faced 
with the overwhelming objective mass of techniques, styles, forms, materials, themes and 
colours, does not think that the process of making the work is telling history; but the most 
progressive consciousness that forces the artist’s decisions and the greatest resistance to 
empirical reality that sparks the artist’s impulses will nonetheless result in a work that stores a 
history of the defeated in an externalized form of consciousness, so, bereft of consciousness. 
Adorno’s theory of advanced art takes into account Hegel’s theory that, at a certain point, art 
ceased to develop. Between Hegel’s theory of unfolding truth and artworks that turned against 
his theory, Adorno considers Hegel’s theory to be regressive. The artworks that took into 
consideration the stage to which Jean Paul had brought art—explosion rather than 
development—were, despite themselves, “advanced.” The advanced artwork is not more 
developed than the others; rather, it drives the aesthetic and social contradictions further—
until they explode. A condition for the advanced artwork is the total availability of styles, 
forms, traditions and materials. The question then is the point at which post-development art 
burst onto the scene. According to Bürger, the legitimate co-existence of traditions, forms and 
materials “occurred definitively” only after the demise of Dada and Surrealism.24 On the one 
hand, Bürger does not show in what respect post-Romantic work does not presuppose the total 
availability of equally-weighted materials, which he attributes to post avant-gardiste work; on 
the other hand, he posits the equal level of all materials as a fixed criterion that will endure 
forever more (“definitively”). The seeming definitiveness of an aesthetic transformation 
                                                
24 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 130 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 94. 
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cannot be the work of an avant-garde, but might indicate rather the advance of the rear-guard. 
The works of the historical avant-gardes, as art movements, must therefore fall behind the art 
of the closest readers of Jean Paul. Robert Schumann—whose surprising recourse to Baroque 
counterpoint in the context of a song cycle ostensibly about Romantic love is just one example 
of the legitimacy of past techniques and material25—would have already realized what Bürger 
claims for the post avant-garde, while the historical avant-gardes would have made no 
specifically artistic advance, something which they themselves never claim to have done. 
Bürger may complain of Adorno’s lack of accounting for what is specific to Dada and 
Surrealism, but his own paralleling of prosaic works of Hegel’s day (and previous) with post 
avant-garde works, in reference to Hegel’s notion of “Schein as such for its own sake,” 
ignores the “rebellion against illusion” that is a mark of Modern works, and which is supposed 
to distinguish them from Dutch genre paintings. Adorno considers the rebellion against 
illusion to be the most recent event to throw into question the survival of art at all. Yet the 
period of realism that set in with a vengeance in 1848 could also be considered a revolt against 
illusion, no less important than the period of Modernism in the twentieth century. That 
depends on whether realist works like Menzel’s aim to capture the momentary, airy and 
fleeting as permanence, as Hegel claims for Dutch genre painting, or whether they renounce 
the former renunciation of reality, and aim to rid art of its free-standing illusoriness, as Adorno 
claims for Modern art. It is the revolt against illusion that endangers progressive art, for if 
artworks make no claims to attach to reality, they are in a sense honest about their illusoriness, 
and cannot be charged with ideology in the way that philosophical texts can be. Artworks of 
illusion make no claims to be real or to refer to anything real, so their failure to do so cannot 
                                                
25 Robert Schumann, Dichterliebe, op. 48, ed. Hansjörg Ewert (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 2011), VI, pp. 10-11. 
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be considered false. As Adorno stated, with reference to Wagner: “Many works of the highest 
quality are true as the expression of a consciousness that is false in itself.”26 A work such as 
Die Meistersinger fully exposes false consciousness and puts it on display so that it may be 
recognized—and its false consciousness was recognized when it was first presented, to judge 
by the hisses that greeted Beckmesser’s “serenade.”27 It was not universally recognized as 
false consciousness when it appeared, although, with proper scholarship, all of humanity may 
yet be liberated from the illusion that the consciousness displayed in Wagner’s works is 
correct—on the day when we have achieved a society free of all stereotypes, prejudice and 
discrimination, no matter the group. Progressive art is possible because art can negate its own 
illusions through illusion, and part of its correct consciousness is the survival of illusion 
beyond the negation of illusion. By remaining illusory, progressive art does not claim to solve 
the real problems in society when it criticizes shapes of backward consciousness. The 
dwindling of aesthetic illusion—not the levelling and co-existence of all forms, techniques, 
styles and traditions—endangers the progressivity of art. The revolt against illusion would be 
an important difference between Dutch genre paintings (which, according to Hegel, are true to 
aesthetic Schein) and later artworks of the prose aesthetic—such as Menzel’s drawings, 
Webern’s Expressionist miniatures or even the post avant-garde works of realia occupying 
contemporary art museums today. Hegel’s question—whether art is to be poetry or prose—has 
                                                
26 GS, vol. 7, p. 196, as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 129. 
27 With reference to this and other historical evidence, Jean-Jacques Nattiez argues convincingly that 
Beckmesser’s “serenade” is a parody of synagogue music. To support his claim that Die Meistersinger itself is 
anti-Semitic, Nattiez not only cites historical evidence of performance practice—such as the deliberate casting of 
a poor singer for the part of Beckmesser—, but also registers a number of aspects common to both the “serenade” 
and a work written for a synagogue cantor (alternation of vocal part and accompaniment, declamatory and 
melismatic style, long organ-points at the ends of phrases, descending fourths and rising thirds in the vocal part, 
presence of tremolos and the unusually high register demanded of the male voice). Jean-Jacques Nattiez, “Le 
Contenu antisémite des œuvres de Wagner: examen de leur contenu dramatique, de leurs livrets et de leur 
musique,” (lecture, Université de Montréal, Montréal, November 14, 2013). 
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been answered in favour of prose. But the criterion that Hegel raised in order to include works 
in the prose aesthetic under the umbrella of art—Schein—can rarely be applied to the prosaic 
works of his future. This is because Schein, along with Spiel, belongs to the side of poetry and 
the Ideal; the post-Romantic works in the wake of Jean Paul lodge a far more devastating 
critique of the Ideal than did the Dutch masters. This critique is extremely risky, but necessary. 
On the one side, the regressiveness of German Idealism and the rise of irrationalism after the 
modest advances of the Enlightenment aligned progressive consciousness against the Ideal. On 
the other side, aesthetic illusion, which is a condition of progressive art, is an aspect of the 
Ideal. While the historical avant-garde movements (some members of which, avid readers of 
Hegel) did not want to answer Hegel’s question in favour of one side or the other, but rather 
exploited the recognized split in art between life and ideal in order to bring art-life and life 
together, artists faced the difficulty of making a critique that could destroy the very conditions 
of the possibility of that critique. Perhaps the most successful criticisms of the Ideal in art, 
Paul Celan’s “Todesfuge” (Deathfugue) and Eduard Mörike’s “Auf eine Lampe” (On a 
Lamp), are spread out amongst a number of its aspects—these works criticize not only 
illusion, but also play and meaning, in more or less oblique engagements with German 
Idealism as represented by Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Schiller and G. W. F. Hegel. Mörike’s 
poem looks Classical, a throw-back to an earlier time, but it is actually a montage. Written 
about one century later, “Todesfuge” is incantatory and expressionless, yet so close to 
discourse that poetry no longer seems possible after it. In what look to be condemnations, 
Adorno seems to have come to too-hasty conclusions about each. These two works are 
philosophical accomplishments, in light of the double role of poet-philosopher played by the 
main object of their critique, Schiller. Yet their medium is fully language. Mörike’s poem pre-
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dates Dada and Surrealism, yet it negates the unity of whole and part that Bürger claims 
characterizes the avant-garde work of art.28 Celan’s poem follows Dada and Surrealism, a 
point at which, according to Bürger, the art institution can no longer be challenged, yet it 
raises the most serious questions about the continuation of culture at all when life has become 
interminable suffering. Adorno’s belief that Schoenberg’s “new music” took a polemical 
stance towards play and illusion requires a critical assessment with reference to Mörike and 
Celan. 
 Modern works negate specific aspects of the Ideal: illusion, play and meaning. 
 For Hegel, the Ideal artwork is a seeming synthesis of Being and the Idea that gives 
the appearance of liveliness: “The task of art must therefore be firmly established in art’s 
having a calling to display the appearance of life [Erscheinung der Lebendigkeit, appearance 
of liveliness], and especially of spiritual animation (in its freedom, externally too) and to make 
the external correspond with its Concept.”29 The Ideal work is an appearance of liveliness 
insofar as it removes the fleetingness and blind arbitrariness of appearances of nature on which 
it draws. According to Adorno, art removes itself from accidents so that its beauty may 
perform a “saving critique” of the beauty of nature: in negating arbitrariness while being 
beautiful, art negates the idea that arbitrary nature really means something, yet supports the 
idea that nature can speak. For Hegel, by contrast, art’s evacuation of the arbitrary is just a 
critique of the inherent illusoriness of arbitrariness itself: 
In the ordinary external and internal world essentiality does indeed appear too, but in 
the form of a chaos of accidents, afflicted by the immediacy of the sensuous and by the 
capriciousness of situations, events, characters, etc. Art liberates the true content of 
phenomena from the pure appearance and deception of this bad, transitory world [Den 
Schein und die Täuschung dieser schlechten, vergänglichen Welt nimmt die Kunst von 
                                                
28 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 77 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 56. 
29 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 202 as translated except where indicated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 152. 
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jenem wahrhaften Gehalt der Erscheinungen fort, art removes the illusion and 
deception of this bad, transitory world from the content of appearances], and gives 
them a higher actuality, born of spirit.30 
  
For Hegel, the mere illusion of reality lies in fleetingness, arbitrariness, immediacy and 
sensuousness. These constitute otherness with respect to ego-feeling and subjectivity. Schein 
in art, the realm purified of accidents, is to Hegel not as objectionable as the Schein of bare 
existence, for his Idealism subordinates existence to thought. Hegel places the artwork 
hierarchically midway between the merely existing thing and the idea. Unlike a merely 
existing thing, the artwork is doubly determined as Schein. Aesthetic Schein for Hegel is the 
fleeting transition between bare, real, contingent, sensuous existence and the idea, where each 
seems to be the other:  
Thereby the sensuous aspect of a work of art, in comparison with the immediate 
existence of things in nature, is elevated to a pure appearance [Schein, illusion], and 
the work of art stands in the middle between immediate sensuousness and ideal 
thought. It is not yet pure thought, but, despite its sensuousness, is no longer a purely 
material existent either, like stones, plants, and organic life [organisches Leben]; on the 
contrary, the sensuous in the work of art is itself something ideal, but which, not being 
ideal as thought is ideal, is still at the same time there externally as a thing [Ding].31 
 
The artwork is an appearance of liveliness insofar as it is situated in between nature and 
divinity. Appearance (Erscheinung) in Hegel’s system is the middle term between being and 
the Idea: the perfect centre of The Science of Logic is “Appearance.”   
 An avowed source of Hegel’s concept of life is Schiller’s poem “Das Ideal und das 
Leben” (The Ideal and Life), whose opening stanza contrasts divine life, which flows on 
eternally, meeting no opposition to trouble or ripple its waters, with the waves of human 
generations, each tossing between the delights of the senses and peace of mind: 
Ewigklar und spiegelrein und eben 
Fließt das zephyrleichte Leben 
                                                
30 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 22 as translated except where indicated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 8f.  
31 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 60 as translated except where indicated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 38.  
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Im Olymp den Seligen dahin. 
Monde wechseln und Geschlechter fliehen, 
Ihrer Götterjugend Rosen blühen 
Wandellos im ewigen Ruin. 
Zwischen Sinnenglück und Seelenfrieden 
Bleibt dem Menschen nur die bange Wahl. 
Auf der Stirn des hohen Uraniden 
Leuchtet ihr vermählter Strahl. 
 
(Ever-clear, mirror-pure, strife unknowing, 
Life the zephyr-light is flowing 
In the Olympus of the blest. 
Moons wax and wane and generations fly 
Roses in their youth of gods blossom high  
Changeless in timeless ruins’ rest. 
Humankind quivers, endlessly torn  
Between sensual joy and soul’s content. 
On the brow of the high Uranus-born  
Their mingled beam of light is bent.)32 
 
This opening stanza sets out the task of the poem: to address the endless human dilemma 
between satisfying one’s body and satisfying one’s conscience. What follows reads like a 
wildly overexcited rewriting of Kant’s three Critiques in reverse order as a single unit sprung 
under the pressure of an enthusiasm that hurtles against every limit, crashes headlong against 
every obstacle and breaks through them. “Das Ideal und das Leben” rehearses a wild array of 
ideas for overcoming the limits of close, cramped, purely sensuous or purely moral-
conventional forms of existence, and strives after experiences to rival the bliss of the gods on 
Olympus, which it sets as a goal for human life.33 Borrowing the imagery of wings and flight 
from The Phaedrus, Schiller alludes to the passage in Plato’s work most suggestive of a 
                                                
32 Friedrich Schiller, “Das Ideal und das Leben,” in Werke und Briefe in zwölf Bänden, herausgegeben von Otto 
Dann et al. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1988-2004), vol. 1, pp. 152-156, here p. 152, lines 
1-10, with my translation.  
33 This suggests that Schiller is defending the use of transcendent principles against Kant. See Immanuel Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), A295f/B352f. NB: The pagination given here and throughout, with “A” and “B” editions noted, 
corresponds to the Academy of Sciences edition of Kant’s works (Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: G. 
Reimer/ W. de Gruyter & Co., 1902-) and appears in the margins of Guyer and Wood’s translation.  
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traversable boundary between the things on earth and the ideal, divine world of the Forms.34 
The “frightful choice” that seemed the lot of human beings is not really a choice, on Schiller’s 
reading, for each alternative is false when something of the ideal world, which knows no such 
conflict, is open to human beings: 
Nur der Körper eignet jenen Mächten, 
Die das dunkle Schicksal flechten, 
Aber frei von jeder Zeitgewalt,    
Die Gespielin seliger Naturen    
Wandelt oben in des Lichtes Fluren,    
Göttlich unter Göttern, die Gestalt.    
Wollt ihr hoch auf ihren Flügeln schweben,   
Werft die Angst des Irdischen von euch.   
Fliehet aus dem engen, dumpfen Leben   
In des Ideales Reich! 
 
(Only the body may those powers grieve, 
Those powers that Fates the evil weave, 
Free yet from time’s violence and storm, 
The mistress of those blessed and serene 
Strolls high above in great halls’ bright sheen,  
Godly amongst gods, Itself, the Form. 
If you wish to soar up high on your wings 
Throw away your fear of the earthly real. 
Fly out of this life of close, musty things 
Into the Ideal!)35 
    
As the ideal Platonic form of beauty holds out the most hope for a transition from the 
changeable world of the senses to the eternal, supra-sensible realm, the greater part of the 
poem is dedicated to the aesthetic. Beauty opens a third way between physical compulsion and 
moral necessity by transforming not only sensible objects, but also the character of the 
recipient’s gaze. Beauty is the transformation of the sensuous mere thing’s pure Schein into 
image. In the second stanza, Schiller warns of a certain danger for the viewer who considers 
the brilliant surfaces of things to be a “feast for the eyes” and who revels in such pure Schein. 
                                                
34 Plato, Phaedrus, ed. Harvey Yunis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 55-60, lines 250e-
256e. 
35 Schiller, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, p. 152, lines 21-30, with my translation. 
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The recipient is not to take pleasure in earthly things, which, according to the Platonic 
doctrine, are nothing but Schein lacking all reality: 
An dem Scheine mag der Blick sich weiden, 
Des Genusses wandelbare Freuden   
Rächet schleunig der Begierde Flucht. 
 
(The gaze may graze on the shining surface, 
Desire’s flight revenges in all swiftness 
Changeable, inconstant pleasure’s delight.)36 
  
The viewer must therefore be protected from the seductive powers of changeable, earthly 
surfaces. The image, Bild, is a perceptible, sensible thing that stands before the gaze “as if 
sprung out of nothing,” no longer enticing the viewer to consume it, because something that 
looks insubstantial, “wispy and light,” can hardly offer sustenance. A material thing’s illusion 
of nothingness occasions a sort of reception other than consumption: the gaze is “enraptured” 
by the image that stands facing it, rather than driven to feast itself on an alluring sheen:  
Aber dringt bis in der Schönheit Sphäre, 
Und im Staube bleibt die Schwere 
Mit dem Stoff, den sie beherrscht, zurück. 
Nicht der Masse qualvoll abgerungen,   
Schlank und leicht, wie aus dem Nichts gesprungen,  
Steht das Bild vor dem entzückten Blick.    
Alle Zweifel, alle Kämpfe schweigen    
In des Sieges hoher Sicherheit,    
Ausgestoßen hat es jeden Zeugen     
Menschlicher Bedürftigkeit. 
 
(But press through into the sphere of beauty 
And leave in the dust all difficulty 
Along with the matter that it conquers! 
Not cut from the stone with agonizing,    
But wispy, light, as if sprung from nothing, 
Stands the image before enchanted eyes.  
All doubts and qualms, all struggles still and cease. 
In the victory of higher certainty 
Comes the expulsion of all witnesses  
To human need and poverty.)37 
                                                
36 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 152, lines 14-16, with my translation. 
37 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 154, lines 81-90, with my translation. 
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Schiller here avows that the “sphere of beauty” is possible only through a difficult 
transformation of material, material which does not itself enter into that sphere. The aesthetic 
image must disavow both material and the signs of difficulties experienced in “dominating” 
the material—in other words, it must disavow the artwork’s work character.38 The sphere of 
beauty might make good the inherent deceptions of material satisfactions, but at the price of 
material’s subordination to spirit and the exile from beauty of “all witnesses to human need.” 
The aesthetic image closes our eyes to the actual longing and neediness in humanity. “Das 
Ideal und das Leben” occupies an unusual position. It divulges in art what art must hide to be 
art. The poem reflects on itself and on artistic production in general, going behind the scenes 
of beauty, to perform a self-reflexive critique of aesthetic illusion and of affirmative images.39 
 A second avowed source of Hegel’s concept of life is another work by Schiller: the 
Prologue to Wallenstein. In the Prologue, Schiller makes an appearance—or rather, makes the 
appearance of an appearance, seeming to step out from his play to address his audience as 
author, yet in poetic form. The “life” here is not divine life, but serious, suffering human life, 
which art seems to take on, while removing its seriousness. The last stanza elevates poetry’s 
right to play above criticism, then defends art as a realm of emphatic or “aufrichtig” 
(forthright) illusion. Schiller claims that poetic inspiration does indeed make the dark image of 
truth pass into the “cheerful” or “light-hearted” realm of art, but he concludes that this 
“deception” or “illusion” truly destroys itself rather than deceitfully insinuating truth: 
                                                
38 Peter Bürger notes that it belongs to Schiller’s concept of aesthetic illusion that “labour becomes hidden.” 
Peter Bürger, Zum Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), p. 62 ( my 
translation). 
39 Hans-Heino Ewers makes the general remark that the artistic Ideal is a self-critique of bourgeois society 
because it acts out the atomization and division of labour in a separate sphere of illusion, which is able to provide 
a point of contrast against the real state of bourgeois society (which hypostatizes in earnest). Ewers largely retains 
the conception of Schein as surface (Oberfläche). Ewers, Die schöne Individualität, p. 266.  
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 Und wenn die Muse heut, 
Des Tanzes freie Göttin und Gesangs, 
Ihr altes deutsches Recht, des Reimes Spiel, 
Bescheiden wieder fordert – tadelts nicht! 
Ja danket ihr’s, daß sie das düstre Bild 
Der Wahrheit in das heitre Reich der Kunst 
Hinüberspielt, die Täuschung, die sie schafft, 
Aufrichtig selbst zerstört und ihren Schein 
Der Wahrheit nicht betrüglich unterschiebt, 
Ernst ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst. 
 
 (And if today the muse, 
Unbounded goddess stirring dance and verse, 
Her ancient German right, the play of rhyme, 
Demands, however meekly—find no fault! 
Yea, for her knack that turns the image grim  
With truth into the cheerful realm of art 
Give thanks, and for her honest will to spoil 
The trick that she invents, without a mind   
To pass off her illusion as the truth, 
Life is in earnest, cheerful is all art.)40 
 
These lines give evidence against the criticism that aesthetic illusion is merely the affirmative 
and ideological masking of real suffering, gloom and dismal dusk by beautiful, bright 
consolation. Art does not consist in passing illusion off as truth, according to Schiller, but in 
combusting the rosy picture that the imagination makes out of what is really dark. In the 
prologue, Schiller not only discursively defines art as the cheer that critically destroys itself, 
but he also performs such an act of self-negation aesthetically. For however dark Wallenstein 
may seem, Schiller avows that it is cheerful in relation to life during the Thirty Years’ War. It 
is really art’s illusion that is affirmative, the illusion that makes the claim that life is cheerful. 
To consider aesthetic illusion to be a mere “conceptual residue of idealist metaphysics” that 
contemporary theory would be best to do without is to ignore the self-critical beginnings of the 
                                                
40 Friedrich Schiller, prologue to Wallenstein, in Werke und Briefe, vol. 4, pp. 13-17, here p. 17, lines 129-138, 
with my translation.  
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concept in Schiller.41 For while the concept of aesthetic illusion may well belong to German 
Idealism, Schiller developed it in a dialectical, exceptionally critical manner. Schiller’s 
concept of Schein contains not only a positive moment, the shining picture that art paints in 
the face of dark truth, but also a negative moment, art’s determination of this shine as illusion. 
While Adorno judged the double character of Schiller’s concept of illusion sufficiently 
advanced to have it enter into his own theory of aesthetics, it does not follow that Adorno’s 
philosophy therefore contains an Idealist element. Adorno transforms Schiller’s concept of 
Schein precisely to remove its Idealist elements. 
While Adorno admits, with Schiller, that each artwork negates its own moments of 
Schein, he emphasizes the self-critical movement of art as a whole:  
The truth content of artworks is fused with their critical content. That is why works are 
also critics of one another. This, not the historical continuity of their dependencies, 
binds artworks to one another; “each artwork is the mortal enemy of the other”; the 
unity of the history of art is the dialectical figure of determinate negation.42  
 
Schiller’s work suffers from an excess of authorial intention. He anticipates the criticisms of 
theory and attempts to defend his work against them on the critics’ own terrain, which is also 
his own: that of discourse. This attempt to manoeuvre not only his work but also poetry as a 
whole into a position of critical unassailability misunderstands the manner in which artworks 
dissolve the aesthetic illusion. Schiller’s Prologue appears to dissolve aesthetic illusion by 
equipping Wallenstein with a theoretical apparatus that takes over the task of philosophy of 
art. But the dissolution of artworks’ illusion of being independent, natural, effortless wholes 
does not come about through any such self-mastery, self-consciousness, intellectualized over-
monitoring of artistic labour, in the thematization of criticism and of art. Art that defends itself 
                                                
41 Nikolas Kompridis, “Amidst the Plurality of Voices: Philosophy of Music after Adorno,” Angelaki: Journal of 
the Theoretical Humanities 8, no. 3 (December 2003): pp. 167-180, p. 178. 
42 GS, vol. 7, p. 59f., as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 35. 
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against criticism in advance merely justifies the domination of material by spirit in carrying it 
to an extreme; on the contrary, the necessity of dominating material is the very illusion to be 
dissolved. The dissolution of illusion therefore happens not through the pure intellect, but 
through the material, specifically through the advance of the material, through material’s 
escape from the centripetal force of illusion, from the unifying force of each individual work. 
Furthermore, art’s self-critical movement as a whole does not render theoretical considerations 
superfluous; theory informs the advance of the material, even if at the moment of advance, it 
cannot be theoretically articulated. While Schiller is correct in his claim that art destroys its 
own illusion, albeit not in the way that is suggested by the behaviour of his own poetry, art’s 
self-critique does not then justify a naïve, unthinking, playful reception. Art’s play—the play 
of rhyme, the play of sensations—is its appearance, its appearance of liveliness. Adorno so 
departs from Schiller on a second point: he does not presuppose the “ancient German right, the 
play of rhyme,” which in Schiller’s view places art as a whole above criticism. Rather, art’s 
appearance of life—its playfulness—must be criticized, confronted with the death and 
reification that the artwork is. In other words:  
Adorno suggests that art’s status as poetry, removed from the accidents and caprices of 
life, must be questioned, confronted with art that would be life—prose.  
The right to existence of poetry as a whole was perhaps unquestioned in philosophy of 
art until 1951, when Adorno made his contentious statement on poetry after Auschwitz: “It is 
barbaric to write a poem after Auschwitz, and that also corrodes the verdict voiced on why it 
has become impossible to write poems today.”43 By turns Adorno maintained,44 qualified,45 
                                                
43 GS, vol. 10.1, p. 30, as translated by Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber, “Cultural Criticism and Society,” in 
Prisms (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), pp. 17-34, here p. 34. 
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revised46 and partially withdrew47 this statement under the pressure of rebuttals such as that of 
Hans Magnus Enzensberger in Merkur in 1959, who defended poetry, that of Nelly Sachs 
above all, against the alternative: the loss of language, of speech itself.48 The upshot of this 
line of counter-argument is that language guards society against forms of barbarism that are 
far more serious and which follow from Nazism much more directly than the barbarism of 
pure escapism that Adorno seems to be attacking. These are: descent into inarticulate rage and 
vengeance, the erasure of the face of the victim, even the incapacitation of life itself. For 
Enzensberger, Nelly Sachs is exceptional in her rescue of what could also be considered a 
victim of Nazism: “Phrase after phrase, she gives us back alone what we threatened to lose: 
language.”49 This argument, however, does not engage with the question of art’s illusory 
                                                                                                                                                    
44 “I do not want to soften my statement that it is barbaric to continue to write poetry after Auschwitz; it 
expresses, negatively, the impulse that animates committed literature. The question one of the characters in 
Sartre’s Morts sans Sépulture…asks, ‘Does living have any meaning when men exist who beat you until your 
bones break?’ is also the question whether art as such should still exist at all; whether spiritual regression in the 
concept of committed literature is not enjoined by the regression of society itself. But Hans Magnus 
Enzensberger’s rejoinder also remains true, namely that literature must resist precisely this verdict, that is, be 
such that it does not surrender to cynicism merely by existing after Auschwitz. It is the situation of literature itself 
and not simply one’s relation to it that is paradoxical.” GS, vol. 11, p. 422f., as translated by Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen, “Commitment,” in Notes to Literature, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1991-1992), vol. 2, pp. 76-94, here p. 87f.  
45 “The statement that it is not possible to write poetry after Auschwitz does not hold absolutely, but it is certain 
that after Auschwitz, because Auschwitz was possible and remains possible for the foreseeable future, light-
hearted art is no longer conceivable.” GS, vol. 11, p. 603, as translated, “Is Art Lighthearted?” in Notes to 
Literature, vol. 2, pp. 247-253, here p. 251. 
46 “The concept of a cultural resurrection after Auschwitz is illusory and absurd, and every work created since 
then has had to pay the bitter price for this. But because the world has outlived its own downfall, it nevertheless 
needs art to write its unconscious history. The authentic artists of the present are those in whose works the 
uttermost horror still quivers.” GS, vol. 10.2, p. 506, as translated by Henry Pickford, “Those Twenties,” in 
Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 41-48, here 
p. 48. 
47 “Perennial suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to scream; hence it may have been 
wrong to say that after Auschwitz you could no longer write poems.” GS, vol. 6, p. 355, as translated by E. B. 
Ashton, Negative Dialectics (1973; repr., New York: Continuum, 1997), p. 362.  
48 Hans Magnus Enzensberger, “Die Steine der Freiheit,” in Lyrik nach Auschwitz? Adorno und die Dichter, 
herausgegeben von Petra Kiedaisch (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1995), pp. 73-76. This volume assembles materials on the 
debate on poetry after Auschwitz: the relevant excerpts from Adorno’s texts and the responses from both literary 
theory and literature.  
49 Ibid., p. 73 (my translation). 
 291 
character. Enzensberger might be claiming that what was appropriated by the Nazis in reality 
can be returned to reality by the realm of illusion. But he could just as well assume that poetry 
has ceased to be a realm of illusion. It is an open question whether Enzensberger is correct to 
claim that a poem that cites from the (written) Torah really delivers the German language 
from the Nazis, who, he states, cut German off from itself, from a long history springing out of 
a decisive meeting between Jewish poetry and Luther.50 Yet there is something paradoxical in 
claiming that poems after Auschwitz really undo the damage that the Nazis wrought on 
language. If poems are actually effective against the strongest and most brutal reality, if they 
actually come out of their sphere to act in the world, then poetry has lost its own language, art 
language, which closes poetry to purposes, communication and real effectiveness by virtue of 
its entirely inward, self-critical movement. For poetic language really to act in the world, it 
would no longer be poetry—language under the illusion of having nothing to do with the 
greater illusion.  
Art itself had refused illusion prior to Auschwitz, and Adorno was keenly aware of 
such refusal in the interwar period. In 1938, publication date of his essay “On the Fetish-
Character of Music and the Regression of Listening,” Adorno claimed that Western music had 
always had an anti-illusory element in dissonance, “which refuses to give credence to the 
illusion [Trug] of prevailing harmony”; moreover, he claimed that such “asceticism,” 
regressive in other times, had become the mark of the advanced art of his era, Modern art.51 In 
that same essay, Adorno claims explicitly that in the current situation, art must do without 
                                                
50 Ibid., p. 75f. 
51 GS, vol. 14, p. 18, or prefer to my translation here the uncredited translation modified by Richard Leppert, “On 
the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening,” in Essays on Music, selected, with introduction, 
commentary and notes by Richard Leppert (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 288-317, here 
p. 291.  
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illusion: “Only where…illusion is absent is faith with its possibility kept.”52 If the redemptive 
side of illusion is impossible to separate from its deceptive side, it becomes necessary for art 
to forego illusion altogether so that it can remain true to what the unity of illusion in the great 
music of Haydn and Mozart once registered: “the image of a social condition in which those 
particular moments of happiness, alone, would be more than mere appearance [Schein, 
illusion].”53 In order to undo the unity of illusion, new music withheld the “moments of 
happiness” that Adorno names: “sensory stimulation as the gate of entry into the harmonic and 
eventually the coloristic dimensions; the unbridled person as the bearer of expression and of 
the humanization of the music itself; ‘superficiality’ as a critique of the mute objectivity of 
forms.”54  
Paul Celan’s “Todesfuge” prohibits the moments of happiness promised by illusion.55 
The surface of the unornamented monody rouses physical aversion. The poetic subject is not 
free but makes the demand for expression and humanity in the face of extreme restriction of 
his powers, demand which is articulated in tight lexical fields whose elements shrink, through 
repetition, to markers—markers of stone and markers of eye, of hair, of time. Not 
superficiality, but seriousness and depth form its critique, critique not of mute objectivity, but 
of objectivity that has made mute. So this poetry should make itself imageless, as the first 
works of Expressionism. Yet the loss of illusion in “Todesfuge” is qualitatively different from 
the disillusionment in works of Modern music. The loss of illusion in new music can be 
                                                
52 GS, vol. 14, p. 19, or prefer to my translation here “On the Fetish-Character in Music,” p. 292.  
53 GS, vol. 14, p. 17 as translated except where indicated, “On the Fetish-Character in Music,” p. 290. 
54 GS, vol. 14, p. 17 as translated, “On the Fetish-Character of Music,” p. 290.  
55 Paul Celan, “Todesfuge,” in Werke, Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe, 1. Abteilung [division], Lyrik und Prosa, 
begründet von Beda Allemann, herausgegeben von Rolf Bücher und Axel Gellhaus, vol. 2/3, “Der Sand aus den 
Urnen” und “Mohn und Gedächtnis”, herausgegeben von Andreas Lohr unter Mitarbeit von Holger Gehle in 
Verbindung mit Rolf Bücher, 2 Teile (parts) (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), Teil (part) 1, pp. 99-102. 
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explained in art-immanent terms alone, as a particularly severe crisis in the constant aesthetic 
cycle that goes from illusion to expression: “Because [the traits of expression], as artworks, 
however indeed remain illusion, the conflict between illusion—form most broadly 
understood—and expression has not been had out and fluctuates historically.”56 “Todesfuge” 
certainly criticizes illusion in art-immanent terms. Yet the loss of illusion in “Todesfuge” is 
also motivated by an extra-aesthetic event that permitted no illusion, and which made naïveté 
in itself an evil. Art’s disavowal of labour is barbaric when social labour takes on the specific 
form of forced labour organized to fulfil not the needs of life but the administrative objective 
of genocide. Poetry’s domination of its material—arbitrary and rule-bound natural 
languages—, its process of spiritualization, which, in Schiller’s words, leaves material “in the 
dust,” becomes barbaric when the human individual has become material, a body to torture 
and to dispose of. In ceasing to disavow work, in ceasing to dominate material, poetry makes 
its critique of the extreme example, in society, of such disavowal and domination—at the price 
of poetry itself. Celan’s evocation of Spiel, a word that becomes a kind of noble, time-
honoured aureole with which Schiller crowns German poetry in his line “Ihr altes deutsches 
Recht, des Reimes Spiel” (Her ancient German right, the play of rhyme), his association of 
Spielen with an overseer in a death camp who “plays” and “writes,” whose “playing” is the 
caprice that decides the fate of lines of people, and whose “writing” commands the death of 
the Jews, by Germany, refutes utterly any such claim to a peculiarly German right to rhyme.57 
The single end-rhyme in “Todesfuge” reaches the absolute of the poem’s horror: in it, poetry 
falls from paradise; the music of poetry, its rhythm and rhyme, gave a logic to the accidents of 
                                                
56 GS, vol. 7, p. 169, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 110. 
57 Celan, Werke, division 1, vol. 2/3, part 1, p. 101, line 5, as translated by John Felstiner, “Deathfugue,” by Paul 
Celan, in John Felstiner, Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 31-32, 
here p. 31. 
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language, but this stuff of childhood curdles and sours, and the logic of poetry is revealed to 
be the satisfaction of a sadistic, unreasonable demand, like those of the man who is 
distinguished by his living in a house, whose whistling is a command, and who commands 
playing, dancing and fiddling:  
der Tod ist ein Meister aus Deutschland sein Aug ist blau 
er trifft dich mit bleierner Kugel er trifft dich genau58 
 
this Death is ein Meister aus Deutschland his eye it is blue 
he shoots you with shot made of lead shoots you level and true59  
 
What rhyme is possible after this one? In it is determinately negated not merely the aesthetic 
norm of rhyme, but the logic of artistic norms in general. “Todesfuge” demands that every 
poem place itself definitively after Auschwitz, in real history, in order to be considered a 
poem. This goes against the idea of art, whose spirit is not to respect the natural laws of time, 
but to exercise its freedom in breaking through historical divisions, in opening moments that 
dreaming and forgetting had closed. If “Todesfuge” demands that every poem thereafter be 
judged according to its subsequence—whether it acknowledges that it comes after 
Auschwitz—, then poems must be not illusions at all, but must really be historical 
appearances, of their time, which is “after Auschwitz.” Then poems can no longer be judged 
advanced or regressive within the history of poetry, but rather must be judged in relation to an 
absolute, real event. The criterion of subsequence may be a demand in autonomous art for the 
end of autonomous art; or it might be a demand in art for the end of art. Celan’s poetry itself 
therefore cannot be the object of Adorno’s ban on poetry after Auschwitz: for it first raised the 
question of such a ban.  
                                                
58 Celan, Werke, division 1, vol. 2/3, part 1, p. 102, lines 30-31. 
59 Celan, “Deathfugue,” in Felstiner, Paul Celan, p. 31. 
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 Adorno’s reasons for declaring poetry after Auschwitz barbaric may be traced to the 
very beginning of his career, to his aesthetics course of 1931/32, which has come down in the 
form of preparatory notes.60 According to the notes for the lecture of February 19th, Adorno 
planned to open the concept of Schein by analyzing the “Mignon-Lied,” “So laßt mich 
scheinen, bis ich werde,” in which Goethe associates seeming (scheinen) with the living.61 
According to Adorno’s notes, Mignon’s song from Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahr (Wilhelm 
Meister’s Apprenticeship) presents the “reversal of beautiful illusion into illusionless presence 
(as consolation: at death),”62 whose affirmative moment lies not so much in the lines  
So laßt mich scheinen, bis ich werde, 
Zieht mir das weiße Kleid nicht aus! 
 
(So let me seem until I become; 
Do not take my white garment off!)63 
 
as in the lines that form their “dialectical answer”:64 
Und keine Kleider, keine Falten 
Umgeben den verklärten Leib. 
 
(And neither garment nor drapery  
Surrounds the transfigured body.)65 
 
The revealed, transfigured body is “the key figure of the loss of illusion” because, one 
surmises, it has left behind all fabrication and production, all artifice and disguise.66 But at the 
same time, this happens only at death. What is in truth the reduction of the human to the naked 
                                                
60 Theodor W. Adorno, “Aufzeichnungen zur Ästhetik-Vorlesung von 1931/32,” in Frankfurter Adorno 
Blätter 1, im Auftrag des Theodor W. Adorno Archivs, herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann (Munich: edition text 
+ kritik, 1992), pp. 34-90. 
61 Ibid., pp. 85-88. 
62 Ibid., p. 88 (my translation).  
63 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, in Sämtliche Werke: Briefe, Tagebücher und 
Gespräche, herausgegeben von Friedmar Apel et al., 40 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 
1985-), Abteilung 1, vol. 9, pp. 355-992, here p. 895, lines 1-2, with my translation. 
64 Adorno, “Aufzeichnungen zur Ästhetik-Vorlesung von 1931/32,” p. 86 (my translation). 
65 Goethe, Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, p. 895, lines 11-12, with my translation.  
66 Adorno, “Aufzeichnungen zur Ästhetik-Vorlesung von 1931/32,” p. 86 (my translation). 
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body is not supposed to be poverty, but heaven: thus the transformation of illusion into 
illusionless presence is consolation, for we should really see this uncloaking as poverty and as 
loss.67 Thus, as these notes indicate, the young Adorno did not locate art’s affirmative aspect 
in illusion itself. Affirmation lies rather the in loss of illusion; in “So laßt mich scheinen, bis 
ich werde” its locus is the naked body at death, which is called “transfigured.” In art, this may 
take the form of an advance in the artistic material or in a general crisis of illusion. Reading 
the “Mignon-Lied” as an allegory of artistic practice, as the model for the modern aesthetic 
category of Schein, as Adorno would have done, we can reconstruct the motivations for his 
condemnation of poetry after Auschwitz. Adorno condemned poetry not because he opposed 
beautiful illusions, but because he opposed bare existence. Goethe turned the body at death 
into something positive, but Auschwitz altered forever what it is to be naked at death, and 
forbids any positivity around it. In order for Auschwitz to become an impossibility, we must 
be inconsolable over every particular death, over every form of bare existence, over every 
uncloaking. This is what throws art into question.68 For through the poetry of Goethe and 
Schiller, uncloaking came to be associated with the moment of truth in art, with the dissolution 
of illusion, which is art-logic. But every artwork must make a claim to truth, must dissolve the 
illusions of other artworks. The criterion of subsequence to Auschwitz, in and of itself, did not 
seem to preclude a new self-critical movement in art, a new inner history, which could begin 
                                                
67 Mignon’s loss of illusion is the loss of sexual ambiguity, and with it, the loss of a sexual utopia beyond the 
sexes, as Elisabeth Lenk reads Goethe through Adorno’s course notes. Elisabeth Lenk, “La catégorie de la 
féminité chez Adorno: Une contradiction secondaire qui a survécu à la contradiction principale,” trans. Nicole 
Gabriel, in “Adorno critique de la domination: Une lecture féministe,” edited by Sonia Dayan-Herzbrun, Nicole 
Gabriel and Eleni Varikas, themed issue, Tumultes, no 23 (novembre 2004): pp. 11-27, esp. p. 26.     
68 The truth content of artworks should be realized in reality, not in the unreal world of art, and this demand 
becomes pressing after Auschwitz. The mature Adorno interprets the Mignon-Lied consistently in this sense: 
“The historical perspective that envisions the end of art is every work’s idea. There is no artwork that does not 
promise that its truth content, to the extent that it appears in the artwork as something existing, realizes itself and 
leaves the artwork behind simply as a husk, as Mignon’s prodigious verse prophesies” (vol. 7, p. 199 as 
translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 132).    
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in 1945. But since the moment of criticism in art, the dissolution of illusion, implies 
consolation, it is not clear whether it is still possible for art to have a self-critical movement. 
Art would have to dissolve the magic of consolation that has become associated with every 
dissolution of illusion. 
In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno maintains that just by existing, artworks are necessarily 
affirmative to some extent: “No [art] leaves no trace of affirmation, if any [art], by its sheer 
existence, rises above the neediness and degradation of the merely existing.”69 To make art is 
necessarily to defend a certain indifference to crude want. Dmitry Shostakovich’s long and 
arduous “Leningrad” Symphony No. 7, op. 60, (1941) did not at all adapt itself to the 
conditions of starvation of its times: during rehearsals musicians fell out of their chairs from 
sheer physical weakness. Olivier Messiaen’s Quatuor pour la fin du temps (1940/41) did not 
take into consideration what is physically comfortable for healthy musicians, let alone 
musicians in a prisoner of war camp: James Campbell remarked in 2000 that he practically 
had to go into training to perform it and, in 2012, that no piece had ever demanded more from 
the clarinettist. Every performance of these works is regarded as a wonder, proof that music 
possesses the power of faith or of the human spirit to overcome the most extreme physical 
limitations and humiliation. Multitudes, however, did not survive these conditions. The idea 
that the human spirit survives, despite it all, is affirmed absolutely in poetry, which in order to 
realize itself does not require performance, its becoming. Weighted towards existence, 
considered complete in its lay on the page, a poem does not spend most of its time failing, as 
music does. If poetry were lyric, it would be less barbaric, not more. Yet performance would 
not cancel out its affirmative character. This is because Auschwitz falsifies art’s universal 
                                                
69 GS, vol. 7, p. 239, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 160.  
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moment. Traditionally, the realizations of every particular artwork are already advances for 
the whole. A single work, the “Walzer” from Schoenberg’s Fünf Klavierstücke, op. 23, 
realized twelve-tone technique and offered it to all of humanity: the universality of twelve-
tone technique was already living and substantial even when his “Walzer” was alone. After 
Auschwitz, art can no longer content itself with advancing the material according to its own 
laws, for Nazi barbarism tainted all art, culture and civilization. After, then, the particular 
artwork is faced not with developing inner-aesthetic laws, but with negating the extra-aesthetic 
Nazi appropriation and barbarization of culture. But because of the peculiar nature of aesthetic 
universality, art cannot oppose the Nazi barbarization of culture in the particular instance 
without affirming at the same time that Nazi barbarism has been universally overcome and 
that culture has been universally restored. But in fact, no single poem can realize civilization 
universally as Schoenberg’s “Walzer” realized twelve-tone technique universally. This would 
require more than aesthetic universality. Every work now and in the foreseeable future starts 
out from barbarism, and it is not in the power of any one work, alone, definitively to overcome 
it. After culture’s failure to inoculate society against absolute barbarism, the very logic of 
artworks inadvertently makes exaggerated claims for culture’s restoration—or else these are 
just part of the continuing barbarism. Thus, art’s affirmative character is hardly harmless 
consolation, but weaves the lie that civilization exists. The deciding question in the debate, 
then, becomes not whether poetry can register negativity, but rather whether, after Auschwitz, 
art can lose its affirmative character. Ultimately, art’s affirmative element lies not in its choice 
of subject—Enzensberger mentions the prohibition on forget-me-nots—,70 but rather in the 
moment of art language: “This moment of affirmation passes out of the immediacy of 
                                                
70 Enzensberger, “Die Steine der Freiheit,” p. 74. 
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artworks and what they say and passes into the fact that they say it at all.”71 The Nazis’ 
destruction of language in particular, their enlisting of all rhetorical forces and powers of 
speech in the winning of the population to systematic murder, has made it impossible to write 
poetry without affirming that there is yet language. Figures of speech carry with them not 
inner history, but outer history: their use under Hitler to adjust individuals to totalitarian 
reality corroded their figurative aspect.72 The idea that a poem re-establishes language after 
Auschwitz, that there is still language after Auschwitz, is the undeniable affirmative moment 
in every single act of writing poetry in this era.  
In his judgement against poetry, Adorno included those artworks that attempted to 
erase their similarity to language. But new music’s distance from all language-like elements 
proved to be a position difficult to maintain, even in an art form that does not share its 
elements with signifying language, as does poetry:  
The movement that is subsumed under the name of the new music could easily be 
represented [darzustellen, presented] from the perspective of its a collective allergy to 
the primacy of similarity to language [Sprachähnlichkeit, language-likeness]. At the 
same time, precisely its most radical formulations have tended more toward the 
extreme of similarity to language than toward the impulse that is hostile to it. With 
these formulations, the subject took aim against the burdensome, conventionalized 
weight of traditional material. But today it is evident that even those elements of the 
new music that, to a conventional way of thinking, are considered subjectivistic contain 
within them a second element that tends to work against the notion used the nineteenth 
century to designate musical similarity to language—expression. The emancipation of 
                                                
71 GS, vol. 7, p. 240, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 160.  
72 Andreas Musolff, “What Role Do Metaphors Play in Racial Prejudice? The Function of Antisemitic Imagery 
in Hitler’s Mein Kampf,” Patterns of Prejudice 41, no. 1 (January 30, 2007): pp. 21-43, doi: 
10.1080/00313220601118744. Musolff examines Hitler’s metaphor comparing the German state to a diseased 
body. He concludes that Hitler’s illness/cure metaphor served at the outset to “transfer” individual consciousness 
into accepting the genocide and ignoring the reality of the atrocities: for those familiar with the metaphor, “the 
awareness of its genocidal dimension would…not have come as a completely new ‘insight’ but at least partly as a 
recognition of a conceptual pattern that was now being ‘turned into reality’ and thus confirmed. The ensuing 
reinterpretations of the metaphor may have ranged from the more or less self-conscious use of the illness-cure 
scenario as a way of glossing over unpalatable experiences or witness accounts to its deliberate use as a cover for 
referring to the atrocities. Once the latter point had been reached, any ‘metaphoric’ quality would have been lost: 
it would have been on a par with the specialized code of Holocaust perpetrators and administrators that included 
terms such as ‘concentration’, ‘deportation’, ‘special treatment’ etc.” (ibid., p. 43).  
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dissonance is often identified with the untrammelled desire for expression, and the 
aptness of this equation is confirmed by the development from Tristan to Elektra to 
Schoenberg’s Erwartung. But precisely in Schoenberg, the opposite also makes itself 
known early on.73  
 
This exact difficulty does not escape Enzensberger, who grasps it as a paradox: “Thus the 
power of speech can be recovered only in dialogue with the speechless.”74 Even Man Ray’s 
Poem of 1924, a page of dark horizontal marks of varying lengths, does not give up its status 
as language. It may be a poem whose every line has been blacked out, as if it had met with the 
censors, yet it both maintains recognizable features of poetry—header, lines and stanzas—and 
goes against the norm in poetry, which is to use words. Man Ray bars all words, carrying his 
refusal even farther than Heinrich Heine did in Ideen: Das Buch Le Grand, whose twelfth 
chapter consists of a page of short horizontal marks, but for the words “Die deutschen 
Censuren” (The German censors) at the beginning and, at one point, the word “Dummköpfe” 
(blockheads).75 Yet a poem without words might not be a poem at all, but a picture, simpler 
and purer than Klee’s colourful strips, which have been compared to scripts. Even in that case, 
Man Ray’s Poem still maintains the language-character specific to art, for it evokes and 
negates the ancient runic quality of Klee’s paintings, to become even more opaque than a rune. 
But no matter how far the work may go in its refusal of the language character, the work still 
exists, and this is also affirmative, according to Adorno. It seems, then, that to rid art of its 
affirmative character, it would be necessary to destroy all physical traces of artworks, reducing 
them to mere ideas. This, however, would set society backwards, for while autonomous 
                                                
73 GS, vol. 16, p. 654 as translated by Susan H. Gillespie except where indicated, “Music, Language and 
Composition,” in Essays on Music, pp. 113-126, here p. 118. 
74 Enzensberger, “Die Steine der Freiheit,” p. 74 (my translation). 
75 Heinrich Heine, Ideen: Das Buch le Grand, in Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe der Werke, herausgegeben 
von Manfred Windfuhr, Düsseldorfer Ausgabe, 16 vols. (Hamburg, Hoffmann und Campe, 1975-1997), vol. 6, 
pp. 169-222, here chapter 12, p. 201.   
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artworks do not strive to intervene politically, their possibility of advancing society is tied to 
their existence: “The effect of artworks is hardly that they present a latent praxis that 
corresponds to a manifest one, for their autonomy has moved far beyond such immediacy; 
rather, their effect is that of recollection [Erinnerung, memory], which they evoke by their 
existence.”76 For artworks to lose their affirmative side at the expense of the social effect of 
memory is not a sustainable position either, for it is the need, after Auschwitz, not to forget 
that places the ban on affirmative, cheerful art in the first place. If the only social effect of 
artworks is to bear memory, and if they must exist in order to bear it, then it seems that society 
gains nothing and loses everything by reducing art to the non-existing, to a kind of thought 
experiment or possibility, even if such de-realization of art is motivated by a justifiable 
repugnance towards affirmation. With the move to locate art’s social effect solely in memory, 
Adorno differs from Benjamin, who considers art to effect change by way of political 
consciousness. Adorno’s anti-Idealist thesis on the disunity of being and mind deters him both 
from attributing political being to political consciousness and from grounding political being 
in political consciousness; Benjamin, by contrast, considers it his theoretical task to offer an 
explanation as to how the modern artwork brings about political consciousness: it is to be 
recalled that, according to him, the modern artwork brings about political consciousness by 
generally heightening consciousness in its use of shock. Benjamin overshoots the mark in 
making political consciousness the presynaptic terminus of the advanced artwork, for he 
already understands shock as a specific form of memory, one which, in his proposal for a 
“new, dialectical method of doing history,” necessarily implies awakening from illusion and 
                                                
76 GS, vol. 7, p. 359 as translated except where indicated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 242.  
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dreaming.77 As the future just society must remain abstract and imageless to us, the best that 
art, history and philosophy can do in terms of social effect is to negate what is concrete, 
present and enduring by determining the existing, here and now, as illusory, as unreal, as 
irrational. In this way, these disciplines show that utopia cannot be ruled out and suppressed 
on the grounds that it is illusory: it is the present, real, enduring society that is truly steeped in 
illusion. But the real social effect of philosophy, history and art does not amount to lucid 
dreaming, but must be awakening, the effective dissolution of social illusion. Shock (or 
“explosion,” in Adorno’s word) shatters the social illusion that things cannot be otherwise 
because it really opens difference in the ever-same, in what has merely continued, the illusion 
of permanence wrought by habit: 
Scars of damage and disruption [Die Male der Zerrütterung, The marks of destruction] 
are the modern’s seal of authenticity [Echtheitssiegel]; by their means, art desperately 
negates the closed confines [die Geschlossenheit, the closed unity] of the ever-same; 
explosion is one of its invariants. Antitraditional energy becomes a voracious vortex. 
To this extent, the modern is myth turned against itself; the timelessness of myth 
becomes the catastrophic instant that destroys temporal continuity; Benjamin’s concept 
of the dialectical image contains this element.78 
 
The anti-illusory effect of memory—modern artwork’s explosion of the ever-same, its blasting 
into the temporal continuum that negates the here and now—is the artwork’s social effect 
because there has been a social injunction to forget. Yet the memory evoked by works that 
pose both language and illusion as a problem does not absolve art of its guilt. The fact that 
these works constitute the illusory sphere of art points to a deep wrong. For Auschwitz 
demanded changed life, life itself so beautiful, so expressive, so free, so luxurious, conscious 
and whole in every human being, so filled with memory and expectation, so as to dissolve the 
                                                
77 Benjamin, “[Pariser Passagen II],” in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 5, pp. 1044-1059, here p. 1058 as translated 
by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin except where indicated, “‹The Arcades of Paris›‹Paris Arcades II›,” in 
The Arcades Project, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 
pp. 873-884, here p. 884. 
78 GS, vol. 7, p. 41 as translated except where indicated Aesthetic Theory, p. 23.  
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need to write poems. But if barbarism is untransformed reality, the continuation of conditions 
that were also present under fascism, then all activities are barbaric. Adorno makes an 
example out of the activity that seems to be civilization par excellence in order to attack the 
notion that there could be any sphere above the taint of barbarism, notion expressed, for 
example, in the statement by Richard Wagner that through art all men are saved. What could 
be evidence more contrary to such an opinion than the footage of Furtwängler conducting the 
final movement of the Ninth Symphony, Beethoven’s setting of Schiller’s “An die Freude,” 
for an audience of Nazi officials and their guests on the occasion of Hitler’s birthday? 
 If culture as a whole can be judged barbaric, then the position of such criticism itself is 
unsustainable. Criticism does not take place outside culture and civilization; its most advanced 
technique, that of determinate negation, depends on the total delusion-context as a whole, and 
in this dependence on the whole it is not radically different from what it criticizes. But for a 
piece of civilization to judge all civilization barbaric is no mere performative error, but a futile 
and desperate reaction of horror before the end. The often-neglected second half of Adorno’s 
pronouncement against poetry after Auschwitz goes in this sense: a cultural sphere so 
compromised by barbarism that critique can write the whole of it off as garbage must be a 
thing so powerful and inescapable that it would corrode even what is said against it. 
Ultimately, criticism would be powerless if the act of writing a poem were itself barbaric. 
Cultural criticism alone cannot successfully negate art’s affirmative character: such criticism 
would have to be a blanket criticism of all art, and it is this assumption of art as a sphere that is 
affirmative. Affirmation, rather, should be made needless by life, life fulfilled at every point 
and pointing towards more.  
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 Criticism that makes a blanket condemnation of all art on the basis of its affirmative 
character is itself affirmative, in that it leaves off its divisive work; it so annuls itself. Poetry, 
however, that determines art’s affirmative character and negates this determinate aspect does 
not annul itself; nor does it become barbaric.  
Celan negates the idea that there can be any ancient German right to the play of rhyme, 
whose exercise would stand above all criticism, anymore. With “Todesfuge,” play becomes 
the arbitrary whim of tyrants. Schiller describes the play impulse as the “partnership between 
the formal and material impulse,” which “fulfils the conception of humanity.”79 But when 
humanity fails its concept so radically, even in the presence of art, then this is clearly an 
exaggerated claim for the play impulse. Play is an affirmative aspect of art, for “art as play 
seeks to atone for its illusion.”80 As illusion, art determines the illusory as human, for in 
Schiller’s aesthetics “all appearance [Schein, illusion] comes originally from man [von dem 
Menschen, from human being].”81 But when art is play, then it claims to be humanity already, 
rather than the occasion to judge whether humanity is adequate to its conception, and the 
collective guilt over the discrepancy between what humanity takes itself to be and what it 
actually is thus seeks to be absolved instead of becoming a spur to substantial humanity. As 
such, the play impulse itself falls under prohibition. 
In light of Celan’s “Todesfuge,” it seems that Schoenberg’s music is more advanced 
than Mahler’s: the critique of play is more advanced than the critique of conventions through 
play. Yet the critique of play first presented itself in art out of its own movement :  
                                                
79 Friedrich Schiller, Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, in Werke und 
Briefe, vol. 8, pp. 556-676, here p. 610, lines 23-24 and line 27 as translated by Reginald Snell, On the Aesthetic 
Education of Man in a Series of Letters (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1965), p. 77.     
80 GS, vol. 7, p. 64, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 39. 
81 Schiller, Werke und Briefe, vol. 8, p. 663, lines 16-17 as translated except where indicated, On the Aesthetic 
Education of Man, p. 127. 
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Schoenberg’s pieces are the first in which nothing can in fact be otherwise: they are 
case studies and constructions in one. In them nothing is left of the conventions that 
guaranteed the freedom of play. Schoenberg adopts just as polemical a position toward 
play as toward illusion.82  
 
Conventions had lost their substance through their facile use in salon music; the serious music 
of late Romanticism consequently treated such forms with the “ironic play” worthy of 
Nietzsche.83 The next step was to ask why these hollow conventions should be maintained at 
all. Since play was the means through which Mahler could maintain a shop-worn form like the 
Ländler, in the highly ironic second movement of his Ninth Symphony, then play was the 
target of Schoenberg’s critique. Convention, not play, was actually Schoenberg’s prime target. 
Schoenberg’s works thus aim at total rationalization and absolute literalness. Adorno, 
however, wildly exaggerates the degree to which Schoenberg realized these ideals, for what is 
supposed to eliminate play, the strict application of twelve-tone technique, necessarily implies 
it, in the breaks between permutations of the row.84 Adorno reads the intention of twelve-tone 
technique as the total bindingness of every note. He takes the example of “the first of 
Schoenberg’s published twelve-tone compositions,” arguably the Menuett from the Suite, 
op. 25,85 claiming that “every tone of the composition is determined by this row: there is no 
longer a single ‘free’ note.”86 This is clearly false because nothing in the technique itself 
determines which note will follow any single horizontal permutation of the row. Schoenberg 
starts the Trio of the Menuett by having the left hand state the prime set: E – F – G – D-flat – 
                                                
82 GS, vol. 12, p. 46, or prefer to my translation here that of Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster, 
Philosophy of Modern Music (New York: Seabury, 1980), p. 40f.  
83 GS, vol. 12, p. 45 as translated, Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 39.  
84 Adorno admits that the “playful quality of the permutations” is unmistakable, but maintains that revolutionary 
art is critical of play. GS, vol. 7, p. 154, as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 100. 
85 Arnold Schoenberg, “Menuett,” from Suite für Klavier, op. 25 (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1925), pp. 17-19.  
86 GS, vol. 12, p. 63, as translated, p. 62. 
 306 
G-flat – E-flat – A-flat – D – B – C – A – B-flat.87 The F-flat following it is free.88 Once all 
twelve notes of the row have been heard in sequence absolutely nothing predetermines what 
should come next, hence which note should come next. There are forty-eight permutations 
from which to choose: the row in its four linear aspects plus all the transpositions of these. 
Since all transpositions are possible, any of the twelve notes is possible. The prime set here 
happens to be followed by its inverted sequence, but this is not determined by the row, but by 
the needs of the composition. Furthermore, Schoenberg’s Menuett is not a sequence, unlike 
Luciano Berio’s Sequenzas, which render the whole notion of twelve-tone serial technique 
absurd.89 Schoenberg’s twelve-tone technique may be serial, but his music is not. In the Trio 
of the Menuett, Schoenberg has the right hand enter with a different permutation of the row 
before the prime set has run its course in the right hand.90 Adorno appears not to consider the 
composition as a whole, but only one voice at a time. He claims: “The row rationalizes what is 
instinctive in every conscientious composer: sensitivity towards the too-early recurrence of the 
same pitch, except for cases in which it is immediately repeated.”91 This is also false. Twelve-
tone technique does not guarantee the too-close repetition of individual notes or intervals 
because the simultaneity or staggering of different permutations of the same row interferes 
with the principle of even distribution of pitches that Adorno claims for the row. One of the 
characteristics of Schoenberg’s row as it first appears in the Trio of the Menuett is the mini-
                                                
87 Schoenberg, “Menuett,” p. 19, m. 34-35, l.h. The prime set here is identified after George Perle, Serial 
Composition and Atonality: An Introduction to the Music of Schoenberg, Berg, and Webern, 4th ed., revised 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 62, ex. 83. Adorno gives the set rather as C-sharp – A – B – 
G – A-flat – F-sharp – B-flat – D – E – E-flat – C – F, but without a reference to the score. See GS, vol. 12, p. 63, 
or in English Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 61f.    
88 Schoenberg, “Menuett,” p. 19, m. 36, l.h. 
89 See, for example, Luciano Berio, Sequenza IXa per clarinetto solo (Vienna: Universal Edition, 1980). 
90 Ibid., p. 19, m. 35. 
91 GS, vol. 12, p. 65 as translated, Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 64.  
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sequence at its close: the half-tone shift from B to C, followed by the half-tone shift from A to 
B-flat.92 This pair of minor seconds corresponds to the minor ninth that opens the set. The 
minor second in its simple or compound form thus should mark off each linear expression of 
the set as a unit, for this interval appears nowhere else in the row. In the preparation for the 
repeat, however, the characteristic finish to the inverted expression of the row in the left hand, 
A' – A-flat' – C-flat'' – B-flat' in sixteenth notes, is followed immediately by A' again, the sixth 
tone of the permutation P-6, which is meanwhile continuing in the right hand.93 For 
Schoenberg has constructed the piece so that the linear expressions of the row overlap at the 
middle, and this produces the effect of a decoration around the A, which is thus emphasized. 
The row is not rhythmically determined in advance, so the A, as a dotted quarter-note, is more 
important in the scope of this passage, not least of all because it falls on the downbeat of the 
last bar of the first section of the Trio (in both first and second endings). For all these reasons, 
A takes on the function of a tonic. The emphasis on A at the end of the first phrase of the Trio 
is not governed by twelve-tone technique. It can thus hardly be claimed that, with twelve-tone 
technique, “the tone which recurs too early, as well as the tone which is ‘free’ or coincidental 
in the face of the totality, becomes taboo.”94 Schoenberg’s critique of play, therefore, is not as 
radical as Adorno claims it is. It might be wondered meanwhile whether Schoenberg’s 
recourse to old forms emptied of their life and breath, which Mahler treated at a critical 
remove, is not simply naïve restoration. The second movement of Mahler’s Symphony No. 3 
subjects the minuet to disconcerting fluctuations in tempo, timbre, intensity and even time 
signature, and this very dramatic contouring of the musical space ends up dislodging the 
                                                
92 Schoenberg, “Menuett,” p. 19, m. 35, l.h., third quarter-note-value. 
93 Ibid., p. 19, mm. 37-38. 
94 GS, vol. 12, p. 65 as translated, Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 64.  
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priority of the traditional form, which does not at any rate follow the conventional Minuet-
Trio-Minuet da capo sequence.95 The Trio, or the contrasting material in nonstandard—or 
even impossible—minuet time signatures in two and in nine, is in fact interspersed with the 
minuet material, which is itself so variously represented colouristically that there is never an 
authentic da capo moment. Schoenberg, by contrast, upholds the traditional Minuet-Trio-
Minuet da capo form, which maintains its priority over the occasional idiosyncrasies in tempo 
and time signature by way of the strongly contrasting character of the Trio, which is entirely 
martellato (“hammered”) to the innig (“heartfelt” or “intimate”) of the Menuett. It so appears 
that Schoenberg failed to appreciate what was genuinely advanced about the music that just 
preceded him: its own critique of convention.96 In order for his critique of play to be decisive, 
he should take a critical position on the old dance forms as well. In Celan’s poetry, the 
problem of play is of a completely different order. It is posed not only by Romanticism or by 
                                                
95 Gustav Mahler, Symphony No. 3, II, in Symphonies Nos. 3 and 4 in Full Score (New York: Dover, 1989), 
pp. 103-131.  
96 Mahler’s ironic play of forms, against which Schoenberg appears merely conventional, is as another reason 
why Anne Boissière is right to oppose Stravinsky and Mahler rather than Stravinsky and Schoenberg. As she 
explains, “La conception critique du progrès qu’Adorno développe dans Philosophie de la nouvelle musique en 
mettant côte à côte Schoenberg et Stravinsky ne doit pas être confondue avec l’aspiration à une musique critique, 
qui reste un point de visée à ce stade non abouti de sa pensée de la musique. Aussi est-il hâtif de penser le trouver 
du côté de Schoenberg et, a fortiori, dans la volonté qu’avait eue le compositeur d’opérer une révolution du 
langage musical, d’abord en émancipant la musique de la tonalité, puis en inventant la méthode dodécaphonique. 
Si Adorno s’est passionnément intéressé à cet aspect du champ compositionnel de son époque, il n’est pas sûr 
qu’il y ait trouvé les modalités de la réconciliation avec la nature qu’il espérait trouver à travers la musique et qui, 
seule, pouvait permettre de sortir de cette logique infernale du progrès à laquelle il ne cessait de réfléchir dans sa 
philosophie. L’antithèse entre Mahler et Stravinsky qu’on a vue se profiler atteste que la problématique du passé 
et du souvenir risque de s’avérer bien plus pertinente pour saisir l’orientation de fond de son travail 
philosophique sur la musique.” (The critical conception of progress that Adorno develops in Philosophy of New 
Music, where he juxtaposes Schoenberg and Stravinsky, must not be confused with the aspiration for a critical 
music, which remains an unrealized goal at this stage in his thought on music. As well, it is hasty to think that he 
aligns himself with Schoenberg and, a fortiori, with the composer’s intention to create a revolution in musical 
language by first emancipating music from tonality and by then inventing the twelve-tone method. Although 
Adorno took a passionate interest in this aspect of the compositional production of his times, it is not certain that 
he would have found the terms and conditions for the reconciliation with nature that he hoped to find by way of 
music, and which was the only thing that could offer an escape from that infernal logic of progress to which he 
devoted unceasing reflection in his philosophy. The antithesis between Mahler and Stravinsky raised above 
suggests that the problematic of the past and memory will turn out to be far more relevant to an understanding of 
the basic direction of Adorno’s philosophical work on music.) Anne Boissière, La pensée musicale de Theodor 
W. Adorno: L’épique et le temps (Paris: Beauchesne, 2011), p. 109.    
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Modernism, not only by Romantic irony or by Modern literalness, but also by overwhelming 
inhumanity, and it is posed to culture as a whole. 
  The question as to whether culture as a whole has become barbaric is articulated 
through play not only because the play impulse in Schiller’s aesthetics is supposed to fulfil the 
concept of humanity, but also because in Kant’s aesthetics the task legislated for the faculty of 
judgement gains all of its legitimacy from its capacity to arbitrate specifically on the universal 
and necessary communicability of aesthetic feeling, which results from the “free play of the 
faculties of cognition with a representation through which an object [Gegenstand] is given.”97 
According to Kant’s own table in the “Introduction” to the second edition of the third Critique, 
there are three faculties of cognition: the faculty of understanding, which applies itself to 
nature; the faculty of the power of judgement, which applies itself to art; and the faculty of 
reason, which applies itself to freedom.98 The application of each of these faculties to its 
specific matter produces cognitions, which have two components, intuitions and concepts.99 
The question that Kant raises in the third Critique is whether these faculties can produce 
something other than determinate cognitions that, like determinate cognitions, attains to 
universality and necessity. The question is whether, when faced with “a representation through 
which an object is given,”100 which is to say, whether, when faced with an intuition,101 the 
faculties of cognition can do something other than synthesize it with a concept and still secure 
universality and necessity for their activity. How can the judgement of taste ever lay claim to 
                                                
97 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5:217. The pagination given here and throughout corresponds to 
the Academy of Sciences edition of Kant’s works (Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: G. Reimer/ W. de 
Gruyter, 1902-), and appears in the margins of Guyer and Matthews’s translation. 
98 Ibid., 5:167 and 5:198. 
99 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B146.  
100 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:217. 
101 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B146. 
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necessity? The faculty of judgement would have something to arbitrate if the judgement of 
taste were based on concepts: it would then be a legitimate judging power. Whether the 
judgement of taste is based on concepts is unclear: on one hand, “de gustibus non est 
disputandum” (there is no disputing taste); on the other hand, arguments, discourse, on what is 
tacky, kitschy, shoddy, flaky, middling, passé or tasteless are legion. The judgement of taste 
appears to be entirely subjective, persisting in its refusal to call “a building, a view, or a poem” 
beautiful, despite the “hundred voices who all praise it highly,”102 and, at the same time, the 
judgement of taste appears to be entirely objective, as if beauty could really be ascribed to the 
object, as if the judgement were made “only in accordance with that quality in it by means of 
which it corresponds with our way of receiving it.”103 This contradiction constitutes the 
antinomy of taste.104 Kant claims that this antinomy, like all antinomies, arises due to a 
natural, inevitable illusion: 
There is no possibility of lifting the conflict between these two principles underlying 
every judgement of taste…., except by showing that the concept to which the object is 
related in this sort of judgement is not taken in the same sense in the two maxims of the 
aesthetic power of judgement, that this twofold sense or point of view in judging is 
necessary in our transcendental power of judgement, but also that the semblance 
[Schein] involved in the confusion of the one with the other is, as a natural illusion 
[Illusion], unavoidable.105 
 
Schiller’s claim that “all appearance [Schein, illusion] comes originally from man [von dem 
Menschen, from human being]” appears to have a target—Kant.106 The illusion that generates 
the antinomy may be necessary, but Kant should not be any more convinced of its naturalness 
                                                
102 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:284. 
103 Ibid., 5:282. 
104 Ibid., 5:338f. 
105 Ibid., 5:339. Please note that “semblance” here appears to be a stylistic choice to avoid repetition: 
transcendental Schein is not a species of natural Illusion, for Kant will also mention “transsendentale Illusion” at 
A695/B723. He also employs “Schein” to refer to the (non-transcendental) optical illusion by which the rising 
moon, close to the horizon, seems larger than a fully risen moon (A297/B354).   
106 Schiller, Werke und Briefe, vol. 8, p. 663, lines 16-17 as translated except where indicated, On the Aesthetic 
Education of Man, p. 127. 
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than is Schiller. For Kant states outright in the above passage that a conflict arises because a 
single concept is taken in two different senses. In effect, Kant attempts to solve the antinomy 
of taste by making a finer distinction in the concept of the concept: the contradiction comes 
about because in the thesis that the judgement of taste is not based on concepts, determinate 
concepts are meant, whereas in the antithesis, that the judgement of taste is based on concepts, 
indeterminate concepts are meant.107 But this contradiction is nothing other than what 
dialectical thinking calls the movement in the concept, which is historical, not natural. What 
Kant takes to be an aberration is on Hegel’s account the norm. Furthermore, the concept’s 
inherent contradictoriness is a result of labour, which, as Adorno does not cease to emphasize, 
is social. While Kant is right to explain the antinomy by starting out from the double-sided 
concept, he does not draw the conclusion that these different determinations of the concept are 
due to intellectual work performed on the concept in an antagonistic society. Today we would 
say that the antinomy of taste is a material and objective contradiction having its basis in a 
society that is in the process of de-realizing its objects. The objective side of the antinomy of 
the judgement of taste, which claims to judge about real qualities in the object and which 
claims that beauty can really be attributed to a particular sensible object, is ceding its way to 
merely subjective consumer satisfaction that wants to impose its likes on others. Kant showed 
himself uncritical of this tendency in society, in that he found his solution to the antinomy not 
in the realm of the senses, in the cold and lonely suffering and deprivation that come about 
when objects’ qualities do not enter into consideration, when an object’s miserable existence is 
a matter of indifference, but he found it rather in the supersensible sphere: 
But now all contradiction vanishes if I say that the judgement of taste is based on a 
concept (of a general ground for the subjective purposiveness of nature for the power 
                                                
107 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:340f. 
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of judgement), from which, however, nothing can be cognized and proved with regard 
to the object, because it is in itself indeterminable and unfit for cognition; yet at the 
same time by means of this very concept it acquires validity for everyone (in each case, 
to be sure, as a singular judgement immediately accompanying the intuition), because 
its determining ground may lie in the concept of that which can be regarded as the 
supersensible substratum of humanity.108 
 
With the move in which the supersensible is evoked to ground the sensible, Kant attempts the 
“redemption of illusion,” as Adorno called it.109 When thought stops in an inevitable and 
impassable illusion, Kant will strive to save objectivity by evoking the necessary and universal 
condition that produces the illusion. The contradiction comes out of the way our faculties are 
naturally set up, out of the natural tendency of reason to apply the categories of the 
understanding beyond the limits of possible experience.110 But an understanding of why this 
contradiction comes about permits us to say with objective certainty that we all necessarily 
have experience only of appearances, not of things in themselves. In this way, Kant presumes 
to ground the universality of the judgement of taste: “For if one did not assume such a point of 
view, then the claim of the judgement of taste to universal validity could not be saved.”111 He 
adopts the same strategy here as he does in the other Critiques, which is to put the consistency 
of reason with itself, the architectonic of reason and the unity of the faculties, before the 
sensible feelings that give the lie to the harmony of reason: 
Thus one see that the removal of the antinomy of the aesthetic power of judgement 
takes a course similar to that followed by the Critique in the resolution of the 
antinomies of pure theoretical reason, and that in the same way both here and in the 
Critique of Practical Reason one is compelled, against one’s will, to look beyond the 
sensible and seek the unifying point of all our faculties a priori in the supersensible: 
because no other way remains to make reason self-consistent.112 
 
                                                
108 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:340. 
109 GS, vol. 6, p. 386, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 393. 
110 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A295/B352. 
111 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:340. 
112 Ibid., 5:341. 
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Kant effectively claims that arguments that seek to establish the beauty of a particular object 
do not need to bring real concepts to bear on it, but can make an appeal to the “supersensible 
substratum of humanity.”113 Instead of saying why an object is beautiful, the Kantian judge of 
beauty can communicate the feeling that results from the free play of her faculties in the 
perception of an object, which proves their essential harmony and self-consistency. In 
claiming that the object is beautiful, the Kantian judge of beauty is effectively saying that in 
the perception of the object her faculties of cognition are engaged in free play, but she is not 
however synthesizing intuition and concept when she makes this judgement because the 
decisive concept here, “freedom,” does not relate to the object. If an object of sense were free, 
then something free would be determined at least in time; freedom, however, is precisely what 
is not subject to natural laws.114 Along with God and immortality, freedom constitutes an 
“unavoidable” problem of dogmatic metaphysics.115 The universality and necessity in the 
judgement of taste are not assured by the object of sense somehow falling under the concept of 
freedom, but by a general, timeless feature of all human beings’ faculties showing up when the 
beautiful object presents itself. The beautiful object shows that perception of an object of 
sense does not necessarily engage the production of cognitions; instead, what can happen is 
that all the faculties of cognition can work together to produce a feeling. Such feeling draws 
universality from the freedom of every individual’s faculties of cognition. This feeling says 
something essential about all our cognitions: they could be or not be, they are born of freedom, 
something different from what they purport to capture—what really is and what must be, the 
object of sense. Understood this way, the judgement of taste is based on a concept, just this 
                                                
113 Ibid., 5:340. 
114 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxxviii. 
115 Ibid., A3/B7. 
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indeterminate concept, which refers to the form of cognition in general. This is compatible 
with claiming that the judgement of taste is not based on any determinate concept, which 
would unite a given manifold of an object.116  
   To Kant’s resolution of the antinomy of taste, Hegel would argue that an indeterminate 
concept is really no concept at all because determinateness belongs to concepts essentially: 
“And because this determinateness is the determinateness of the concept, and hence the 
absolute determinateness, singularity, the concept is the ground and source of all finite 
determinateness and manifoldness.”117 Even the suggestion of such things as “thoughts 
without content” or “intuitions without concepts”118 strikes Hegel as nonsensical, for intuitions 
and concepts are not intrinsically separate:  
If on the superficial view of what the concept is all manifoldness falls outside it, and 
only the form of abstract universality or of empty reflective identity stays with it, we 
can at once call attention to the fact that any statement or definition expressly requires, 
besides the genus which in fact is already itself more than just abstract universality, 
also a specific determinateness. And it does not take much thoughtful reflection on the 
implication of this requirement to see that differentiation is an equally essential 
moment of the concept.119 
 
The feeling of satisfaction that is supposed to accompany beautiful objects would not be any 
kind of concept at all, according to Hegel, for it is entirely indeterminate, so if there are 
arguments to be made for why a work can be called beautiful, they imply real, determinate 
concepts. Kant, however, is not as formal a thinker as Hegel makes him out to be, and Hegel 
knows it, for Kant’s indeterminate concept is just that of a “supersensible substratum of 
                                                
116 Ibid., B137. 
117 Hegel, Werke, vol. 6, p. 261 as translated by George di Giovanni, The Science of Logic (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 520. 
118 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A51/B75. 
119 Hegel, Werke, vol. 6, p. 260 as translated by G. di Giovanni, The Science of Logic, p. 519. 
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appearances.”120 Kant so much as admits that already a purely conceptual element underlies 
appearances, which, by definition, are supposed to be undetermined, as evidenced by the 
following statement: “The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called 
appearance.”121 The function of the indeterminate concept is precisely to determine the object 
of sense as an appearance as distinct from the thing in itself: “A concept of this kind, 
however, is the mere pure rational concept of the supersensible, which grounds the object (and 
also the judging subject) as an object of sense, consequently as an appearance.”122 The 
beautiful object appears as appearance, rather than as some reality whose relation to subjects 
is unclear or which is wholly independent vis-à-vis sensing subjects. The beautiful object’s 
appearance as appearance should in fact ground all appearances as already implicitly 
determined in some way, or, as Hegel would say, as grounded in the concept. If “sensible” is 
understood in the sensible subject’s experience of the sensible object, if the experience of the 
sensible in some sense says “I am sensible,” then the supersensible is already implicit in all 
objects of sense, so, in appearances. Even in the terms of Kant’s own philosophy, then, 
transcendental schematism should not in fact be necessary for the synthesis that characterizes 
knowledge in the robust sense—non-tautological, new knowledge that has a relation to its 
objects. Hegel’s entire dialectical project, which is to produce what attains to the Kantian 
concept of knowledge out of the already supersensible part of the sensible, out of the so-called 
indeterminately conceptual part of the appearance, part whose potential Kant merely raises but 
does not realize, aims to demonstrate the redundancy of the transcendental schema, that “third 
thing” that Kant thinks “is always requisite for a synthetic proposition in order to connect with 
                                                
120 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:341. 
121 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A20/B34. 
122 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:340. 
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other concepts that have no logical (analytic) affinity.”123 Schematism is unnecessary even 
within the parameters of Kant’s philosophy, Hegel would argue, because objects of sense are 
not just indeterminate appearances, but also intelligible, so are already determined (as 
“intelligible”). They are already to some extent conceptualized. While Adorno is opposed to 
all forms of schematism, he recasts the transcendental schemata in materialist terms—that is, 
linguistically and historically—as “constellations.” Even without the term “necessity,” we can 
still circumscribe its object, as Kant does: “the existence of an object at all times.”124 The 
actual Kantian schemata are fixed and ready devices, limited in number, that eternally 
guarantee adequacy not only between subject and object, but also between any heterogeneous 
concepts that are to come, for all human beings. But schemata, like the one just cited, can be 
models for rethinking any concept. When we express an object clearly even while suspending 
use of the existing term for that object, then Saussure’s claim that nothing but thoughtless 
murk ever precedes the arbitrary union of signifier and signified is false. If an object can be 
recognizably expressed not through its existing concept, which has been arbitrarily attached to 
an acoustic image, but through a configuration of other concepts centred around the object, 
then we do not really need an arbitrary sign system in order to think, nor, by extension, 
intersubjective agreement on the meaning of gestures in order to communicate. Signs, and the 
concepts that constitute them, are social illusion, however necessary, and the objectivity of 
constellations is drawn from the force of demonstrating that signs are social illusion. A 
constellation is the determinate way in which many previously determined (i.e., historically 
determined) concepts come together to represent what an existing concept already represents 
faultily on its own: the object. It is objective not in that it perfectly captures or corresponds to 
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reality, but in that it resists the social domination that gives the arbitrary relation of concepts 
and images a seemingly objective allure. It succeeds when it temporarily suspends a sign, 
disturbing its seeming consensus. The ability to express and to recognize an object in new 
combinations of old concepts, and not by way of the concept that would subsume it, is nothing 
other than the survival of the mimetic gift, the capacity for similarities. This way of 
proceeding, and not any non-signifying artistic “gesturing,” is precisely what of mimesis 
Adorno proposes philosophy should adopt in its comportment: “The concept is able to 
represent [vertreten] the thing, whose mimesis it drove out [verdrängt], in no way other than 
by taking on something mimetic in its own conduct, without giving itself up to it.”125 It is not a 
question of philosophy abandoning conceptual practice to restore the former mimetic one, 
returning to the original exercise of the mimetic faculty in improvising new names for things. 
The concept in the form of a constellation is not art, for it must still be able to represent the 
thing. Adorno’s critique of schematism, then, does not wipe out the difference between art and 
non-art in his philosophy. Unlike Hegel, Adorno maintains that art is “without a concept,” 
where “concept” implies the (determinate) representation of a thing. 
  When one looks more closely into how Kant defines the arts, however, one discovers 
that the concept there is not indeterminate, but always involves play. Kant defines all the arts 
in his tripartite system of the fine arts in terms of this concept. The arts of speech, rhetoric and 
poetry, involve the free play of the imagination: “Rhetoric is the art of conducting a business 
of the understanding as a free play of the imagination; poetry that of carrying out a free play 
                                                
125 GS, vol. 6, p. 26, or prefer to my translation here, Negative Dialectics, p. 14. 
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of the imagination as a business of the imagination.”126 Pictorial art also depends on a free 
play of the imagination, one which animates lifeless things:  
But how pictorial art can be counted (by analogy) as gesture in a language is justified 
by the fact that the spirit of the artist gives a corporeal expression through these shapes 
to what and how he has thought, and makes the thing itself speak as it were in mime: a 
very common play of our fantasy, which attributes to lifeless things, in accordance 
with their form, a spirit that speaks from them.127 
 
Kant calls the third kind of fine art “the art of the play of sensations,” in which he classes 
music and the art of colour.128 All other arts derive from or combine one or more of these 
forms.129 Furthermore, Kant makes the general claim that “all stiff regularity (whatever 
approaches mathematical regularity) is of itself contrary to taste.”130 The natural beauty of 
birdsong also lies in its irregularity: “Even the song of the bird, which we cannot bring under 
any musical rules, seems to contain more freedom and thus more that is entertaining for taste 
than even a human song that is performed in accordance with all the rules of the art of 
music.”131 The free play of the imagination would be most sustained by the freedom of 
English gardens and Baroque furniture; hence these would be the most beautiful art objects.132 
From the whole of this evidence, one concludes that, if the beautiful art object sets the 
faculties in free play, it is because it is itself a kind of play and evokes the concept of play, 
which would appear to contradict Kant’s thesis that the beautiful pleases universally without a 
concept. Beautiful art (but not beautiful nature) engages the concept of play. Play turns into a 
historical invariant, a permanent aspect of beautiful art, because the beautiful is just what 
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128 Ibid., 5:321. 
129 Ibid., 5:325f.  
130 Ibid., 5:342. 
131 Ibid., 5:343. 
132 Ibid., 5:342. 
 319 
engages the play of the faculties, necessarily referring us to those permanent features of 
ourselves that make cognition possible.   
 Modern art’s critique of play evokes the Kantian concept of play, which has not only to 
do with the play of the faculties, but also with the beautiful art object. The critique of play in 
Celan’s “Todesfuge” is, however, a far more serious critique of Kant than Schoenberg’s 
dodecaphonic music. The object of criticism is not so much the old and unquestioned 
determination of beauty, inherited from German Idealism, as it is aesthetic illusion as the 
reflection of an a priori harmonized and civilized human reason. The beautiful object itself 
may be without a concept, in the sense that it does not pick out, collect together and 
subordinate some part of the manifold under it, but the judgement that an object is beautiful is 
not critical if it presumes to draw its universality from a notion of humanity that excludes the 
suffering, sensible aspect of the thing. Celan negates the seemingly natural determination of 
aesthetic illusion as play by determining appearance instead as historical appearance.133 In the 
same moment, play picks up its non-aesthetic sense, the arbitrary “play of chance” that 
Idealism excludes from the beautiful, while history breaks into the poem as this arbitrary and 
inhumane play, which ends up taking the aesthetic concept of play with it.134 One cannot, after 
Celan, speak of appearance as play, much less rehabilitate play as an aesthetic category, as 
Ruth Sonderegger135 and Martin Seel136 have recently attempted.  
                                                
133 See Felstiner, chapter 2, “A Fugue after Auschwitz (1944-45),” in his Paul Celan, pp. 26-41. Felstiner brings 
out not only the many literary and cultural references in “Todesfuge,” but also the poem’s documentation of 
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134 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:331. 
135 Ruth Sonderegger, Für eine Ästhetik des Spiels: Hermeneutik, Dekonstruktion, und der Eigensinn der Kunst 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000). Sonderegger defends the need of the concept of play as a way out of the 
“unfruitful” impasse between hermeneutics and deconstruction: “I will therefore propose a new beginning made 
possible by the concept of aesthetic play, which makes a restitution of the matter that hermeneutics and 
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 In “Is Art Light-Hearted?” Adorno revises the ban on poetry after Auschwitz to cover 
only art that is “heiter”—cheerful or light-hearted: “Because Auschwitz was possible and 
remains possible for the foreseeable future, light-hearted art is no longer conceivable.”137 This 
essay takes as its point of departure the last line of Schiller’s prologue to Wallenstein: “Ernst 
ist das Leben, heiter ist die Kunst.”138 Adorno, however, reads this line as voicing a hard and 
fast dichotomy between life and art that affirms the present-day split between work and leisure 
as an “eternal law.”139 This may reflect the facile way the bourgeoisie of Adorno’s day used 
the line, quoting it out of context. But Schiller’s lines previous to “Ernst ist das Leben, heiter 
ist die Kunst” deny any such compartmentalization of life and art: poetic inspiration presents 
the possibility for the “dark image/Of truth” (“düstre Bild/ Der Wahrheit”) to pass over to the 
cheerful realm of art.140 If anything, Schiller could be accused not of making eternal, iron-clad 
categories, but of the opposite: of presupposing no limit that could not be overcome. Clearly 
the intention of the line is not to claim all art for leisure. Then Adorno’s claim that cheerful art 
is inconceivable after Auschwitz would be just as facile, amounting to the claim that art should 
                                                                                                                                                    
deconstruction takes as their concern, but each in its extreme one-sidedness” (ibid., p. 10, my translation). Spiel, 
however, does not open a new beginning, but rather returns aesthetics to the past. 
136 Martin Seel, Ästhetik des Erscheinens (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2000), trans. John Farrell as Aesthetics 
of Appearing (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); and Die Macht des Erscheinens: Texte zur Ästhetik 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007). Seel’s argues that perception and its objects are central to aesthetics. He 
defines aesthetic perception in terms of the category of play: “Aesthetic perception is play, and it is attentiveness 
to a game. It is a playful going along with a game that is not solely its game” (Aesthetics of Appearing, p. 135). 
Seel does not consider the need felt by Adorno and Kant to save the possibility of a subject not “going along with 
a game that is not solely its game,” but rather exercising freedom with respect to sensuous givenness. In his 
reflections on what of the German tradition could still be taught after Auschwitz, Adorno advocates saving 
precisely this aspect of Kant’s autonomous subject—the “Nicht-Mitmachen” of the autonomous subject, the 
refusal to just go along with whatever is given (GS, vol. 10.2, p. 679). In Seel’s aesthetics of appearing, by 
contrast, play becomes a screen-concept that cuts off serious reflection on the repressed concept of Auschwitz, 
and on the real “Macht des Erscheinens”—the power of appearances to force subjects “to go along with the 
game.” 
137 GS, vol. 11, p. 603 as translated, Notes to Literature, vol. 2, p. 251. 
138 Schiller, Werke und Briefe, vol. 4, p. 17, line 138.  
139 GS, vol. 11, p. 599 as translated, Notes to Literature, vol. 2, p. 247. 
140 Schiller, Werke und Briefe, vol. 4, p. 17, lines 133-34. 
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not be entertainment. But a more serious misreading of Heiterkeit is lodged in Adorno’s claim 
that Schiller defines art according to the effect that it has on the recipient. Adorno even 
attempts to enlist Hegel as an ally against Heiterkeit: 
The possibility that things might sometime become truly different is hidden from 
Schiller the idealist. He is concerned with the effects of art. For all the noblesse of his 
gesture, Schiller secretly anticipates the situation under the culture industry in which 
art is prescribed to tired businesspeople as a shot in the arm. Hegel was the first to 
object, at he height of German Idealism, to an aesthetics of effect [Wirkungsästhetik] 
dating back to the eighteenth century and including Kant, and with it to this view of 
art: art was not, he stated, a mechanism for delight and instruction à la Horace.141 
 
Hegel, however, cites that despised line of Schiller with approval:  
In this respect, amongst the fundamental characteristics of the Ideal we may put at the 
top this serene peace and bliss, this self-enjoyment in its own achievedness and 
satisfaction. The ideal work of art confronts us like a blessed god. For the blessed gods 
..., there is no final seriousness in distress, in anger, in the interest involved in finite 
spheres and aims, and this positive withdrawal into themselves, along with the negation 
of everything particular, gives them the characteristic of serenity and tranquillity. In 
this sense Schiller’s phrase holds good: “Life is serious, art cheerful.” Often enough, it 
is true, pedants have poked fun at this, on the ground that art in general, and especially 
Schiller’s own poetry, is of a most serious kind; and after all in fact ideal art does not 
lack seriousness—but even in the seriousness cheerfulness or serenity remains its 
inherent and essential character. The force of individuality, this triumph of concrete 
freedom concentrated in itself, is what we recognize especially in the works of art of 
antiquity in the cheerful and serene peace of their shapes. And this results not at all 
from a mere satisfaction gained without struggle, but on the contrary, only when a 
deeper breach has rent the subject’s inner life and his whole existence. For even if the 
heroes of tragedy for example, are so portrayed that they succumb to fate, still the heart 
of the hero recoils into simple unity with itself, when it says: “It is so.” The subject in 
this case still always remains true to himself; he surrenders what he has been robbed of, 
yet the ends he pursues are not just taken from him; he renounces them and thereby 
does not lose himself. Man, the slave of destiny, may lose his life, but not his freedom. 
It is this self-reliance which even in grief enables him to preserve and manifest the 
cheerfulness and serenity of tranquillity.142 
 
Referring the reader to Schiller’s own, often tragic, poetry, Hegel argues against interpreting 
“cheerful” as an effect, as the feeling it instils in the recipient. Hegel does not interpret 
Schiller’s notion of cheerfulness this way because effects are contingent, and he has just 
                                                
141 GS, vol. 11, p. 599f. as translated, Notes to Literature, vol. 2, p. 247f.  
142 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 208f. as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 157f. 
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defined the Ideal as what has removed itself from contingency: “The Ideal is actuality 
[Wirklichkeit], withdrawn from the profusion of details and accidents.”143 According to Hegel, 
the cheerfulness of the artwork relates precisely to the elimination of contingency and of 
particularity, carried out in tragedy by the hero himself, who appropriates every pain and ego-
alien force and lives out every external event, even death itself, as a higher logic and as his 
own individuality. The operation of tragedy is the conversion of fate, of what the external 
reality forces on the individual, into freely chosen and self-determining reason, into the 
expression of individual power. But the concept of Heiterkeit that Adorno is attacking is 
properly Hegel’s, not Schiller’s. Hegel’s adage that “human beings may lose their lives, but 
not freedom” expresses art’s supreme consolation and the pinnacle of what is false and cruel 
in art: that death is not supposed to be the absolute limit on the individual, not doom, pain, 
suffering and heartless social necessity, but rather freedom.144 Heiterkeit is supposed to raise 
the particular thing out from the scattering of miserable moments into the unitary sphere of art: 
The thesis of art’s lightheartedness is to be taken in a very precise sense. It holds for art 
as a whole, not for individual works. Those may be thoroughly devoid of 
lightheartedness, in accordance with the horrors of reality. What is lighthearted in art 
is, if you like, the opposite of what one might easily assume it to be: not its content but 
its demeanor [Verhalten, comportment], the abstract fact [das Abstrakte] that it is art at 
all, that it opens out over the reality to whose violence it bears witness at the same 
time.145  
 
Adorno’s clarification that art’s cheerfulness lies not in what art the artwork is, but that it is art 
at all corresponds quite recognizably to what, in one passage of Aesthetic Theory, he called 
art’s moment of affirmation, to quote it again: “This moment of affirmation passes out of the 
                                                
143 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 207 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 156. 
144 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 209, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 158.  
145 GS, vol. 11, p. 600, as translated except where indicated, Notes to Literature, vol. 2, p. 248.  
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immediacy of artworks and what they say and passes into the fact that they say it at all.”146 It 
is the cultural sphere as a whole that consoles the individual over daily loss of life, whether 
that individual is an inarticulate lovesick teenager scribbling poems in a basement bedroom or 
Samuel Beckett reading Proust. As Adorno clearly associates art’s affirmative moment with 
art as a sphere, advanced works have not been able to negate it. In order for particular 
artworks to negate art’s affirmative character, they would have to be in solidarity with one 
another, rather than the mortal enemies of one another—on at least one point. They would 
have to reach a consensus on the decision to abandon cheerfulness. To rid art of its 
cheerfulness, every particular work and not just the advanced works would have to negate art-
in-general. This negative zone is difficult to find, as art’s affirmative character appears to be 
generated from without and from within, pertaining as much to art’s place in society as to 
what art makes of itself. Adorno’s thesis that art can and must rid itself of its cheerfulness is 
itself caught in these contradictions of affirmation: 
Art, which is no longer possible if it is not reflective, must renounce lightheartedness 
of its own accord. It is forced to do so above all by what has recently happened. The 
statement that it is not possible to write poetry after Auschwitz does not hold 
absolutely, but it is certain that after Auschwitz, because Auschwitz was possible and 
remains possible for the foreseeable future, lighthearted art is no longer conceivable.147 
 
Adorno here makes a paradoxical claim: extra-aesthetic circumstances force art to surrender 
cheerfulness yet art must renounce cheerfulness “of its own accord,” according to its own 
aesthetic laws and out of its own immanent movement. This paradox is precisely the structure 
of cheerful, ideal art: the tragic figure “surrenders what he has been robbed of,”148 and this is 
                                                
146 GS, vol. 7, p. 240, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 160.  
147 GS, vol. 11, p. 603 as translated, Notes to Literature, vol. 2, p. 251.  
148 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 208 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 158. 
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called “freedom,” according to Hegel.149 Thus Adorno claims that art’s renunciation of 
cheerfulness must have the structure of aesthetic cheerfulness, and so he ultimately takes the 
side of cheerfulness. But if art were really to renounce cheerfulness, it would have to refuse 
absolutely to appropriate or to make aesthetically logical the extra-aesthetic event, Auschwitz, 
which breaks into art and diverts it entirely from its course. Art is forced by Auschwitz to 
abandon its language, its universality, its logic and itself, its free self-determination, at least at 
a point, the point of expression: the event. But this event must not in any way be called art’s 
freedom and life, and this goes against Hegel’s concept of beauty, the Ideal, which is 
essentially the idea of a kingdom of death through which life still flows. In “Das Ideal und das 
Leben,” the “silent shadow land of beauty” is figured as a kind of reward for the life that has 
overcome barriers:  
Aber der, von Klippen eingeschlossen,    
Wild und schäumend sich ergossen,     
Sanft und eben rinnt des Lebens Fluß   
Durch der Schönheit stille Schattenlande,   
Und auf seiner Wellen Silberrande    
Malt Aurora sich und Hesperus.     
Aufgelöst in zarter Wechselliebe, 
In der Anmut freiem Bund vereint, 
Ruhen hier die ausgesöhnten Triebe, 
Und verschwunden ist der Feind. 
 
(The river of life, when met with a block, 
Gushes wild and spuming against the rock, 
But gentle and even runs life’s river 
Through the silent shadowland of beauty,  
And on the silver rim of the swells’ sea 
Aurora and Hesperus there figure. 
Dissolved in tender, shifting love 
In the grace of a free bond united, 
The reconciled drives find calm above.  
And the adversary has vanished.)150 
 
                                                
149 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 209 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 158. 
150 Schiller, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, p. 153f., lines 61-70, with my translation.  
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To lose its cheerfulness, art would have to resist turning out the image of death as freedom and 
as bliss, as does Hegel when he explicates the single line in which Schiller’s philosophy of art 
is concentrated: 
Schiller in his poem Das Ideal und das Leben…contrasts actuality [Wirklichkeit] and 
its griefs and battles with the “still shadow-land of beauty.” Such a realm of shadows is 
the Ideal; the spirits appearing in it are dead to immediate existence, cut off from the 
indigence of natural life, freed from the bonds of dependence on external influences 
and all the perversions and convulsions inseparable from the finitude of the 
phenomenal world [Erscheinung, appearance]. But all the same the Ideal treads into the 
sensuous and the natural form thereof, yet it still at the same time draws this, like the 
sphere of the external, back into itself, since art can bring back the apparatus, required 
by external appearance for its self-preservation, to the limits within which the external 
can be the manifestation of spiritual freedom. Only by this process does the Ideal exist 
in externality, self-enclosed, free, self-reliant, as sensuously blessed in itself [sinnlich 
selig in sich], enjoying and delighting in its own self. The ring of this bliss resounds 
throughout the entire appearance of the Ideal, for however far the external form 
[Außengestalt] may extend, the soul of the Ideal never loses itself in it. And precisely 
as a result of this alone is the Ideal genuinely beautiful [wahrhaft schön], since the 
beautiful exists only as a total though subjective unity; wherefore too the subject who 
manifests the Ideal must appear collected together in himself again into a higher 
totality and independence out of the divisions in the life of other individuals and their 
aims and efforts.151 
   
To grasp the possibilities of art overcoming its cheerfulness, at least on the terms of Hegelian 
aesthetics, it is important to grasp where this passage falls in the dynamic organization of 
Hegel’s lectures. This passage forms the latter half of the introductory paragraph (c), the third 
moment of “Beautiful Individuality,” in Hegel’s opening discussion of art beauty, “The Ideal 
as Such.” Thus it belongs to considerations of the dissolution of the Ideal, poetry, and the 
passage to non-Ideal art, prose.  
Adorno’s statement that poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric can be read not as a ban on 
the artistic form of poetry, but as a new answer to Hegel’s question—whether art should be 
poetry or prose—, upon the exhaustion and invalidation of cheerful, Ideal art by historical 
circumstances. 
                                                
151 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 207f. as translated except where indicated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 156f. 
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 Yet poetry (as opposed to prose) may have been invalidated some one hundred years 
before Auschwitz. 
 Eduard Mörike’s “Auf eine Lampe” criticizes Hegel’s resolution of the conflict 
between poetry and prose, Ideal and Life, on the side of the Ideal. “Auf eine Lampe” takes up 
vocabulary from Schiller’s high-flown “Das Ideal und das Leben,” then uses these words to 
praise an aesthetic experience of an object of use, somewhat kitsch, found in a nineteenth-
century European interior.152 The tiny fragments salvaged from a founding text of Idealist 
aesthetics are keyed utterly differently in “Auf eine Lampe” and function against the Ideal, 
rather than for it. In other words, “Auf eine Lampe” is an inorganic montage that changes the 
function of its fragments—and this, over half a century before Modernism. Some of the words 
common to both poems are common everywhere—for example, “Noch,” “an,” “und,” “der” 
and so forth. But the occurrence in both poems of forms of rarer words—such as “Marmor,” 
“Rand,” “sanft,” “ernst” and “ergossen”—is enough for one poem to recall the other:  
Noch unverrückt, o schöne Lampe, schmückest du, 
An leichten Ketten zierlich aufgehangen hier, 
Die Decke des nun fast vergeßnen Lustgemachs. 
Auf deiner weißen Marmorschale, deren Rand 
Der Epheukranz von goldengrünem Erz umflicht, 
Schlingt fröhlich eine Kinderschaar den Ringelreihn. 
Wie reizend Alles! lachend, und ein sanfter Geist  
Des Ernstes doch ergossen um die ganze Form – 
Ein Kunstgebild der ächten Art. Wer achtet sein? 
Was aber schön ist, selig scheint es in ihm selbst. 
 
 
(Not yet removed, O lamp of beauty, pendant, you, 
Suspended here with delicacy on light chains, 
Still grace the ceiling of this near-forgotten room. 
On the white shade of marble yours, whose running rim 
                                                
152 This interior is a Lustgemach, a gallery. As Christopher Middleton points out, “Lustgemach,” is idiomatic: 
the word “denotes a special room, found in grander eighteenth-century houses, for the entertainment of guests; it 
need not be large.” Christopher Middleton, notes to “Auf eine Lampe,” in Friedrich Hölderlin, Eduard Mörike, 
Selected Poems, translated and with an introduction by Christopher Middleton (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1972), p. 250. 
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Of golden-greening bronze weaves round an ivy wreath, 
A ring of children blithely dance a roundelay. 
How lovely all is! laughing, and a spirit mild 
In earnest gushes, though, around the form entire— 
A work of art, the genuine. Who pays it heed? 
The beautiful so seems with bliss in that itself.)153 
 
Where Schiller uses a word to describe the Ideal, Mörike uses it to describe the everyday: 
Mörike transforms the pure Platonic Forms,154 exalted in Schiller’s poem, into the literal shape 
or “Form” of the existing lamp, so transforms Being itself into an existing thing. In this vein, 
Mörike literalizes Schiller’s metaphor. The metaphorical “silver rim,” or “Silberrande”155 of 
the waves in Schiller’s poem becomes the literal rim of the lamp in Mörike’s.156 Mörike also 
performs the inverse procedure: where Schiller means literal marble,157 Mörike means 
metaphorical marble—the ersatz-marble shade of a commodity fixture.158 Mörike also 
synthesizes terms that Schiller opposes and contrasts. In both “Das Ideal und das Leben” and 
in the prologue to Wallenstein, Schiller registers Ernst on the side of work and difficulty, 
opposing it to Spirit and to the life that runs gently and unperturbed through beauty: “sanft und 
eben rinnt des Lebens Fluß/ Durch der Schönheit stille Schattenlande” (Yet gentle and even 
runs life’s river/Through the silent shadowland of beauty);159 Mörike combines these 
opposites into a new kind of spirit: “ein sanfter Geist/des Ernstes” (a spirit mild in earnest).160 
While Schiller contrasts the life that bursts its bounds to gush forth in a wild foam with the life 
                                                
153 Eduard Mörike, “Auf eine Lampe,” in Werke und Briefe, herausgegeben von Hubert Arbogast, Hans-Henrik 
Krummacher, Herbert Meyer und Bernhard Zeller, Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 
s.a.), vol. 1, Teil (part) 1, p. 132, with my translation. The added underlining indicates the elements common to 
“Das Ideal und das Leben.”  
154 Schiller, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, p. 155, line 122. 
155 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 152, line 65. 
156 Mörike, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, part 1, p. 132, line 4. 
157 Schiller, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, p. 152, line 80. 
158 Mörike, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, part 1, p. 132, line 4. 
159 Schiller, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, p. 152, lines 63-64, with my translation. 
160 Mörike, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, part 1, p. 132, lines 7-8, with my translation. 
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that beauty has tamed into a peacefully flowing stream, Mörike condenses these two moments 
into a single contradictory image. While the river of life in Schiller’s poem overcomes the 
cliffs that hem it in and gushes forth, eventually to reach the calm of beauty, the mild spirit in 
earnest in Mörike’s poem gushes around the lamp:  
Aber der, von Klippen eingeschlossen,    
Wild und schäumend sich ergossen,     
Sanft und eben rinnt des Lebens Fluß   
Durch der Schönheit stille Schattenlande,   
Und auf seiner Wellen Silberrande    
Malt Aurora sich und Hesperus. 
(The river of life, when met with a block, 
Gushes wild and spuming against the rock, 
Yet mild and even runs life’s river 
Through the silent shadowland of beauty,  
And on the silver rim of the swells’ sea 
Aurora and Hesperus there figure.)161 
 
The cliffs in Schiller’s poem represent a natural barrier or limit dividing work and seriousness 
from beauty and tranquillity. But the declamation “Ein Kunstgebild der ächten Art” (A work 
of art, the genuine), referring to the beautiful lamp, rules out the beauty of the lamp as natural 
beauty.162 This statement brings the poem into the main debate of Hegel’s aesthetics: whether 
art should be poetry or prose. The ode on the ceiling lamp might appear at first to raise a mere 
real thing into the aesthetic sphere, as suggested by its initial vocative: “o schöne Lampe” (O 
lamp of beauty).163 But the first lines situate the lamp in the private sphere: if the gallery and 
its past entertainments are by now almost forgotten, they are still too close for the lamp to 
appear really elevated, aesthetic. The lamp even hangs on light chains, so it is not lofty 
through its own power, but through the power of what binds it. Its tendency is to fall, 
                                                
161 Schiller, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, p. 153f., lines 61-66, with my translation.  
162 Mörike, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, part 1, p. 132, line 9, with my translation. 
163 Ibid., vol. 1, part 1, p. 132, line 1, with my translation. 
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submitted as it is to the force of gravity, “Ernstes” (earnest).164 The question “Wer achtet 
sein?” (Who pay it heed?) solicits a reflection on the position or status of the poem’s speaker, 
who is implicit only, disembodied, and does not so much appear.165 Perhaps the lamp can 
become an object of attention at all because the speaker is alone, gazing at whatever happens 
to present itself in the field of vision from an occasional perspective. Furthermore, as it is 
described, the lamp gives reason to inquire into the speaker’s qualification of it as “schöne” 
(beautiful).166 A white form in a material like marble, which presents interest in itself, just by 
its irregular colouring, by its smooth, polished surface and by its quality of lightness, becomes 
kitsch when anything is figured on it or around it, particularly anything human, particularly 
anything childish. It is funny to note that this kitschiness, which can still be observed in ceiling 
lamps of today, particularly those that aspire to marble, is not new. Kitsch, not the Ideal, is 
immortal. The lamp sins against the Ideal in another way: it breaks into outright laughter, 
which Hegel condemned. The sole exclamation in the poem is not an expression of awe before 
serious and profound beauty, but is an unserious reaction to charm: “Wie reizend Alles!” 
(How lovely all is!) is a squeal from one of the laughing children in the roundelay figured on 
the lamp.167 This laughter does not concord with the “spirit mild in earnest gushes, though, 
around the form entire,” itself a paradoxical image. The last line of “Auf eine Lampe” is 
composed almost entirely of fragments of “Das Ideal und das Leben.” Divergent translations 
have been suggested for the last line, with incommensurable results for the interpretations of 
the poem, depending on the resolution of three ambiguities: “aber” can intensify “schön” or 
mark a caesura with what has preceded; “scheint” can be read as “shines” or “seems”; the 
                                                
164 Ibid., vol. 1, part 1, p. 132, line 8, with my translation. 
165 Ibid., vol. 1, part 1, p. 132, line 9, with my translation. 
166 Ibid., vol. 1, part 1, p. 132,  line 1, with my translation. 
167 Ibid., vol. 1, part 1, p. 132, line 7, with my translation. 
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pronoun “ihm” could refer to “es,” which itself could refer to the adjective “schön” or to 
“Was,”or “ihm” could be dialect for the reflexive pronoun “sich.”168 One hears in it an 
unmistakably Hegelian accent: 
Was aber schön ist, selig scheint es in ihm selbst.169    
One might say that this line has been recomposed from Schiller previously—by Hegel. It has 
two sources. First, it vaguely echoes Hegel’s description of art beauty, the Ideal, as “sinnlich 
selig in sich,” sensuously blissful in itself, in the sentence “Dadurch allein steht das Ideal im 
Äußerlichen mit sich selbst zusammengeschlossen frei auf sich beruhend da, als sinnlich selig 
in sich, seiner sich freuend und genießend.”170 Second, in its wording “scheint es in ihm 
selbst” recalls the first section of the second book of The Science of Logic, “Das Wesen als 
Reflexion in ihm selbst,” where, in its first chapter, Hegel introduces the concept of Schein: 
“Das Scheinen des Wesens in ihm selbst ist die Reflexion.”171 It may be argued that Hegel’s 
peculiar use of the pronoun “ihm” enacts alienated reflection itself. The pronoun is not 
reflexive in standard usage, but it can have a reflexive sense in Swabian dialect, which, 
according to Adorno, is not incidental to Hegel’s philosophy: “The often-repeated remark, 
originally Horkheimer’s, that only someone who knows Swabian can really understand Hegel, 
is no mere aperçu about linguistic idiosyncrasies; it describes the very gesture of Hegel’s 
language.”172 Horkheimer and Adorno’s opinion that Hegel expressed himself in Swabian is 
                                                
168 See, for example, the various positions on this expressed by Albrecht Holschuh, Berel Lang and Herbert 
Lindenberger in the forum, “Interpreting a Pronoun in Mörike,” PMLA 106, no. 2 (March 1991): pp. 312-314. 
169 Mörike, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, part 1, p. 132, line 10. 
170 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 207, translated as “Only by this process does the Ideal exist in externality, self-
enclosed, free, self-reliant, as sensuously blessed in itself, enjoying and delighting in its own self” in Aesthetics, 
vol. 1, p. 157. 
171 Hegel, Werke, vol. 6, p. 17, or translated by G. di Giovanni, The Science of Logic, p. 341: “The shining of 
essence within it is reflection.” 
172 GS, vol. 5, p. 350 as translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen, Hegel: Three Studies (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1993), p. 118. 
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more likely a residual piece of Volksideologie. It should be pointed out that in the phrase “Das 
Scheinen des Wesens in ihm selbst” and in the title “Das Wesen als Reflexion in ihm selbst,” 
the use of the pronoun “ihm” disambiguates the antecedent: essence is reflection in essence 
itself, as opposed to being reflection in reflection itself; reflection is shining (or seeming) of 
essence in essence itself, not in shining (or seeming) itself. The illusion of an essence in itself, 
of an essence through and through essence, occurs within essence, not outside it. This is 
absolute reflection: “Reflection, as absolute reflection, is essence shining within [das in ihm 
selbst scheinende Wesen, essence that shines in essence itself], essence that posits only shine 
[Schein], only positedness, for its presupposition; and as presupposing reflection, it is 
immediately only positing reflection.”173 The consequences of all this for the last line of 
Mörike’s poem is a speculative grammar, whereby the antecedent of “ihm” is “es,” whose 
antecedent must be the adjective “schön,” so that through the middle term “es,” which can 
substitute both nouns and adjectives, “ihm” replaces a noun that never appears in the poem, 
but can only be drawn out by inference, in reflection: “das Schöne,” the essence of the 
Beautiful: 
 But what is beautiful seems so blissfully in that itself.174 
The last line of Mörike’s “Auf eine Lampe,” here unmetered for clarity, can be read in these 
Hegelian terms: what is beautiful loses its essence—i.e. seems or, in George di Giovanni’s 
translation, shines—blissfully within essence itself. The unusual thing about absolute 
reflection is that, in the scope of Hegel’s Logic, it is the moment of reversal: the Logic 
presupposes forward movement, but absolute reflection discovers this presupposition, and to 
                                                
173 Hegel, Werke, vol. 6, p. 28 as translated by G. di Giovanni except where indicated in square brackets, The 
Science of Logic, p. 348.  
174 Mörike, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, part 1, p. 132, line 10 (my translation). 
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discover this presupposition to be merely posited, set up at the start, absolute reflection had to 
go backwards. But backwards motion to the presupposition that logic only goes forwards is 
not illogical because forward movement was merely posited, as only backward motion can 
discover. So absolute reflection deposes the absoluteness of forward movement as sheer 
illusion. Forward movement is not absolute, but only something within essence itself. 
Movement does not thereby become relative; movement is determined, rather, as that which in 
essence is without essence.175 The last line of the poem, then, claims that what is beautiful 
loses its essence, ceases to participate in the beautiful itself, becomes movement only within 
the beautiful itself, in the discovery of what the beautiful was presumed to be. Yet this last line 
contrasts sharply with the rest of the poem, which determines the beautiful imagistically, as a 
beautiful lamp—albeit a lamp that is a montage of a broken-up Ideal. The “aber” is a 
conjunction of contrast; however, the last line is not completely cut off: it still clings within 
the circle of the beautiful evoked in the first line: “o schöne Lampe.” Mörike’s “Auf eine 
Lampe” in the end seeks to free itself from images and its time, even from all that has gone on 
before. The closing gesture sounds restorative, a rejection of the lamp in favour of Hegel’s 
Idealist philosophy of art. However, Mörike is doubtless baiting crypto-Idealist thinkers. A 
naïve reading of the poem, which reduces it to Hegel in a nutshell, would face the criticism 
that Adorno raised in Negative Dialectics: “The power of language proves itself when 
expression and thing separate in reflection.176 Language becomes a measure of truth only upon 
the consciousness of the nonidentity of an expression with what is meant.”177 In his 1960/61 
                                                
175 Cf. Peter Bürger, Zur Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik, p. 59 and p. 72. As Schein is the loss of essence, the 
claim that Schein is the essential characteristic of art is absurd.  
176 Vgl. [Cf.] Hermann Schweppenhäuser, Studien über die Heideggersche Sprachtheorie, in Archiv für 
Philosophie 7, 1957, p. 304 [Adorno’s note]. 
177 GS, vol. 6, p. 117 as translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 111. 
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lectures on ontology and dialectics, Adorno called it the mark of critical thinking since Bacon 
to reflect on the difference between language and object, instead of following the tradition of 
language analysis, formalized by Aristotle, which simply took the forms of speech to be the 
forms of being.178 The claim cannot be made that Mörike follows Hegelian doctrine; such a 
viewpoint would assume that Hegelian aesthetic language always already is what it expresses, 
the Ideal. Mörike’s montage is not random for all that. Not only is the ordering of the 
fragments important, but the separations between them also speak eloquently. The dash places 
“Die ganze Form” (the form entire) and “Ein Kunstgebild der ächten Art” (A work of art, the 
genuine) in apposition, joining them, while the “aber” marks contrast, setting the last line off 
by itself.179 Besides detaching the last line from the rest of the poem, the “aber” also negates 
the point of view that the beautiful is something in the form of an authentic artwork under 
observation. What is beautiful, rather, is the blissful negation of essence in Schein that starts to 
move by itself. This is different from Hegel’s idea of the beautiful artwork that “stands there” 
in sensuous bliss.180 The model for the Ideal is the state enjoyed by Greek gods, far removed 
from the seriousness of ascetic gods of monotheistic religions: artworks lie in intense luxury 
and take on the jovial, gently mocking, amused attitude of the Olympians towards mere 
mortals. Mörike leaves the “sinnlich” out from what seems to be a concluding paraphrase of 
Hegel. It may be granted that sensuousness is implied by “scheint,” which can refer back to 
the “Scheine” of sensual pleasures in the opening of “Das Ideal und das Leben,”181 or, more 
generally, to the strong tradition since Plato of associating sensuousness with illusion. But this 
                                                
178 Theodor W. Adorno, Ontologie und Dialektik (1960/61), herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), p. 57. 
179 Mörike, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, part 1, p. 132, respectively line 8, line 9 and line 10. 
180 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 207, or prefer to my translation here “does…exist” from Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 157.  
181 Schiller, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, p. 152, line 14. 
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“scheint” in itself constitutes an important divergence from Hegel’s initial characterization of 
the Ideal: Hegel does not claim that art beauty seems sensuously blissful in itself nor that it 
shines in sensuous bliss in itself, but that it stands there in sensuous bliss.182 Thus, in Hegel’s 
lectures, the first appearance of the Ideal as sensuous bliss, as the cheerfulness of gods, has not 
to do with art’s illusory character, but with its presence and its capacity to stay up, with its 
integrity, steadfastness, persistence, viability and structural success: its Being. Mörike denies 
the beautiful its bliss, its standing, not only in his concluding enunciation of the beautiful, but 
also in his choice of a particular beautiful object. His last line takes on an almost bitter tinge: 
what is beautiful does not rejoice in its own free-standing success and presence, in its bodying 
forth before the viewer, like the Ideal, but is blissful only shining in itself: in its reflecting, 
alienated condition. Furthermore, the lamp does not stand there, self-sufficient, but hangs on 
chains.183 Thus, Mörike suggests that the truly beautiful does not turn the fact of its existence 
into affirmation, self-contentment and self-satisfaction, as Hegel claims that the Ideal does. In 
this way, then, Hegelian language is employed to say the opposite of what Hegel expressed 
with it. Likewise, Schiller’s words, placed in different constructions, say the opposite of what 
Schiller expressed. A word-montage refutes the identity of expression and thing.  
 Yet Adorno missed Mörike’s critique of German Idealism because, to judge by his 
1958/59 lectures on aesthetics, he took Mörike’s Hegelian language in the last line of “Auf 
eine Lampe” to be Hegelian philosophy. Adorno, in good philosopher fashion, actually 
misquotes the line, leaving out the notion of “scheinen” altogether, so biasing the reading 
toward Hegel’s notion of the Ideal artwork as sensuously blissful in itself:   
                                                
182 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 207, or see Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 157, where Knox translates “steht…da” as 
“does…exist.” 
183 Mörike, Werke und Briefe, vol. 1, part 1, p. 132, line 2. 
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So I think one only then gets beyond the bad, purely bourgeois, contemplative concept 
of beauty, which satisfies itself in an artwork that is blissful in itself—as it goes in the 
beautiful poem by Mörike—, if one is capable, in the perception and in the experience 
of significant artworks, of recognizing them as that play of forces that they really are 
according to their essence, play of forces which is not external to their concept of 
beauty, but rather that in which their own beauty has its substance—and this, not by 
way of a belated intellectualization and interpretation, but rather through the 
experience of their inner connection, of the moments that constitute them.184    
  
The critical reference to Schein precludes the thesis that Mörike’s poem unequivocally 
promotes a purely contemplative and static concept of beauty over and above the actual 
engagement with works as a process. Plato reserved contemplation for Being, the pure, 
immortal forms, as distinct from Schein, the changing, fleeting, scattered things of this world. 
But in denying that what is beautiful is simply, in drawing out the aspect of Schein in what is 
beautiful, Mörike implicitly denies that the beautiful is an object of pure contemplation. 
Changing the directional tendency of Schiller’s words puts the simple identity of the lamp and 
the concluding “definition” of beauty out of circulation: left indeterminate is whether the lamp 
is an artwork, whether it is really beautiful, whether it participates in the really beautiful or 
whether what is beautiful completely cuts itself off from objects and subjects. The elements of 
the poem are, however, determined, also—to overturn the presuppositions of Idealist 
aesthetics. Mörike deposes the Ideal in the prose aesthetic ultimately rejected by Hegel, but 
which would go on to reach perhaps its deepest expression in the drawings of Adolph von 
Menzel. Hegel does indeed accept the criticism, voiced by von Rumohr, that Ideal art can be 
empty, and even admits that ideal beauty “lapsed into flatness, lifelessness, and superficiality 
                                                
184 Theodor W. Adorno, Ästhetik (1958/59), herausgegeben von Eberhard Ortland (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2009), p. 169. 
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without character.”185 But he ends up defending Ideal art against the prosaic world of Dutch 
genre paintings, which simply makes a selection out of what exists: 
Now one might suppose that the artist should select here and there the best forms in the 
world confronting him and collect them together, or even as has happened, hunt 
through collections of etchings and wood-cuts for faces [Physiognomien, 
physiognomies], postures, etc. in an endeavour to find the genuine forms for his topic. 
But with this collecting, and choosing, nothing is achieved, for the artist must act 
creatively and, in his own imagination and with knowledge of the corresponding forms, 
with profound sense [Sinn] and serious feeling, give form and shape throughout and 
from a single casting to the meaning [Bedeutung] which animates him.186 
 
Mörike indeed collects and chooses out of what confronts him rather than creating a poem out 
of a “meaning,” but whether his poem is beautiful and expressive does not reduce to a “purely 
empirical question,” which is the danger that Hegel sees in such a procedure.187 For Mörike 
did not proceed empirically, by choosing the most beautiful words in the German language, 
which he happened to find already collected for the most part in “Das Ideal und das Leben.” 
“Auf eine Lampe” escapes Hegel’s criticism because Mörike arranges the terms of his 
“controlled vocabulary” to negate the meanings of the past, which load these expressions 
down with a false dignity and pseudo-intelligence that they do not possess in and of 
themselves. But at the same time, Mörike’s constellational procedure baffles Hegelian 
aesthetics, which assumes the necessity and primacy of meaning. 
 While “Auf eine Lampe” escapes the charge of empiricism, Hegel is right to claim that 
everyday art, arrangements of things picked out from what simply exists, cannot bring down 
the Ideal without working against meaning at the same time. Yet far from invalidating 
Mörike’s poem, the dissolution of meaning that follows inevitably from the attack on the Ideal 
                                                
185 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 212 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 161. 
186 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 229 as translated except where indicated in square brackets, but preserving the 
emphasis of the original, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 174.  
187 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 227 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 173. 
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in fact distinguishes Mörike as a progressive artist. The artwork’s critique of meaning goes 
beyond the critique of cheerfulness. For in the context of affirmative culture, any claim to 
have clarified and grasped the meaning of what exists is bound to ignore the impermissibility 
of questioning the sense of things:  
Under the ban on thinking, thinking sanctions what merely exists. The genuinely 
critical need of thought to awaken from the phantasmagoria of culture is brought under 
control, channelled, fed to false consciousness. The culture in which thinking bathes 
cured it of questioning what this was all about and to what end; this question, loosely 
put, of the meaning [Sinn] of it all becomes ever more pressing, the less self-
explanatory some such meaning is to any human being any more, and the more 
completely the cultural management replaces it. Instead of what, as culture, claims to 
have meaning, “that’s-just-the-way-it-is-and-none-other” is set on the throne. Under 
the weight of existing culture, it is just as little demanded whether the meaning claimed 
by culture is fulfilled as it is demanded how meaning effects its own legitimation.188 
 
Increasing cultural administration—now even its formalization as a branch of commerce—
cancels questions about the process by which, on one hand, cultural objects gain a seeming 
inherent meaningfulness and, on the other, meaning itself becomes, it seems, intrinsically good 
and right. In the face of the total organization of culture, senselessly performed in astounding 
ignorance of the particularities of works, to ask pointed questions about meaning is necessary 
but impossible. Questions about meaning can be asked, provided they are asked on the most 
general level—about the meaning of Being. But, as Adorno has pointed out, the question of 
the meaning of Being, of access, cannot be adequately answered.189 He recognizes that the 
ontology behind this question comes from a real place, from an “ontological need” that arises 
when “what is is relative to others, irrelevant in itself.”190 Thinking that asserts the primacy of 
inquiry into Being over inquiry into any particular being, determined in time and space, seems 
truthful to the contemporary subject in need of the consolation that it “will survive the 
                                                
188 GS, vol. 6, p. 93, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 85f. 
189 GS, vol. 1, p. 336f. 
190 GS, vol. 6, p. 73, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 65.  
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functional context,” the world of total administration.191 The priority that the new ontology 
accords to substantial, whole Being over and above relative, determined beings provides such 
reassurance. Ontology thus “became untruthfully affirmative,” for it developed a method 
without inquiring into whether its object was legitimate, real and knowable.192 The result 
ultimately only affords consolation, rather than actually opening up the twentieth-century 
experience through, say, the real concept of meaning, which implies an object. In the context 
of totalitarian racism, the decisiveness with which the facts of existence played in dooming the 
particular human being to relations of domination, atrocious forced labour, torture and death 
clearly expose any claim to the meaningfulness of existence as false affirmation: 
After Auschwitz, after events that make a mockery of constructing meaning on the 
immanence that emanates from affirmatively posited transcendence, there is an 
objective side to the feeling that refuses any claim for the positivity of existence as 
sanctimonious, as wronging the victims, that balks at squeezing any kind of sense, 
however faint, out of the victims’ fate.193 
 
The artwork that negates meaning is therefore of a more advanced consciousness than the one 
animated by meaning. Such an advanced artwork, which collects and arranges what simply 
exists, empties these elements of the illusory meanings with which the “phantasmagoria of 
culture” has filled them. The artwork of everyday prose however escapes the randomness of 
what simply exists insofar as it responds to the specific extra-aesthetic historical experiences 
that universally call affirmative meaning into question. Like Modern works, Mörike’s “Auf 
eine Lampe” is part of the “crisis of meaning,”194 in which “it becomes ever harder for 
artworks to cohere as a nexus of meaning [Sinnzusammenhang, context of meaning].”195 A 
                                                
191 GS, vol. 6, p. 73 as translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 65. 
192 GS, vol. 6, p. 73 as translated, Negative Dialectics, p. 65. 
193 GS, vol. 6, p. 354, or prefer to my translation here Negative Dialectics, p. 361. 
194 GS, vol. 7, p. 231 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 154. 
195 GS, vol. 7, p. 229 as translated except where indicated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 152. 
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single meaning cannot be behind “Auf eine Lampe” because it is the break-up of what 
previously constituted a context of meaning. Its paradoxical descriptions, its shifts from 
second to third person and its re-ordering of fragments of texts from Schiller and Hegel all 
fend off interpretation by breaking the work’s closed cell open onto other texts and other 
perspectives. Its fractured re-composition of Schiller and of Hegel has an analogue in certain 
of Menzel’s drawings in which legs, arms, trees and heads abruptly cut by the paper’s edge are 
continued elsewhere on the same page, so that reality appears as a provisional arrangement of 
collected treasures or mementos: feet, hands, boughs, a woman’s chignon float in cameos. The 
material, the physical limitation of the page’s edge, intrudes on the idea of drawing a picture of 
something. Montage is a determinate negation of Idealist aesthetics and of the art it upholds, 
which is supposed to flow out of meanings, rather than, say, out of the material. “Auf eine 
Lampe” cannot be a symbol, for it drives a wedge between the material, language, and what 
that language expressed in the past. The iterancy of Idealist language is thus short-circuited.   
  
 
{Transition to Chapter VII} Contrary to Hegel’s reckoning that art is to be poetry, 
and so, the advance of the Ideal, we have seen that a prosaic work, Eduard Mörike’s “Auf eine 
Lampe,” is “advanced” in light of what Ideal, with its priority of meaning, has become: 
affirmation. According to the usual historical divisions, “Auf eine Lampe” heralds a new, anti-
Ideal phase in art, realism. Yet it is not clear whether Ideal implies self-critique and even its 
own dissolution.  
 For in his Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel splits the “Ideal as Such” between two 
moments—(1.) the moment of beautiful individuality, which posits the Ideal only to see it 
dissolve from within, and (2.) the moment in which the Ideal relates back to Nature, in an 
attempt perhaps to give itself a lease on life by borrowing from the “prose of the world” that it 
had cut out. What Peter Bürger calls “post-romantic art” may actually be Romantic, according 
to certain passages from Hegel’s lectures.1 The prosaic works that Bürger has in mind, 
exemplified by Dutch genre painting, fall under two headings. On the one hand, Hegel treats 
the work of genre painters—he names Adriaen van Ostade, David Teniers II, and Jan Steen—
under the category of Romanticism, at the dissolution of the Romantic form.2 Romantic art is 
always implicitly the dissolution of the Classical Ideal, and it is still Romantic even when it 
realizes this potential, as Hegel claims at the end of the second part of his lectures on 
aesthetics: “The last matter with which we now still have to deal in more detail is the point at 
which romanticism, already implicitly the principle of dissolution of the classical ideal, now 
                                                
1 Peter Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, 2e. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), p. 129 as translated 
by Michael Shaw, Theory of the Avant-Garde (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 93. Please 
note that only chapters 1-4 of Theorie der Avantgarde are translated in Theory of the Avant-Garde (as chapters 2-
5). 
2 G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Theorie-Werkausgabe, vols. 13-15, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), vol. 14, p. 227 as translated by T. M. Knox, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine 
Art, by G. W. F. Hegel, 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), vol. 1, p. 599. 
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makes this dissolution appear clearly in fact as dissolution.”3 Hegel, however, conceives of his 
system as an organic unity, in which possibility just lies latent in whatever is. A leap into a 
completely different form of art does not belong to his conception of art as a system. It is 
inherent to ideal, classical art, according to Hegel, that it will decay and degenerate. Ideal art is 
always working against its sensuous form, because what it wants is not sensuous—the 
Absolute. But on the other hand, Hegel elsewhere suggests that genre painters do not posit the 
Ideal, but that their interest is fed by another source: they take their content “out of their own 
life in the present.”4 Hegel admits that art has at least tried to make progress through a 
renewed interest “in the older Italian and German painting, as well as in the later Dutch 
school,” yet this new art does not seem to presuppose anything ideal at all: “Art in general” 
but “painting in particular, influenced by other stimuli, has moved away from this mania for 
so-called ideals.”5 The art that would spring from another principle altogether—nature in all 
its contingency—seems to pose an obstacle to Hegel’s system. Ultimately, however, Hegel is 
able to find subtle ways in which genre paintings admit of the Ideal, so that the apparently 
trivial and random choice of subject does not have the final word. He claims that, even in the 
midst of needy, insalubrious conditions, Seligkeit shines through the characters depicted in the 
genre paintings The Toilette and Boys Eating Grapes and Melon by Bartholmé Esteban 
Murillo.6 Hegel seems particularly taken with the second of these:  
We see that [those boys of Murillo] have no wider interests and aims, yet not at all 
because of stupidity; rather do they squat on the ground content and serene [selig], 
almost like the gods of Olympus; they do nothing, they say nothing; but they are 
people all of one piece without any surliness or discontent; and since they possess this 
                                                
3 Hegel, Werke, vol. 14, p. 220 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 593f. 
4 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 222 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 169. 
5 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 213 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 161. 
6 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 224 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 170. 
 342 
foundations of all excellence, we have the idea that anything may come of these 
youths.7 
 
Here Hegel subsumes the paradigmatic prosaic works under poetry; works that take their 
inspiration from life, under the Ideal; works that admit of contingent nature, under art.  
 In the contradictory terms of Hegel’s system, Dutch genre paintings may have failed to 
supplant Ideal with Life as the principle of art—in which case they fail as post-Romantic 
works—, or, alternatively, as Romantic works, they may have failed to dissolve the Ideal fully 
from within, for selig (serene, blissful) in the face of life, they mastered and resolved their 
contingency.  
 This becomes clear when one considers the three moments that go to build beautiful 
individuality, or, the “poetry” side of the Ideal as such: (a) the harmony of inner and outer; (b) 
the negation of contingency; and (c) Seligkeit (the result). These three moments are stages in a 
process by which outerness becomes innerness. Hegel understands beautiful individuality to 
be art’s way of making the outer manifestation, surface or appearance of external reality into 
subjectivity: art, he says, “has to convert every shape in all points of its visible surface into an 
eye.”8 Art so makes all that we see look back at us, yet with a look that we ourselves cannot 
give, for eyes in life have a veiled regard, just as much surface as “actions and events” are:  
And it is not only the bodily form, the look of the eyes, the countenance and posture, 
but also actions and events, speech and tones of voice, and the series of their course 
through all conditions of appearance that art has everywhere to make into an eye, in 
which the free soul is revealed in its inner infinity.9 
  
Hegel then breaks art’s process of making the outer an inner into its three moments. In the first 
moment, (a), he rejects merely formal expressions of inwardness, both those due to a wrong 
                                                
7 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 224 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 170. 
8 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 203 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 153. 
9 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 203f. as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 154. 
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choice of object, inherently finite ones,10 and those due to what could be called the laziness of 
spirit, the inability of spirit to raise manifestation to universality, universalization through 
which the artwork grasps its freedom, according to Hegel.11 Hegel posits the criterion of truth 
in art as the harmony of inner and outer: “Thus the truth of art cannot be mere correctness, to 
which the so-called imitation of nature is restricted; on the contrary, the outer must harmonize 
[zumsammenstimmen] with an inner which is harmonious in itself, and, just on that account, 
can reveal itself as itself in the outer.”12 Another way in which Hegel expresses the agreement 
between inner and outer is “this harmony [of art] with its true Concept.”13 The second 
moment, (b), is the negative one. Art criticizes the abstraction and formality of the first 
moment by determinately negating “chance and externality”: it “casts aside everything in 
appearance which does not correspond with the Concept and only by this purification does it 
produce the Ideal.”14 This is the moment in which the arbitrary is cut out from the artwork. 
Hegel cites the example of Raphael cutting out from his Madonnas everything that did not 
express their concept, motherly love. The third moment (c), is really the moment in which the 
Ideal first appears, as godly bliss, Seligkeit.  
 Seligkeit itself is broken into three moments, the first of which is properly the moment 
of cheerfulness and affirmation, which relates to the achievement of the work, its 
“Beschlossenheit,” this conclusiveness, decidedness and resolve,15 even, we might add, in the 
face of a “breach” between the inner life of the subject and external circumstances, as in 
                                                
10 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 204 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 154. 
11 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 205 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 155. 
12 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 205 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 155. 
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15 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 208 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 157. 
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tragedy.16 Closure represents the truth moment of art for Hegel. If art can make itself whole 
and coherent even when obvious ruptures rent life apart, then it has succeeded on Hegel’s 
terms: it is cheerful. Tragedy is “cheerful” in the sense that through the conversion of blind, 
outer circumstances into the freedom of inner subjectivity it produces an individual whose 
autonomy consists of his resignation to fate. Tragedy, as Hegel understands it, is affirmative, 
for he reduces freedom to consciousness or to an attitude about misfortune; however, being 
reconciled to one’s fate covers over the actual breach between the universal and the individual 
in which the universal endures while the living, breathing material individual perishes. 
Knowledge does not deliver the tragic hero from his fate. Such deliverance would be 
substantial freedom. In the absence or impossibility of such deliverance, one would expect 
criticism of the unreconciled and unfree state of the world or at least some expression of the 
painful rift between theory and praxis. Instead, the tragic hero turns this negative into a 
positive. 
 Hegel associates the second and third moments of Seligkeit—sustained disunity and 
irony—with Romantic artworks, as stages in decline. Thus, in a way, what Bürger calls “post-
romantic” is, according to Hegel’s schema, pre-Romantic: Dutch genre paintings, automatic 
writing, objective chance, aleatory music, art informel and other artforms that embrace rather 
than spurn contingency are even pre-Ideal, in that they refuse the bliss, the Seligkeit, that is to 
reconcile harmony and chaos, and which is the real beginning of the Ideal of beauty. On this 
schema, the “emancipation from the concept of harmony” associated with the Second 
Viennese School would have overcome an even more fundamental principle: the harmony of 
                                                
16 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 208 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 158.  
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inner and outer to which contingency constitutes the antithesis.17 Bürger suggests that the 
“shift of the form-content dialectic in favour of form” observed by Hegel “characterizes the 
further course of art”—which may be correct, but this describes not a new kind of art, post-
Romantic art, but rather Symbolic art.18 The Classical Ideal is the perfect balance of form and 
content, of outer shape and inner subjectivity, while imbalances in favour of one or the other 
result in either Symbolic art (where form predominates) or Romantic art (where content 
predominates). A truly post-Romantic art would have to break out of the Hegelian schema and 
its imperatives of harmony, balance, unity, cheeriness and blessed bliss. Hegel himself claims 
that art is not the place for reconciliation:  
The absolute Spirit is, as spirit, not an immediate topic for art. Its supreme actual 
reconciliation within itself [höchste wirkliche Versöhnung in sich] can only be a 
reconciliation and satisfaction in the spiritual as such; and this in its purely ideal 
element is not susceptible of expression in art, since absolute truth is on a higher level 
than the appearance of beauty [der Schein des Schönen] which cannot be detached 
form the soil of the sensuous and apparent [Erscheinenden].19   
  
 Bürger rejects the organicist premise of Hegel’s schema, in which art follows the natural 
pattern of germination, growth and decay. By rights, art should have come to an end, died of 
its inherent contradictions between life and ideal, sensuousness and spirit, external 
appearances and subjective innerness, Bürger seems to say.20 The continuation of art after the 
failure of the avant-garde movements to bring these contradictions to their crisis indicates that 
art does not follow an organic pattern in the least. But at the same time, works that pursue an 
open and continued divisiveness are Romantic, not anti-art, to Hegel’s mind. Art does not die 
of its contradictions, but rather of their resolution. Art, according to Hegel, seeks to satisfy its 
                                                
17 GS, vol. 7, p. 154 as translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor, Aesthetic Theory, edited by Gretel Adorno and Rolf 
Tiedemann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 100. 
18 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 130 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 93. 
19 Hegel, Werke, vol. 14, p. 154 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 539. 
20 Bürger, Theorie der Avantgarde, p. 130 as translated, Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 93. 
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longing for the absolute in a sensuous realm, which can never fulfil it. Art overcomes this 
inadequacy by moving into other, spiritual realms. From the fact that art has not disappeared, 
not even a century after the Dadaists and Surrealists began their manifestations, one cannot 
conclude that Hegel’s theory is false: art may be declining much more slowly than expected, 
tarrying longer before finding the true spiritual regions for its Ideas. Yet, in a way, the 
continued emptying of meaning from the artistic sphere, notably through the use of montage, 
brings art very nearly to the end: as a “shining as shining for the sake of shining,” art is a 
lustrous collection of open and split shells, beautifully nacred within, deserted by their 
departed ideas. It seems restorative and timid to judge the great twentieth-century anti-
organicist movement of advanced consciousness by the standard of Hegel, who remains a 
thinker of organicism. Yet the totalizing system does not admit of any other standard but its 
own. This is why, in this last chapter, the test will be made to break Hegel’s system apart from 
within. Even a work that to all appearances fits in with Hegel’s definition of the Romantic 
artwork goes beyond Romanticism and Hegel. Far earlier than the post avant-garde period, art 
had become a collection of dead, spent forms of co-existing traditions and times, among which 
the advanced artist could choose.  
 This chapter aims to detail an anti-Ideal that is not decline and degeneration, but rather 
critical choice and combination of what remains of fled life, inorganic and still, after the 
explosion of Jean Paul, arresting the aesthetics of growth and development. It is itself divided 
into seven sections.  
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{Chapter VII} The thesis defended is that Robert Schumann’s song cycle Dichterliebe, 
op. 48, (1840) is a true artwork.21 To this end, each of the seven sections of this chapter treats 
a separate dimension of the work’s “progressiveness”: i) its character as a Romantic artwork; 
ii) its character as an Expessionist artwork avant la lettre; iii) its position, as a “cycle,” on the 
unity debate in Homeric studies; iv) its inorganic, cleft form; v) its handling of the folk idiom 
in the context of rising German nationalism and concomitant interest in the Niebelungenlied; 
vi) its technical progressiveness, Schumann’s discovery of a hidden key to a world beyond 
tonality; and vii) the work’s social praxis against reification, in the form of remembrance.  
{Section i} Schumann began his career not long after Hegel delivered his lectures on 
aesthetics. Hegel died exactly one week after Schumann saw the publication of his Opus 1, the 
“Abegg” Variations, on November 7, 1831.22 Although, according to Thomas Alan Brown, 
“there is no evidence that Schumann systematically read Hegel,”23 he was an avid reader of 
Jean Paul’s novels and aesthetics, even paying a visit to his widow in Bayreuth in May 1828.24 
Jean Paul was not a mere influence on Schumann; certain ones of Schumann’s compositions, 
notably Papillons, op. 2, were musical versions or transfers25 of Jean Paul.26 Of multifarious 
talents and wide-ranging culture, Schumann was well-versed in the Romanticism disparaged 
by Hegel: “If the artist himself is devoid of the core and support of a mind filled with genuine 
                                                
21 Robert Schumann, Dichterliebe, op. 48, ed. Hansjörg Ewert, translation of song texts by Richard Stokes 
(Kassel: Bärenreiter, 2011). 
22 John Daverio, Robert Schumann: Herald of a “New Poetic Age” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 
65. 
23 Thomas Alan Brown, The Aesthetics of Robert Schumann (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), p. 20. 
24 Daverio, Robert Schumann, p. 36. 
25 Maxime McKinley has coined the term “Wirkunst” to designate an artwork inspired by work or works in 
another medium. See his doctoral thesis, which consists of eight musical “Wirkünste” (such as “Wirkunst-Fellini: 
pour ensemble de 12 instruments,” based on the films of Federico Fellini) and a written component entitled 
“Intermédialité et composition musicale: les arts visuels, la littérature et le cinéma comme fondements d’une 
musique narrative” (PhD diss., Université de Montréal, 2009). 
26 See Daverio, Robert Schumann, pp. 79-93.  
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objectivity, humour readily slips into what is namby-pamby and sentimental, and of this too 
Jean Paul provides an example.”27    
 Dichterliebe combines the negative moments of Seligkeit—sustained disunity and 
irony—to negate the affirmative, Ideal art favoured by Hegel. 
 According to Hegel, the negativity of the second moment of Seligkeit appears clearly 
in extreme forms of Romantic art, where the opposition between outer and inner remains 
unreconciled: “It is true that in romantic art the distraction and dissonance of the heart goes 
further and, in general, the oppositions displayed in it are deepened and their disunion may be 
maintained.”28 Hegel accepts Romantic art as long as a particular spirit of cheerfulness—
Heiterkeit—is present, even in the avowal of the rift between inner and outer, the particular 
cheerfulness that he expresses as “smiling through tears”: “Tears belong to grief, smiles to 
cheerfulness, and so smiling in weeping denotes this inherent tranquillity amidst agony and 
suffering.”29 But Hegel finds fault with Carl Maria von Weber’s Der Freischütz, which he 
criticizes for breaking up the affirmative harmony into separate, abstract moments of 
unrestrained mirth on one side and inconsolable grief on the other: 
But laughter and tears may fall apart in abstraction from one another and in this 
abstraction they have been used inappropriately as a motif for art, as for instance in the 
laughter’s chorus of von Weber’s Der Freischütz. Laughing as such is an outburst 
which yet ought not to remain unrestrained if the Ideal is not to be lost. The same 
abstraction occurs in the similar laughter in the duet from Weber’s Oberon [1826] 
during which one may be anxious and distressed for the throat and lungs of the prima 
donna! How differently moving, on the other hand, is the inextinguishable laughter of 
the gods in Homer, which springs from the blessed tranquillity of the gods and is only 
cheerfulness and not abstract boisterousness. Neither on the other side, should tears, as 
unrestrained grief, enter the ideal work of art, as when, for example, such abstract 
inconsolability is to be heard in Weber’s Der Freischütz, to mention it again. In music 
in general, song is this joy and pleasure in self-awareness, like the lark’s singing in the 
freedom of the air. Shrieking, whether of grief or mirth, is not music at all. Even in 
                                                
27 Hegel, Werke, vol. 14, p. 230 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 602. 
28 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 209 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 158. 
29 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 209 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 158. 
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suffering, the sweet tone of lament must sound through the griefs and alleviate them, so 
that it seems to us worthwhile so to suffer as to understand this lament. This is the 
sweet melody, the song in all art.30  
 
One presumes that in his criticisms of Der Freischütz Hegel has in mind moments such as the 
“Hee-hee-hee” of “Schau der Herr mich an als König”31 and the cry from the heart that opens 
“Wie? Was? Entsetzen!” in Act Two.32 The repressive Hegel is generally opposed to extreme 
displays of emotion in art, but especially to the grief that is not alleviated by sweetness and to 
the suffering that is not rewarded by understanding. Hegel’s criticism of Romanticism is not 
aimed at its dissonance and disunity per se; rather, he takes issue with “the retention of 
disunion” to the point that the Ideal breaks up and is ultimately lost in abstract points of 
uncontrolled emotion.33 It is this disintegrating—one could say “analytic”—aspect of 
Romanticism that is problematic for Hegel. The negation of cheerfulness consists not in 
dissonance as much as in the sudden collapse of the artwork into discrete, contradicting, 
emotional moments—in sudden events that resist assimilation not only into the whole work, 
but also into the aesthetic corpus, in those detached, unrestrained and inconsolable moments, 
in outbursts and in “shrieking.” Advanced Romantic art refuses to appropriate the external 
events that cause the individual suffering: instead of making the outer inner, Romantic works 
go into inner contradictions, making the suffering subject the measure by which to judge what 
is external to the subject, the objectivity under which the subject suffers. It must be admitted 
that, in Der Freischütz, the few emotional outbursts do not exert as much critical force as they 
could: the essential conflict between the bad universal and the suffering individual is resolved 
                                                
30 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 210 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 159. 
31 Carl Maria von Weber, Der Freischütz: Romantische Oper in drei Aufzügen, Text von Friedrich Kind nach 
den Quellen herausgegeben von Joachim Freyer (Leipzig: Peters, 1976), Act 1, I, p. 42f., mm. 108-116. 
32 Ibid., Act 2, IX, p. 133, mm. 2-4. Agathe’s upper neighbour-tone on the second syllable of “Entsetzen!” forms 
a dissonant ninth to the minor chord (f6) under it. 
33 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 209 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 158. 
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by way of a Deus ex machina in the figure of the Holy Hermit. The reconciliation between 
Max, who has stepped outside the bounds of his society in order to meet its arbitrary, 
unreasonable demand, and that society, a Bohemian community of hunters, is brokered by way 
of compromise: on one hand, Max must wait a year before he can marry Agathe; on the other, 
the ancient custom of the marksmanship contest for suitors is abolished. Max’s recourse to the 
supernatural to win his bride reveals itself to be recourse to the super-social: to the idea of a 
society other than the merely existing one, with its unchallenged customs and glorification of 
hunting, hunting which only seems to be synonymous with survival. Prepared to win the 
marksmanship contest with magic bullets, Max recognizes that there is no longer a real 
necessity for each suitor to prove himself an excellent shot on his own strength. The necessity 
would be real if marriage were the mere establishment of an economic unit and if the family’s 
survival depended solely on the husband’s hunting abilities. At the conclusion of the opera, the 
whole society recognizes that it can admit a less than apt marksman, although it is not clear 
how Max and Agathe will live in this changed community. The abstraction of the opera’s 
emotive moments is connected to the abstraction of the society yet to come. Yet those 
unrestrained passages, detaching themselves from the fabric of the opera, rising beyond what 
this work could fulfil and the expectations that it sets up, lose something of their power 
through the Deus ex machina ending, in which a heaven-sent mediator forces the 
reconciliation between inner subjectivity and external norms and conditions. Hegel does not 
particularly treat this reconciliation, but it is interesting to note that even it does not overcome 
the prolonged disunity that forms his criticism of Weber’s Romanticism. 
 Dichterliebe forces no reconciliation between the individual and the collective such as 
that found in Der Freischütz by C. M. von Weber: its moments of unrestrained emotion find 
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no final acknowledgment within the world of conventions. While individual expression in Der 
Freischütz points toward its universal recognition in the determinate negation of the norm that 
causes suffering, the marksmanship contest, Schumann raises the spectre of a completely futile 
expression of suffering in an alienated and reified world. While Hegel accepts moments of 
radical divergence between subject and object into his aesthetics, for him it is necessary that 
such moments not be free-standing, but constitutive of truth in their reconciliation; Schumann 
asks whether such opposing moments of abstraction may find no place in a final 
reconciliation. In a sense, the individuals in Der Freischütz do not suffer in vain: they suffer 
entirely as a result of mindless conventions, which they recognize, resist and overcome. 
Striving to go beyond existing society, they appeal to supernatural powers—Max to Samiel’s 
diabolic magic and Agathe to God and to the starry heaven—, yet the wolf’s den and starry 
heaven turn out to be social forces, secret channels through which suffering individuals 
communicate with the universal. And, indeed, the universal in Der Freischütz is neither cold 
nor vengeful toward the individual who challenges it. Like Max and Agathe, the poet of 
Dichterliebe is oppressed by the universal: the world of conventions, marriage, the social 
necessity to make his love universally comprehensible through words. This is as true of 
Dichterliebe as it is of Schumann’s source material, Heinrich Heine’s Lyrisches Intermezzo 
from the 1827 edition of the Buch der Lieder.34 Instead of the abstractly speaking nature that 
the narrator seeks, signifying human speech of unbearable clichés (“Ich liebe dich!”35) greets 
his astonishing offering of literary transformations, of flowers and of nightingale lyric not 
                                                
34 Heinrich Heine, Lyrisches Intermezzo (1822-1823), in Buch der Lieder (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 
1827), pp. 105-171. This edition may be consulted in a circumtuitous fashion via the Heinrich-Heine-Portal, from 
link D1 at  
http://www.hhp.uni-trier.de/Projekte/HHP/Projekte/HHP/werke/baende/D01/index_html?widthgiven=30 or 
directly via the Deutsches Textarchiv at http://www.deutschestextarchiv.de/book/show/heine_lieder_1827. 
35 Ibid., p. 114. 
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plucked ready-made but produced ingeniously out of his own tears and sighs.36 Contrary to 
Agathe, the narrator of Heine’s text discovers in nature no higher law by which social custom 
can be effectively challenged. Rather, he becomes sensitive to nature as a mere second nature 
that is incapable of passing judgement on society—for it is society. Second nature is 
indifferent to the poetic subject’s sufferings because it is self-alienated, so, does not know 
itself to have a work character, to be the objectification of these sufferings: flowers do not 
recognize themselves to be made of his tears; nightingales do not recognize their song to be 
made of his sighs. If they did, they would alleviate his pain: 
Und wüßten’s die Blumen, die kleinen, 
Wie tief verwundet mein Herz; 
Sie würden mit mir weinen, 
Zu heilen meinen Schmerz. 
 
Und wüßten’s die Nachtigallen, 
Wie ich so traurig und krank, 
Sie ließen fröhlich erschallen 
Erquickenden Gesang. 
 
Und wüßten sie mein Wehe, 
Die goldenen Sternelein, 
Sie kämen aus ihrer Höhe, 
Und sprächen Trost mir ein. 
 
Sie alle können’s nicht wissen, 
Nur Eine kennt meinen Schmerz; 
Sie hat ja selbst zerrissen, 
Zerrissen mir das Herz. 
 
(And if it were known to the flowers 
How deeply the wound cuts my heart; 
They would weep with me for hours, 
To take away the smart.   
 
And if it were known the nightingales 
How ill and mournful I be, 
They’d send ringing joyous o’er vales  
A song to enliven me. 
 
                                                
36 Ibid., p. 113. 
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And if they knew my plights, 
The gold little stars beyond reach, 
They would descend their heights, 
And console me with their speech. 
  
Not one of them could know it, 
One only knows my smart: 
The one herself who gave it, 
The one who broke my heart.)37 
 
But the suffering subject is himself alienated in the process of artistic objectification. Pain 
loses its social character, apparently becoming a unique, conscious creation. The lover 
believes his beloved to be the sole cause of his anguish, to have inflicted suffering knowingly 
on him, to have risen up as an individual out of society to relegate him, personally, to a 
private, peculiar hell. He is a lonely subject among the mute, unconscious, indifferent nature 
of poetic tropes, which prove inadequate for expressing the new grief of an atomized 
individual, whose pain does not seem in any way connected to society. In Dichterliebe, what is 
supposed to admit the individual into a relation with the universal—signifying language—
becomes the poet’s nemesis. The lover’s refusal of signifying language is apparent in certain 
poems of Lyrisches Intermezzo that Schumann did not set: “Es stehen unbeweglich,” in which 
the lover reveals that the stars, fixed at impossible distances from their loves, speak a language 
whose beauty makes it incomprehensible to philologists, but which he avers to have learned 
by reading its grammar off the face of his beloved;38 “Du liebst mich nicht, du liebst mich 
nicht,” in which he denies being troubled by her verbal rejection of him, happy as he is gazing 
into her face, key to a natural language;39 “Die Welt ist dumm, die Welt ist blind” in which the 
                                                
37 Ibid., p. 128, with my translation. 
38 Heine, Lyrisches Intermezzo, VIII, p. 116. The poems, numbered but untitled in the text, are mentioned here 
and further by their first lines. 
39 Ibid., XII, p. 121. 
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lover recognizes his beloved in her kiss, not in the society gossip about her.40 Signifying 
language is already conventional—gossip, vows, and clichés—; it brokers agreement between 
the universal and the particular, but only under duress. Yet Heine does not oppose the bad 
universal by one-sidedly asserting the particular’s sheer sensuousness as truth, as the poem “O 
schwöre nicht und küsse nur” might suggest.41 From “Es stehen unbeweglich,” it becomes 
apparent that the sensuousness of the beloved is not sheer sensuousness, but the key to reading 
nature. In adopting Heine’s critique of the merely conventional, Schumann also avoids 
becoming prey to facile sensualist notions. Here and there, he ‘sets’ “Es stehen unbeweglich” 
without words, by opening language, both linguistic and musical, onto abstraction, in his 
delicacy in freeing tones from functions. Chords no longer fulfil their contract with listeners 
always to orient them to the tonic. In tonal music, the particular sonorities—major triads, 
dominant seventh chords and so on—correspond each to one or more scale degrees, or, in the 
influential functional harmony of Hugo Riemann, to one of three functions: the subdominant 
function, the dominant function and the tonic function. Normally, these three functions, 
respectively, represent increasing proximity to the resolution. In Schumann, correspondence 
between sonority and degree of tension or position in the progression is not guaranteed. 
Chords that escape their roles in tonality become enigmas and ciphers—abstract sounds to 
which no definite meaning can be affixed. The abstraction that Hegel rejects in the only very 
occasionally emotive music of Carl Maria von Weber he would certainly have strongly 
condemned in the highly feeling music of Robert Schumann. Heine, by contrast, does not 
make recourse to this kind of abstraction.  
                                                
40 Ibid., XV, p. 123. 
41 Ibid., XIII, p. 122. 
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 Hegel would not only reject Robert Schumann’s music for its abstract emotional 
extremes, but also Heinrich Heine’s text for its irony—, which constitutes the third moment 
and downfall of Seligkeit. Irony is, in Hegel’s words, “this art of annihilating everything 
everywhere [diese allseitige Vernichtigungskunst].”42 Hegel does not appear to oppose 
comedic irony, which takes critical aim at what should rightly be criticized—empty forms that 
have lost their substance, but which still seem to stand for something. Hegel claims, however, 
that irony indiscriminately levels what has lost its substance and what still has its substance. In 
negating what is null and void, irony brings out the inherent nullity, but when it applies its 
procedure to what is sound, it merely destroys for the sake of destroying. Irony in all cases is 
opposed to the Ideal, which “requires an inherently substantive content.”43 For irony’s content 
is emptiness, not substance. Now implicit in Hegel’s concept of substance is the notion of 
unified, full participation of all the members of a reconciled whole: 
This substance is equally the universal work [Werk] produced by the action of all and 
each as their unity and identity [Gleichheit], for it is the being-for-self, the self, action. 
As substance, Spirit is unshaken righteous self-identity; but as being-for-self it is a 
fragmented being, self-sacrificing and benevolent, in which each accomplishes his own 
work, rends asunder the universal being, and takes from it his own share.44  
 
There has never existed a society, however, that really resulted from the uncoerced, equal and 
equally rational participation of all its members. Every society systematically excludes certain 
individuals from social production right from the start, often in a completely overt and 
rigorously codified way. Such excluded have been the slaves and Metics of the Greek polis, 
women of most societies and the migrant workers, sans-papiers and prisoners everywhere 
                                                
42 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 211 as translated in Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 160. 
43 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 211 as translated in Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 160. 
44 Hegel, Werke, vol. 3, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1969), p. 325 as translated 
by A. V. Miller, Phenomenology of Spirit, by G. W. F. Hegel, forword by J. N. Findlay (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), p. 264 ¶ 439. 
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today. Although social exclusion may not be the declared intention of the state, there is no 
denying that certain individuals really are systematically left out of the processes by which 
their lives are determined. We cannot say with Hegel that in any given society literally all act, 
all accomplish their own work and all receive their share: as long as some people are excluded 
from the social whole, as is evident in their want and lack, as long as individuals—not Spirit—
sacrifice themselves, only to receive nothing, then there is no substance.45 Romantic irony, 
therefore, is never out of place.46 Yet, in another sense, Hegel is correct to distinguish the 
comedy that is critical of empty nonsense from Romantic irony, which he thinks if critical of 
everything. This distinction is clear in Heine, who concerns himself with forms that are empty 
from one point of view, since they are unquestioningly, mindlessly upheld, but, from another 
point of view, have force and power in the suffering that they cause the individual. This is why 
Heine’s irony is not actually funny. Hegel recognizes the lack of comedy in Novalis and reacts 
                                                
45 Charles Taylor does not take issue with the idealism of Hegel’s concept of ethical substance in his classic 
Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). Revelatory on this point is his definition of alienation—
or, the loss of ethical substance—as the survival of a practice beyond the norms or ends that gave it life (ibid., p. 
384). This definition cannot account for the present condition under capitalism, in which things are hollow not 
because their purposes no longer animate them, but because the purposes that do still animate them were never 
good and sound. What Taylor calls the “meanings expressed in the public life of…societies” surely cannot be of 
substance when conditions are so poor for certain individuals that they cannot participate in the public life of their 
societies (ibid., p. 386). Belief in the notion of substance itself prevents this society from seeing its alienated 
condition. Taylor, however, seems to think that the alienated condition is the exception:  
Thus what is strange and contestable in Hegel’s theory of the state is not the idea of a 
larger life in which men are immersed, or the notion that the public life of a society 
expresses certain ideas, which are thus in a sense the ideas of the society as a whole and 
not just of the individuals, so that we can speak of a people as having a certain ‘spirit.’ 
For throughout most of human history men have lived most intensely in relation to the 
meanings expressed in the public life of their societies. Only an exaggerated atomism 
could make the condition of alienated men seem the inescapable human norm (ibid., p. 
386).  
While the condition of “alienated men” is not inescapable, it is nonetheless the norm; however, the “exaggerated 
atomism” that creates it is not individualistic thinking, as Taylor means by this term, but the systemic lack of 
consideration for individuals in the adoption of norms and practices.  
46 On the other hand, Adorno claims that today “there is not a crevice in the cliff of the established order into 
which the ironist might hook a fingernail.” GS, vol. 4, p. 241 §134 as translated by E. F. N. Jephcott, Minima 
Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life (London: Verso, 2005), p. 211. For interpretations on this quote, see 
Deborah Cook, The Culture Industry Revisisted: Theodor W. Adorno on Mass Culture (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), p. 85; and Martin Jay, Adorno (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1984), p. 43. 
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against it according to his conviction that the individual who engages in unfunny ironic 
critique only annihilates what still has substance. It does not much occur to Hegel that the real 
being of the object of ironic Romantic critique is substantial—“substantial” in the pain and 
suffering of those who run afoul of universally imposed norms and practices. Emotional 
extremes in Dichterliebe thus work to cut short the Hegelian critique of Romantic irony. The 
unrestrained outbursts of suffering in the musical setting suggest that the object of Heine’s 
irony—conventional marriage, words, showy precious stones—cannot really be solid, 
upstanding and excellent in a world of unconsoled suffering. So, they do not have their 
substance. Thus Schumann’s setting supports Heine’s irony against a would-be Hegelian 
charge of nihilism. If Dichterliebe is ironic, it is because, on one hand, so comprehendingly is 
it set that the music cannot be detached from Heine’s ironic text, and, on the other, the second 
and third moments of Seligkeit in Hegel’s schema share the quality of lacking restraint, 
making outbursts and irony inseparable on this point. The music of Dichterliebe in no way 
deals ironically with Heine’s text: rather, the music supports its ironic conviction that 
conventional society is bad and hollow, whereas society wants us to believe that it is good and 
solid. Since the expression in Dichterliebe provides the key to the irony of Heine’s text, 
Schumann cannot be accused of the “organic irrationality,” with which Adorno charged 
twentieth-century Expressionism.47 Adorno sees the basic distinction between Surrealism and 
Expressionism in this “position towards the organic”: the rigidity of Expressionism is slumber, 
whereas the rigidity of Surrealism is death; the contradictions of Expressionism have to do 
with different states of the living body; the contradictions of Surrealism have to do with 
                                                
47 GS, vol. 12, p. 54 n11 as translated by Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster, Philosophy of Modern 
Music (New York: Seabury, 1980), p. 51 n15. 
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reification.48 Expressionism and Surrealism think the problem of irrationality differently: 
Expressionism understands irrationality to be different states of a single, unpredictable body, 
but what Surrealism understands irrationality to be is death, and social death. Lyrisches 
Intermezzo deals thematically with both sleep and death: the ambiguity between sleep and 
death is precisely its problematic. Dichterliebe is itself an inorganic work critical of backward, 
irrational tendencies. Its inorganicity is expressed largely in two characteristics: its 
microstructure and its split between chords and functions. Schumann tears up the surface of 
Heine’s text, disassembles it and reconstructs it to form a second structure, a musical 
microstructure, whose connections between distant passages criss-cross one another, cracking 
the work, inorganically, into pieces. At the same time, Dichterliebe shows a way out of the 
irrationality of death by its notable use of musical quotation, which opens the work onto 
scholarly reception. Secondly, the moments of expression in Dichterliebe do not merely 
contradict one another, but are in themselves contradictory. In them, qualities come into 
conflict with conventions and functions. The moments that detach from the surface of the 
work are not only expressions of suffering, but also keys to the cause of suffering. They hint at 
the commodity form, at other basic forms of ideology, and society is imprinted in them; but 
Dichterliebe as a whole does not claim that these are any guarantee of a solution and an end to 
suffering. The moments of expression do not ultimately bring about a changed society even 
within the cycle, as those in Der Freischütz do; in this, Schumann’s song cycle takes 
alienation into account, the objective forms of separation that prevent the subject from 
connecting a particular, subjective feeling of suffering to large social forms of domination, to 
see it as more than personal and peculiar. This is not the fault of the individual consciousness; 
                                                
48 GS, vol. 12, p. 54 n11, or prefer to my translation here Philosophy of Modern Music, p. 51 n15. 
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society as a whole is organized so that woes appear only as “personal problems,” and 
individuals, if they are to survive, must say that they have “dealt with” them, found “closure” 
and “moved on.” The final cadence of Dichterliebe is not reconciliation, but alienation: 
expression plus irony. But these two negatives do not make a positive: irony plus expression 
make the negation of bliss and cheerfulness—and the negation of Hegel’s affirmative 
aesthetics, the heritage of the Schillerian Ideal.  
{Section ii} Besides supporting the ironic conviction of the text, the expression of 
Dichterliebe is also a solution to an objective music-specific problem. This problem results 
from the seeming necessity for the moving element of music to serve the static element of key. 
This necessity meant that a great deal of musical time was already spoken for. The root 
progression, which was tonality’s advance over modality, the grounding of merely passing 
time in history, had turned into its opposite: the ever-same of the working hours in which 
nothing could actually happen historically. The abstract outbursts of emotion in Dichterliebe 
are history-making events that advance music and resist the mere flowing out of homogeneous 
time. Expression is art-historical movement in the concept of tonality. The contradictions of 
Dichterliebe show that the concept of key is not the static thing that it gives itself to be: it 
proves to be a complex and historically changing concept, not something identifiable by a 
single mark, such as the key signature. As expression is part of Schumann’s critique of 
tonality’s falling behind its own claims to be historically grounded in a definite progression, 
Dichterliebe is also a highly constructed work. Expression flares up momentarily as a 
compressed critique of system: a small death of the times. In their Expressionist works, 
Schoenberg, Berg and Webern multiply the moments of expression that Schumann, by 
contrast, holds in reserve. Negating the constructed, law-abiding order with a gesture, 
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Schumann dramatizes moments of abstract emotion as differences in the ever-same. Moments 
of abstraction are windows that give onto deeply-felt, living time freed from the homogeneous 
labour-time of functional chord meanings, for example:  
(a) the unresolved dissonance on which closes the first Lied;49  
(b) in the fourth Lied, the far secondary dominant on deinen Mund, which opens a series of 
harmonic diversions that delay the home key cadence until the close of the piece;50  
(c) the dissonant sf acciaccatura chord in the cadenza of the piano postlude of the tenth Lied;51  
(d) the series of distortions, drawing peculiar advantage of a legal loophole in the rules of 
harmony governing figuration in applied Phrygian key areas, that accompany the first 
occurrence of the line Es flüstern und sprechen die Blumen in the twelfth Lied, including a 
“resolution” on a figurated major-minor seventh chord;52  
(e) the incomplete “apparent” Neapolitan seventh chord ending the brief D-flat major passage 
of the thirteenth Lied;53  
(f) the bar of silence in the thirteenth Lied;54 and, finally,  
(g) the unusual figuration following the diminished seventh block chord marked with the 
crescendo-decrescendo swell on a single block chord, impossible to render literally on a 
keyboard instrument, both in the postlude of the twelfth Lied55 and in quotation at the 
beginning of the Andante espressivo of the last Lied.56  
                                                
49 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), I, p. 3, m. 26. 
50 Ibid., IV, p. 6, mm. 5-6. The first cadence in the home key, G Major, occurs first in measures 17-18 (ibid., IV, 
p. 7). The Lied shortly thereafter closes on this plagal cadence in measures 19-21 (ibid.).  
51 Ibid., X, p. 21, m. 24. 
52 Ibid., XII, p. 24, mm. 7-9, last half of m. 9 for the “resolution.” 
53 Ibid., XIII, p. 27, m. 29. 
54 Ibid., XIII, p. 27, m. 34. 
55 Ibid., XII, p. 25, m. 24. 
56 Ibid., XVI, p. 37, m. 54. 
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 Expression in Schumann’s Dichterliebe is double-sided: it is at once the subjective 
reaction to rude, harsh bad objectivity, on the one side, and, on the other, the objective state of 
subjective reactions as seemingly private. Schumann’s music draws its critical dimension from 
this double character. Objective conditions have become so powerful and decisive that, for the 
subject to say anything critical against them, he must appear not to be talking about them at 
all; yet this very split then raises the possibility of never being able to connect subjective 
suffering to objective conditions, and that is the genuine problem with which expression 
concerns itself. This is why expression in Dichterliebe is always the possibility of futile 
suffering, of protest that might never be read back into unfree society, and which might never 
serve, subsequently, to negate the oppressive practices and backward schooling and 
conventions that provoke it. Thus Schumann’s advanced music of expression decisively denies 
any identity between concept and object. Dichterliebe is an objective artwork in that it does 
not pretend to be above the necessary illusion—Schumann sets poems that adopt the secret 
language of feeling and which raise personal recrimination into an art. On the other side, his 
song cycle actually opens the possibility of subjective freedom, for it does not itself represent 
the change to the objective order that would really spell the poet’s joy, after the fashion of 
C. M. von Weber, who in Der Freischütz clearly presents the cause of the couple’s grief as the 
obligatory marksmanship contest. It is perfectly safe for Weber to depict a society freeing 
itself of the norm of the marksmanship contest, a norm which has outlasted its usefulness, 
because this norm is not at all a norm of the society in which he lives. As Schumann is a 
modern composer insofar as he is dealing with contemporary norms in their contemporary 
state: as puzzles hovering around individuals less and less apt to recognize them as badly 
objective, manmade creations that ensnare the whole, not the mere, private individual alone. 
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The enigmatic character of his music is a sign of its advanced and critical abiding negativity—
precisely what Hegel attacks in the Romantic artwork. It is left to the recipients, listeners and 
interpreters, to un-riddle the poet’s overwhelming grief; the music does not guarantee its own 
comprehensibility, neither in anagnorisis nor in reconciliation, as in tragedy. Yet if 
Dichterliebe had been really comprehensible, if its critique had been philosophically realized 
at the moment of its appearance, it would have been a liability to the towering bad objectivity 
and social illusion of its time. Since the puzzling character has a distant, twice-removed 
potential to change the society outside the artwork, then this sign of something other, the sign 
that something is not given in the work, runs the risk of turning into its opposite, into 
affirmation. The overtly enigmatic work appears to be harbouring a magical solution. If 
“works, particularly those of supreme dignity, wait for their interpretation,” then they must 
take care to counter-balance their enigmatic aspect.57 
 Nineteenth-century bourgeois art is deeply enigmatic: Schubert and Schumann 
musically grasped reification, fetishism, phantasmagoria, alienated labour, uneven 
development, surplus value, total administration and ideology before these were truly 
conceptually grasped, notably by Karl Marx. Yet even after Marx alienation runs so deep that 
Schumann’s Lieder are still sometimes considered to be the sighs of a fiancé, rather than the 
objective ciphers of heartless industrialization and rationalization. That the process of 
alienation can be recognized at all is thanks to illusion that splits itself off into social illusion 
and aesthetic illusion. The divergence between the two is a condition for interpretation. To 
escape all detection, social illusion would require its identity, absolute proximity, with 
everything, including aesthetic illusion. The more aesthetic that society appears to be—taking 
                                                
57 GS, vol. 7, p. 193, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 128. 
 363 
on the allures of arbitrary, indeterminate play—, the less recognizable illusion is in general: 
the profusion of images outside art today (in advertising, magazines, movies, television and so 
forth) has the effect of collapsing aesthetic and social illusion into one. The wilfully 
constructed illusion of society is a grotesque parody of poetry. The difficulty that artworks 
present to interpreters is an indication of the divergence of artistic aesthetic illusion and mere 
social illusion: continuing alienation. Romantic art’s outbursts of emotion may offer the 
thought of a vain suffering that the sufferer is never able in his or her lifetime to attach to its 
objective cause—but for objective reasons.   
 Hegel interprets abstraction in art as recalcitrance towards resolution—as the 
preference for immediacy over mediation, which is why he—and philosophers at large—tend 
to cut emotion off from thinking. So domination is perpetuated, for the displays of suffering 
indicating that reality does not yet have its concept are dismissed as a clinging to immediacy, 
rather than traced to objective conditions. Hegel cannot but condemn the suffering inherent to 
art when he condemns feeling. Censuring emotion not only erases important clues that would 
put the concept into contact with its object, but it also places the burden of dialectical change 
on the sufferers, who are themselves to objectify or forget their distress in the attainment of 
the philosophical concept. Romanticism’s shrieks of mirth and pain, dissolving meaning into 
abstraction, its moments of high expression attaching to no concept, would give the lie to 
identity thinking, which takes concept and reality to be in harmony. The alienation that Hegel 
wants to overcome is only compounded by his objection to emotional displays in art. The new 
art, for whom beauty comes from elsewhere, strange like the “schöne Fremde”58—, does not 
                                                
58 Robert Schumann, “Schöne Fremde,” in Liederkreis Opus 39 für Singstimme und Klavier: Fassungen 1842 
und 1850, herausgegeben von Kazuko Ozawa (München: G. Henle, 2010), pp. 15-17 (1850)/ pp. 45-47 (1842). 
Schumann set the poem “Schöne Fremde” by Joseph Freiherrn von Eichendorff in 1840. 
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solve its own enigma; its strange expression therefore seems to be mere ‘feeling for the sake of 
feeling,’ organic irrationality, to those who expect resolution in art. Hegel’s influence is so 
strong that, even in times when resolution can no longer be taken for granted, the expressive 
extremes in Schumann’s art are nonetheless called “powerful musical representations of 
pathological states of feeling”59 and in some cases provoke intense speculation on his medical 
history and psychological states.60 Authoritative source books such as the Werkverzeichnis 
uncritically link Schumann’s moods to illness, without considering that Schumann was 
engaged in a process of social contestation.61 Schumann’s moods cannot automatically be put 
down to psychological dysfunction: depression and elation are likely responses of a healthy 
individual caught up in challenging the objective order. Not even the controversial Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-5 claims that elation or periods of intense 
creativity (or “goal-directed activity”62 in the jargon) are pathological in themselves, because 
it builds into all of its categories “the generic diagnostic criterion requiring distress or 
                                                
59 Charles Rosen, The Romantic Generation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 648. 
60 Dagmar Hoffmann-Axthelm, “‘Der Werth der Compositionen nimmt deutlich ab’ versus ‘Ausdruck eines 
Genius auf der Höhe seiner schöpferischen Kraft’: Kann ein großer Komponist ‘Wahnsinns-Musik’ schreiben?,” 
in Der späte Schumann, herausgegeben von Ulrich Tadday, special issue, Musik-Konzepte (Munich: edition text 
+ kritik, 2006), pp. 29-49, esp. p. 49. 
61 Margit L. McCorkle, Robert Schumann: Thematisch-Bibliographisches Werkverzeichnis=Robert Schumann: 
Thematic-bibliographical Catalogue of the Works, herausgegeben von der Robert-Schumann-Gesellschaft 
Düsseldorf, unter Mitwirkung von Akio Mayeda und der Robert-Schumann-Forschungsstelle (Mainz: Schott, 
2003). McCorkle uncritically accepts a popular notion of the psychiatric category of manic-depressive illness 
without examining whether the concept actually refers to anything real or whether Schumann in fact falls under 
it:   
Like so many of his Romantic contemporaries, Schumann was subject to periods of elation 
and melancholy that more or less affected his creative activities. In fact, he probably suffered 
from what today would be diagnosed as manic-depressive illness. In productive times he 
typically composed at “white heat,” often drafting works at a seemingly frenzied pace; these 
periods would be followed intermittently by months of depression and general malaise during 
which little was created (ibid., p. 61*). 
62 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-5, 5th ed. 
(Arlington, Va.: American Psychiatric Association, 2013), p. 124. 
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disability.”63 Yet those who have been trusted with the task of writing history64 toss off the 
suggestion that Schumann was manically depressed and then somehow escape with the 
insinuation that the evidence for this lies in his quickly produced works—like Dichterliebe, 
which was essentially composed in nine days,65 and in joy, from what we can tell from 
surviving documents.66 Dichterliebe may have been composed quickly and joyfully, but that 
does not imply that it was composed in a manic or even hypomanic state.67 The question, 
unexamined by Schumann’s reactionary biographers, interpreters, historians and critics, is 
whether he was in distress or disabled while composing “at a seemingly frenzied pace.”68 The 
psychotic features of Schumann’s final illness, which are undeniable, do not retroactively alter 
the character of his working methods and habits some ten or fifteen years previous from 
healthy to unhealthy. But even practicing psychiatric professionals have made the armchair 
                                                
63 Ibid., p. 21. In 2005, Rachel Cooper argued convincingly that the description for mania in the fourth edition of 
the DSM did not necessarily imply illness. A case for bipolar disorder cannot be made today solely on the basis 
of bits of evidence showing that for weeks at a time Schumann composed intensively, made far-reaching 
connections rapidly, rated his own work highly, felt persistently elated and functioned less well socially, even 
though these descriptors resemble the symptoms listed for a manic episode (ibid., p. 124). According to the new 
DSM-5, the individual who does not experience distress or disability does not count as mentally ill. Yet where the 
individual does experience distress or disability, the DSM leaves it up to clinical practitioners to decide whether 
this results from a dysfunction in the underlying “psychological, biological, or developmental processes” or 
whether this is the social consequence for a healthy individual who deviates from some norm or has a conflict 
with society (ibid., p. 20). In other words, the individual practitioner must somehow be above ideology, able to 
separate social contestation and just “being different” from psychological dysfunction—a tall order. See Rachel 
Cooper, Classifying Madness: A Philosophical Examination of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (Berlin: Springer, 2005). 
64 For example, McCorkle, Werkverzeichnis, p. 61*. 
65 Rufus E. Hallmark, The Genesis of Schumann’s “Dichterliebe”: A Source Study (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University Microfilms International, 1979), p. 23. 
66 Ibid., p. 21f. 
67 John Worthen is one of the rare biographers of Schumann to question received notions: “What have been 
declared to be manic episodes might also be seen as a concentrated mind working very hard under the kind of 
self-imposed pressure that Schumann knew well (he was recognized from his schooldays as capable of great 
concentration).”  John Worthen, Robert Schumann: Life and Death of a Musician (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2007), p. 367. 
68 McCorkle, Werkverzeichnis, p. 61*. 
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diagnosis of bipolar disorder for Robert Schumann,69 despite the most glaring piece of 
evidence mentioned in the autopsy report, which has been available since 1986, —“a rather 
large quantity of a yellowish slushy mass” around the pituitary gland.70 The evidence of 
haemorrhage at the base of the brain and the consistency of the yellowish mass, suggestive of 
liquefaction-necrosis, would support pituitary apoplexy as the cause of final illness and 
death.71 Although it is rare that pituitary tumours present as psychosis, such cases have been 
recently documented.72 The tendency in the literature is to attribute the psychosis to bipolar 
depression73 or to syphilis;74 however, the mass mentioned in the post-mortem report should 
                                                
69 For an example, see Ta-Wei Guu and Kuan-Pin Su, “Musical Creativity and Mood Bipolarity in Robert 
Schumann: A Tribute on the 200th Anniversary of the Composer’s Birth,” Psychiatry & Clinical Neurosciences 
65, no. 1 (published electronically January 26, 2011): pp. 113-114. The authors would treat Robert Schumann for 
bipolar disorder regardless of any other medical condition, if found: “With modern psychiatry guidelines, Mr 
[sic] S, the great composer Schumann, should be assessed soon after admission with comprehensive physical and 
laboratory examinations for any correctable organic causes. He should then be treated with a second-generation 
antipsychotic agent (e.g. olanzapine and quetiapine) for acute psychotic bipolar depression, with or without a 
mood stabilizer” (ibid., p. 114).  
70 W. Jänisch and G. Nauhaus, “Der Obduktionsbefund der Leiche des Komponisten Robert Schumann—
Veröffentlichung und Wertung eines wiederentdeckten Dokuments,” Zentralblatt für allgemeine Pathologie und 
pathologische Anatomie 132 (1986): pp. 129-36, here p. 132. In their commentary on the autopsy report, W. 
Jänisch and G. Nauhaus state that it gives evidence neither for nor against “endogenous psychoses” such as 
schizophrenia and manic-depressive disorder, that it provides insufficient grounds for a diagnosis of 
neurosyphilis and that it gives no grounds for the diagnosis of hypertension (ibid., p. 134f.). On the other hand, 
they claim that, while the report does not provide ample information to diagnose the yellowish mass, its 
description nonetheless “likely represents a pathological finding” (ibid., p. 134, my translation). 
71 On the subject of pituitary apoplexy, see Milton Brougham, A. Price Heusner and Raymond D. Adams, “Acute 
Degenerative Changes in Adenomas of the Pituitary Body—with Special Reference to Pituitary Apoplexy,” 
Journal of Neurosurgery 7, no. 5 (September 1950): pp. 421-439. The symptoms that Schumann experienced in 
February 1854 (tinnitus, psychosis) could be attributed to the rapid change in the tumour. 
72 See Y. Izci et al., “Diencephalic Tumours Presenting as Psychosis,” Acta Neuropsychiatrica 15 (2003): pp. 97-
101, doi: 10.1034/j.1601-5215.2003.00014.x. See also Arnab Kumar Ghosh, Rajesh Jacob, and Satya 
Rayapureddy, “Pituitary Tumour Presenting with Psychotic Symptoms Without Neurological Signs,” Singapore 
Medical Journal 53, no. 7 (July 2012): pp. 499-500, 
http://sma.org.sg/publications/smjcurrentissue.aspx?PID=186. 
73 See, for example, Peter Ostwald, Schumann: The Inner Voices of a Musical Genius (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1985), p. 303. Ostwald had access to the then-unpublished autopsy report at the time of writing, 
but rules out pituitary apoplexy because he believes that “there would have been a history of a sudden and 
massive collapse quickly leading to death” (ibid., p. 298). This is untrue. In one case of pituitary apoplexy, the 
patient had experienced mental confusion for a period of three years before the sudden collapse, then lived an 
additional six months.  See Brougham et al., “Acute Degenerative Changes,” under “Case 3,” pp. 425-427. 
74 See, for example, Daverio, Robert Schumann, pp. 482-488 and esp. p. 568 n82. Daverio believes that the 
irregularities signalled in the autopsy report are indications of syphilis. Worthen is more cautious than Daverio: 
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count as a significant finding deserving of discussion in the literature. Rampant speculation 
into Schumann’s personal life, sanctioned by nothing but merely social illusion, has caused the 
public release of the medical reports of one of Schumann’s attending doctors, Dr. Franz 
Richarz, who wanted them withheld to keep the professional secret.75 But the demands of 
science should not contradict the ethical compunction of Dr. Richarz. While no diagnosis for 
Robert Schumann can be made definitively today,76 the suggestion that he suffered from 
bipolar disorder is reactionary and absurd—emotions and the work of progress are not 
illnesses, nor even disorders. It is in the interests of the status quo to ban all emotion and 
gesture as sick and irrational. Domination is effectively perpetuated by the ideology that 
subjugated groups like women and indigenous peoples are by their nature driven by emotion, 
that they are therefore irrational and that any expression of suffering therefore does not relate 
to anything real or objective outside them—such as poor wages, social exclusion, lack of 
access to basic services or any of the other things that prejudice and discrimination bring. The 
denial of thought, reflection and critique to the emotional extremes in Schumann’s music is 
merely part of this perpetuation of the current wrong state of things, but to prohibit feelings in 
music is no less ideological: the greatest thinkers and musicians are agreed that in imagination 
                                                                                                                                                    
“It is possible that what is being described is a syphilitic gumma, but the terms are far too vague to allow any 
final identification of the abnormality” (Worthen, Robert Schumann, p. 395). If, however, the mass were a 
syphilitic lesion, or gumma, the causes of Robert Schumann’s psychosis and death would still go unexplained 
because the presence of gummas indicates benign late-stage syphilis rather the life-threatening kinds, such as 
paresis, which has the psychotic manifestations. It should also be mentioned that the physical complaints that 
support a diagnosis of tertiary neurosyphilis—headaches, tinnitus, unequal eye pupil size, aphasia, convulsions, 
paralysis—are identical with the symptoms that support a diagnosis of pituitary tumour, and are thus 
inconclusive. See Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, academic edition, s.v. “syphilis,” accessed April 12, 2013, 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/578770/syphilis>.  
75 Daverio, Robert Schumann, p. 567 n69. 
76 More information would be required to identify the mass that the autopsy report signals, especially considering 
the many sorts of tumours and lesions that can be present around the pituitary gland, and also considering the 
heterogeneity and non-specificity of symptoms associated with these different growths—symptoms which, 
furthermore, do not necessarily all show up in the same patient. 
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feeling and understanding cannot be divided.77 Schumann’s Hegel-fed detractors78 are merely 
assuming the conventional separation between reason and emotion in their mistaken view of 
his music as immediate, subjective feeling. Any immediacy of expression in Romanticism is 
farthest from a psychological output: it indicates the non-immediacy of resolution—a 
continuing split between appearance and reality.  
    Schumann’s scoring of Dichterliebe for high voice puts distance between the 
sentiment expressed and its presentation, defeating the possible Hegelian charge of a clinging 
to immediacy. The score asks that sopranos sing an “ich” that patently expresses a grown 
man’s point of view—for instance, in the passage where the flowers address the narrator as du 
trauriger blasser Mann! 79 This contradiction in the work, however, is rarely heard: 
Dichterliebe has generally always been sung by men. There are even formally educated 
singers today who are surprised to learn that Dichterliebe was written for high voice, so far 
has the performance practice departed from the score.80 One would do well, however, to 
reflect on why such a split between performance and score has occurred, especially since it 
started so early in the life of the work, in a precedent set by none less than Johannes Brahms 
and Julius Stockhausen, in 1861.81 On one hand, the rarity of soprano performances of 
Dichterliebe is a sign of the general irritation with illusion, unreality and magic in art, as 
                                                
77 See Theodor W. Adorno, Zu einer Theorie der musikalischen Reproduktion: Aufzeichnungen, ein Entwurf und 
zwei Schemata, herausgegeben von Henri Lonitz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001), p. 126f.  
78 See, for example, Richard Pohl [Hoplit, pseud.], Das Karlsruher Musikfest im October 1853 (Leipzig: Hinze, 
1853), esp. pp. 51-55, http://www.mdz-nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10599227-7.  
79 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), XII, p. 25, mm. 17-20. 
80 Unsatisfactory on this point is Arthur Komar, “The Music of Dichterliebe: The Whole and Its Parts,” in Robert 
Schumann, Dichterliebe: An Authoritative Score, Historical Background, Essays in Analysis, Views and 
Comments, ed. A. Komar (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971), pp. 63-94. After arguing that the keys in 
Dichterliebe are essential to understanding the work, Komar implies that its register is not essential: he accepts 
that “women rarely sing the cycle in public because of its poetic content” (ibid., p. 93) and includes tenors in his 
list of “acceptable recordings” (ibid., p. 93 n16), yet declares in the same breath that “Schumann dedicated the 
cycle to the famous soprano, Schröder-Devrient” (ibid.).  
81 McCorkle, Werkverzeichnis, p. 207. 
 369 
Schumann’s scoring of Heine’s masculine voice for a feminine voice is indeed a manifestation 
of aesthetic illusion: “In the contradiction between its curdled state in writing, and the liquid 
state it implies, music has a part in the illusory character of mature art.”82 The idea that a 
narrator could be telling someone else’s story, someone who is no longer present, strikes the 
listener in high positivism as nonsensical. Somehow the literalists have not gone so far as to 
insist that the male singer produce flowers out of his tears and nightingale choruses out of his 
sighs, as the song goes.83 Expressed by a woman, the poet’s experiences seem utopian or 
imaginary, either because the history only comes from a witness at second hand who, as a 
woman, must certainly be—according to the common understanding—an unreliable 
interpreter of a man’s experience in love, or else because some magical transformation must 
have occurred for the man to appear in the guise of a woman, like the goddess Athena appears 
to Telemachos in the form of a man. This second, mythical, reading is possible. The voice 
seems like the poet’s spirit; or that of the poet as a boy, as if returned to innocence; or that of 
the beloved herself, who alone knows the poet’s grief,84 so who is the one apt to sing of it; or, 
judging by the Phrygian references, both the Phrygian chord85 and the Phrygian mode,86 the 
voice could belong to a Bacchante mourning the tragic dissolution of the godlike hero. Yet 
apart from this bad, mythical aspect of Schein, there is its utopian, social aspect. The 
dissatisfaction with soprano performances of Dichterliebe has also in part to do with the 
refusal on the part of audiences to allow the transcendent—the society to come—into the 
artwork. The scoring for high voice is incomprehensible within the current and past states of 
                                                
82 GS, vol. 16, p. 517, or prefer to my translation here “Vers une musique informelle,” in Quasi una Fantasia: 
Essays on Modern Music, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 1992), pp. 269-322, here p. 296. 
83 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe, (2011), II, p. 4, mm. 1-8, with pick-up. 
84 Ibid., VIII, p. 16, mm. 27-28, with pick-up. 
85 See, for example, ibid., VIII, p. 14f., mm. 10-11. 
86 See, for example, ibid., XIII, p. 26, mm. 1-6, with pick-up. 
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gender and their relations. The transfer of poetic subjectivity only seems supernatural in a 
society where the limits of the self are considered absolute. The “correction” of inconsistency 
in Schumann’s cycle, the emendation of Dichterliebe to low voice, not only covers up a 
contradiction in the artwork; it strengthens the social illusion that would have us believe that 
the Ich is always and everywhere the impermeable, personal self in a world of irreducible 
others. Adorno calls this “Ich of lyric” a mask for what actually speaks in art, the We: “Out of 
artworks, even the so-called personal ones, a We speaks and not ‘I’, and, in fact, all the more 
plainly, the less it expressly adapts itself to a We and its idiom.”87 The woman who sings the 
masculine  “I” gets in the way of the “illusion that poetic subjectivity goes without saying”—
that is, of the unchallenged belief that an “I” in poetry signals personal confession, never 
anything that has its source in something deeper than personal reactions and inclinations.88 
Irritation with artistic aesthetic illusion turns out to be an attachment to mere social illusion, to 
the comfortable thinking that prefers an ironclad division between the sexes, particularly as 
regards subjectivity. The masculine voice of Heine’s poems is tangential to their poetic 
language, as far as Schumann’s setting goes. The soprano voice increases the feeling of 
alienation, strengthening the demands for the society yet to come. 
{Section iii} Schumann’s critique of immediacy also operates in his ostensible adoption of 
the cycle as his aesthetic form. That Dichterliebe seeks to engage in the question of unity 
polemically is clear from its original subtitle: “Liederzyclus aus Heinrich Heines Buch der 
Lieder.”89 In his letter of August 6, 1843 to the Breitkopf & Härtel publishing house, 
Schumann offered, in his words, “a cycle (Cyklus) of 20 songs, which form a whole, but also, 
                                                
87 GS, vol. 7, p. 249 and vol. 7, p. 250, or prefer to my translations here Aesthetic Theory, p. 167. 
88 GS, vol. 7, p. 249, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 167. 
89 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), p. III. 
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individually, self-contained entities unto themselves.”90 Schumann here refers to “20 songs,” 
not 16, because four of the 20 songs were never published as part of Dichterliebe, but 
eventually became parts of other works—“Dein Angesicht” and “Es leuchtet meine Liebe” as 
nos. 2 and 3 of Fünf Lieder und Gesänge, op. 127, and “Lehn’ deine Wang’” and “Mein 
Wagen rollet langsam” as nos. 2 and 4 of Vier Gesänge, op. 142.91 The removal of the four 
songs to other works might raise questions about the musical whole of Dichterliebe, but 
Schumann’s statement is cited here not as proof that he was working with a specific unifying 
plan for the twenty songs that made up the song cycle he offered his publisher, nor as proof 
about the real unity of his art, but rather as a demonstration that Schumann was working with 
the antinomical concept of the cycle.  Schumann’s preference for the Greek “Cyklus” over the 
German “Kreis” in the sub-title of Dichterliebe evokes the Trojan Epic Cycle—a matter of 
debate among his contemporaries and no less a tormented notion in his day than in ours. On 
one hand, the Epic Cycle can refer to diverse poems, once circulating, now lost, that tell 
different stories around the origin of the universe, the Trojan War and the Theban War. On the 
other hand, the Epic Cycle can refer to the stories on the origins of the universe, the Trojan 
War and the Theban War as if worked into a single, all-embracing narrative. There is debate 
even today over whether individual poems sprang up to give accounts of parts missing from 
the whole, or whether the idea of stitching all the poems together into a single unit came later. 
Jonathan S. Burgess supposes that “the conceptual basis of the Epic Cycle was probably in 
existence long before its actual manufacture.”92 Yet to claim that the Greeks had an existing 
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91 These are included as an appendix in R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), pp. 38-49. 
92 Jonathan S. Burgess, The Tradition of the Trojan War in Homer and the Epic Cycle (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
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concept of the Epic Cycle before composing the poems of the Epic Cycle says nothing, for 
Burgess himself demonstrates that there is always an even greater whole beyond whatever part 
of the Cycle we take to be the whole:  
In my view this manufacture of the Epic Cycle would involve the interference with 
fixed texts by individuals who stood outside any authentic compositional or 
performance tradition for these poems. … The textual boundaries of the Cycle poems 
that are found in Proclus cannot be the dimensions of their oral traditions or the fixed 
texts arising from them… It seems to me most plausible to explain such manipulation 
as resulting from editorial activity imposed on the fixed texts of the poems. Rhapsodes, 
however, may have prefigured an editorial manufacture of the Epic Cycle by joining 
together song performances from different epics…. Theoretically rhapsodies could 
have been presented in this manner, for example (comparable with the Trojan War 
section of the Epic Cycle), or even the sum of the mythical past in all its theogonic and 
heroic material (comparable with the Epic Cycle in its entirety). A presentation of the 
Trojan War in this manner would not be a complete, detailed account, but rather a 
rough suggestion of the story through the use of epic from various sources….In 
mythological terms the Trojan War would have always existed as a loosely unified 
story, and so the tradition itself can be described as a “cycle” (itself part of the larger 
cycle of the mythological past). Even if an epic about the Trojan War was never 
actually used in connection with other epics to present the larger story of the war, its 
inherent nature as belonging to the tradition of the Trojan War would qualify it as part 
of the “potential performance” of the whole story…. If a patchwork narrative of the 
Trojan War was ever constituted by means of rhapsodes performing epic material from 
different sources, this presentation would be conceptually related to the Trojan War 
section of what became known as the Epic Cycle.93 
 
To Burgess, epics on the Trojan War are part of the Epic Cycle, which is part of the larger 
cycle of hearing and handing down stories, which is itself part of the even larger cycle of 
generating myths about the past. The “cycle” suggests a totality whose illusory closure is 
broken by its expansion into an even greater whole. On this reading, the Greeks did not have a 
fixed idea of the Epic Cycle in advance of the stories generated. Or rather, once they had the 
idea of a limited number of stories that would make the totality of the Cycle, they cut 
themselves off from the very process of manufacture that generated the Cycle, the largest ring 
in Burgess’s circle of circles: in abiding by the concept of totality, they would have ceased to 
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be creative, and in fact would have lost the whole—the collective in which every actual 
individual is a spontaneous generator of myths. With the Epic Cycle fixed as a definite 
totality, myth passes into Enlightenment, for the Cycle implies a rationalization of wild, 
spontaneous, endless confabulation. With increasing rationalization, the idea of whole is 
transferred from the story-generating collective to the individual great Classical work, and, 
subsequently, to the canon of great Classical works. The “unity” conventionally sought for 
great works of art implies this act of closure of the work from infinitely expansive creativity. 
Different social roles and categories perform the function of closing off a totality. First, the 
birth of the category of bard restricts story-telling to a specific group. Then, in order to 
become writing, the epics pass another process of selection, so imply acts of judgement: they 
are selections of the many songs available. Yet if editors may have manipulated texts to be 
able to form rational wholes, this process of rationalization was already present if, as Burgess 
supposes, the rhapsodes themselves manipulated songs to form logical narratives out of parts 
arising from different oral sources. The ultimate rationalization of all this myth, the aesthetic 
judgements by Aristotle that Homer ranks as the best poet94 and that the Iliad and the Odyssey 
are qualitatively superior to the rest,95 have the consequence of changing the sense of “cycle,” 
such that it refers only to the rhapsodic and disunified epics, not to the Homeric epics. With 
the subsequent loss of works of the Epic Cycle, such as the Cypria and the Little Iliad, the 
concept of Cycle is able to realize itself, but as its opposite: as a definite whole, which 
Aristotle calls “unity” or “artificial whole.” The basis of Aristotle’s aesthetic judgement on the 
cyclic poets,96 however, suffered severe damage during Schumann’s lifetime. Leipzig was not 
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only the cultural milieu in which Robert Schumann would produce most of his innovative, 
early piano works and songs, but also the scene of a dispute in a century-long debate in 
Classical philology. Studies on Homer in nineteenth-century Germany turned largely around 
the famous Homeric Question: the question of the authorship or aesthetic unity of the Odyssey 
raised by Friedrich August Wolf in his 1795 publication Prolegomena ad Homerum sive de 
operum homericorum prisca et genuine forma variisque mutationibus et probabili ratione 
emendandi.97 The period of debate around this question corresponds nearly exactly to the 
Romantic period: 1795-1912.98 The University of Leipzig had a representative of each side of 
the debate in Gregor Wilhelm Nitzsch, who, as a Unitarian, argued, against Wolf, for the 
Homeric Epic as a unified artwork created by single author, and Johann Gottfried Jakob 
Hermann, who, with Wolf, would argue for its multiple authorship on the basis its disunity, so, 
would defend the new model of Analysis. It was to this Hermann that Schumann was 
promised a letter of introduction in 1828.99 When Analysis challenged the idea that the 
Odyssey and the Iliad were integral and indivisible works by the unique creator Homer, and 
the rifts, hard line-breaks, and inconsistencies began to appear, the criterion by which Aristotle 
judged them superior to other epics, the restriction of their material to just “one part (hen 
meros)” each of the Trojan War, no longer seemed pertinent.100 Aristotle had reproached now-
lost works of the Epic Cycle, the Cypria and Little Iliad, for “consisting of many parts 
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Neumann, 1996), pp. 271-287, here p. 275.  
100 Aristotle, Poetics 23.1459b1 (my translation). 
 375 
(polumerê).”101 But the same reproach could be made of the Odyssey: although it deals with 
only one part of the Trojan war, it does not restrict itself to just one part of Odysseus’s return 
home. The proliferation of episodes is characteristic of epic form, which Aristotle tolerates as 
long as, in the composing process, the poet invents the episodes only after coming up with the 
general idea: “When putting stories into verse, whether of one’s own or stories already made, 
it is necessary to set out something general (katholou), then only after the episodes, and to 
develop them.”102 If the Odyssey and the Iliad are in fact patchworks of different stories, 
conceived each in isolation, without any overreaching plan or notion of the whole, then 
Aristotle’s judgement of unity on them is endangered. With Aristotle’s judgement of the 
Homeric epics’ aesthetic superiority thrown into doubt, Homer becomes just one poet working 
amongst many on the collective project of the Epic Cycle. In the decades after the publication 
of Wolf’s Prolegomena, Classical philologists began to turn their attention to the Cycle 
specifically. At the same time, composers such as Ludwig van Beethoven, Conradin Kreutzer, 
Leopold Lenz, Fanny Mendelssohn and Felix Mendelssohn, Wilhelm Häser, Heinrich 
Marschner and, notably, Franz Schubert published loose collections of songs, some bearing 
the subtitle “Cyclus.”103 Schubert’s masterworks in the genre, Die schöne Müllerin, op. 25, 
and Winterreise, op. 89, are settings of “songs” by Wilhelm Müller, himself not only a once-
student of Wolf, but also a theorist whose Homerische Vorschule: Eine Einleitung in das 
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Studium der Ilias und Odyssee brought the question of the Epic Cycle to a wider audience.104 
By the time Schumann was composing his Lieder, the term “cycle” had picked up specific 
connotations available to the general musical public. In calling Dichterliebe a “cycle,” 
Schumann denied that his work needed to correspond to the Aristotelian criterion of aesthetic 
excellence—that of a general idea, conceived in advance, that guided every moment of the 
creative process and unified the whole. He denied, too, the Aristotelian benchmark for the 
superiority of the Homeric epics over the Cyclic epics—that it consist of a single part.105 
Schumann’s anti-Aristotelian sense of “cycle” is confirmed by the letter to Breitkopf and 
Härtel: Schumann claims that each part that constitutes the cycle is “a self-contained entity 
[ein Abgeschlossenes],” so, turned in on itself like a windowless monad, without any 
necessary conscious intention towards or even awareness of the whole.106 The performance 
practice of giving the vocal role to men now shows itself to be in some sense a compensation 
for the lost unity wrought by a single universal conceived in advance; in having the audience 
believe that the exceptionally diverse material is unified in the male persona who immediately 
is the poet, however, standard contemporary performance renounces Schumann’s critique of 
immediacy.107 Schumann’s resistance towards Aristotelian aesthetics raises the question of 
how the cycle can fulfil his claim that it is a whole if not through a unifying idea conceived in 
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advance. Aristotle himself, however, indicates two ways in which unity—or an artificial 
whole, as opposed to a whole defined by nature—may be constituted: 
 For not only is it [oneness], on the one hand, the universal [katholou], or the thing that 
says something [legomenon] in general on its own, as a whole, so that it is universal 
insofar as, encompassing the many, it alleges itself [katêgoreisthai] therefore to be, in 
particular, all, together, as a single one, like a human being, a horse, a god can be all, 
together, as a single one, because all, together, are living; but also, on the other hand, 
oneness is the continuous stretch related right through, sustaining from beginning to 
end, whenever one is made out of more, especially when the more are there in 
potential, but if not, in actuality.108  
 
The first kind of unity, which we can call intensive unity, is the kind of unity that Aristotle 
expects to find in poetry. An intensive unity is wrought by way of the universal (katholou)—a 
compressed declaration that, as a particular, claims to be the many things that it gathers all 
together. The universal is both a mere manner of speaking and real craft, both a claim and 
reality: it really encompasses many particular, scattered things, but claims to do so as a 
particular single thing, united in itself, so is in some sense a mere allegation.109 The other type 
of artificial whole, the extensive type, is really constituted by way of constant relation. What 
makes this second type of oneness a whole is its unbroken unrolling in time (or spreading in 
space). It seems that an epic would be considered unified in the second way, extensively, by 
sustained telling.110 But in the Poetics, Aristotle suggests that poetry is not essentially this type 
of whole; for he claims that poetry proceeds from the universal, the katholou.111 To obtain a 
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better idea of what Aristotle means by katholou in literature, one can use his examples as a 
guide. Aristotle gives the katholou for two works: the Iphigenia and the Odyssey. When 
Aristotle expresses the katholou of the Iphigenia, he gives not a one-word predicate, but he 
presents it as a précis of the action, the plot.112 The plot that Aristotle provides can serve as a 
katholou because it encompasses the many, or, contains variants. Aristotle records a different 
version of the Iphigenia, by Polyidos, in which the realization by the priestess that the sacrifice 
victim is her brother occurs as a result of his blurting out, at the last minute, that his sister’s 
fate is also his own, which presumably gives her pause, whereas in Iphigenia in Taurus by 
Euripides, the revelation happens differently: as we know, when the priestess asks Pylades, in 
Orestes’s presence, to convey a written message to her brother in Argos, whom she names 
with herself, Pylades reacts by handing the letter to the sacrifice victim, whom Iphigenia then 
questions to arrive at the confirmation that he is her brother.113 Yet the Iphigenia is universal 
insofar as it claims on its own behalf (katêgoreisthai) to be one particular thing that is all its 
different versions, together: the Iphigenia. Or, to exploit a different sense of “katêgoreisthai,” 
the Iphigenia is a universal insofar as it is told in general terms as one particular thing. So 
when Aristotle tells the Iphigenia such that his telling encompasses a multiplicity of tellings, 
his telling itself makes the claim to be a single one: the Iphigenia told so that it contains every 
version of it, but which, as a telling, is a particular amongst others. For instance, Hegel also 
tells the Iphigenia such that it contains its variants.114 While Aristotle gives the variant of 
Polyidos and that of Euripides, Hegel gives that of Euripides and that of Goethe. In this way, 
the Iphigenia that claims to be all its multiple versions, can itself be just one, particular telling 
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that takes in the Iphigenia’s multiplicity—this particular Aristotle Iphigenia or this particular 
Hegel Iphigenia. However, with Hegel’s telling of the Iphigenia, it becomes clear that 
Aristotle’s Iphigenia was not the whole Iphigenia in all its multiplicity: it was just an artificial, 
constructed whole. Thus Hegel destroys the old illusion of the whole Iphigenia—Aristotle’s—
and creates a new illusison of the whole Iphigenia. From this presentation of the katholou for 
the Iphigenia, it is clear that, for Aristotle, universals are part of the aesthetic sphere. After 
giving the katholou of the Iphigenia, Aristotle proceeds with a like demonstration for the 
Odyssey, where he adopts a slightly different vocabulary, opposing “episodes” not to 
“universal,” but to “story,” logos.115 A poem therefore is a whole not by virtue of unbroken 
telling, but by virtue of its universal (katholou), from which the episodes follow, both logically 
and in the actual process of composition. For Aristotle, then, a poem is unified in the same 
way that a concept is unified: by the universal. Although the epic is episodic, Aristotle claims 
that its unity nonetheless rests on the logos—the story or subject or principle that guided the 
composition of the work. Since Aristotle presumes that the logos is universal, it can be in the 
heads of any number of people, so, clearly, poetic unity does not necessarily depend upon a 
single, individual, personal, unified consciousness that shapes the whole poem in every aspect, 
from beginning to end, and is alone responsible for it. Poetic unity does, however, depend on 
the logos being given in advance and guiding the work of all the poets. This is not assured if 
the Odyssey and Iliad were stitched together after the fact, out of many different stories each 
conceived in isolation. Once intensive unity appears barred to the epic, it seems reasonable, 
then, to try to argue for poetic unity on the basis of extensive unity. In fact, according to 
Gregory Nagy, extensive unity was epic poetry’s own criterion. The concept of cycle as traced 
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by Nagy implied two aspects that the Aristotelian concept of artificial whole did not: the craft 
of cleverly joining together what was separate and a single, mythical master joiner of all 
poetry: 
…let us begin by reconsidering the traditional status of Homer as a prototypical 
author…The further back in time we reconstruct this figure, the greater the repertoire 
attributed to him: in the preclassical period, it seems that he is credited with all the so-
called Cycle, all the Theban epics, and so on…As we have already noted, the very 
concept of “cycle”—that is, kuklos—had once served as a metaphor for all of Homer’s 
poetry…But now we discover that this same word kuklos, used as a metaphor for the 
sum total of Homeric poetry, is attested with the meaning of ‘chariot wheel’ in 
Homeric diction…In the poetic traditions of Indo-European languages, we find a direct 
attestation of a metaphor that compares a well-composed song to a well-crafted chariot 
wheel.… In the Greek poetic traditions, the specific image of crafting a chariot wheel 
is implicit: the root of ar- of arariskô, ‘join, fit together’….is shared by the word that 
means ‘chariot wheel’ in the Linear B texts, harmo (Knossos tablets Sg 1811, So 0437, 
etc.); in another dialectal form, harma…becomes, metonymically, the word for 
‘chariot’ (Iliad 5.231, etc.). I submit that this same root ar- is shared by the name of 
Homer, Homêros, the etymology of which can be explained as ‘he who joins together’ 
(homo- plus ar-)….If this etymology is correct, then the making of the cycle, the sum 
total of epic, by the master poet Homer is a metaphor that pictures the crafting of the 
ultimate chariot-wheel by the ultimate carpenter or “joiner.”116 
 
Leaving aside the question as to whether the etymology for “Homer” is correct or revelatory 
of the way in which the archaic Greeks thought about Homer, we can glean from Nagy’s 
research some insight into why the cycle presents such difficulty for aesthetic judgement. 
Aristotle’s aesthetic criterion is intensive unity, yet this conflicts with the aesthetic criterion 
given by the Homeric song itself: extensive unity. By its own measure, a divine song is not the 
result of the priority of the whole in thought over the parts, but it consists of many parts fitted 
together well. Indeed, in Telemachos’s defense of “mournful song”117—a passage of the 
Odyssey which, incidentally, the twenty-year-old Schumann copied into his daybook118—, 
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Telemachos describes Phemios’s song as ἐρίηρον,119 which literally means “fitting exactly,” 
and which contains the “ar-” root to which Nagy refers. This same Indo-European root 
happens to be in the Greek word “harmonia,” which means both harmony and a join. 
Moreover, the root “ar-” forms the basis of the English word art.120 Now the concepts of art 
and harmony no longer imply masterful joins—and this change should by no means be seen as 
a “corruption” of these concepts. The gradual suppression of meetness or extensive unity from 
the concept of art indicates rather increasing rationalization in general, of which Aristotle is 
himself the arena. Although Aristotle was aware of the aesthetic criterion that the Homeric 
poems set for themselves, he did not measure them by that criterion. This is something that 
seems to have escaped the Unitarians. Unable to argue for the great epics’ wholeness on the 
basis of Aristotle’s criterion for them (their unification by a preconceived universal, or, 
katholou), Unitarians argued for a wholeness on the basis of these artworks’ resemblance to 
natural forms, sweeping aside his distinction between artificial wholes and wholes defined by 
nature. Unitarians considered works of art wholes not insofar as they were unified by a single 
logos, conceived in advance, but insofar as they resembled organisms. George Curtius notes 
that Unitarians vaunted their “organic” view over the “atomistic” view of Homeric Analysis, 
on page five of his “Andeutungen über den gegenwärtigen Stand der homerischen Frage” from 
the fifth volume of the Zeitschrift für die österreichischen Gymnasien.121 Friedrich Schlegel, 
however, found an organic metaphor of such cunning that it split the difference between 
Unitarianism and Analysis before the debate really took place, in his response to Wolf’s 
Prolegomena of 1796—“Über die homerische Poesie mit Rücksicht auf die Wolfischen 
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Untersuchungen.”122 There, in the attempt to save Homeric unity in the face of Wolf’s 
challenge, he compares the epic to a natural form, the polyp: “The epic is, if you will permit 
the expression, a poetical polyp, where each smaller or bigger member (which can detach 
itself from the cohesive whole, without mutilating it or breaking it up into absolutely simple, 
no longer poetic and epic, components) has a life of its own, with just as much harmony as the 
whole.”123 
{Polyp Excursus} The polyp is a riddle for the taxonomist and for the philosopher, and has 
been for centuries. Scientific discoveries about its capacities to regenerate itself and even to 
survive scission inspired French Enlightenment materialism.124 The discovery of this creature 
upset common-sense notions of the individual as indivisible and independent: the polyp may 
reproduce asexually by fragmenting into a number of separate viable bodies,125 or by budding 
its offspring from an outgrowth of cells somewhere on its body, adding still more to its 
aggregate form.126 In the case of coral, a new polyp formed from a bud generally remains 
attached to parent polyp by connective tissue to form a colony, one continuous, self-generating 
body that is everywhere coral,127 but whose members may either kill prey, feed, and reproduce 
independently, and even die off individually, without the whole colony dying. In the case of 
the sea anemone, the bud may also detach itself from its parent to lead an independent 
                                                
122 Friedrich Schlegel, “Über die homerische Poesie mit Rücksicht auf die Wolfischen Untersuchungen,” in 
Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, herausgegeben von Ernst Behler (München: Schöningh, 1958-), Abteilung 
[division] 1, vol. 1, pp. 116-132. 
123 Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, division 1, vol. 1, p. 131. 
124 See Aram Vartanian, “Trembley’s Polyp, La Mettrie, and Eighteenth-Century French Materialism,” Journal 
of the History of Ideas 11, no. 3 (June 1950): pp. 259-286.    
125 Daphne Gail Fautin, “Reproduction of Cnidaria,” Canadian Journal of Zoology 80, no. 10 (published 
electronically November 19, 2002): pp. 1735-1754, doi: 10.1139/Z02-133.   
126 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, academic edition, s.v. “budding,” accessed February 17, 2013, 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/83411/budding>. 
127 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, academic edition, s.v. “polyp,” accessed February 17, 2013, 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/468956/polyp>. 
 383 
existence. In non-colonial polyps, the break-away bud may turn out to be more polyp of the 
same genetic make-up, more polyp of different genetic make-up or not polyp at all, but a 
medusa.128 But the concept of polyp with which Schlegel was working in no way embraces the 
whole baffling, astounding array of what polyp can be, for the connection between the medusa 
and the polyp was not appreciated until 1843 at the earliest, when the findings of Michael Sars 
and those of J. G. Dalyell gained a hearing, and polyps and medusas started to be conceived as 
alternating “generations” in the life cycle of certain coelenterates.129 The polyp turned out to 
be an outward appearance, a body type, not a kind of animal (or kind of plant, as some had 
thought). The Cnidaria phylum as we know it today contains animals who have only the polyp 
body form, those who have only the medusa form and those who have both. Nonetheless, by 
1758, Linnaeus had gone very far in grouping together, as Vermes imperfecta, Cnidaria so 
diverse as the blue button, the wind sailor, the beadlet anemone, hard and soft corals and the 
common jellyfish.130 Despite all this variety, Schlegel has in mind a very specific polyp: he 
appears to be referring to what we now know as the body-form of the hydra. This solitary 
hydroid can reproduce asexually by budding, yet its buds do not form medusas, but only single 
polyps, genetically identical to it: hydras are clonal.131 Furthermore, the buds assume the 
specific form of limbs or members, which detach themselves to summersault off to be solitary 
hydra: a tentacle of a hydra can literally take on a life of its own, just as Schlegel describes 
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131 J. B. C. Jackson and A. G. Coates, “Life Cycles and Evolution of Clonal (Modular) Animals,” Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B (Biological Sciences), 313, no. 1159 (August 14, 1986): 
pp. 7-22, here p. 7. 
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it.132 It was upon a hydra polyp specifically that Abraham Trembley performed his rather cruel 
experiments,133 whose philosophical implications were worked out by the French 
materialists.134 The polyp plays a memorable role in Diderot’s “Le Rêve de d’Alembert.” 
When d’Alembert begins to speak feverishly in his sleep, Mademoiselle de l’Espinasse, who is 
watching over him, decides to record his words, whose reason or unreason she tests on Dr. 
Bordeu the following morning, reading out the dictation she took during the night: 
On Jupiter or on Saturn, human polyps! Males break down into males; females, into 
females—that is pleasing… (There he burst into gales of laughter enough to frighten 
me.)… Man breaks down into an infinite number of atom-men they enclose between 
leaves of paper like eggs of insects known to build up their shells gradually, remain 
chrysalides for a certain period of time, then crack their shells to emerge as butterflies, 
a society of moulded men, an entire province peopled with the debris from a single 
man—the image is utterly delightful…(and then the gales of laughter started up 
again)… If man breaks down into an infinite number of animalcule-men somewhere—
there they must be less adverse to death; there they make up for the loss of a man so 
easily that it must be little cause for regret.135          
 
This passage is a likely source for Schlegel’s statement that the member of the polyp has as 
much “harmony” as the whole. Yet from this passage it emerges that the polyp model is in fact 
a denial of individuality to any mere part whatsoever. The experiments with polyps seem to 
have overthrown continuity in space as the mark of individuality: from the scientific fact that a 
single polyp can split into two or more viable polyps, the dreaming d’Alembert character 
supposes something like a “Big Bang Theory” of life, whereby all spatially delimited beings 
are in fact fragments of an original, single, whole being, which alone can be called 
“individual.” Society is formed out of the “debris” of whole humanity, in which the particular 
                                                
132 Encyclopædia Britannica Online, academic edition, s.v. “hydra,” accessed February 17, 2013, 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/278116/Hydra>. 
133 Howard M. Lenhoff and Sylvia G. Lenhoff, “Challenge to the Specialist: Abraham Trembley’s Approach to 
Research on the Organism – 1744 and Today,” American Zoologist 29, no. 3 (1989): pp. 1105-1117, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3883509. 
134 Vartanian, “Trembley’s Polyp,” p. 259. 
135 Denis Diderot, “Le Rêve de d’Alembert,” in Œuvres complètes, ed. H. Dieckmann, Jean Fabre, Jacques 
Proust et Jean Varloot (Paris: Hermann, 1975-), vol. 17, pp. 23-109, here p. 125f. (my translation).  
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is subordinate to the whole.136 Diderot presented the subordination of the part to the whole as 
feverish dreaming in his dialogue. But in Schlegel’s essay on Homeric poetry, the polyp 
returns in earnest, this time to break away from the whole to which it has been subordinated in 
d’Alembert’s dream. Schlegel compares the epic poem only to a certain polyp, and then only 
in a certain respect: it is only in the capacity of the non-colonial polyp to reproduce asexually 
by budding that it bears a resemblance to epic poetry. Schlegel’s polyp is thus not a 
Portuguese man-of-war dactylozooid polyp, which remains subordinate to the man-of-war, 
and which has only a lethal function, not a generative function, and whose accompanying 
tentacles do not detach themselves to take on lives of their own, but merely replenish 
themselves, as they are periodically bitten off by prey.137 Nor is Schlegel’s polyp a coral 
polyp, for coral is colonial. It is not even a coral polyp of the since-discovered species 
Anthipathes grandis, whose capacity to generate a new colony from a detached polyp 
tentacle—the rather recently formulated concept of ‘polyp bailout’138—has not been observed 
in the wild, while even its capacity to reproduce itself from a broken polyp-bearing branch is 
“rarely successful.”139 Schlegel restricts his comparison, rather, to the asexual budding of new, 
solitary, free-swimming, clonal polyps: the metaphor does not extend to the hydra’s capacity 
to regenerate and to fragment. He so sees the model for Epic poetry in the subordinate part that 
breaks away to gain an independent life. By claiming that the poetic organism’s member can 
                                                
136 Ibid., vol. 17, p. 126. 
137 Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, academic edition, s.v. “Portuguese man-of-war,” accessed February 18, 
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138 Paul W. Sammarco, “Polyp Bail-Out: An Escape Response to Environmental Stress and a New Means of 
Reproduction in Corals,” Marine Ecology, Progress Series, 10 (November 10, 1982): pp. 57-65. 
139 Daniel Wagner, Rhian G. Waller and Robert J. Toonen, “Sexual Reproduction of Hawaiian Black Corals, 
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detach itself to take on a life of its own, Schlegel contests the idea, expressed by Diderot’s 
d’Alembert, that life and individuality really belong to the polypic totality. The breakaway 
progeny has its own life, regardless of the fact that it has the same shape or, as we express it 
today, the same genetic material, as its parent. After all, the parent polyp and the child polyp 
may even be clones, but, even then, they do not have the same personal history: they belong to 
different generations and arose in different historical periods. Different rhapsodies of the Iliad 
and the Odyssey might have arisen in different historical periods, but distinguishing these does 
not destroy these two surviving epics, according to Schlegel, because the Vollendung, the 
achievement or fulfilment, that characterizes the whole epic also characterizes each part of 
it.140 In fact, Schlegel argues that the Homeric epics are the most achieved in their parts.141 The 
sign of the part’s achievement is harmony: the peace amongst the different parts of this part.142 
Arguing this way, in favour of the harmonious part, Schlegel wishes to save the Homeric epics 
as artworks, from the verdict that their diverse authorship and heterogeneous episodes bring 
down. Although Schlegel’s polyp metaphor is very colourful, it does not show that the 
Odyssey is a unity as far as Aristotle is concerned, for, according to the philosopher, a poem is 
an artificial whole of the intensive type, not a natural, living whole: the poem is a whole 
insofar as it claims to be many as one, whereas an animal is a whole in virtue of having no part 
missing.143 Schlegel argues for the separate rhapsodies forming independent wholes and, 
collectively, one whole on the basis of how nature defines whole, according to Aristotle. 
Whether we can consider the new miniature hydra that formed from the big hydra’s finger-like 
projection, and which broke away, a whole in its own right has no consequences for 
                                                
140 Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, division 1, vol. 1, p. 130. 
141 Ibid., division 1, vol. 1, p. 132. 
142 Ibid., division 1, vol. 1, p. 130. 
143 Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.26.1023b26f. 
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Aristotle’s judgement on the Odyssey and the Iliad because, for these to be wholes according 
to his criteria, they must have formed from the terse expression of a diverse group of non-
continuous particulars, as one. Aristotle’s representation of the subject of the Odyssey is only 
part of what the idea of the Odyssey could be, and at the same time more than any particular 
teller of the Odyssey has told: it is an artificial or technical whole, and not repleteness and 
closure imposed by nature. {End of Excursus} 
  To evoke the cycle form in connection with extensive unity seems to be a restorative 
gesture: the demand that the new work be measured against the aesthetics of the distant past.  
 Schumann, however, by calling his work a “cycle,” is not evoking the older aesthetic 
criterion that epic poetry established for itself, extensive unity; rather, he offers the illusion of 
a form—a false immediacy.  
{Section iv} Important literature on Dichterliebe in English has concerned itself with the 
question of the whole by showing that the work is a linear progression of linked songs. In 
general, commentators of Dichterliebe have argued against its being a potpourri of unrelated 
things—or even a collection of similar but randomly-ordered things—by claiming that key 
relationships link the songs. The emphasis on linkage between the songs suggests that 
Schumann’s recent interpreters accept extensive unity, unbroken continuity, as a criterion by 
which to judge the cycle. What counts as a masterful join or logical link, however, is far from 
clear. Fifth relations are considered logical links, but not all of the Lieder in Dichterliebe are 
linked by fifth relations.144 More seriously, in the absence of any agreed-upon criteria, the 
main authors involved in the unity debate fall back on the organicist paradigm, despite its 
                                                
144 Consider, for example, R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), XII, p. 24, m. 1. One must ask in what sense this 
German sixth in B-flat major constitutes a link from the final tonic chord in E-flat major of the preceding Lied 
(ibid., XI, p. 23, m. 46).  
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political misuse and fundamentally repressive character.145 Commentators such as Heinrich 
Schenker do not ultimately judge Dichterliebe on the basis of extensive unity—the Homeric 
songs’ criterion for success—, but rather assume access to the “whole” as it is defined by 
nature, and it is this whole defined by nature, as opposed to a whole established by 
technique—i.e., unity146—that serves as their criterion for Schumann’s art. Yet not a single 
author has convincingly argued for the unity of the cycle.         
 The decades-long persistence of the unity question is fuelled by a basic contradiction: 
the dominant method of musical interpretation is the organicist paradigm of Heinrich 
Schenker; however, Schenker’s influential theory was never intended for multi-part works.147 
Although Schenker is in line with the dominant Western tradition insofar as he equates 
aesthetic unity and artistic success, what he means by unity is specific to his theory of 
                                                
145 David Ferris in Schumann’s Eichendorff “Liederkreis” and the Genre of the Romantic Cycle (Oxford: Oxford 
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inappropriateness or one-sidedness of applying organicist criteria to Schumann’s song cycles. Ferris for his part 
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for our understanding of the cycle than the organicist model that has so strongly dominated 
recent scholarship. But they can serve as a kind of corrective to that model by reminding us 
of how far our historical moment is from Schumann’s and by encouraging us to question our 
assumptions and expand our vision” (ibid., p. 58).  
The position defended in the present work, by contrast, is that Schumann’s Dichterliebe is itself a critique of the 
concept of the organic; it is a source of anti-organic knowledge, not a hermeneutic specimen to which anti-
organic thinking is applied or not; the aim in demonstrating the anti-organicism of Schumann’s song cycles is not 
to appreciate the distance between his historical moment and ours as a matter of curiosity; rather, anti-organicism 
is to be preferred over organicism because it is the progressive model of philosophy and art, to which no 
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146 Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.26.1023b26f. 
147 Heinrich Schenker, Der freie Satz, herausgegeben und bearbeitet von Oswald Jonas, 2. Auflage (Vienna: 
Universal Edition, 1956) translated by Ernst Oster as Free Composition, ed. Ernst Oster, 1 vol. accompanied by a 
supplement, Musical Examples, (New York: Longman, 1979). In subsequent references to Free Composition, 
page number references (p.) refer to the main volume while figure number references (fig.) refer to the 
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harmony. For Schenker, the aesthetic unity of a piece of music relates to the fact that it is all in 
the same key. Aesthetic unity is what he calls “fundamental structure,” or “Ursatz,” which is 
both the unity of bass arpeggiation together with the upper line, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, a representation of origin that becomes destiny. Schenkerian analysis assumes that a 
piece of music unfolds an arpeggio hidden in a single tone stated at the true beginning, which 
is why it does not apply to whole works with multiple movements or to song cycles, which 
have several such opening statements. The need to demonstrate unity of the parts and of the 
whole work is an additional demand, which Schenker’s influential theory, however 
conservative, does not suggest. 
 Arthur Komar employs Schenker’s methods to analyze Dichterliebe, while admitting 
that he is not “entirely orthodox” in his application of them.148 He does not state his criticisms 
of Schenker explicitly, but posits his own criteria for an aesthetic unity that can apply to the 
work with multiple parts. Komar sets out the concept of “musical totality” in seven additive 
levels of increasing stringency.149 He ultimately claims that Dichterliebe corresponds to the 
highest of these: it is a totality because 1) the poems on which it is based are alike; 2) there are 
many cases of a distinctive progression, piece of a theme or rhythm occurring in at least two 
different songs; 3) there are many cases of the same pitch grouping occurring in at least two 
different songs; 4) “elements of local continuity” connect adjacent songs;150 5) there is a 
general principle that governs the key relation of one song to the next; 6) there is a “general 
compositional plan” that gives a “rationale” for the place at which the work ends;151 and, in 
                                                
148 Komar, “The Music of Dichterliebe,” p. 67 n3.  
149 Ibid., p. 63. 
150 Ibid., p. 64. 
151 Ibid., p. 65. 
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addition to all these, 7) “a single key governs the entire work.”152 While, in Komar’s 
reproduction of the tonal plan, different keys govern different individual songs, he suggests 
that the whole cycle is in A major, with individual songs linked together by the third and fifth 
relations and passing tone relations that make their respective keys.153 Clearly Komar 
contradicts himself in claiming that Dichterliebe is unified according to these seven criteria, 
for he does not supply a principle that explains the rationale behind linking certain songs by 
way of third relations, others by fifth relations and still others by passing tone relations. 
 While disagreeing with certain points of Komar’s supporting analysis, Rufus E. 
Hallmark does not contest the claims that Dichterliebe has a tonal plan, a compositional plan 
and a single key; these, however, are not sufficient. He argues: 
Analysis of the musical cycle as a whole must also be considered with the poetry. In 
Dichterliebe the tonal plan and the narrative sequence support one another. Arthur 
Komar’s harmonic and modal plan is basically valid,…for movement by descending 
fifth and by rising and falling thirds do bind the cycle together. But his disregard for 
the narrative junctures of the cycle led Komar to divide the cycle on exclusively 
musical (linear) grounds into two parts, between Songs 7 and 8, and to minimize the 
shifts of mood and abrupt harmonic breaks between Songs 4 and 5 and Songs 11 and 
12.154 
 
As he himself does not perform Schenkerian analysis, Hallmark is so able to argue for 
Dichterliebe as an artistic whole on grounds that Schenker would reject: the narrative norm 
that has governed traditional storytelling. In Hallmark’s own analysis, the harmonic breaks 
correspond to traditional narrative divisions of “exposition,” “development and crisis” and 
“resolution.”155 Hallmark nonetheless accepts the premise, inherited from Komar, that third 
                                                
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid., p. 77f. 
154 Hallmark, The Genesis of Schumann’s “Dichterliebe”, p. 150. 
155 Ibid., p. 142. 
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and fifth relations bind the cycle together.156 At the same time, he does not examine the 
theoretical basis that supports the disregard for Heine’s lyric in a study such as Komar’s.  
 David Neumeyer for his part wishes to retain Schenkerian analysis, but makes the 
explicit criticism that, in its subordination of all elements to harmonic and melodic closure, 
such a framework is ill-equipped to deal with vocal, “narrative” works.157 Despite the 
insufficiency of Schenkerian analysis in the face of lyric, Neumeyer argues that Schenker’s 
methods could be applied to such works if it forswore two assumptions: (1) that the organic 
unity of works is guaranteed by melodic and harmonic closure and by unity of key; and (2) 
that the closure of the dominant harmonic structure overrides any other structuring 
principle.158 Neumeyer suggests that an even higher principle may override the principle of 
dominant relations: “The multipart vocal work, then, is understood as organically unified on a 
higher plane, as it were, since the combination of the harmonic-tonal with narrative-dramatic 
aspects should potentially allow an adequate interpretation of organic structure which either 
aspect alone could not achieve.”159 Neumeyer traces the negligence of the text in previous 
studies of Dichterliebe to the Schenkerian theoretical basis, yet he opts to modify the 
theoretical model rather than to face the contradictions of such an enterprise. Yet Neumeyer’s 
“higher plane” of organic unity remains mysterious. While it is true that tones and words must 
be considered in vocal works, nothing permits us to think that a rent in a song’s harmonic 
fabric is really made good by the text. If we diagnosed every harmonic gap as a need of words 
and every narrative gap as a need of tones, then there would be almost no need to do harmonic 
                                                
156 Ibid., p. 135 and p. 141f. 
157 David Neumeyer, “Organic Structure and the Song Cycle: Another Look at Schumann’s Dichterliebe,” Music 
Theory Spectrum 4 (Spring 1982): pp. 92-105, doi: 10.2307/746012. 
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analysis to make the case for Schoenberg’s Pierrot Lunaire’s being a whole: everything 
harmonically unusual in this multipart vocal work could be explained as yet another 
illustration of the main character’s madness. The same goes for Schoenberg’s Erwartung. But 
we would be missing a lot if we put down the breakdown of tonal harmony in these works to 
the narrative demands of portraying characters going mad. Neumeyer suggests that narrative 
can substitute for harmonic explanation, as if the seventh chord at the end of the first Lied 
could be resolved by the presence of the word “Sehnen” in the lyric or as if the poet’s strange 
tears of bitterness could become tears of joy in the presence of the authentic cadence (at last in 
the “right” key) underlying the word “bitterlich.” But referring oneself to both words and 
tones is no guarantee of an adequate interpretation; to affirm, as Neumeyer seems to, that this 
might possibly allow adequate interpretation is to say nothing at all. 
 Neumeyer’s attempt to extend Schenker’s concept of organic whole to narrative works, 
however, misses what is peculiar to it. Schenker’s organicism does not consist only in a 
comparison between the artwork and a life form, but, more crucially, his theory is organicist in 
that it assumes an inevitable, organic transition of the inorganic to the organic. Schenker’s 
organicism is problematic because, ultimately, his method requires that the inorganic and 
natural-historical—i.e., historically produced, anti-subjective or reified aspects of music—be 
subsumed under the organic or else considered as if it were organic. The consequence for 
interpretation is that the artwork’s illusion of life will be preserved rather than exploded as 
illusory. To Schenker, the mystery of music is the mystery of life. The question of how a 
natural, physical phenomenon, sound, becomes a human phenomenon, music, is just the 
question of how dead, inert matter makes the sudden transition to life. This comparison could 
be made, if, on one hand, sound were a purely natural, physical phenomenon, and if, on the 
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other, music were really alive and human. Tempered tuning, however, implies that triads are 
not purely natural phenomena; reified musical conventions that go unquestioned, sometimes 
for centuries, imply on the other side that music drags with it a mass of dead matter, to the 
point that humanity is crushed under the authority of tradition.  
 Schenker’s theory is founded on a naturalistic presumption: he takes the harmonic 
series to be an invariable natural phenomenon. Schenker conceives of all masterpieces of 
Western tonal music as having a “fundamental structure” or “Ursatz,” which represents 
music’s “background”—as opposed to the “foreground” of chromatic events, modulations, 
alterations, and other “illusory effects.” One aspect of the fundamental structure is its role “as 
transmitter of the primary arpeggiation.”160 By this, Schenker means that underlying all tonal 
music is an analysis of the natural overtone series present in a single tone into the basic 
components of third, fifth and octave, which each composition makes distinct to the ear 
through their unfolding in time:  
In nature sound is a vertical phenomenon…. In this form, however, it cannot be 
transferred to the human larynx; nor is such a transfer desirable, for the mere 
duplication of nature cannot be the object of human endeavour. Therefore art manifests 
the principle of the harmonic series in a special way, one which still lets the chord of 
nature shine through. The overtone series, this vertical sound of nature, this chord in 
which all the tones sound at once, is transformed into a succession, a horizontal 
arpeggiation, which has the advantage of lying within the range of the human voice. 
Thus the harmonic series is condensed, abbreviated for the purposes of art.161 
 
A second aspect of the fundamental structure is its unity with the upper voice, which Schenker 
calls the “fundamental line.”162 Schenker conceives of art only as this fundamental unity: 
“Neither the fundamental line nor the bass arpeggiation can stand alone. Only when acting 
                                                
160 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 232 § 2, section title as translated in Free Composition, p. 10. 
161 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 39 § 1 as translated, Free Composition, p. 10. 
162 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 40 Anmerkung § 3 as translated, Free Composition, p. 10 n1. 
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together, when unified in a contrapuntal structure, do they produce art.”163 This forms the 
contrapuntal “diatony.” Schenker justifies these musical invariants by referring to the 
harmonic series of the monochord—or, what he calls “the chord of nature”: 
After centuries of striving, when creative ears had finally learned to mold several 
voices successfully into a contrapuntal complex, it became possible to fill in the spaces 
in the arpeggiation in the upper voice of the fundamental structure with passing tones 
in a manner which did justice to both nature and art. In the process musicians also 
gradually learned to conform to nature by adjusting the horizontal and vertical aspects 
simultaneously: they adopted the octave, fifth, and third, which dominate the 
fundamental arpeggiation of the chord of nature. In addition they learned how to treat 
the passing tone as consonant or dissonant according to what the practice of strict 
counterpoint <in composition> revealed. 
 Within the octave, this first adjustment resulted in a relatedness of the whole 
structure to a single tone, the fundamental of the chord. The series of tones thus created 
in the upper voice, the fundamental line, represents diatony (Diatonie). In the 
narrowest sense, diatony belongs only to the upper voice. But, in accord with its origin, 
it simultaneously governs the whole contrapuntal structure, including the bass 
arpeggiation and the passing tones. 
 The same relationship to a fundamental tone prevails also in the foreground: 
all the foreground diminutions, including the apparent “keys” [scheinbaren Tonarten] 
arising out of the voice-leading transformations, ultimately emanate from the diatony 
in the background. I have used the term tonality to include the various illusory effects 
[Scheinwirkungen] in the foreground; yet the tonal sparseness of diatony in the 
background and the fullness of tonality in the foreground are one and the same.164  
 
On one hand, Schenker’s attempt to secure a theory of musical structure on the harmonic 
series fails on its own terms. For, according to Schenker’s own rendering of the harmonic 
series of Great C, the minor third to C, E-flat, does not occur at all,165 yet his theory is 
supposed to apply to works in minor keys: he indeed relies on them in his illustrations.166 Yet, 
on the other hand, Schenker’s pretension to have discovered a deep natural basis for all 
musical structures in tonal music rests on a distorting and “partial” presentation of the 
harmonic series of the monochord. Firstly, the overtone series does not stop at the fifth partial. 
                                                
163 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 40 § 3 as translated, Free Composition, p. 11. 
164 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 40f. §4 as translated, Free Composition, p. 11. 
165 Schenker, Free Composition, fig. 2. 
166 See, for instance, Schenker’s first musical example, the first movement of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata, op. 27, 
no. 2, in C-sharp minor (Schenker, Free Composition, fig. 7a) and the corresponding comment, in which he refers 
to “the complete triad”(ibid., p. 14 § 17). 
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The limitation of the scale degrees that can fall within the fundamental structure to the octave, 
the fifth, and the third is an arbitrary selection, not an already-existing fact of nature. 
Secondly, there is not just one harmonic series. Schenker bases his theory on the harmonic 
series of the monochord, a single-string instrument of Greek Antiquity, whereas, except for 
perhaps the trumpet marine—whose upper partials well beyond the fifth partial are 
audible167—, monochords are excluded from the Western art music that forms the basis of 
Schenker’s theory. By contrast, the instruments for which Western art music is written include 
winds, whose harmonic series can be quite different from that of the monochord. Notably, the 
even partials are missing from the harmonic series of the clarinet, which means that if Western 
harmony were really organized according to the harmonic series, the clarinet would have 
required its own theory of harmony, based on the division of its first partial, which is the 
twelfth, not the octave. Acoustically, octaves on clarinets are dissonances, and they do sound 
rough—a quality that Mahler and the mature Brahms understood, but which some orchestra 
conductors do not. But, ultimately, Schenker’s recourse to the harmonic series of the 
monochord to justify great music runs into the same difficulty as Schoenberg’s recourse to it 
to justify dissonance:168 the partials of the harmonic series are not equivalent to the musical 
intervals. Carl Dahlhaus has pointed this out: “There is no ‘just’ intonation—the tuning known 
by that name suffers from having no acoustical difference between two sizes of whole tones, a 
difference to which nothing corresponds musically.”169 In tonal music, twelve equal semi-
                                                
167 See Grove Music Online,  s.v. “trumpet marine,” by Cecil Adkins, accessed December 31, 2013, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/28494. 
168 Arnold Schoenberg, Structural Functions of Harmony (London: Williams and Norgate, 1954), p. 193. 
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tones make up the interval of an octave; the interval of a perfect fifth is equal to seven semi-
tones; the interval of a major third is equal to four semi-tones. In the harmonic series, 
however, the partial that is supposed to correspond to the major third (the fifth partial, at 386 
cents) is not equal to four-sevenths of the partial that is supposed to correspond to the perfect 
fifth (the third partial, at 702 cents). Stacking three major thirds produces an octave in tonal 
music; stacking three intervals equivalent to the fifth partial falls short of the octave by close 
to an eighth of a tone. A progression through the circle of musical fifths spans seven octaves; 
twelve pure fifths do not equal seven pure octaves. And to our current understanding of the 
harmonic series, so-called just intonation does not produce merely two sizes of whole tone, but 
almost as many as there are notes. If the ninth partial of the overtone series is the reference, 
the whole tone corresponds to 204 cents, but as the whole tone is part of a tonal system, it 
must also be expressible in terms of all the other partials that can correspond to intervals: if the 
third partial is the reference, then the whole tone is 201 cents; the fifth or seventh partial, 193 
cents; the fifteenth, 198 cents; the seventeenth, 210 cents; the nineteenth, 199 cents. As any 
note in a composition carries on multiple musical interval relations at any given time, both 
horizontally and vertically, so-called just intonation is nothing but a prioritization of these 
competing demands: temperament. As Schenker claims to offer “a genuine theory of tonal 
language,” it goes without saying that all music under consideration implies some kind of 
tempered tuning.170 In any kind of tempered tuning, never both of the relevant intervals, the 
third and the fifth, correspond to segmentation in the harmonic series. Temperaments are 
essentially the illusion of just intonation, different ways of hiding the acoustic 
incommensurability amongst the different intervals of the tonal system of tonal music. It is to 
                                                
170 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 37 as translated, Free Composition, p. 9. 
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the historical event of temperament and to the collapse of Pythagorean tuning that triadic 
chordal harmony in tonal music should be related, not to the natural phenomenon of the 
overtone series. Thirds in the era of Pythagorean intonation were not autonomous, structuring 
units; rather, major and minor thirds were imperfect consonances, which required the addition 
of the fifth:  
In the 13th and 14th centuries, the harmonic interval of a third was still perceived as an 
unstable, dependent consonance supported by an adjoining fifth or unison.… The fact 
that two tones at the interval of a third form a functional unity thus does not presuppose 
an emancipation of the third to the status of an independent simultaneity. On the 
contrary, the consonant character of the simultaneity appears as a result of the 
functional unity of the melodic tones.171  
 
The “emancipation of the third” took place over the course of the fifteenth century. Dahlhaus 
considers the emancipation of thirds and not the omnipresence of thirds to be the mark of 
triadic harmony: it was Adam von Fulda at the end of the fifteenth century advocating for the 
free use of thirds who reflected the more advanced stage of consciousness on the tendency in 
the material, the consciousness of the third as a perfect consonance—and not Zarlino in the 
middle of the sixteenth, who, while decreeing the omnipresence of thirds and fifths, still 
thought in terms of imperfect and perfect consonances.172 While musical perception knew 
only an uneven and incomplete transformation from harmony as the mere result of 
horizontally moving voices sounding together to harmony as a definite root progression of 
autonomous vertical units, it is clear that by the fifteenth century the harmonic interval of the 
third was emancipated for composition, for it needed no resolution to the fifth or unison.173 
While the inclusion of the third among the consonances is bound up with the demise of 
Pythagorean intonation, this is not the result of the relative purity of (selective) thirds in the 
                                                
171 Dahlhaus, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, p. 70, lines 27-33 as translated, Studies, p. 74. 
172 Dahlhaus, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, p. 90, lines 2-21, or translated, Studies, p. 92. 
173 Dahlhaus, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, p. 90, line 26-p. 91, line 15, or translated, Studies, p. 93. 
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so-called just intonation that replaced it. According to Dahlhaus himself, medieval concepts of 
consonance and dissonance were in fact constellations of many concepts, and could not be 
reduced to a single aspect, such as the degree of smoothness or harshness of the sound; 
Dahlhaus names as conditions of consonance “simple numerical proportion, a direct 
relationship between the tones, the fusing of the pitches, and the autonomy of the sonority.”174 
The inelegance of the Pythagorean ratios that yielded minor and major thirds, at 32:27 and 
81:64 respectively,175 would have disqualified them from the category of consonance, even 
though they could qualify for it on the basis of other criteria named. It was this partial 
fulfilment of the criteria for consonance that gave thirds their disputed status in the Middle 
Ages. Of all the criteria, the demand for elegant ratios prevented thirds from becoming 
consonances in their own right. The contradictions inherent to the Pythagorean concept of 
“third” were resolved with an explosion of the entire Pythagorean system. The collapse of 
Pythagorean tuning was the appearance of a movement in the concept of third, which in turn 
changed every musical concept—although Dahlhaus does not state it in these terms. The 
association of major thirds with fifths in tonal music has to do not with the physical 
phenomenon of the harmonic series, but with the fusion of the imperfect consonance of the 
major third, or ditone, with the perfect consonance to which it had to resolve in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries, the fifth, and this association still had not to do with the harmonic 
series, but with the then-practice of intervallic expansion, whereby a smaller interval could 
transform into a larger interval by opening simultaneously upward and downward by a step 
and half-step (or the inverse). Imperfect could become perfect by way of intervallic expansion, 
                                                
174 Dahlhaus, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, p. 76, lines 3-5 as translated, Studies, p. 79. 
175 Grove Music Online, s.v. “Pythagorean intonation,” by Mark Lindley, accessed January 3, 2013, 
http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/22604. 
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a technique that Alban Berg revived almost as a form of “resolution” in his Expressionist 
phase.176 It was not because the major third and the fifth sounded pleasing together that they 
were associated; they were associated because, while offering a contrasting sonority, the wide 
third led easily to the fifth. Dahlhaus suggests that the natural third, which is considerably 
lower, would not have invited this compositional practice, which was consistent with tuning: 
Like the comma, the ditone—the “inharmonic” third—should also be understood as a 
musical phenomenon rather than as a mathematically motivated acoustical defect. As 
mentioned, it corresponds to the concept of “consonantia imperfecta.” And the 
hypothesis is unnecessary that in musical practice, as opposed to mathematically 
theory, the third was intoned as the 4:5 natural third. Even in the Middle Ages it is not 
out of the question that the harmonic third [4:5] was perceived as a musical fact of 
nature. This natural third is nevertheless denied by the content of that which was 
composed. The compositional technique calls attention to the factor of the pitches 
spreading apart, not of their fusing.177  
 
Triadic harmony can be understood on the model of quartal harmony: like the fusion of V and 
I chords that becomes its own autonomous structuring entity in quartal harmony, the triad is 
the fusion of the imperfect consonance of the third and the perfect consonance of the fifth. On 
the one hand, triadic harmony melds together the tensions and resolutions of the past, and 
freezes them together as chords, which make up the “natural history” of tonal music; on the 
other hand, triadic harmony breaks through the closed world of merely alternating or cycling 
sonorities, produced by convergence or divergence of voices, and grounds its voices in the 
harmonic progression, music’s historiography. That which Schenker sees as the 
horizontalization of the overtone series, and which he poses as an absolute musical foundation, 
is historiographical unfolding of the past tensions frozen in the tonal music microcosm, the 
triad, through its contradictions. Schenker treats the horizontalization of the inorganic “chord 
of nature” as an organic process resembling natural growth, and this, which is the critical 
                                                
176 See, for example, Alban Berg, Vier Stücke für Klarinette und Klavier, Opus 5 (Vienna: Universal Edition, 
1924), IV, p. 9, mm. 10-11, with pick-up, cl. 
177 Dahlhaus, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, p. 182, lines 6-14 as translated, Studies, p. 188f.  
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point of his organicism, leads him to ignore the inorganic historical tensions and 
contradictions of music in its dynamic. Organic unity turns out to be not a unity of the 
organism with itself, but the unity of the organic and inorganic, which is called “organic.” 
 Despite the conservatism of Schenker’s organicism, he at least acknowledges the extra-
territoriality of text to music, in no way insisting that words and music form an organic whole. 
Schenker betrays a certain disdain for song, for he assumes that the mere presence of words 
makes music accessible to the masses, who, he claims, can have no understanding of absolute 
music, which is art in the strong sense: 
The history of music reveals that music really began and flourished in ecclesiastical, 
royal, and aristocratic circles. This is confirmed by the fact that music developed 
polyphony, which must forever remain alien to the masses. For them music has always 
been and remains only an accompaniment to dance, march, or song: at best, a kind of 
utilitarian art, if one can accept the inherent contradiction. A feeling for such music 
fills head and heart, even those of the masses, but this feeling is not adequate to 
comprehend the true and lofty art of Bach, Handel, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven. Indeed, 
it tends to lead away from those concepts and responses which are essential to music as 
an art. Although Haydn offers them his oratorios, the absolute music of his chamber 
works and symphonies can never assume real importance in their lives. Mozart lets 
them view his operas, yet they will never comprehend the distance which separates his 
great operatic art from the operatic music of other composers. Beethoven jubilantly 
sings the praise of womanly fidelity in the visible Fidelio, and in the Ninth Symphony, 
together with Schiller, he sings the “Hymn to Joy”—nevertheless, the masses will 
never have access to the rest of his art.178 
 
Schenker is right to insist here on the cognitive aspect of music. His suggestion, however, that 
music in ecclesiastical circles was non-utilitarian is debatable. Music was allowed to enter the 
early Christian Church in order to lead “weaker spirits” to the truth of the holy text. In 
Augustine’s view, music was the sensuous vehicle by which the Psalms could be made 
accessible to a greater number: 
I waver between the danger that lies in gratifying the senses and the benefits which, as 
I know from experience, can accrue from singing. Without committing myself to an 
irrevocable opinion, I am inclined to approve of the custom of singing in church, in 
                                                
178 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 26f. as translated, Free Composition, p. 4. 
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order that by indulging the ears weaker spirits may be inspired with feelings of 
devotion. Yet when I find the singing itself more moving than the truth which it 
conveys, I confess that this is a grievous sing, and at those times I would prefer not to 
hear the singer.179 
 
In its ecclesiastical beginnings, music was not to overstep its role as an accompaniment to holy 
text, and therefore ecclesiastic music cannot be said to be “absolute,” as Schenker suggests. 
Polyphony may well have developed as a defense against music’s becoming a mere 
gratification of the senses and an indulgence in sheer feeling. But music may be said to be 
“absolute”—or better, non-utilitarian—when it frees itself from norms imposed from the 
outside, whether by the church, the court, or capital—not when it frees itself from words. 
Schenker passes over the fact that the source of advanced vocal music is poetry, which is itself 
art and therefore in need of interpretation, comprehension and judgement. He does not 
consider that poetry’s transformation of communicative, signifying language into functionless, 
non-signifying language blocks access to comprehension. Advanced Lieder increase the 
demands on the recipient, for the choice of advanced, ambiguous texts for setting requires that 
the interpreter have abilities not only in music, but also in literary analysis. If we understand 
by “access” progress in the logic of a particular work, then not lyrics, but universal aesthetic 
education would open the comprehension of musical works to the people. Schenker conceives 
of the association of music with elites as an invariant, which makes him unfashionable these 
days. It was not some such noble birth, but rather individuals’ cultural education and free 
disposition of time that contributed to the flourishing of music in the select milieux that 
Schenker names. Those who have made actual advances in music tend not to issue from elites; 
furthermore, composers’ complementary published contributions to music criticism, theory 
                                                
179 Augustine, Confessions, translated by R. S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), p. 239. 
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and education are consistent with a democratic model of music, not an elitist one. Schenker 
himself published his theory in the aim to instruct. 
{Section v} The inapplicability of Schenker’s organicist theory to vocal works is a negative 
indication of the growing alienation of Lieder, which has its basis in the historical difficulty of 
reconciling music and text. The Romantic Lied is a problematic genre because it purports to 
overstep the widening gap between poetry and music, which is historical. Adorno treats Lied 
as a problematic genre in his 1928 essay “Situation des Liedes” (Situation of the Lied), but he 
builds the claim that “all roads seem equally barred to the Lied” on the assumption that song 
implies a reconciled singing humanity, and this emphatic concept of humanity, which the 
human voice cannot but evoke, is embarrassing.180 If Lieder made children blush in 1928, then 
the songs in televised musicals decades later had nearly everyone fleeing from the room in 
embarrassment. Given the suggestion that Lieder reconcile the individual and the collective by 
lending silent, oppressed humanity a voice, it seems that the inherent problem of the genre can 
be solved only through sustained disunity. This is why it is surprising that the young Adorno 
names Schoenberg as the saviour of Lied.181 Adorno’s rationale is that the true mode of song 
is outwardness:  
Only Schubert’s inscrutably accurate music registers the genuine outward bearing of 
song. The alternative, however, is for it to become private; carrying the mark of real 
grief [Trauer] and of unreconciled innerness, even in Schumann it becomes either 
stupidly average or intolerably vain and ultimately a ghostlike photography of what 
immediately vanishes and should not be preserved.182 
 
Adorno claims that Schoenberg grasps the essentially outward character of song: 
“‘Purification’ of the musical organism and its reduction to the ‘essential’ alone supply the 
                                                
180 GS, vol. 18, p. 346 (my translation). 
181 GS, vol. 18, p. 346. 
182 GS, vol. 18, p. 345f. (my translation). 
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dialectical motive, in virtue of which Schoenberg explodes the sphere of psychic immanence 
and restores precisely the genuine outward bearing of song, with which the New Objectivity 
[neue Sachlichkeit] of today only plays.”183 Here Adorno clearly picks up on the organicism of 
Schoenberg’s Lieder, yet instead of taking a critical view of the song that approaches “the 
indifference of word and tone”—or at least, the inseparability of word and tone, inseparability 
which mimics the inseparability of parts of a single organism—, he praises Schoenberg’s 
restorative gesture.184 Adorno suggests that the Lieder of Schubert and Schoenberg succeed 
where the Lieder of Schumann fail because the former grasp poetry as essentially musical, 
possessing an external reality, whereas Schumann retains the silent innerness and “Trauer” of 
the text. Indeed, poetry is laden with the remainders of music—rhythm and bar form, for 
instance. But Schumann chose to set the text of a poet for whom these remainders were 
already problematic, and the more mature Adorno of the 1949 text “Toward a Reappraisal of 
Heine” knew it: “Heine was the first German poet who faced squarely the problem: how is 
lyrical poetry possible at all in the sober, cold, disillusioned world of early industrialism?”185 
 Both Schumann’s music and its poetic source cast suspicion and even aspersion on the 
harmonizing claims of Lieder. In the last Lied, the narrator calls for the burial of the “alte, 
böse Lieder.”186 Heine hardly peddles song as a balm on the soul. Old songs fit together tones 
and words, denying the inherent contradiction between them. They purport to make the 
incongruous congruous, to adapt bitter words to sweet music, as if music could reconcile the 
self to bad experiences. Heine’s poems from the Buch der Lieder are far less songs than 
exhibitions of the claims of song. Schumann grasps the non-identity between songs and their 
                                                
183 GS, vol. 18, p. 348 (my translation). 
184 GS, vol. 18, p. 347 (my translation). 
185 GS, vol. 20.2, p. 443, in English in the original. 
186 Heine, Lyrisches Intermezzo, LXVI, p. 170. 
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claims, as is clear in his choice to cite and not recite the folk music idiom suggested by such 
features of Heine’s poetry as the quatrain stanza and free syllable count in the unaccented 
parts of the line.187 Schumann was deeply versed in folk songs, singing them from childhood 
and collecting them; he was on close terms with the folk song collector Anton Wilhelm 
Florentin von Zuccalmaglio, whose folk song collection he requested in a letter in 1840.188 
Schumann could very well have adopted folk conventions wholesale; that he did not, even 
when the folk idiom of Heine’s poetry would have been absolutely clear to him, indicates that 
he read Heine’s “Songs” critically. He followed Heine in confronting songs with their claims. 
The main claim of folk song in 1840 would have been that the individual and the collective 
were reconciled. This comes out in connection with authorship: folk music claims to be an 
expression of collective work and enjoyment, not the assertion of property by the private 
individual. Such a claim to communal ownership becomes highly questionable at a time when 
the products of collective labour are appropriated by private individuals and their work 
character hidden. Traditionally, names were not attached to folk songs because these were 
collective; by 1840, folk songs were no longer collective, but anonymous, like all of the 
people’s labour. The integration of folk music into Classical music can be seen as the silent 
appropriation of poor people’s labour by autonomous individuals. Folk song collectors, 
though, drew attention to collective, popular sources of Western music. Heine (and 
Schumann) seized on the timeliness, or actuality, of folk music. Schumann could neither avoid 
folk elements nor handle them in the way that his predecessors had. His solution in 
Dichterliebe is advanced: on one hand, he employs (German) folk elements—the drone in the 
                                                
187 See Hallmark, The Genesis of Schumann’s “Dichterliebe”, p. 3. 
188 Eberhard Möller, “Robert Schumann und das Volkslied,” Schumann-Studien 8 (2006): pp. 199-214, here 
p. 202f.  
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third,189 sixth,190 ninth191 and fifteenth192 Lieder; the a cappella vocal line in the Phrygian 
mode in the thirteen Lied;193 the alternation of 2/4 and 3/4 measures in the fourteenth Lied;194 
the unadorned melody to “Hör’ ich das Liedchen klingen,/ das einst die Liebste sang” of the 
tenth Lied195—; on the other hand, he asserts that the harmony between the individual and 
collective that these folk elements imply no longer holds, if it ever did. The incursion of a 
tritone leap down in the voice part of the tenth Lied negates the folk-character of the melody 
up to then.196 In the thirteenth Lied, the suggestion of an “apparent” Neapolitan seventh, 
however missing its third, negates the innocence and simplicity of the monophonic opening.197 
The voice that breaks off mid-cadence at the end of Lied XIV negates the closed, unbroken 
folk world suggested by the song’s meter and simple modulations.198 The unusual 
modulations, surprising dissonances and chromatic harmony in these moments of high 
expression challenge the claims of song to reconcile the part in the whole, which in turn 
challenges the naturalness of folk song. These moments break the continuum of the folk 
tradition into abstract moments of pain, suffering, lack and want. In its refusal to restore the 
old folk forms, Dichterliebe prolongs Heine’s problematization of song. Schumann’s setting 
of poems from the Buch der Lieder is an interpretation in the critical sense of the word: it 
finds the resistance and roughness in things that conventional society sands down and would 
                                                
189 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), III, p. 5, mm. 17-21. 
190 Ibid., VI, p. 10, mm. 21-25. 
191 Ibid., IX, p. 17, mm. 1-8 and mm. 17-24; p. 18, mm. 34-42; p. 18f., mm. 51-58; and p. 19, mm. 73-80. 
192 Ibid., XV, p. 30, mm. 16-24; p. 31f., mm. 48-57; and p. 32f., mm. 69-80 with pick-up. 
193 Ibid., XIII, p. 26, mm. 1-6 with pick-up. 
194 Ibid., XIV, p. 28, mm. 8-10 and p. 29, mm. 21-23. 
195 Ibid., X, p. 20, mm. 5-8. “Whenever I hear the song/My love sang long ago.” Heinrich Heine, “Hör ich das 
Liedchen klingen,” trans. Aaron Kramer, in The Poetry of Heinrich Heine, selected and edited with an 
introduction by Frederic Ewen, trans. Louis Untermeyer et al. (New York: Citadel Press, 1969), p. 76.    
196 Ibid., X, p. 20, m. 11, G' in voice part (from preceding D-flat'' pick-up). 
197 Ibid., XIII, p. 27, m. 29. 
198 Ibid., XIV, p. 29, m. 35, in v. part. 
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varnish over.199 On Schumann’s reading, Heine does not adopt, but rather throws into question 
the substance of the folk idiom. A non-interpreting, literal-minded tunesmith would have 
rendered the folk forms of Heine’s Lyrisches Intermezzo in the musical forms corresponding 
to these poems’ musical remainders—perhaps in a number of unconnected, diatonic folk-
melodies and simple harmonizations. Externalizing these musical remainders in music in this 
way, as the young Adorno in “Situation des Liedes” suggests is proper to song, would not take 
into account Heine’s skepticism about lyric poetry, but would have only produced a pseudo-
folk-music, not Dichterliebe.200 By way of a great diversity of keys, restless modulation, 
surprising and frequent recourse to secondary dominants, enormous variegation in the 
harmony, vocal colour tones, dissonance and density, Schumann reads the denial of unity out 
of Heine’s poems, in the sense that is relevant here: the denial of the unity of the individual 
with the social whole implied by the folk form that Heine only seems to adopt. The collective 
folk tradition of old cannot be restored with the restitution of the musical remainders in 
Heine’s text to music. In unpoetical, even unmusical moments, Schumann registers the 
historic splitting of poetry from music in his setting. 
                                                
199 See Paul Peters, “Musik als Interpretation: Zu Robert Schumanns ‘Dichterliebe’,” Heine-Jahrbuch 33 (1994): 
pp. 124-144, esp. p. 125. 
200 Almost twenty years after “Situation des Liedes,” Adorno claimed that all folk art was already fractured and 
inorganic: “It is possible that the German Fascist professor was right and that real folk-songs already lived on 
cultural values that had sunk down from the upper stratum. Not for nothing is all folk art fissured and, like the 
film, not ‘organic’” (GS, vol. 4, p. 234 §131, as translated, Minima Moralia, p. 205). As an afterlife of fallen 
cultural values, folk art as a whole would, according to this notion, be “fissured and not ‘organic’” only because 
inorganicity had ceased to be valued in high art. While it is true that at a certain point inorganicity had ceased to 
be valued in the “upper” cultural sphere, Adorno’s blanket condemnations of folk art in this aphorism enter into 
contradiction with his support for the “radical folklorism” of composers such as Bartók in Philosophy of Modern 
Music (GS, vol. 12, p. 42n) and with his critique of organicism in his essay “Schubert” (GS, vol. 17, pp. 18-33). 
The opinion of the Fascist professor serves to mask the silent appropriation of musical material from folk 
traditions by court and bourgeois composers, which was once the norm.  
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 As a cycle of ironically set folk idioms, Dichterliebe stands critically to the 
Volksideologie to come out of a certain irrational strain of Romanticism.201 Besides calling for 
a re-evaluation of the Cyclic poets, the lost unity of the Homeric epics had another 
consequence: it focussed attention on non-Classical, “nationalist” epic cycles, notably the 
Niebelunglied. The Niebelungenlied was the subject of part of the third of three series of 
lectures on fine art and literature that August Wilhelm Schlegel delivered in Berlin over the 
1802/1803 year, sparking interest in these legends of chivalry. Throughout his short ninth 
lecture of that series, Schlegel explicitly compares the Niebelungenlied favourably to the 
Homeric epics, and implies that this comparison is warranted, even necessary.202 For he 
concludes his lecture by making an appeal to his listeners to do as the Greeks, not in drawing 
from the same sources as they did, but in drawing from the analogous source: 
This colossal tragedy [The Niebelungen] terminates in the end of a world; it represents 
the last things of the heroic period, and so much so that after the Nibelungen there 
really are no mythic epics from this cycle, whose surviving heroic poems must have 
had antecedents. Greek tragedy took its material in many ways from out of Homer: if it 
is still at all possible to succeed in renewing our national mythology, then a mass of 
dramatic tragedies more narrowly restricted in scope can be developed out of this one 
epic tragedy. Since we have roved around in all corners of the world long enough, we 
should finally for once begin to use indigenous poetry.203  
 
Schlegel uses the expression “die letzten Dinge” to suggest of course that the Nibelungenlied 
refers not just to the death of the heroic period, but also to the life beyond it. In alluding to the 
                                                
201 On the relation between Romanticism and Volksideologie, see George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German 
Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964), chap. 1, “From 
Romanticism to Volk,” pp. 13-30, esp. pp. 28-29, on Heine as the object of “völkish” thinkers’ attacks. Mosse 
defines “Volk” as follows: “‘Volk’ is a much more comprehensive term than ‘people,’ for to German thinkers 
ever since the birth of German romanticism in the late eighteenth century ‘Volk’ signified the union of a group of 
people with a transcendental ‘essence.’ This ‘essence’ might be called ‘nature’ or ‘cosmos’ or ‘mythos,’ but in 
each instance it was fused to man’s innermost nature, and represented the source of his creativity, his depth of 
feeling, his individuality, and his unity with other members of the Volk” (ibid., p. 4).   
202 August Wilhelm Schlegel, “Das Lied der Nibelungen,” in Geschichte der romantischen Literatur, Kritische 
Schriften und Briefe, herausgegeben von Edgar Lohner, 4 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1965), pp. 102-
114, here p. 102f. 
203 Ibid., p. 114 (my translation). 
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end of the world depicted in the epic in this connection, Schlegel erects an eschatology of the 
apocalyptic kind, as if the Nibelungenlied had to be largely forgotten and the Germanic tribes 
dispersed by the Huns so that, he implies, God’s justice could be done and a new German 
literature and a new German nation could emerge. August Wilhelm Schlegel wishes to move 
the foundation of the “German national character” from its traditional place with Charlemagne 
backwards to a time shortly after the migration period.204 The invasions that drove the 
Germanic tribes into the Roman Empire would then become the great historic event that 
creates German national character, while the Nibelungenlied, whose imaginative content is 
largely based on events after the migration period but before the crowning of Charlemagne 
and the founding of the Holy Roman Empire, then would become the story on the origins of 
the Germans, equivalent to the Odyssey and the Iliad. The Nibelungenlied thus takes on a 
special connotation: it appears to support the project of founding a German state. One of the 
first proponents of German unity, Heinrich Karl Hofmann, who, at the heart of the movement 
of student societies (Burschenschaften) in Heidelberg met with a group of friends twice a 
week in the first half of 1815 to read the Niebelungenlied.205 Of these friends, Franz Josef 
Mone shortly went on to publish a manual on the Niebelungenlied, which he prefaced by 
voicing his hopes that the Niebelungenlied would be taught in schools and that Germans 
would give it the attention that the Greeks gave Homer.206 Interest in this saga was quite 
broad, and at some point, perhaps into the 1840s, Schumann himself considered writing an 
                                                
204 Ibid., p. 109. 
205 Hermann Haupt, “Heinrich Karl Hofmann, ein süddeutscher Vorkämpfer der deutschen Einheitsgedankens,” 
Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte der Burschenschaft und der deutschen Einheitsbewegung 3 (1912): 
pp. 327-404, here p. 361. 
206 D. F. J. Mone, Einleitung in das Nibelungen-Lied; zum Schul- und Selbstgebrauch (Heidelberg: Oswald, 
1818), p. III, digitized by the University of Toronto Library, https://archive.org/details/einleitungindasn00mone. 
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opera based on it.207 But any work inspired by the Niebelungen cycle would no doubt carry 
along with it August Schlegel’s argument that, through it, the “German national character” 
take root in a certain soil. In a way, to use the Niebelungen cycle as source material was 
already to heed August Schlegel’s appeal, and to agree, in a sense, that the German national 
mythology had to be renewed by Germanic tribes. Yet August Schlegel suggests not that the 
whole cycle be reworked by one person, but rather that many smaller works be based on 
determinate parts of it. The implication here is that the unity missing from the single text of 
national mythology (and from the scattered Germanic tribes) can be had in other forms—in 
modern tragic dramas that take consistent parts of it for their subjects. Here the Aristotelian 
judgement on the superiority of tragedy over epic clearly motivates Schlegel’s appeal. For 
later, indeed, the Niebelungenlied was also judged disunified. One of the most prominent 
philologists engaged with the Homeric Question and the founder of the genealogical method 
of textual editing, Karl Lachmann, contested not only the unity of the Iliad, but also that of the 
Niebelungenlied. Applying Analysis to the German epic, Lachmann worked to uncover the 
work’s “antecedents” as August Schlegel calls them.208 According to Lachmann, the 
Niebelungenlied actually grew out of “individual, romantic-type Lieder,” whose contours 
could be discerned within the whole work that had been handed down.209 He pieced together 
twenty such Lieder out of the whole. Karl Simrock, who had rendered the whole 
Niebelungenlied into modern German, went on to make a version based on Lachmann’s 
textual recovery, and happened to publish the resulting Zwanzig Lieder von den Nibelungen 
nach Lachmanns Andeutungen in Bonn in 1840. Like Simrock’s Zwanzig Lieder, Schumann’s 
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“Cyklus von 20 Liedern” involves translation, extraction and reassembly—but his cycle of 
songs stands critically to the concept of song as it was developed in academic circles. First of 
all, it was the Lyrisches Intermezzo from Heine’s Buch der Lieder and not the Niebelungenlied 
that served as Robert Schumann’s source material. Instead of reaching backwards hundreds of 
years into a mythical founding song for the mythical German Volk, whose connection to 
nineteenth-century German-speakers was surely imaginary, Schumann took up the forward-
thinking poetry of a German contemporary critical of August Schlegel’s mythology. If it were 
an isolated statement, August Schlegel’s appeal to his contemporaries to use the 
Niebelungenlied as their source material, rather than, say, the Odyssey, would not necessarily 
be exclusionary; however, his articulation of the duty to use “einheimisch” poetry comes at the 
end of a lecture in which the Niebelungenlied is characterized as a national treasure that dates 
not to the thirteenth-century, the date of the manuscripts, but to the Merovingian era, the 
beginning of the oral tradition of the Niebelungenlied: “Hardly any other European nation has 
boasted of such a monument of old fame, from perhaps more than 1200 years ago.”210 This 
dating coincides with Schlegel’s dating of the formation of some such “German national 
character” happening “very soon after the migration period.”211 When Schlegel finally 
announces that “we have roved around in all corners of the world long enough,” he 
subliminally evokes the wandering Germanic tribes to which he alluded earlier in his talk. But 
clearly Schlegel and his audience are not Germanic tribes. Given the emphasis that Schlegel 
lays on the actual historical events underlying the saga, the apocalyptic reference at the 
conclusion becomes highly questionable. What was destroyed in the invasion of the Huns in 
437 did not destroy Worms; Worms then was not at all “the end of a world,” the “heroic” 
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world, awaiting its next world in nineteenth-century German poetry. For at the time of 
Schlegel’s lecture, the city of Worms gave ample evidence of its great history and long life; its 
synagogue, perhaps the oldest in Europe, the Holy Sand Cemetery with its valley of the rabbis, 
and Rashi Chapel were to become regular places of pilgrimage and memory in the nineteenth 
century.212 Very shortly before Schlegel’s lecture, in 1801, the mayor of Worms had broken 
the locks of the Judengasse, a promising sign for the community whose allegiance to France 
had been forced under threat of dispossession of property, army service and even torture.213 
Schlegel seems to evoke the historical Worms, but it is only the lost mythical Worms, not the 
living, historical Worms of his time. He calls for Worms to endure in contemporary art as a 
destroyed place, as if there were really nothing there. Heine himself may well have been 
excluded on the terms that his professor August Schlegel strove to establish in the lecture on 
the Niebelungenlied. Heine’s own place in Düsseldorf should have been assured, but it was 
not. Yet Heine was not an “emigrant,”214 if by this Adorno was referring to Heine’s time in 
Paris, where, as a subject born in Düsseldorf between 1791 and 1801, he had the right to 
reside.215 Heine’s criticism of the working conditions of the Silesian weavers was the 
ostensible reason for a search warrant; the cultural stereotypes found in this document suggest 
an underlying motive of anti-Semitism.216 Heine had heard August Schlegel’s lectures on 
German folksong at the University of Bonn.217 His early critique of Volk ideology takes a 
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subtle, folk-like form.218 Heine imparted to his own poetry only folk form or meter, so resisted 
appealing to the authority and mystery of the imaginative material, which was the way that 
Schlegel elsewhere envisioned for his contemporaries to work with the Niebelungenlied: while 
keeping folk form, Heine avowedly let “conventional society [conventionnellen Gesellschaft]” 
provide the content of his Lieder.219 This effectively reduced contemporary conventional 
society to the status of mythology, legend or superstition, while reflecting onto the folkloric 
contents of the past something of the banality and stupidity of the present. Schumann, while 
certainly not above the regressive society in which he found himself,220 showed good musical 
instinct. In 1840, he chose to set the words of the poet who in that same year published “Der 
Rabbi von Bacherach,” in which Worms does not figure as the destroyed seat of the 
Burgundians awaiting some resurrection, but the birthplace of a cantor singing in a synagogue 
in Frankfurt, the refuge for the rabbi and his wife, who have narrowly escaped a pogrom in the 
Rhine town of Bacherach.221 In calling his setting of Heine’s poems a “cycle,” Schumann 
evokes the mythological status of the contents: good bourgeois marriages and diamond arrays 
are on the level of sea maidens and magic cloaks. 
{Section vi} The song cycle form gives the impression that Romantic love follows the 
seasonal cycle of nature in its flowering, fruition and decay; individual details of Dichterliebe 
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destroy this illusion. It seems to be organized according to nature; yet its real organization is 
not unity, despite its love of common tones. 
  Dichterliebe appears to make a perfect circle. The opening pitch of the cycle (C-
sharp'') is conceivably a common tone carried over from the last, D-flat major, triad of the 
cycle, where the pitch appears as its enharmonic equivalent D-flat'', the top note in the final 
chord. In the autograph, the final postlude is in C-sharp major, which would have made it an 
extended tierce de Picardie to C-sharp minor of the last Lied, and which would have so 
confirmed C-sharp as the tonic of the whole cycle. Schumann changed his mind, however, and 
noted that the enharmonic equivalent key should, in the final postlude, be used instead.222 The 
final statement of key in Dichterliebe sounds as though it designates the same tonic as the first 
note of the cycle does, but, in writing, C-sharp and D-flat are non-identical. This necessary 
divergence between the performance and the score is another indication of that illusory 
character, noted above, by which music partakes in “mature art.”223 True to illusion, 
Dichterliebe is distinct from Modern and post avant-gardiste artworks. Schumann’s insistence 
on a nuance that, in the era of equal temperament, should make no difference to the ear, is, 
again, a strong critique of immediacy. The choice of the enharmonic equivalent of the home 
key rather than the home key itself not only points to the artificial or constructed character of 
key (as opposed to some kind of essence of key), but also engages the problematic or dialectic 
of tonality, confronting key with its claim to be the guarantor of unity for a work as a whole. It 
can be assumed that in 1840 Leipzig Robert Schumann was working in the context of equal 
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temperament, and that C-sharp'' and D-flat'' referred to the same key on the piano.224 Thus the 
ending of Dichterliebe demands reflection on the difference between C-sharp and D-flat, 
which, in 1840, would have been not audible, but historical. First, the preference to end the 
work on the enharmonic equivalent of the home key refers back to the time in the past when 
C-sharp and D-flat would have sounded differently—in the mean-tone temperament widely in 
use during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries:  
If a piano is tuned in meantone with C-sharp, music can not be used that contains D-
flat, unless this particular note is retuned…chromatic pairs in meantone are widely 
separated by the great diesis, so that, when C-sharp is used enharmonically for D-flat, 
for example, the sound is distressing.225  
 
Mean-tone temperament is an unequal temperament; key largely dictates the degree of 
temperament for the specific thirds and fifths. Some triads—generally those with fewer sharps 
or flats—will be closer to just than others. As mean-tone temperament privileges the purity of 
the thirds, the fifths are tempered more than they are in equal-temperament tuning, which 
leaves one fifth, known as the “wolf fifth,” to make up the difference. Thus, the circle of fifths 
in meantone temperament does not close perfectly. The piano tuner can position the wolf fifth 
according to the key, so that it may be avoided in playing.226 Mean-tone temperament does not 
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lend itself to distant modulations within a single piece. “Well” temperament, by contrast, 
supports modulation into all the keys, given the ingenuity of a composer able to take into 
consideration the different proportions of the particular triads and the characteristics of each. 
Johann Sebastian Bach’s keys have been interpreted as expression markings by some: Murray 
Perahia, for example, suggests that, in the Bach Partita No. 6, the key of E minor calls for 
severity, even when the piece is played in 2012 on a modern piano—equally-tempered in 
principle.227 It is an open question whether keys in the nineteenth century suggested particular 
moods or characters. Robert Schumann the music critic denied, on one hand, a fixed one-to-
one relation between key and a particular designation and, on the other, the total 
indeterminacy of keys’ associations: “One can as little say that this or that sentiment can be 
expressed only in this or that key (rage in C sharp minor, etc.) as that every key is capable of 
expressing anything, as Zelter maintained.”228 Schumann’s insight here applies beyond key-
characteristics. A striking parallel may be drawn between it and Adorno’s response to Rudolf 
Kolisch’s article on Beethoven,229 on the question of whether particular tempi always express 
certain characters.230 The diversity of relations in any given work prohibits isolating any one 
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relation as completely determinative. For Schumann, the antinomy that key characteristics 
raise, between fixed signification and total indeterminacy, is not the complete expression of 
the problem. The interpreter’s task consists largely in seeing beyond the stereotypical uses of 
key: “If it is, indeed, true that in various epochs certain stereotypes have come to be associated 
with certain keys, then we should assemble all the masterpieces set in any given key and 
compare their prevailing moods.”231 The general tendency that Schumann notes, which is for 
emotional pitch to rise with increasing sharps or flats, is based on the relative unfamiliarity 
with the keys whose use was restricted due to limitations of keyboard instruments. This 
general rule is based on sounded pitches, which puts D-flat major (with five flats) on the same 
emotional level as C-sharp major (with seven sharps): these keys lie one on each side of what 
Schumann considers to be the highpoint of the emotional cycle of keys, F-sharp major, with 
six sharps.232 The late change of D-flat for C-sharp, therefore, is untouched by Schumann’s 
general observation about key and character. Of course, Schumann’s music criticism cannot be 
taken for personal statements on his own (prospective) compositions and working methods—
in the last postlude of Dichterliebe, for example, it is not the case that Schumann himself “hits 
upon the correct key immediately,” as he claims for the genius composer.233 Rather, 
Schumann’s music criticism lays out contradictions that press heavily on all composers of his 
time and out of which any one of them would have to advance. His music can therefore be 
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measured against the criteria set by his criticism. These are not merely posited norms, but are 
dialectically determined; they arise out of the contradictions that Schumann grasps in the 
process of reading, playing and listening his way through musical objectivity and reacting 
against the society in which he finds himself. The setting of key presents a double task for any 
composer: on one hand, keys must avoid activating their conventional, stereotypical meanings; 
on the other hand, they must avoid total indeterminacy—i.e., they must be determined in some 
way. Schumann’s solution is to negate keys’ autonomous meanings by determining their 
significance within the individual work. Schumann’s preference, at the end of Dichterliebe, 
for the D-flat major key over C-sharp is decisive for the form of the work.234 Thereby 
Schumann relates this conclusion not back to the beginning of the cycle, but to the songs in 
flat keys, notably to the twelfth Lied, which it cites,235 and to the thirteenth Lied, which passes 
briefly through D-flat major.236 The choice of key for the postlude not only creates a rupture 
within the last Lied of the cycle, but also within the cycle itself. D-flat major negates the 
illusion of nature associated with the cycle form, and avoids the platitude that, however 
hyperbolic the renunciation of pain and love at the end of the work, the poet’s suffering is just 
part of a natural, regularly recurring process to which he can be reconciled again and again. 
Schumann ultimately negates this illusion of unity.  
 To claim that Dichterliebe is an illusory natural whole and that it negates its illusion of 
unity is not to claim that Dichterliebe is nothing but fragments and pieces. 
 Recently, the presumption of organic unity adopted by Schenker and others has been 
deemed inadequate or constraining for an understanding of Dichterliebe as a Romantic 
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artwork and an aesthetic of fragmentation adopted instead. David Ferris defends Schenker’s 
contributions to musical analysis,237 but claims that “the organicist model is ultimately 
inadequate for explaining Schumann’s song cycles.”238 Following Ferris, Julia Beate Perrey 
also wishes to abandon the unity thesis and argue for Dichterliebe as a fragmented work.239 In 
fact, neither Ferris nor Perrey abandons organicism. In the case of Perrey, organicism is 
implied by the hermeneutical method in which she emphatically claims to ground her study—
for example, when she declares: “My own point of view is consciously sited in the 
hermeneutic tradition as developed by Schleiermacher, whose proposed approach to works of 
art implies the recognition of an insurmountable distance between artist, work and critic.”240 
This choice of method, the object of a critique that Jürgen Habermas delivered some time 
ago,241 and which is not irrelevant here,242 is essentially a method for establishing a work’s 
organic unity. Hans-Georg Gadamer, whom Perrey claims as a philosophical forebear,243 
explicitly draws attention to the primacy of the whole over the part in the hermeneutical 
tradition: “Schleiermacher follows Friedrich Ast and the whole hermeneutical and rhetorical 
tradition when he regards it as a fundamental principle of understanding that the meaning of 
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the part can be discovered only from the context—i.e., ultimately from the whole.”244 
Gadamer traces this priority of the whole over the parts to the need to escape from the 
hermeneutic circle:  
The literal meaning of Scripture, however, is not univocally intelligible in every place 
and at every moment. For the whole of Scripture guides the understanding of 
individual passages; and again this whole can be reached only through the cumulative 
understanding of individual passages. This circular relationship between the whole 
and the parts is not new. It was already known to classical rhetoric, which compares 
perfect speech with the organic body, with the relationship between head and limbs. 
Luther and his successors transferred this image, familiar from classical rhetoric, to 
the process of understanding; and they developed the universal principle of textual 
interpretation that all the details of a text were to be understood from the contextus and 
from the scopus, the unified sense at which the whole aims.245  
 
The way in which the concept of the organic has developed historically implies in the term not 
only the unity of the whole and the parts, but also the primacy of the whole over the parts in 
cases where the two come into conflict. The hermeneutic tradition considers Scripture to 
possess organic unity in that it constitutes a “unified sense” or meaning that serves to bring 
problematic passages into harmony with one another. In adopting the hermeneutic method, 
Perrey sets herself the task of developing a unified meaning for Dichterliebe. The fact that this 
particular unified meaning is fragmentation, whose meaning connotes a lack of unity, does not 
destroy the organicism of her hermeneutic approach, for meaning must necessarily exist on a 
different level from the object of interpretation if it is to offer a veritable escape from the 
hermeneutic circle. Perrey’s hermeneutic commitments can also be observed in analytical 
practice, for she reads certain chords almost as if they were words with determinate 
meanings.246 Her insistence on fragmentation leads her to ignore the many non-fragmentary 
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moments of the work—for example, the many perfect cadences that appear in their expected 
places. Furthermore, the reading is biased by the unit of analysis, which is in some cases itself 
a fragment of a recognizable harmonic statement.247 Perrey limits her attention only to 
particular songs of Dichterliebe, not to the collection as a whole, so she is bound to confirm 
her hypothesis that the Schumann song cycle engages in an “aesthetics of fragmentation.”248 
Ferris for his part argues that Schumann’s Liederkreis, op. 39, is “a Romantic whole, a whole 
that is open-ended and fragmentary.”249 He argues that a “compositional logic” of roughly 
alternating weak and strong openings governs the first six songs, but he breaks off his 
demonstration mid-way through the work.250 In this way, Ferris, too, prejudices his study and 
sets himself up to confirm his hypothesis: “The complete cycle is as fragmentary and open-
ended as the individual songs [which comprise it], and its ultimate coherence and meaning are 
recreated anew by each individual listener.”251 Both Perrey and Ferris remain within the 
organicist model because they both argue for the fragmentary nature of both the whole and the 
part. They claim therefore an agreement of whole and part, and it is this agreement or 
harmony between whole and part that characterizes organicism. While the intention of Perrey 
and of Ferris may have been to understand Dichterliebe (and the Eichendorff Liederkreis) in 
their historical specificity as Romantic artworks, the authors err in considering Schumann to 
be a mere sponge for the historical period in which he was apparently immersed—rather than 
a cultural figure in his own right, who happened to be swimming against the tide. 
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 The proponents of a fragmentary aesthetic have at least made clear that Schenker’s 
theory cannot properly account for the specificity of Romantic artworks. The difference 
between Classical and Romantic works for Schenker would be only a matter of the degree of 
tension accumulated and released: “If a differentiation is to be made between ‘classic’ and 
‘romantic,’ only the degree of tension and fulfilment should be considered. A classical work 
will exceed a romantic one in the height and extent of its tension and in the profundity of its 
fulfilment, even if it may be a short work.”252 Hegel, by contrast, formulating his aesthetics a 
century prior to Schenker, realizes that he must give an account of the departure that Der 
Freischütz represents. While Hegel is critical of Romanticism, he at least grasps that its 
emotional extremes threaten to undermine the Ideal: the beauty, unity, reconciliation, 
composure and “cheerfulness” of art. An important quality of Classical works, according to 
Hegel, is their poised acceptance and appropriation of fate; Romantic artworks do not easily 
accept fate, if they accept it at all. The sustained disunity that characterizes the most radical of 
Romantic artworks is pointed against the individual’s Idealized harmonization of the self with 
the context that spells his doom, as can be observed in tragedy. For Schenker, on the other 
hand, accepting fate is an intrinsic part of all musical masterworks: “The origin of every life, 
whether in a Volk, generation [Geschlecht], or in the individual, is at the same time its fate. 
Hegel takes fate to be ‘the appearance [Erscheinung] of what the determinate individuality is 
in itself as an inner, original determinateness.’”253 This origin that is at the same time fate is 
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what Schenker calls the “background.”254 He writes: “The background in music is represented 
by a contrapuntal structure, which I have designated the fundamental structure [Ursatz]”255—
in other words, it is represented by the unity of the bass arpeggiation of the “chord of nature” 
and the fundamental line (Urlinie).256 A task of analysis is to demonstrate the unity of bass 
arpeggiation and upper voice, which is presumed. Thereby the demonstration is made that the 
composition is the representation of a definite background—of the origin that is at the same 
time destiny. While Schenker also presumes the unity of background (“origin”), middleground 
(“development”) and foreground (“present”), the background has priority.257 Anything that 
differs from the unity of bass arpeggiation and Urlinie is a mere derivation of the same, since, 
in Schenker’s theory, the background is really God’s order, whence everything emerges: “The 
whole of the foreground, which men call chaos, God derives from His cosmos, the 
background. The eternal harmony of His eternal Being is grounded in this relationship.”258 
Furthermore, Schenkerian analysis rests on the presumption that there is a real, predetermined 
correspondence between the actual background and the human soul: “In order to comprehend 
what lives and moves behind the phenomena of life, behind idea in general and art in 
particular, we ourselves require a definite background [dazu gehört aber ein bestimmter 
Hintergrund in uns selbst, it takes a definite background in us ourselves], a soul predisposed to 
accept the background [eine hintergründig vorbestimmte Seele, a soul predisposed toward the 
                                                
254 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 25 as translated, Free Composition, p. 3. 
255 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 27 as translated, Free Composition, p. 4. 
256 Schenker, Der freie Satz, [“Der Ursatz der Einheit”], p. 40 §3, or translated, Free Composition, p. 11. See 
also Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 28, or translated, Free Composition p. 11. 
257 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 25 as translated, Free Composition, p. 3. 
258 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 18 as translated, Free Composition, p. xxiii. 
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background].”259 But since the background is the origin that is at the same time fate or destiny, 
Schenker means that we have a definite origin that is at the same time our fate. Understanding 
the particular musical artwork demands not only a prioritization of the origin—the inner 
potential or “an sich”—of the beautiful individual artwork over what differs from it; it also 
demands the prioritization of the tonic triad as a founding structure, as something fateful. 
There can be no account here of great works that revolt against destiny, hence no account of 
advanced Romantic artworks. Whatever falls outside the tonic triad must be brought back to it; 
it can neither conduct an autonomous existence nor say something for itself. Furthermore, 
whatever is new in the work must be shown to be a derivation of the original potential, an 
offshoot of the same living individual, and not the difference that it is.  
 Schenker’s theory of musical analysis should be able to account for Romantic 
artworks, considering that his organicism may be traced to a certain organicity in Hegel’s 
concept of harmony. First of all, harmony, for Hegel, is a form of natural beauty. In particular, 
harmony is the third moment of “abstract form”260 and, as such, is the sublation of the 
contradiction between the beauty of regular and symmetrical forms occurring in nature 
(inorganic mineral and organic plant and animal forms), on the one hand, and, on the other, 
the dissipation of this beauty once it is revealed to be mere “conformity to law,” lacking the 
vitality of nature.261 Harmony, according to Hegel, is a “totality”: 
Therefore at this stage harmony stands higher than mere conformity to law, i.e. 
harmony is a relation of qualitative differences, and indeed of a totality of such 
differences, a totality grounded in the essence of the thing itself. This relation 
advances beyond conformity to law, which has in itself the aspect of regularity, and 
rises above equality and repetition. But at the same time the qualitative differences 
                                                
259 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 26 as translated except where indicated in square brackets, Free Composition, p. 
3. 
260 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 179 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 134. 
261 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 185 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 138. 
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assert themselves not merely as differences and their opposition and contradiction, but 
as a congruous unity which has set forth all its proper factors while yet containing 
them as a whole inherently one. This congruity [Zusammenstimmen] is harmony.262 
 
Although harmony is a form of natural beauty, it quickly becomes clear that Hegel does not 
merely have in mind harmonious meadows of wildflowers and harmonious choruses of 
nightingales, but is speaking of a nature that has already been spiritualized in some sense: 
“Among notes, the tonic, mediant, and dominant, e.g., are such essential differences, which in 
their difference harmonize unitedly into one whole.”263 The notes of the tonic triad, then, are 
an example of harmony, according to Hegel. But the tonic triad on its own is deficient, for it 
lacks the “free subjectivity” of melody.264 Hegel considers natural beauty in general to be 
deficient due just to this lack of individuality and subjective freedom. Art beauty, then, is the 
attempt to leave nature behind—or, least, to leave behind what in nature is inimical to 
subjectivity. It is in this transition between the beauty of nature and the beauty of art that the 
antinomies of the concept of harmony come to the fore. For Hegel does not leave harmony 
behind completely once he makes the transition to the beauty of art. The beauty of art retains 
this element of natural beauty, and harmony becomes the mode by which the Ideal overcomes 
the mere externality of natural beauty: 
In short, art has the function of grasping and displaying existence, in its appearance 
[Erscheinung], as true, i.e. in its suitability to the content which is adequate to itself, 
the content which is both implicit and explicit. Thus the truth of art cannot be mere 
correctness, to which the so-called imitation of nature is restricted; on the contrary, the 
outer must harmonize [zusammenstimmen] with an inner which is harmonious in 
itself, and, just on that account, can reveal itself as itself in the outer.265 
 
                                                
262 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 187 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 140. 
263 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 188 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 141. 
264 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 188 as translated, Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 141. 
265 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 205 as translated, Aesthetics,  vol. 1, p. 155. 
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This “congruity,” which Hegel will shortly call art’s “harmony [Harmonie] with its true 
concept,” is not identical with the congruity of natural beauty.266 The form of natural beauty 
called harmony was supposed to have been a totality, but it was not actually total, but a merely 
one-sided externality. Art is the harmony of outer and inner; thus it is supposed to overcome 
this deficiency of nature. Harmony seemed to be a totality of differences, but it was only a 
totality of external differences and did not yet contain the difference of inner and outer. Art’s 
harmony also harmonizes the difference of inner and outer, and thus is supposed to overcome 
the otherness of nature, to achieve totality again. This is precisely the kind of move that 
Lukács, in his own ambivalent way, found illicit, since, firstly, where there is still nature, the 
totality is unknowable and, secondly, expanding a concept pertaining to nature so that its 
external dimension is suddenly subjectivized wipes away what is really particular about 
nature: its otherness. Since harmony is a mere externality, on Hegel’s own terms, the harmony 
of inner and outer in art beauty would not subjectivize nature, but would merely reproduce 
nature’s alienation on a higher level. Hegel’s concept of harmony itself adopts the movement 
of organic plant growth, mindlessly incorporating everything in its path, even the inorganic, 
animal and human. This incoherence becomes clear once Hegel’s concept of harmony is 
imported into Schenker’s theory of musical analysis. Harmony for Schenker is a continuum 
between natural harmony, the harmony of the “chord of nature,” and art harmony, the 
harmony of inner and outer—the harmony of harmony with melody, bass arpeggiation with 
Urlinie, and also the harmony of the “inner law of the origin,” the background, with the 
external events of music, with the chaos of appearances in the foreground.267 But because 
harmony is an externality, the tonic triad is not the living, vivacious element that it seems to 
                                                
266 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 205 as translated, Aesthetics,  vol. 1, p. 155. 
267 Schenker, Der freie Satz, p. 25 as translated, Free Composition, p. 3. 
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be, but must in fact be a reified, “second nature” of convention and dead, depleted 
subjectivity, which only a true dialectics of otherness—negative dialectics—can recognize it 
to be. One does not find what is indeed beautiful in art by harmonizing all musical events with 
the tonic triad, because harmony is an externality. Schenker’s organicism is not merely 
metaphorical; his practice really demands that the artistic whole be related back to the concept 
of natural harmony.268 Schenker, however, does not take into account Hegel’s critique of 
natural beauty—its lack of subjectivity, individuality and freedom. In all great works, 
according to Schenker, it is the tonic triad that ultimately controls the Urlinie—the melody 
that is supposed to represent the element of free subjectivity, according to Hegel. Furthermore, 
Hegel’s theory also gives an account of dissonant artworks, which protest against the idealized 
concept of harmony, against the supposed overcoming of nature’s externality in Ideal. 
Schenker’s method does not recognize anti-harmonic music, so is bound to distort negative, 
Romantic works, making them out to be affirmative.  
 Adorno’s declaration that “the emancipation from the concept of harmony reveals 
itself as a revolt against illusion” also bears some of the contradictions of the Hegelian concept 
of harmony.269 In this statement, Adorno appears to be referring to advanced Modern music, 
which indeed emancipated itself from triadic harmony and the cadence, on one hand, and 
                                                
268 See Robert Snarrenberg, “Competing Myths: The American Abandonment of Schenker’s Organcism,” in 
Theory, Analysis and Meaning in Music, ed. Anthony Pople (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
pp. 29-56. Snarrenberg argues that when, in the American reception of Schenker’s writings, the organicist 
metaphors were translated into scientific language, Schenkerian analysis did not thereby become scientific as 
opposed to literary: rather one myth was replaced by another. Snarrenberg’s thesis is that these myths or 
“fictions” play an active role in the work of interpretation: “The central metaphors by means of which authors 
shape their musical conceptions inescapably affect the kinds of activities and aesthetic attitudes that readers find 
themselves invited to adopt” (ibid., p. 31). Snarrenberg concludes that Schenker’s central metaphor of procreation 
personifies the artwork and causes the interpreter to treat the work with “consideration” (ibid., p. 56). 
Snarrenberg does not, however, much consider Schenker’s philosophical plant organicism—his commitment to 
the idea of the musical masterpiece as the harmony of inner origin (in the “chord of nature”) and outer present, to 
the idea of the musical artwork as growth—, which is implied in Schenkerian analysis even when the metaphors 
change. 
269 GS, vol. 7, p. 154, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 100. 
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which, on the other, maintained “the inner’s rupture and dissonance,” instead of harmonizing 
the outer with an inner harmonious in itself.270 Modern music appears to have emancipated 
itself from natural harmony—not from the “chord of nature,” but from the chord of second 
nature, which had become a mindless convention, a mere externality. To be fully emancipated 
from natural harmony, however, would involve more than abandoning triadic harmony: it 
would involve a completely awake and alive subject and an object whose beauty would at no 
moment be mere conformity to law or mere externality. In other words, emancipation from 
natural harmony would be the effective solution to the problem of reification. Modern music 
made tremendous advances, but it did not, however, overcome reification: it is, among other 
things, congealed labour-time in a society of unfair exchange and hidden work. In particular, 
the music of the Second Viennese School hides the work of so-called Romantic composers—
particularly the quicksilver advances of Schubert and Schumann that Schoenberg in a sense 
normalized. Emancipation from the concept of natural harmony is a much more modest 
achievement than the emancipation from natural harmony. We may now have liberated 
ourselves from the idea that there is a harmony, existing in first nature, on which music is 
based, but we have not actually rid music of reification.  
 Schoenberg, at least, did not abandon the idea of harmony inherent in the physical 
divisions of sound; in fact, he used the harmonic series to justify the dissonance in his music: 
My school, including such men as Alban Berg, Anton Webern and others, does not aim 
at the establishment of a tonality, yet does not exclude it entirely. The procedure is 
based upon my theory of “the emancipation of the dissonance.” Dissonances, 
according to this theory, are merely more remote consonances in the series of 
overtones.271 
                                                
270 Hegel, Werke, vol. 13, p. 209, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetics, vol. 1, p. 158. 
271 Schoenberg, Structural Functions of Harmony, p. 193. Here and elsewhere Schoenberg employs the word 
“tonality” where “key” is often expected. I have retained Schoenberg’s preference for “tonality,” which the 
Oxford English Dictionary gives as equivalent to “key.” See Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “tonality,” 
accessed December 31, 2013, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/203142.  
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According to this statement, what is decisive for the music of Schoenberg’s school is not the 
tonic triad or the lack thereof, but an expanded notion of consonance. Consonances, as we 
know, require no special “treatment” as long as parallel fifths and octaves are avoided. 
However, Schoenberg adopts an empirical point of view to expand the notion of consonance. 
If the harmonic series were any measure of consonance, then, at fourteen cents sharper than 
pure, the major third in equal-tempered tuning, which Schoenberg’s music assumes,272 would 
be far more dissonant than the minor second, the major second, and the minor third, which are 
all within five cents of just.273 An “emancipation of the dissonance” based on the principle of 
the harmonic series would not taboo major thirds, as Schoenberg did. If scientific discoveries 
about the overtone series in and of themselves were any ultimate explanation for changes in 
music history, then the demise of the major third and the flourishing of the ninth would 
indicate not so much tolerance of dissonant intervals as intolerance of wildly beating major 
thirds! It simply is not true that dissonances are less perceptible consonances, for the 
                                                
272 Schoenberg assumed equal temperament not only for fixed-pitch instruments like the piano, but also for 
variable-tuning instruments. This can be drawn from various statements on performance practice made by his 
once-student and later brother-in-law Rudolf Kolisch, who, as a member of both the Wiener Streichquartett and 
the Kolisch-Quartett, had a particularly close working relationship with him. For instance, Kolisch sharply 
criticized the resistance of the “string-player sect” to equal temperament: “The attribute of non-fixed-pitch tuning 
let the strings dispense with the process of chromaticization, which was necessary for the other instruments in 
order for them to be workable for tonal music. The possibility of being able to produce a continuum of pitches, 
which puts the strings ahead of the other instruments, and of which they are rightfully proud, was not placed in 
the service of music. The fact that a physical change to their instruments was unnecessary does not mean, 
however, that the change in musical consciousness, the mental transformation that the establishment of the tonal 
system required, was spared them. But the strings did not carry out this mental transformation, and thus they 
distance themselves from this decisive turning point in the history of Western polyphony of art music. This 
transformation manifests itself technically in equal temperament, which, necessary for new music, predominated 
in Western musical practice for some 250 years. At no time, however, did strings accept this. In a realm reserved 
for reactionary ideology, they feel called upon to rescue eternal values that, consequent upon the rationalistic 
solution to tuning problems by equal temperament, have dwindled away.” Rudolf Kolisch, “Religion der 
Streicher,” in Rudolf Kolisch, Zur Theorie der Aufführung: Ein Gespräch mit Berthold Türke, herausgegeben von 
Heinz-Klaus Metzger und Rainer Riehn, Musik-Konzepte; 29/30 (Munich: Edition Text + Kritik, 1983), pp. 113-
119, here p. 113 (my translation). 
273 The Oxford Companion to Music Online, s.v. “harmonic series,” by Anthony Baines and John Borwick, 
accessed December 29, 2012, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/opr/t114/e3137. 
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dissonance par excellence, the tritone, is not even the (virtually indiscernible) twenty-third 
partial, which, at 628 cents above the fundamental tone, corresponds to no note in equal 
temperament: the partial corresponding to 600 cents above the fundamental tone is so many 
light-years distant in the harmonic series that it voids the question. An almost perfectly equal-
tempered quarter-tone (between the perfect fourth and the tritone), appears as the eleventh 
partial, yet Schoenberg sees no need to justify composition with only twelve tones. His 
uncanny perception of the overtone series is extremely selective; while he hears equal-
tempered tritones as “merely more remote consonances,” he does not hear quarter-tones as 
merely more proximate consonances. It is not difficult to understand why microtonality 
seemed like the way forward. The conclusion to draw, however, is not that the overtone series 
justifies the use of quarter-tones. The conclusion to draw is that Schoenberg wrongly tried to 
justify his innovations as products of a natural and inevitable development of the hearing 
apparatus’s sensitivity to characteristics observable with the help of scientific instruments and 
verifiable by scientific methods.  
 The notion of consonance is not based fundamentally on what sounds suave or 
pleasing, nor that of dissonance on what sounds rough or harsh, and Schoenberg in other 
moods acknowledges this. In contrast to his justification of dissonance based on perception, he 
states elsewhere that dissonance, especially in past times, was the sound that “interrupted 
plain, undeviating understanding.”274 The consonance of the minor third was arrived at 
historically, through its “emancipation.”275 Given this fluctuation in Schoenberg’s use of 
terms, the phrase of “emancipation of the dissonance” is ambiguous. If a dissonance is a 
                                                
274 The quote in full reads: “In earlier epochs, even more than in our times, the inclusion of a dissonant tone—
‘foreign’ to the harmony—interrupted plain, undeviating understanding.” Schoenberg, Structural Functions of 
Harmony, p. 192.  
275 Ibid., p. 193. 
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merely more remote consonance (in the sense that it is farther from the home key), then by 
“emancipation of the dissonance,” Schoenberg means the unrestricted use of these remote 
relations, which have become musical self-evidences due to a historical shift in understanding. 
But if dissonance is not a third or a tritone, but whatever interferes with the musical self-
evidences of the day, then by “emancipation of the dissonance,” Schoenberg calls for music 
that ceases to give itself as something self-explanatory, a music that deliberately sets out to 
baffle.  
 On one hand, Schoenberg is quite against the unrestricted use of dissonant chords. He 
claims that diminished sevenths and augmented triads gained an autonomy of sound through 
their overuse in Wagner. The “nomadic” diminished seventh chord has become propertied:  
The unusual, flitting, unreliable guest, who was here one day, there the next, settled 
down, became bourgeois, ended up a washed-up Philistine. It lost the appeal of 
newness and with it some of its harshness and also some of its radiance. It has nothing 
more to say to a new time. So it sank out of the higher sphere of art music and into the 
lower sphere of entertainment music. There it now turns up as the sentimental 
expression of sentimental affairs. It has become banal and weak. Banal!276 
  
The augmented triad, which was a function of voice leading, used either to make a smoother 
point of transition between keys, or, contrariwise, in what would amount to an 
asynchronization of the voices, to give refinement to a square chord change within the same 
key area, in Wagner becomes an independent unit, needing no treatment or musical 
justification. However, the “emancipation” of the symmetrical chords does not amount to an 
understanding of them. In a telling anecdote, Schoenberg relates the reaction of young 
students and an old composition teacher to the first act of Tristan. The young Schoenberg and 
his fellows attend a performance of the Wagner solely in the aim to hear what this horrid 
music is, which serves as the comparison of reproach for their composition exercises, but are 
                                                
276 Arnold Schoenberg, Harmonielehre (s.l.: Universal Edition, 1949), p. 288f. (my translation). 
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no more enlightened by listening to it. The old composition teacher reveals finally that the 
great number of diminished seventh chords is what makes the first act of Tristan und Isolde so 
boring.277 But the transformation of diminished seventh chords into musical self-evidences—
or worse, into mere signals to the listener to feel something—does not actually amount to an 
understanding of them. The reason why they were kept in reserve by refined composers such 
as Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert and Schumann had to do not only with the distinctive shapes 
of these chords, but also with the proportion of symmetrical chords within the whole tonal 
system of chords: there are only three fully diminished seventh chords and only four 
augmented triads. Tristan is boring to the composition professor who, listening in note names, 
roman numerals, and figured bass notation, hears not “so many” diminished seventh chords, 
but rather only the same few chords, repeated so many times. The “emancipation of the 
dissonance” effectively happened with Wagner’s inordinate hankering for effect, and it was 
not a good thing. The resolution is supposed to reveal what the dissonance was—a suspension 
or a pedal point, a seventh chord or a passing tone, an appoggiatura or a kind of buoy or flare 
that the progression follows into a new key. To have chords function as symbols, as iterative 
signs that mean something outside the music, it is necessary to suppress the musical 
justifications as much as possible. Indeed, dissonances that have become fetishes cannot be 
resolved musically, but must be dissolved philosophically.  
 But on the other hand, Schoenberg undertook to make dissonance incomprehensible 
again, because any good theory teacher knows what is really happening with Wagner’s 
dissonances. Music’s need of enigma comes out in Schoenberg’s writings. His justification for 
free use of dissonance, however, is no “theory,” but a scientific factoid about sound properties 
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that is irrelevant to his music and, for the large part, irrelevant to the temperament that he 
assumes. If Schoenberg’s dissonances may make a claim to being consonances, it should be on 
the basis of their no longer needing “treatment,” not on the basis of the harmonic series; 
however, in Schoenberg’s actual practice, dissonances are not consonances, for the experience 
of his music is not that of an uninterrupted stream of pure comprehensibility. Rameau’s 
harmony was indeed a theory: it aimed at the comprehensibility of the dissonance of his time, 
the seventh chord. According to Rameau, music progressed by posing a new dissonance with 
every resolution of an old dissonance, and this interlocking chain of dissonances is what 
properly propelled the music along to the cadence, which establishes the key.278 But 
Schoenberg, in claiming that the aim of his school is not the establishment of a key, says 
simply that the endpoint of a series of dissonances need not be a cadence—i.e., dissonances 
need not be the means by which music moves to an unmistakable expression of key. This is an 
emancipated handling of dissonance. The establishment of the key is historically the 
subordination of dissonance to the status of mere vehicle for arriving there. This 
instrumentalization of dissonance is what Schoenberg rightfully finds objectionable in 
tonality. But tonality does not reduce to the obligatory resolution of dissonance, which can be 
criticized quite independently. The concept of dissonance itself predates tonality. Tonality 
associates the ultimate resolution of dissonance with the statement of key, but keys can be 
glimpsed through thickets of passing notes, suspensions and anticipations: there is no reason to 
think that dissonance annuls the tonal centre or tonality.  
 The unresolved dissonance in Schoenberg’s music seems to correspond to the second 
moment of Seligkeit, to the sustained disunity that, according to Hegel, characterizes extreme 
                                                
278 Dahlhaus, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 3, p. 29, lines 8-14, with the accompanying illustration beneath, or 
translated, Studies, p. 26. 
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Romantic artworks, and the difference between advanced Romantic works and advanced 
Modern works threatens to collapse. It may be argued that Hegel’s threshold for dissonance is 
far lower than that of Schoenberg’s rioting audiences, although such a display of concert 
manners from Hegel is practically unimaginable, and just as out of place as philosophical 
reflection in the vociferous, jeering crowd. Hegel considers the Ideal lost when individual 
moments break out of the fabric of the work in a kind of meaningless abstraction. Moments 
that arise from the artistic material and come into unrepressed conflict with the work as “born 
of spirit” would constitute the release of the work from the concept of artistic harmony. When 
Hegel argues that the “dissonance” of certain Romantic artworks “goes on” or “continues,” he 
does not imply that an unstable sound is left without resolution.279 Rather, for Hegel 
dissonance is maintained when individual moments of a work find no justification or basis in 
the unified concept that is supposed to form every moment of the work. Hegel comes close to 
one of Schoenberg’s definitions of dissonance—dissonance as the sound that disrupts or 
blocks an understanding of the work.280 In this sense, sustained dissonance is not everlastingly 
an unresolved seventh chord, but it is the mark of what exceeds expectations, escapes existing 
codes or, in general, impedes an easy listening of the work. There are, however, important 
differences between Hegel’s concept of dissonance and Schoenberg’s. Hegel specifies that the 
dissonance of Romantic art is the “Dissonanz der Inneren”—dissonance within the concept, 
subject or inner potential that is then supposed to harmonize with being, externality and 
actuality.281 Sustained dissonance negates the concept of artistic harmony, the harmony of 
inner and outer, because the eruption of painful inner contradictions shows innerness to be 
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280 Schoenberg, Structural Functions of Harmony, p. 192. 
281 Ibid. 
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something quite different from outerness. In Dichterliebe, the moments of extreme sentiment 
are indeed moments of contradiction within the suffering subject, but they in turn stand in 
contradiction with the outer appearance of natural harmony, itself a second nature of 
harmonic conventions. Schumann’s Opus 48 ends on a perfect authentic cadence in D-flat 
Major and a return to the initial sonority;282 however, the emotional extremes of the work, of 
lasting effect, colour the harmony of the final cadence of Lied XVI as well. In comparison to 
these, the final cadence of the sixteenth and last Lied is weak—merely conventional, lacking 
the subjectivity of, for instance, the last chord in the first Lied, whose key continues to 
baffle.283 The “subjective” sonority of the first Lied is indeed dissonant in the Hegelian 
sense—its personal quality as a major-minor seventh chord enters into contradiction with its 
role, that of concluding a piece. The subject is split between its irreducible quality and its 
place in the whole, hence the dissonance. The unconventional ending reveals the “natural” 
way of concluding a piece to be merely a convention and a transitory norm. This colours the 
final cadence of the last Lied of the cycle. Dissonance for Schoenberg, however, does not so 
much seek to point up the natural as conventional as to defend the natural over the 
conventional. Taken in one sense—dissonance as the sound that defeats easy understanding—, 
dissonance does not necessarily negate natural harmony by being emancipated. Such 
emancipation can just as well be anti-intellectual as subtly intellectual, especially as the use 
without restriction of dissonance tends to turn into the necessary use of dissonance and the 
reversion to blind, second nature, as occurred with the emancipation of the third. Taken in the 
other main sense that Schoenberg attributes to it—dissonance as a more distant partial of the 
                                                
282 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), XVI, p. 37, mm. 66-67. 
283 Jon W. Finson even claims that “the home key, like love itself, does not exist.” Jon W. Finson, Robert 
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harmonic series—, dissonance collapses the concept of artistic harmony into the concept of 
natural harmony. Thus it does not negate the concept of natural harmony. Schoenberg is 
unconventional, but he would have a supposed harmony of first nature take over conventional 
harmony, harmony of second nature. The New in New Music of today or of a century ago 
indeed points toward the rediscovery of a true first nature, undistorted by reified social forms 
and habits of thinking, in its momentary escape from conventional society. But Schoenberg’s 
audacious accomplishments also owed themselves to works of the past—something which 
perhaps has not been fully appreciated. 
 In Harmonielehre, Schoenberg himself admits that “Voll jener Süße,” op. 8, no. 5, and 
“Lockung,” op. 6, no. 7, were continuations of the advances in “schwebende Tonalität,” made 
by Beethoven, Schumann and Mahler.284 By “floating” or “suspended” tonality, Schoenberg 
there understands a tonality aimed not at affirming a single tonic, but rather at exploiting the 
ambiguities between two somewhat related keys, not only through progressions based around 
their common chords, but also through the use of the symmetrical, or “vagrant,” chords 
(augmented triads and fully diminished sevenths).285 What he himself translates as “suspended 
tonality,” however, itself lies suspended between two different definitions: it floats between 
the idea of a new type of tonality, which lies suspended between two established tonalities, on 
one hand, and that of a tonality that never touches down on its tonic, on the other. For 
instance, when he wishes to illustrate the concept in his Structural Functions of Harmony, 
again presenting the example of “Lockung,” Schoenberg points to its unstated tonic: “Perhaps 
the most interesting feature of this song, as mentioned in my Harmonielehre, is that the tonic, 
                                                
284 Schoenberg, Harmonielehre, p. 459. 
285 For a theory of Schweben (suspension) drawn from the work of both Schoenberg and Adorno, see Lydia 
Goehr, “Adorno, Schoenberg, and the Totentanz der Prinzipien—in Thirteen Steps,” Journal of the American 
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E-flat, does not appear throughout the whole piece; I calls this ‘schwebende Tonalität’ 
(suspended tonality).”286 According to his Harmonielehre, though, the last movement of 
Beethoven’s String Quartet No. 8 in E Minor, op. 59, no. 2, is also an example of a key that 
hovers over its tonic.287 Yet there the tonic does indeed appear, at the sempre f. 288 
 The contradiction in Schoenberg’s concept of “floating tonality” arises because his 
concept of tonality is antinomical.  
 On one hand, tonality is a specific selection of tones from the twelve available. This is 
clear when Schoenberg writes, “Distinguishing a tonality from those tonalities which resemble 
it is the first step towards its unmistakable establishment. C major differs from G major and F 
major by only one tone, in each case, f-sharp and b-flat respectively.”289 A passage may be in 
a key, but not express this key. Yet Schoenberg’s criterion for the expression of tonality is 
stringent. While most would consider a key expressed at the cadence, for Schoenberg “a 
tonality is expressed by the exclusive use of all its tones.”290 The question then is at what point 
it becomes clear that all the tones have been used and only those tones. Schoenberg would 
have to conceive of tonality in diatonic terms to state, as he does, that “the chords which 
express a tonality unmistakably are the three main triads: I, IV and V.”291 For these triads, 
                                                
286 Schoenberg, Structural Functions of Harmony, p. 111. 
287 Schoenberg, Harmonielehre, p. 459. 
288 Ludwig van Beethoven, Streichquartette=String Quartets, op. 59, herausgegeben von Jonathan del Mar 
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example, Michael Spitzer would probably call it “Schein” rather than “suspended tonality.” He describes musical 
Schein as “bifocal” (as opposed to bitonal, or, as it may be surmised, atonal). Of the first phrase of Beethoven’s 
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Philosophy: Adorno and Beethoven’s Late Style (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2006), p. 101.  
289 Schoenberg, Structural Functions of Harmony, p. 12. 
290 Ibid., p. 11. 
291 Ibid., p. 13. 
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which, when strung together in their traditional progression, we recognize as the cadence IV – 
V – I, contain all seven note names. Thus, B-natural as the third in the V chord not only 
affirms the key of C major, but simultaneously negates the key of F major suggested by the 
foregoing IV chord, for there is a simple B “slot” that can be occupied by only one of sharp, 
flat or natural. Music, however, does not express its tonality at all times. Schoenberg states, 
rather arbitrarily, that whenever a succession of three chords fails to express the tonality, then 
the harmony is “roving.”292 This raises the question of how to distinguish floating harmony, 
which expresses two tonics, successively or simultaneously, from roving harmony, which 
implies a single tonic, but does not express it. What is seen as the failure of a progression to 
express a single diatonic key region can also be seen as its success at expressing a double 
diatonic key region. Likewise, what is normally seen as a successful expression of the key, the 
cadence, might not be the whole story, for we do not know in advance how many or which 
tones make up the key: again, “a tonality is expressed by the exclusive use of all its tones.”293 
As Schoenberg points out, the unmistakable expression of key depends on the contradiction to 
be overcome: in music composed only of V and I chords, the IV chord is not necessary to 
establish the key: the music everywhere establishes the key.294 One can extend this logic: the 
IV – V – I progression would establish the tonality in a piece making limited use of secondary 
dominants—or, as Schoenberg says, “artificial” dominants—, but perhaps not in a piece 
making extended use of substitutions and vagrant harmonies. Indeed, we find the progression 
iv – V7 – I in the Finale of the Beethoven Op. 59, no. 2, but it is a question whether at this 
point the cadence on E minor has really conquered the great deal of elements that have 
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contradicted the home key of E minor in the preceding fifty bars.295 Even the 
interchangeability of major and minor, which Schoenberg considers standard practice, would 
seem to require more than the traditional cadence to establish the tonality credibly. If the 
parallel minor becomes part of the vocabulary of a piece in major, then clearly IV – V – I, in 
which the third, sixth and seventh scale degrees occur only once, does not definitively 
establish the mode—certainly not if previously the altered third, sixths and sevenths have 
persistently resurfaced. The tierce de Picardie does not necessarily make a piece major: on the 
contrary. The listener can disbelieve a supposedly unmistakeable expression of tonality just as 
well as infer the tonality from indirect, scattered hints. The cadence can be a merely formal 
requirement and so not substantively expressive of anything: it can be “affirmative,” as 
Schoenberg himself puts it, in the pejorative sense of the term.296 Schoenberg indeed 
recognizes the mediated character of tonality insofar as he distinguishes the affirmation of the 
tonality from tonality. Clearly, tonality cannot be decided by a simple immediate perception. 
Yet if theory of harmony were really to follow the consequences of its insight into the 
mediated character of tonality, it would see as its task the unfolding of the relations of the 
tonic or tonics (the anti-harmonic element) to the harmony—that is, to the different classes of 
wholes: all scale degrees, modes, keys, chords, chord qualities, pitch classes, and progressions 
used in the work. Yet Schoenberg’s notation in Structural Functions of Harmony is too vague 
to distinguish the different elements of harmonic language, so obscures these relations. He 
does not use figured bass notation; rather, he indicates any alteration in the chord by striking 
through the Roman numeral (which is always in upper case), no matter whether the root, the 
third, the fifth or the seventh is altered. His preference for writing secondary dominants as 
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altered chords in the same key (so that V/V is represented as II) opens the possibility of easily 
grasping stepwise progression in the fundamental bass, but he ruins this possibility at a stroke 
because it is impossible to tell from the notation if the substitution has occurred at the root. 
Schoenberg so obscures a certain root progression, the chromatic root progression, in what 
looks like a theory of diatonic scale degrees. While purporting to lay emphasis on the writing 
of progressions, Schoenberg’s notation and the theory that it represents fail to distinguish 
harmonic movement from chromatic colouring. In a major key, the Neapolitan chord and V/V 
are both represented by II, as a mere colouring of the static II chord: a strange rendering as in 
fact the Neapolitan and V/V have not a note in common and, used in this succession, would 
not constitute harmonic iridescence, but a movement up in all the voices. This notation does 
not even bring out the aspect of harmony that Schoenberg sees as primary: the structural 
functions of harmony. Schoenberg names three structural functions of harmony: progressions 
are strong, descending, or superstrong.297 A progression whereby a root becomes a third or a 
fifth is strong; a progression whereby a fifth or third becomes a root is descending; a 
progression whereby not one of the root, third, or fifth is picked up by the following chord is 
superstrong. It is thus vital to know whether the alteration affects the root, the third, or the 
fifth. Given the major-key ii – V progression, a chromatic alteration of the root of the ii chord 
down by a semi-tone (N – V) will change the function from strong to superstrong, but a 
chromatic alteration of the third of the ii chord (V/V – V) will not change it. Yet Schoenberg 
contends that the borrowed and altered chords never “alter” the structural function of the 
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progression itself.298 But Schoenberg holds to the inalterability of the progression because his 
theory of harmony is in some sense a theory of diatonic scale degrees.  
 Yet, on the other hand, Schoenberg does not conceive of tonality in diatonic terms in 
the least. Tonality is not a selection of seven of the twelve possible notes, but the control of all 
chords, no matter how remote, by a single tonic: 
 The concept of regions is a logical consequence of the principle of 
monotonality. According to this principle, every digression from the tonic is considered 
to be still within the tonality, whether directly or indirectly, closely or remotely related. 
In other words, there is only one tonality in a piece, and every segment formerly 
considered as another tonality is only a region, a harmonic contrast within that tonality. 
 Monotonality includes modulation—movement towards another mode and 
even establishment of that mode. But it considers these deviations as regions of the 
tonality subordinate to the central power of a tonic. Thus comprehension of the 
harmonic unity within a piece is achieved.299 
 
According to the principle of monotonality, the extension of tonality through the nineteenth 
century is the effective increase of the tonic’s power, to the point that the tonic is supposed to 
be able to control virtually every single chord, even without ever putting in an appearance. 
What Schoenberg means by “hovering tonality” in Structural Functions of Harmony is less 
tonal ambiguity than this domination of all chords by a physically absent tonic chord. The 
tonic in “Lockung” is more or less like Kant’s universal transcendental subject, which 
guarantees the formal unity of the pure categories of the understanding but which does not 
appear. In this light, withholding the tonic is a gesture against the merely formal unity of the 
transcendental subject, which does not, as the formal harmony of the categories, attain to the 
free individuality of melody. 
 Carl Dahlhaus registers a similar collapse of the distinction between diatonicism and 
chromaticism in the theory of functions of Hugo Riemann, who, by always postulating an 
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imaginary extension of the stacks of thirds in chords, strives to claim a direct relation between 
chords suggesting different keys. As Dahlhaus notes, “an A-flat major or E-major chord 
related directly to C major is neither diatonic nor chromatic—the distinction is abolished 
[aufgehoben, sublated].”300 Yet Dahlhaus points out that, in the mind of Riemann, the concept 
of tonality referred precisely to this abolition of the distinction between diatonicism and 
chromaticism: “And it is in this suspension of diatonicism as the basis of chordal relationships 
that Riemann saw the distinctive feature of ‘tonality,’ as opposed to the ‘older doctrine of key’ 
founded on the diatonic scale.”301 To Riemann, then, it is music, not theory, that becomes 
insensitive to the distinction between diatonicism and chromaticism; the concept of tonality 
refers to this insensitivity. But if it were the case that tonal music related chords not on the 
basis of the diatonic scale, but on the basis of suspending diatonicism, then certainly cadences 
would have assumed quite a different role than they did. In effect, to suspend diatonicism, 
music would have to suspend the final tonic itself, which tolerates no chromaticism. But tonal 
music regulated the use of chromaticism, making final tonics chromatic-free zones. It is in fact 
the theory of functions that erases the distinction between diatonicism and chromaticism. For, 
as Dahlhaus points out, the “functions” in Riemann’s theory of functions—tonic, 
subdominant, and dominant—could just as well refer to the different moves in musical logic 
as they could to the diatonic scale degrees.302 Riemann’s theory cannot be a pure theory of 
functions, Dahlhaus argues, or he would have just postulated the functional equivalence of the 
subdominant chord and the subdominant parallel chord instead of making the latter a 
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derivative of the former;303 Riemann’s theory cannot be a pure theory of chordal scale degrees, 
or he would not have seen the need to reduce the number of degrees to just three. Yet 
Dahlhaus does suggest that Riemann’s theory of functions would actually be much more 
successful as a theory of chordal scale degrees. In suggesting this, however, he does not seem 
to consider that Riemann’s suspension of the difference between chromaticism and 
diatonicism, to which he alluded earlier, is a problem for his theory of functions: 
Even according to the theory of fundamental progressions, different chords—B – d – f, 
B – d – f – a, B-flat – d – f—represent the same chordal scale degree: the supertonic in 
A minor. And the theory of functions differs from the theory of fundamental 
progressions only in that it allows, as valid means for modifying a chordal scale 
degree, not only added dissonances and chromatic alterations, but also the substitution 
of the sixth for the fifth, or the lower second for the root.304 
 
Dahlhaus so attempts to decide over a fundamental ambivalence in Riemann’s theory. But 
theory that merely acts as a watchdog, ensuring that “valid means” are used “for modifying a 
chordal scale degree,” represses the context-specific associations and the historical charge that 
these diverse modifications carry. It must be said that Riemann’s theory, founded on the 
naturalistic principle of the harmonic series, is a fundamentally reactionary one, in that it tries 
to reduce anything new and unusual in the progression, so anything genuinely historic, to the 
ever-same I – IV – V – I workaday mould, as if nothing really progressed. His theory of the 
fundamental progression is based on the popular misrepresentation of dialectical logic as the 
thesis—antithesis—synthesis schema, where the “antithesis” between tonic and subdominant 
has to do with the fact that the root of the IV chord does not lie in the harmonic series of the I 
chord. The V – I at the end of the progression is supposed to resolve this opposition because 
not only does the root of V lie in the harmonic series of I, but the root of I also lies in the 
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harmonic series of the root of IV. The assumption is that a tone previously heard as an 
overtone cannot be recognized when it later occurs as the fundamental partial, but that a tone 
sounding for the first time as an overtone can be connected to its previously heard instance as 
the fundamental partial—in other words, fundamental partials are prospective and overtones 
retrospective. Riemann’s static view of I – IV – V – I is as un-dialectical as they come, for 
instead of recognizing the merely posited character of “I” and “IV”, Riemann clings 
stubbornly to the idea that this opposition is natural, and that it is only a change of season, so 
to speak, that resolves the conflict, like the definitive onset of winter that solves the 
contradictions that the year has thrown out: the crocus blooming in the snow in the spring, the 
early frost on tomato plants at the end of summer, and the sudden warm days under denuded 
trees, all, reduce to the frozen stillness and barrenness of January. Music is itself dialectical 
not in that it “synthesizes,” as Riemann thinks, but in that it unmasks the merely posited nature 
of themes, keys, voicings, orchestrations, progressions, intervals, cadences, chordal features; it 
challenges the arbitrariness of any purely given musical self-evidence. But no theory that 
postulates its own musical givens in advance can discover what in music is dialectical. 
 Although Schoenberg acknowledges floating tonality and even “sublated” tonality in 
the music of his predecessors, his own theory of harmony is prejudiced so as to downplay 
these instances, making his own music appear more radical than it is. Structural Functions of 
Harmony does not purport to be a theory of floating tonality: 
It should not be overlooked that harmonies with multiple meaning—the “vagrants”—
may occasionally proceed in conflict with the theory of root progressions. This is one 
of the short-comings of every theory—and this theory cannot claim to be an exception; 
no theory can exclude everything that is wrong, poor, or even detestable, or include 
everything that is right, good, or beautiful.305 
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In this way Schoenberg does not draw out the consequences of Romanticism’s floating or 
“wandering” harmonies for harmonic theory. His harmonic theory makes some “tonal” music 
seem less radical than it is and most “atonal” music seem more radical than it is. He 
acknowledges that the symmetrical chords, the augmented triad and the diminished seventh, 
have indeterminate roots, so cannot be tied to any specific key in and of themselves. If the root 
progression were always the first priority for composition, then these symmetrical chords 
would require that their roots be identified clearly in a conventional way. But there are no 
prohibitions on these chords regarding position or octave doubling. Although Schoenberg 
realizes that compositional practice around these chords gives priority to their ambivalent 
quality over the single root progression, he himself nonetheless gives priority to the root 
progression, related to degrees. He even suggests that the diminished seventh chord be thought 
of as a ninth chord with a missing root a major third below one of the tones, so that it can be 
attached to a definite degree in the progression.306 This rigidity is perfectly understandable 
given Schoenberg’s objection to the absolute fetishism of the symmetrical chords in the 
entertainment industry. Schoenberg attempts to escape the antinomies of the concept of 
tonality by adding bridge concepts—roving harmony and floating or hovering tonality. But 
occurrences of so-called “tonal ambiguity” are not external to tonality; they are manifestations 
of an antinomical concept of tonality whose different aspects clash. A progression that is 
seemingly split between two keys may in fact be split between chromatic and diatonic 
definitions of tonality. Schoenberg’s notation has the unique advantage of allowing readers to 
see this split at a glance.307 His theory, however, does not mediate the contradictions of 
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tonality. On the one hand, Schoenberg stresses the importance of relating all altered and 
borrowed chords to definite scale degrees.308 On the other hand, the structural functions of the 
progression should not depend on the concept of diatonic scale degree because the division 
into strong, descending, and superstrong progressions is based on the presence or absence of 
common tones from one chord to the next. Schoenberg, however, in the particular definitions 
of these progressions, assumes that all chords have definite roots, implying scale degrees. 
 Kofi Agawu criticizes the musicological practice of pleading ambiguity and argues 
that, while certain passages of tonal music suggest multiple readings, where these are not 
disambiguated by the music in its unfolding, the task of theory is to resolve ambiguities: “An 
analysis that terminates in undecidability represents a conscious or subconscious retreat from 
theory.” 309 A reason he gives for this is that the performer must take a decision on those 
concrete situations of ambiguity.310 Indeed, to conclude that a certain chord or passage of tonal 
music is frankly undecidable or indeterminate is in a sense to deny that music is a performing 
art. Furthermore, Agawu suggests that, taken in isolation, a small enough segment of tonal 
music is bound to sound ambiguous: at the very least, the context in which a certain chord 
sounds ambiguous must be specified.311 The critique of ambiguity as a theoretical concept in a 
sense converges on Adorno’s critique of atomistic listening.312 Indeed, Agawu opens his essay 
with Adorno’s example from that essay, Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony.313 To atomistic 
listening, all works are merely fragmentary, remaining indeterminate or ineffable. Since 
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atomistic listening represents normal, average, unschooled listening, advanced musicology 
must argue for and support the opposite tendency, as Agawu does. Agawu’s position, 
however, that analysis “necessarily includes a mechanism for resolving ambiguities at all 
levels of structure,” is itself a retreat from theory.314 This mysterious mechanism, if it exists, is 
likely to be a social mechanism by which the real contradictions of music are glossed over and 
forgotten. Theory seeks to dissolve problems, but it is wishful thinking to assert that a theory 
necessarily possesses or produces a device that will solve them every time. As Agawu insists 
that “in situations of competing meanings, the alternatives are always formed hierarchically, 
making all such situations decidable,” it becomes clear that theory’s “mechanism” would 
merely prioritize the competing demands on the interpreter instead of actually solving the 
ambiguities.315 This prioritization of competing demands might serve as a quick and easy 
heuristic for the musician, but it is not the same as a solution to a musical problem.316 
Musicological analysis, for its part, is not subjected to the same constraints as musical 
performance practice is. But it is not really differentiated by what seem to be the specific 
demands of performance—the actual state of audiences, concert halls, instruments and 
acoustics and the irreversible, linear unfolding of the piece in time. Music, unlike analysis, 
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must make a claim to truth through aesthetic illusion, manifested, notably, in the contradiction 
between score and performance. The decisions taken on the musical problems subsisting in 
print must oppose the score in such a way that an illusion of independence is created. Despite 
this particularity of performance, adequate musical reproduction implies analysis.317 Analysis 
for its part must articulate contradictions between the fixed score and the sound in time 
without claiming that these are truth. Prioritizing competing interpretations hierarchically 
relinquishes the reflective freedom of analysis to work on what remains open in music. 
Analysis can recognize music as a performing art much more faithfully by setting out the 
contradictions in the musical text rather than by prioritizing them. Contradiction appears not to 
aid the performer at all; however, according to Adorno’s notes for his theory of musical 
reproduction, “true reproduction is not simply the realization of the result of the analysis.”318 
True reproduction “must contain the idiomatic element in itself as sublated 
[aufgehobenes].”319 This idiomatic element refers to one of three elements of musical 
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reproduction that Adorno lists in his notes.320 It is the social-conventional dimension, as 
opposed to the mensural (notational) or the neumic (or mimetic). True reproduction, then, 
implies the negation, preservation and elevation of the idiomatic element, the social context, 
which, in the modern age, is inherently resistant towards becoming other than what it is. True 
musical reproduction must turn its idiomatic element, its general, “irrational”321 contemporary 
context of “conventions,”322 into a particular content, into a specific mimetic gesture, by way 
of the notation, the score.323 Music is supposed to get over social repression by forgetting it 
safely, preserving it as something irreducibly individual. These are the particular demands 
with which performance is faced, and which musical analysis cannot solve for it.  
 Recently David Kopp has attempted to account for the unusual handling of key in the 
first song of Dichterliebe by supplying the concept of a key continuum, which, to his mind, 
escapes Agawu’s criticisms of tonal ambiguity while resisting the pressure to resolve 
Schumann’s puzzle definitively in favour of A major or F-sharp minor.324 Kopp suggests that 
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Laura Tunbridge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 300-325. 
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interpretations of “Im wunderschönen Monat Mai”325 are hampered by a model of tonality 
whereby keys are discrete units; he proposes a different concept of key: 
We are accustomed to thinking of keys as definite states of harmony in which a tonic 
actively organizes pitch-class relations. From Weber to our own time, for example, 
theorists have characteristically represented keys as nodes within harmonic networks 
or Tonnetze, showing motion from key to key as directed moves from one node to 
another. But what if we were to think of the path from one node to anther not as a 
binary switch from one tonic state to another, but as a continuum? Nodes would 
represent the clear, unmitigated predominance of a single pitch-class as tonic. Along 
the continuum would be intermediate—not ambiguous—states in which more than one 
pitch class exerts some tonic force. Thus music could, at times, be understood to be at 
some specified position between keys rather than in them. This could satisfy Agawu’s 
demand for a definite, theory-backed analytical observation, without resorting either to 
choosing between alternatives or to hierarchical differentiation. This approach also has 
some affinity with the conception of key advanced by Schumann’s preferred theorist, 
A. B. Marx.326   
 
 Kopp does exceedingly well to start his article by unpacking the notion of key, setting out, in 
good Aristotelian fashion, a dialectic of viewpoints among important nineteenth-century music 
theorists. It quickly becomes apparent that the concept of key in the nineteenth century could 
refer to nearly completely opposite things. Kopp’s solution, however, closes the dialectic: he 
proposes a different model of key, loosely modelled on Adolph Bernhard Marx’s diatonic 
Stufentheorie, that would account for the key in “Im wunderschönen Monat Mai.” He justifies 
his concept of key on evidence that A. B. Marx was Schumann’s favourite theorist. Whether 
A. B. Marx was Schumann’s favourite theorist should not decide the key of the opening song 
of Dichterliebe. Schumann’s Opus 48, No. 1 showed tonality to be an antinomical system; the 
coherence of “Im wunderschönen Monat Mai” can be grasped only in grasping the 
incoherence of tonality. Yet Schumann did not remain trapped in the antinomies of tonality; he 
pointed the way out of them. 
                                                
325 The Lieder of Dichterliebe, like the poems of Lyrisches Intermezzo, are titled only by Roman numerals. The 
numerals of the one, however, do not correspond to those of the other. “Im wunderschönen Monat Mai” here and 
in the following refers to the opening words of Lied I. 
326 Kopp, “Intermediate States of Key in Schumann,” p. 312. 
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  Im wunderschönen Monat Mai, 
 Als alle Knospen sprangen, 
 Da ist in meinem Herzen 
 Die Liebe aufgegangen. 
 
  Im wunderschönen Monat Mai, 
 Als alle Vögel sangen, 
 Da hab ich ihr gestanden 
 Mein Sehnen und Verlangen. 
 
 
 ( In wondrous lovely month of May, 
 When all the buds exploded 
 Then deep within my own heart 
 The love for her unfolded. 
 
  In wondrous lovely month of May, 
 When all birds sang in choir, 
 Then true to her declared I  
 My longing and desire.)327 
  
 The statement of key is conventionally taken to “mean” the unity of the work. While 
Schumann preserves the notion of key, he brings its conventional character into sharp relief. It 
would seem that an intrinsic, fundamental relation between functions and qualities makes 
individual chords, taken on their own, stronger or weaker indicators of the tonic. Setting aside 
the rare case of the melodic minor mode entering the harmony, the mere quality of the major-
minor seventh chord points forward to the imminent revelation of key: whatever follows is 
supposed to have the character of a tonic (or of a temporary tonic). However, when chord 
qualities become disassociated from their traditional scale degrees and traditional, allotted 
places in the progression, then major-minor seventh chords in themselves no longer orient the 
listener to the tonic in any technical or real-objective sense. The “dominant” seventh on which 
Lied I ends throws into sharp relief the conventional—not natural—way in which keys are 
                                                
327 Heine, Lyrisches Intermezzo, I, p. 112, with my translation. 
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identified in current practice. The expectation for a further chord is due to the conventional 
character of cadences, to the seeming necessity to make beginnings and endings “key” 
moments, as well as to the appointment of the major-minor seventh chord to a specific task of 
introducing the tonic (or a temporary tonic). Schumann brings out this conventional character 
by throwing the conventions into contradiction with one another in virtually perfectly equal 
measure.  
 The first Lied of Dichterliebe shows key to be contradictory concept. To judge by its 
key signature, this first Lied of Dichterliebe would be either in A major or in F-sharp minor, 
but its first, ambiguous statement fits into neither key: both are almost immediately 
contradicted by the Great A-sharp.328 Furthermore, the sharps or flats after the clef have not 
always indicated the key: there may be fewer sharps in the signature than in the key, what is 
called a “partial signature.” If the first entry heard is an indication of key, then the Lied can be 
in C-sharp (major or minor).329 But this “chord” is incomplete: in fact, it is a single note, 
which is perhaps not sufficient to put a scale into the ear. But the next two notes sounded are 
hardly any more definite: an incomplete D augmented chord.330 If the first cadence is an 
indication of key, then the Lied can be in A major. But the first full cadence occurs where one 
would expect a half-cadence.331 If the chord qualities are a clue to scale degrees, and if scale 
degrees are an indication of the key, then the first Lied is in F-sharp minor. But if the complete 
tonic chord must appear at least once, then the Lied cannot be in F-sharp minor. If the last 
chord struck is an indication of key, then the Lied may be in C-sharp major. But if a 
dissonance discounts the statement of key at the end, then the Lied cannot be in C-sharp 
                                                
328 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), I, p. 2, m. 1, pf., l.h. 
329 Ibid., I, p. 2, pick-up to m. 1. 
330 Ibid., I, p. 2, m. 1, pf., l.h. 
331 Ibid., I, p. 2, m. 5, from quarter note value 2, through measure 6. 
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major. If a major-minor seventh chord portentously placed identifies the root of this chord as 
the dominant degree of the diatonic scale on which the work is based, then this Lied can be in 
F-sharp major or minor. But if the leading tone cannot be doubled in a seventh chord, then this 
major-minor seventh chord is not a dominant seventh chord, and the key is not F-sharp minor, 
for the E-sharp is doubled, while the B-natural and G-sharp are not.332 If the degree of 
diatonicism of the root progression is an indication of key, then the key may be A major or D 
major, for in each case there is just one chord whose root does not fit in. But this presumes 
modulation to be an exception, not one of the main characteristics of tonality—if not the main 
characteristic. If the prominence of the tonic note is an indication of key, then the key is still 
undecided, for C-sharp and D are about equally prominent: the bass alternates between them 
in the introduction, interlude and postlude, and there are only a few beats here and there where 
neither note sounds.  
Tonal ambiguity, tonal instability indeterminacy, bitonality, or even polytonality, are 
easy ways to solve the puzzle of the first Lied’s key. More difficult is to recognize that 
antinomies are rooted in a necessary illusion and to determine what it is, to explode it. Yet 
more difficult still is to save it. While theory wants to explode tonality’s illusion of harmony, 
musical reproduction is still faced with the task of presenting it. A theorist may sit self-
satisfied in the knowledge that tonality is a contradictory system; practicing musicians are 
forced to take decisions on it, to make a convincing performance. Lied I of Dichterliebe could 
be rhapsodic, moving from F-sharp minor to A major to B minor to D major in a matter of 
twelve short bars: 
                                                
332 Ibid., I, p. 3, m. 26. Please note that this “Urtext” edition has an E-natural where other sources give G-sharp. 
Cf. R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (1971), I, p. 15, m. 26, and also the autograph reproduction in Hallmark, The 
Genesis of Schumann’s “Dichterliebe,” p. 37, plate 5.  
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F-sharp minor: V|1 – VI+ – iv6 – iiø4,3|2 – V9|3 – VI+ – iv6 – iiø4,3|4 – V9| 
|| 5 – A Major: ii6 – V7|6 – I|7 – ii6 – V7|8 – I| 
||9 – b minor: iv6 – V7|10 – VI6,5 +9+11&maj13+13 ||11 – D Major: iv6 – V7|12 – I… . 
  
This is a functional analysis for present-day performance purposes. When the musicians 
cannot assume structural listening on the part of the audience, they will be more concerned 
with presenting each moment as either one of tension or of release, than with presenting a self-
referring whole, however contradictory. The above analysis prioritizes the dominant sevenths, 
which are moments of tension. Of the six in this short excerpt, three resolve as expected; two 
make a veiled deceptive movement (to the VI chord); one (at the end of the F-sharp minor 
passage) moves to a pivot chord, iv in first inversion, (ii in A Major). When only half of the 
dominant sevenths acquit their functions as expected, questions should be raised about the 
adequacy of functional analysis to Lied I of Dichterliebe. The dominant seventh chord here is 
more than the tension-builder that it normally must be. 
When functions dominate qualities according to convention, then the progressive 
element of harmony, movement from chord to chord, takes on a landscape character: the goal 
comes into view and disappears, comes close into view and is reached. Schumann’s 
unconventional split between the in-itself of chords and the relation of chords to the tonic is 
already in a certain sense the demand for music to unfold according to its essence, as a purely 
temporal medium, for progress to be the mutual determination and self-determination of 
particulars in time. Yet the enormous potential of liberated time opened in Lied I runs a risk in 
its musical realization: the risk of affirming that such liberated time really exists, and that this 
music is it. The enormous, contradictory constraints that Schumann faced at the hour of 
music’s advance express themselves as harmonic buckling.    
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 The last, expressive bar of the first Lied of Dichterliebe is new. It combines into a 
single figure elements of what has until then only presented as two separate, consecutive 
figures. These two previously appearing figures, which Schumann groups by way of slurs, 
may be analyzed as a single C-sharp ninth chord.333 These two figures are particular in that 
they make possible the strophic structure of the Lied. A different figuration of what could be 
the same chord changes expectations at the last bar. The chord in measures 4 and 15 may be 
understood as a major-minor seventh chord by the second sixteenth note in the left hand. The 
chord in the last measure, however, substitutes a Small g-sharp for the Small b at the second 
sixteenth note, so, unlike its models, it can be heard initially as the C-sharp major triad, 
sustained, to which is added the b' that has in previous instances commenced the second, 
written-out double-appoggiatura figure that sets up the strophe.334 A slight modification to the 
disposition of the figuration momentarily produces a C-sharp major triad, which then 
transforms into a dissonant seventh chord. Stilled on a fermata, the moving figure freezes, 
breaking the endless strophic cycle. The first Lied of Dichterliebe ends by interrupting its 
circular form with a sonority that is traditionally used to signal forward, linear movement 
toward a goal. In its frozen form, the final sonority can be classified as a major-minor seventh 
chord. But on the basis of this quality alone, it has been called a dominant seventh chord, 
which is expected to acquit its function as preparer of the tonic, F-sharp, despite the fact that at 
no point in the song has the C-sharp major-minor seventh chord led to an F-sharp chord. Such 
an expectation, if there is one, is based on convention. But from the observation that 
Schumann does not end the piece in the conventional way it should not be concluded that the 
                                                
333 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe, (2011), I, p. 2, m. 4 and p. 3, m. 15. 
334 Ibid., I, p. 3, m. 26 (where Small g-sharp has been incorrectly reproduced as Small e) or prefer R. Schumann, 
Dichterliebe (1971), p. 15, m. 26. 
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last bar represents frustrated expectation. According to Rufus E. Hallmark, the end of Lied I is 
clearly an “unconsummated ending” because “in 1840,…the chord C sharp – E-sharp – G 
sharp – B in the present context (proceeding from the first inversion of a  B – D – F sharp 
triad) had a clear, not vague harmonic meaning.”335 He argues that this chord is a dominant 
seventh that arouses “frustrated expectancy” because like progressions in the history of 
Western music have built such expectancy right into it.336 But this last gesture should in fact 
generate expectation: the expectation for something new—not another strophe, to which the b' 
in bars 4 and 15 leads. For whatever clear “harmonic meaning” the major-minor seventh chord 
had has been negated in the construction of the chord out of remainders of different sonorities 
that have structured the Lied up to there. Although Hallmark is right to point out that the 
major-minor seventh chord has a history that an unusual appearance of it does not efface, he 
claims to position himself at a point in history over a century previous and to have full access 
to a “harmonic meaning,” which he assumes to be completely determinate and operative.  
 The major-minor seventh chord placed at the end of the first song of Dichterliebe 
cannot be reduced to a “harmonic meaning” because the chord controls more than harmony: it 
also controls the concept of “tonal piece” or “tonal work.” The placement of a major-minor 
seventh chord at the end of a song in a song cycle might be compared to a putting a loop in a 
video installation video. The video installation art-form is in fact the perfect opposite of the 
song cycle: a video installation is a linear form that is conventionally presented as an endless 
loop, while a song cycle makes the claim to being an endless loop, but is always presented 
linearly. In Parcours, Jacynthe Carrier turns the appearances of formal, extra-aesthetic 
constraints of video installation, the black screen and repetition, into logical, aesthetic 
                                                
335 Hallmark, The Genesis of Schumann’s “Dichterliebe”, p. 36. 
336 Ibid. 
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moments of her ‘loop’ showing an assortment of people running in a large circle at the bottom 
of what looks to be a former quarry: in her installation, a black screen followed by a repetition 
of the start of the film turns out not to be another screening of the same video, but a slightly 
different edit of the footage. The unexpected cuts, especially the jarring one in which the axis 
is crossed, negate the general, conventional “meaning” that a black screen followed by a 
repetition of the start of the film takes on in video installation, the “meaning” that “here the 
loop has come full circle.” The negated sign of the whole then raises the question as to 
whether Parcours is a short repeated video or one long video that lasts as long as the gallery is 
open—so whether the title means “loop,” “trajectory,” “loops,” or “trajectories.” In a similar 
challenge to a general convention that merely signals to the recipient’s “aesthetic on/off 
switch,” the major-minor seventh chord closing the first Lied of Dichterliebe negates the 
chord’s extra-aesthetic function, which is to indicate that “the song isn’t finished.” Once the 
aesthetic on/off indicator is broken, the artwork can then raise doubts about its own genre and 
form.    
 Yet Hallmark ignores the artwork’s self-negation because he implicitly uses the text to 
justify Schumann’s eccentricity: for Hallmark, the last chord is the mere music-conventional 
equivalent of the last words of the Lied, Sehnen und Verlangen (longing and desire).337 
Schumann, however, is known to resist positivist programme music and word-painting, and 
this is evident in his reconstructive handling of his source material. Schumann makes no strict 
one-to-one correlation between words and tones in his setting; rather, words gather different 
associations so that something transpires between them and through them. Quite the opposite 
of the amateur musician whose playing does not extend beyond the mere decoding of the 
                                                
337 Ibid., p. 16.  
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musical print, Schumann approaches the static text like a true musician the score: with 
fluency. Aside from the actual condensation implied by Schumann’s definitive selection of 16 
of the 66 poems forming the 1827 version of Lyrisches Intermezzo and the actual expansion of 
the poems in their amplification by music, the setting of Heine’s text is a different mode of 
condensation and expansion. The setting is a tacit analysis, then regrouping and rearranging of 
the selected poems themselves; it achieves its coherence by way of cross-references in chords, 
rhythms, textures, vocal contours, figures, and intensities. Schumann is able to activate far-
reaching associations amongst dissimilar elements in Heine’s text. Eminent amongst these 
connections is the secret passage between the first Lied and the twelfth. 
 Am leuchtenden Sommermorgen 
 Geh’ ich im Garten herum. 
 Es flüstern und sprechen die Blumen, 
 Ich aber wandle stumm. 
 
 Es flüstern und sprechen die Blumen 
 Und shau’n mitleidig mich an: 
 Sei unsrer Schwester nicht böse, 
 Du trauriger blasser Mann!338 
 
 
 This radiant morning of summer 
 I walk in the flowering yard; 
 The blossoms gossip and whisper, 
 I walk with never a word. 
 
 The blossoms gossip and whisper 
 And watch me regretful and sad: 
 “Do not be cross with our sister, 
 You pallid, sorrowing lad!”339 
 
 
 The C-sharp major-minor seventh chord at the end of the first Lied tends across an 
immense distance to the F-sharp minor triad falling on the first syllable of the word Blumen in 
                                                
338 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2010), XII, pp. 24-25. 
339 Heinrich Heine, Songs of Love and Grief: A Bilingual Anthology in the Verse Forms of the Originals, trans. 
Walter W. Arndt, with a foreword and annotated by Jeffrey L. Sammons (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1995), p. 33. 
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the first occurrence of the line Es flüstern und sprechen die Blumen in the twelfth Lied.340 The 
setting of this line stands out as one of the most transporting in the entire cycle. In the second 
inversion, the F-sharp minor chord has a figurated texture and falling contour that correspond 
to the figurated texture and rising contour of the unresolved dominant of the first Lied. Even 
the Great B-natural pick-up to the final bar of Lied I matches the Great B-natural in measure 9 
of Lied XII. The F-sharp minor triad, when it arrives, however, is not the tonic cadence, but a 
secondary dominant in the typically dominant inversion—though, curiously, a minor 
dominant, where the third is an A-natural rather than an A-sharp. It in fact follows a dominant 
chord with the “right” quality of dominant—the major-minor seventh—on sprechen. What 
accounts for this variation in quality? Because these two chords are figurated and because they 
have been applied to flat-II, the Neapolitan chord, they are at once governed by two 
conflicting harmonic rules: figuration in the applied Neapolitan key area can borrow its notes 
either from the scale of the Neapolitan or from the scale of the home key. Schumann points 
out this legal inconsistency by borrowing his notes from both keys at once, effectively 
breaking his work out of the tonal system of harmony: if the scales of the tonic and of the 
Neapolitan can be combined within the broken texture, then there is effectively a harmonic 
progression of chords whose roots can support any of the twelve notes as harmonic tones. 
Schumann gives an alternative reading of events, one that is not tracked by the root 
progression, by offering two different versions of the dominant of the cadence, in what 
appears to be a source of Mahlerian variants, which Adorno compares to versions of a story in 
oral tradition.341 On the first syllable of Blumen, Schumann offers a second version of the 
                                                
340 “The blossoms gossip and whisper.” Ibid., p. 33. 
341 GS vol. 13, p. 235, translated by Edmund Jephcott, Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996) p. 88. 
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dominant chord—an atypical minor dominant in a typical dominant inversion—second 
inversion. In so doing, he drives a wedge between chord qualities and chord functions, so 
brings to light the contradiction between intrinsic qualities of things and their functional 
exchange value. The effect of Schumann’s setting of sprechen die Blumen/ ich aber…, the 
iridescent alterity of its altering, anamorphous figures, opens his work, enmeshed in the 
contradictions of harmony, out of its time, even beyond Mahlerian variants, towards twelve-
tone composition, in which all twelve tones must form the harmonic structures. Schumann is 
not far off from such all-embracing harmony: in the space of two and a half measures, from 
the B-flat chord on the first instance of flüstern to the C dominant seventh chord on ich aber, 
the piano part incorporates eleven of the twelve tones. The tension in this beautiful passage, 
between the harmonic re-contextualization of the B-flat at flüstern as enharmonic A-sharp at 
sprechen and the sudden appearance, at Blumen, of the A-natural that the A-sharp would have 
barred, evokes the opening phrases of the entire cycle, phrases which gain their enigmatic 
quality from this very tension between A-sharp and A-natural. The Blumen passage in the 
twelfth Lied does not resolve this tension, the problematic that the work sets out at its opening, 
but directs its energies towards something outside of the work entirely, something more that 
the work does not contain. This “more” was in no way exhausted by Schoenberg’s twelve-tone 
technique, whose pre-determined row and calculated permutations thereof do not solve the 
objective problem that Schumann had isolated with such perspicuity: that of time already 
scheduled. Rather, Schoenberg’s tone-row functions modally, in that it determines at the 
outset a sequence of intervals, which is given to transposition. Nonetheless, twelve-tone 
technique warned of the sort of conditions that exploited workers find themselves in today: in 
sometimes unregistered movements, workers today pass from leisure activity to something 
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work-related—until they find themselves working virtually all the time. The first note of the 
tone-row finds a contemporary comparison in the pager signal, telephone call, or electronic 
mail message that ineluctably determines the next hours to come as work. The moments 
between permutations offer the only freedom and respite. Whatever unexpected things happen 
in composition with twelve-tone technique, a series goes under them unrecognized, just as 
workers today almost never really escape work, which follows them in their thoughts and 
preoccupations. The major-minor seventh at the end of the first Lied of Dichterliebe goes 
beyond text and musical conventions to open history, living time, unscheduled time, the time 
of love, out of the ever-same of cadences. It is in this sense that the new way that Schumann 
opened has never been travelled to this day.   
 The first Lied becomes readable in light of the twelfth Lied as the articulation of the 
problem that the applied Phrygian key area poses to the very idea of non-harmonic tones 
within a figurated texture. Schumann is not merely throwing into question the opposition 
between major and minor: for what is really striking about the opening chord of the cycle is 
the A-sharp, which belongs to neither A major nor F-sharp minor. Schumann is raising the far 
more radical possibility of twelve-tone harmony, which must follow from the basic 
inconsistency surrounding figuration in the temporary Neapolitan key area in a major context. 
The opening of the key region to include potentially all twelve notes is not just the whim of 
the composer, but is based on widely recognized historical precedents. If Bach in bar 74 of 
Prelude 17 of the Well-Tempered Clavier, Book II, can figurate according to the diatonic scale 
based on the Neapolitan, but Mozart in bar 53 of the Fantasy in D minor can figurate 
according to the diatonic scale of the home key, then Schumann’s figuration in Dichterliebe is 
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not arbitrary, but advances out of the objective contradiction.342 Although it would appear to 
take only a legal mind to exploit such a juridical grey zone, Schumann is not thereby law-
abiding. Schumann pinpoints the moment of possibility in a seemingly closed system of 
actuality. Yet the objective contradiction, which would be real possibility in society—so a 
merely negative, imageless indication that things could be somehow otherwise—, in music is 
aesthetic illusion. It seems as if a potential in Dichterliebe were fulfilled by Schoenberg in the 
Piano Pieces, op. 23, no. 5, but it really still goes unfulfilled as long as society remains 
antagonistic, cold and loveless. D-Major-as-Applied-Neapolitan is the key in which to analyze 
the opening Lied of Dichterliebe because it shows Schumann’s specific technical advance out 
of the existing musical material. It prioritizes the root progression over functions, so history 
over social roles, and it explains what has appeared arbitrary and subjective. But Schumann’s 
eminent place as a composer lies also in his musical denial that his aesthetic advances can 
translate into actual social ones. The musical denial takes the form of a great divergence 
between the advanced expressive moments and a better order of things. The cycle charts a 
decline from its most musically advanced moment at the beginning, rather than ending in the 
utopia promised so early. But Schumann does not compose cynical music: it permits itself 
hope in the form of memory.   
 Schumann’s musical advance comes out of the properties of figuration itself. In an 
entirely figurated composition, sensory consonance is no longer any indication of musical 
resolution. There, the immediate psychoacoustic impression of an isolated sound-atom as 
smooth or pleasant has no bearing on the degree of musical tension within it, whether it needs 
                                                
342 Edward Aldwell and Carl Schachter, Harmony and Voice Leading, 3rd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: 
Thomson/Schirmer, 2003), p. 502. The examples are drawn from the textbook normally assigned in first-year 
university harmony courses in North America. 
 462 
treatment or not. For example, the last F-sharp'' in the piano part of bars 12 and 23 of Lied I 
does not sound dissonant (it forms an expanded perfect fifth with the B in the bass), but it is 
actually the seventh of a half-diminished chord, so in need of resolution. Figuration demands 
precisely that music’s moving, historical dimension be seized in figures and interpreted. Yet 
any two differing tones placed in succession should bring to mind some kind of chord, 
however incomplete: thirds and fifths suggest triads; fourths and sixths suggest inverted triads; 
seconds and sevenths evoke seventh chords. The tritone seems an exception to this, but 
depending on the context, it could bring to mind different seventh chords, even an augmented 
sixth chord with doubly augmented seventh. Furthermore, what is in appearance a non-
harmonic note may, in broken texture, actually be a faster harmonic rhythm. Figuration so 
already throws into question the notion of the non-harmonic note, the subsidiary tone. 
Schoenberg may have emancipated dissonance, but Schumann emancipated consonance. Each 
lodges a critique against immediacy, against the notion that key or musical tension or formal 
closure can be sensed in the immediately given sonic perception. Immediacy is exactly the 
right object of critique in the positivist age of structural illusion, for the immediately 
perceiving consciousness can have no experience of illusion as illusion. For that it would need 
memory.   
 Dichterliebe opens on C-sharp'', the tonic, where “tonic” refers to the root of the first 
chord of a work. A single tone, the C-sharp, can be the root of an incomplete chord, so can be 
the tonic. The note is sustained as a pedal in an upper voice over the incomplete D augmented 
chord. As soon as the Small D is touched, the song slips into the applied Phrygian key area, so 
the figurated Phrygian chord itself undergoes alteration as it unfolds. Fully exploiting the 
ambiguity in the rules for figuration in the applied Phrygian key area, Schumann is able to 
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impart colour to every single chord that follows. He renders the notion of altered chords 
meaningless. The root progression as analyzed in the Neapolitan key area presents Roman 
numerals that are not at all suggested by the chord qualities, which take on surprising shapes 
in a harmony whose normally vertical aspect, here more often than not horizontal (in 
figuration), contradicts the linear, progressive aspect, the movement from chord to chord. The 
first two bars (excluding the pick-up), analyzed with D as the tonic, translate into the 
following progression: 
D major: |I+ – vi6 – sharp-ivø4,3 – |VII9| 
These Roman numerals do not normally support such chord qualities, while the chord qualities 
suggest other Roman numerals. The augmented chord suggests a scale degree other than the 
tonic; the half-diminished chord suggests either ii (in minor) or vii (in major); the major-minor 
chord with an added flat ninth above the bass suggests a dominant chord. To judge by the 
chord qualities alone, the progression would fit better into f-sharp minor: 
f-sharp minor : |VI+ – iv6 – iiø4,3 – |V9| 
An analysis in f-sharp minor is the least historically adequate of all, however, as it one-sidedly 
prioritizes diatonicism over chromaticism and reduces qualities to functions, something which 
typifies the form of consciousness necessary for the current form of exchange: in truth, there 
should be no equivalent for quality. Forcing the dominant function—the fifth relation—decide 
the key, on the other hand, throws up a progression that is just as little comprehensible to 
traditional theory: 
C-sharp major : |II+ – flattened-vii6 – vø4,3 – |I9| 
The G-sharp half-diminished chord in measure 1 and the major-minor C-sharp chord with an 
added flattened ninth can be analyzed as altered dominant and tonic chords. The dominant 
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relation between the chords suggests an analysis with C-sharp as the tonic. The dominant 
relation, however, is supposed to indicate resolution, while the “tonic” here is fantastically 
dissonant. It is the applied Phrygian key area that permits such liberties. Since the B-natural 
and D-natural of the C-sharp ninth chord do not both fall in either the key of C-sharp major or 
in the key of C-sharp minor, the C-sharp chord should not be analyzed as the tonic chord in C-
sharp major, but rather as a chord based on the ultimate scale degree in the Phrygian key area 
applied to C-sharp major, which also encompasses the notes falling out of the diatonic key 
region of D major. Yet these traditional schematic renderings do not really express the idea of 
the progression. These strings of Roman numerals and figured bass notation give to think that 
the opening of Dichterliebe is a very disjunctive progression.  
 The opening of Dichterliebe, however, presents a great diversity of highly coloured 
chords—four different proportions of chords built on four different roots—yet without a sense 
of rupture: it is by a skilful use of common tones that Schumann is able to bring together 
chords that normally would not be associated in such a brief passage. All of the chords have 
been fashioned so as to achieve the suppleness demanded by the constraints of this intensely 
brief Lied. For at the same time, their presentation here is a condensation of the entire song. 
The third relations among the three heterogeneous chords in bars 1, 3, 14 and 25 (the D 
augmented chord, the minor B triad in first inversion and the half diminished G-sharp seventh 
chord in second inversion) allow for very close transitions from one to the other. The common 
tone B between the G-sharp half-diminished chord and the C-sharp ninth chord lends the first 
four bars a minimal regularity amidst the rapid changes of proportion of the chords: the sixth 
sixteenth note b' in the right hand of the piano that repeats in bars 1, 2, 3 and 4 alternates 
between forming the third of the G-sharp chord and the seventh of the C-sharp chord. This is 
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why the C-sharp chord in bar 4 should not be identified as a dominant seventh: it does so that 
the purely musical end may be served. Besides the fact that it is not tonicized, its seventh is a 
common tone in each octave—both its Small b and its b' occur in the g-sharp half-diminished 
chord that precedes it and in the b minor chord that follows it—, which means that it has an 
important historical precedent in the stören chord in bar 73 of Schubert’s “Gute Nacht!” from 
Winterreise, also a major-minor seventh chord (there, E) whose seventh is a common tone in 
each octave with the chord that precedes it (there, D major) and the chord that follows it (also 
D major).343 Schumann’s C-sharp ninth chord is so determined by the need of the music to 
present the impression of a wildly diverse but essentially unbroken and ever-returning 
wholeness of nature. Since its shape serves the need for very close connections between 
chords by way of multiple common tones, the end of the piano introduction should not be 
analyzed as the end of the progression. Rather the progression should continue, and can 
continue, to the beginning of the ritardando in bar 12 as follows (with note names): 
C-sharp major: C-sharp –||1 –N: D+ – b6 – g-sharpø4,3|2 – C-sharp9|3 – D+ – b6 – 
g-sharpø4,3|4 – C-sharp9|5 – b6 – E7|6 – A|7 – b6 – E7|8 – A|9 – e6 –  
F-sharp7|10 – G6,5 +9+11&maj13+13 |11 – g6 – A7|12 – D… . 
 
This is a highly unusual progression, in that it traverses every single diatonic scale degree in D 
major, while departing, however, from the circle of fifths. An important part of the progression 
is a diatonic stepwise ascent from E to A that includes movement by both tones and half-
tones.344 It in fact exactly follows the melody line in Schumann’s vocal sketch, a fifth 
below.345 The underlying reason for this shadowing may be the priority of the text, and hence 
of the soprano part, in Schumann’s compositional process, if the manuscript sources are an 
                                                
343 This should not be contentious. See ibid., p. 558. 
344 See R. Schumann, Dichterliebe, (2011), I, p. 2, mm. 9-11. 
345 Hallmark, The Genesis of Schumann’s “Dichterliebe”, p. 34, ex. 1:1.  
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adequate indication of it—according to Hallmark, Schumann made the vocal sketch first, then 
proceeded to the piano draft.346 But this Lied is something more than a harmonized melody. 
For the parallel between vocal line and progression is clouded by way of inversions, 
figuration, and the split between chords and functions. Ultimately, the parallelism between 
vocal line and progression is cancelled by the intense G-natural: without it, the entire vocal 
line could be in A major. While stepwise ascent is not unusual in a melody, it is very unusual 
in a harmony. Progressions that move by steps are what Schoenberg would call “superstrong” 
root progressions, as opposed to “ascending” or “descending” progressions.347 Superstrong 
progressions are particular in that, unlike ascending and descending progressions, no note used 
in the root, third, or fifth of one chord is supposed to be transferred to the root, third, or fifth of 
the other. Thus they would appear to create ruptures in the harmonic fabric. Schoenberg, 
however, does not consider the seventh in his schema, so the superstrong root progression 
does not necessarily manifest the variegated, rapidly changing, discontinuous harmonic 
movement that the characterization suggests. Furthermore, because chords can be incomplete, 
an ascending progression can be just as discontinuous as a superstrong progression. The root 
of the ii chord in first inversion does not necessarily become the fifth of the V chord in ii – V, 
which Schoenberg gives as an example of an “ascending” progression, for the reason that the 
seventh chord often lacks its fifth.348 Furthermore, Schoenberg’s classification of the 
progressions assumes that chord qualities will match diatonic scale degrees, which is not 
necessarily the case, and which his theory of harmony furthermore does not elsewhere assume. 
His classification is not only inadequate for grasping how smooth or disjunctive the chord 
                                                
346 Ibid., p. 34. 
347 Schoenberg, Structural Functions of Harmony, pp. 6-9. 
348 Ibid., p. 6, ex. 10e. 
 467 
changes are, but also poor at tracking the actual movement in the root progression. The 
concept of superstrong progression does not differentiate between half-steps and whole steps 
in the progression, nor between steps up and steps down. But Schoenberg’s aim, to be fair, is 
not to develop a method of analyzing compositions, but rather to teach composition students 
“to compose harmony progressions from the very beginning,” for this is the key to gaining 
adequate understanding of harmony, as opposed to a “superficial” understanding of harmony 
“foreign to the procedures of great composers.”349 Schoenberg’s classification of structural 
functions is thus expedient: the writing of good root progressions can be reduced to a few rules 
of thumb: to avoid constant cycling about the circle of fifths in ascending progressions, to 
resolve descending progressions with ascending progressions, and to limit the use of 
superstrong progressions.350 As Schoenberg bases his teaching on norms established by 
important works, including those of Schumann, the great deal of superstrong movement in 
Schumann’s progression must be considered not wrong, but problematic for traditional 
harmony.  
  The beauty of an interpretation in D major-as-Neapolitan is that it does not require any 
special treatment of “non-chord” tones—all the tones can be chord tones in this analysis. This 
allows music to be interpreted musically. Hallmark, by contrast, must explain “the 
appoggiatura and melodic peak (m. 10) for Herz-” as the registering of irregular stresses in 
Heine’s poem.351 Since Hallmark imagines the melodic peak to occur in bar 10, he, in a rare 
criticism, reproaches Schumann’s setting for the melodization of the fourth line: “The melody 
                                                
349 Ibid., p. xi. 
350 Ibid., p. 8f. 
351 Hallmark, The Genesis of Schumann’s “Dichterliebe”, p. 29. 
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fails only to give prominence to Die Liebe, and it overweights aufgegangen.”352 Furthermore, 
he recommends that the singer, to compensate for the apparent flaw in the composition, stress 
die Liebe (the love) more than aufgegangen (unfolded).353 But it is Hallmark’s interpretation, 
rather than Schumann’s score, that should be corrected. The de-emphasis of aufgegangen 
clearly goes against the musical intention, for there is a crescendo over the first syllable of this 
word. The misinterpretation stems from the identification of the soprano’s e'' in bar 10 and g'' 
in bar 12 as appoggiaturas, non-chord tones. In the autograph, only the left hand of the piano 
suspends its note into bars 10 and 12, while the voice changes harmonies on the beat.354 But in 
going back to his earlier draft for the voice part in bar 10 and matching the voice part in bar 12 
to it, Schumann in fact gave the “suspensions” in the left hand of the piano into bars 10 and 12 
the quality of chord tones: they form a minor third with the soprano each time. The minor third 
movement in the right hand of the piano in bar 10 and the corresponding fifth movement in 
bar 12 imply chords, and it is not any worse to decide the dilemma in the favour of the two 
upper voices, so that the Small B in bar 10 be struck as an anticipation that resolves on the 
Small B-flat on Liebe in bar 11, while the Small-D in bar 12, as an anticipation that resolves to 
the Small C-sharp in bar 13. The merit of analyzing these downbeat chords as independent 
sonorities, incomplete seventh chords in third inversion, is that this reveals the notes in need of 
dissonance treatment: the bass notes. This analysis so bars the soprano from attacking the e'' in 
bar 10 and the g'' in bar 12 as dissonant non-harmonic tones, “appoggiaturas,” for in each case 
her note relates to the other sounding notes as a consonance. On the other hand, Schumann’s 
phrasing marks do not suggest independent chords on the downbeats of 10 and 12. These 
                                                
352 Ibid. 
353 Ibid., p. 182 n6. 
354 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), p. 50. 
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sonorities could also be explained as asynchronous chord changes, coming out of a 
performance practice of nineteenth-century piano virtuosos: hand asynchronization. Such an 
interpretation would yield a performance able to accumulate the greatest degree of tension 
over the longest distance, for it would bar the artificial sudden inflations and deflations, the 
noisy hyperventilation, that come inevitably with tonality imagined as dissonance and its 
treatment. It should not be forgotten that in 1840 Schumann praised Schubert’s Symphony in 
C Major for its “heavenly length,”355 which likens it to novels—“never-ending” as those by 
Jean Paul.356 By “never-ending” Schumann refers less to the literal volumes of a Jean Paul 
novel than to the possibility that “the reader may go on creating in the same vein 
afterwards.”357 These are not statements of Schumann’s personal taste or aesthetic, nor direct 
declarations of his intentions, nor the ideas that his music embodies, nor even the appearance 
of the spirit of the times. The first performance of Schubert’s “Great” Symphony in C Major, 
D944, in Leipzig in 1839 placed new binding norms on composers of the day. Schumann, 
composer and music critic working in Leipzig, and one of the best placed to articulate those 
norms in words, draws attention to “the brilliance and novelty of the instrumentation, the 
breadth and expanse of the form, the striking changes of mood, the whole new world into 
which we are transported,” all of which “may be confusing to the listener, like any initial view 
of the unfamiliar.”358 Schumann would have had to have set himself the task of accomplishing 
all these things in the form of the song cycle. But the long line is historically adequate today 
                                                
355 Robert Schumann, “Die C-Dur-Sinfonie von Franz Schubert,” in Robert Schumann in Eigenen Wort, 
zusammengestellt und herausgegeben von Willi Reich (Zurich: Manesse, 1967), pp. 390-399, here p. 396 as 
translated by Henry Pleasants from “Schubert’s Symphony in C,” in Schumann on Music: A Selection from the 
Writings, edited and annotated by Henry Pleasants (New York: Dover, 1988), pp. 163-168, here p. 165f.  
356 R. Schumann, “Die C-Dur-Sinfonie von Schubert,” p. 396 as translated, “Schubert’s Symphony in C,” p. 166. 
357 R. Schumann, “Die C-Dur-Sinfonie von Schubert,” p. 396 as translated, “Schubert’s Symphony in C,” p. 166. 
358 R. Schumann, “Die C-Dur-Sinfonie von Schubert,” p. 397f. as translated, “Schubert’s Symphony in C,” p. 
166. 
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because, after Schoenberg, all chords are free-standing and the split between chord qualities 
and functions has been driven to its extreme, so the traditional chord “meanings” should no 
longer interfere with the musical reproduction of the harmonic structures and root progression. 
The asynchrony of chord changes in the first lied of Dichterliebe would counsel against 
emphatic performance, suggesting rather that there is no absolute break, only a number of 
overlapping pieces forming a long progression that traverses the stanza and can continue 
beyond it. Analyzing bars 1-12 in Neapolitan applied to C-sharp major best serves the musical 
intention of continuing reach that finds rest in the D major tonic triad in bar 12. 
 It may be argued that an analysis in applied Neapolitan should at least bring out the 
“tonal” moments of this progression. Tonality, however, does not reduce to dominant 
relations, much less the dominant seventh chord: not even the major-minor seventh chords 
should be analyzed as secondary (i.e., tertiary) dominants, for this reading would impute rest 
to what follows the dominants: Mai, sprangen, Herzen, sangen, (ge-)standen. Relaxing at 
these junctures can only create enormous performance problems, as this contradicts the clear 
movement of continual ascent in the words, figuration, vocal line, and inner piano parts: the 
entire musical idea.  The reading of the major-minor seventh chords in bars 5, 7, 16 and 18 as 
dominant seventh chords actually causes the interpreter to mistake the effective dominant for 
the tonic.359 Hallmark contradicts himself on this point. On one hand, he quotes S. S. Prawer, 
who notes of Als alle Knospen sprangen360 that “the grammatical construction does not allow 
us to let our voice sink at the end of the second line: and this combines with the hesitant 
                                                
359 The real dominant is the A7 chord. R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), I, p. 2, m. 11, quarter note value 2. 
360 When all the buds exploded… 
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movement to induce in the reader a feeling of expectancy.”361 In his gloss on Prawer’s analysis 
of Heine’s text, Hallmark claims: “Schumann’s setting fits Heine’s lyric like a glove. The 
music produces musically the same effect as the poem.”362 On the other hand, Hallmark claims 
that, “because of the cadence, the singer’s voice does sink at the end of both lines, but the 
piano prelude denies finality to the cadence.”363 The singer’s voice sinking for reasons dictated 
by the harmony, against the sense of expectancy suggested by the text and natural speech-
rhythms, would suggest just the opposite: a poor setting of Heine’s lyric. Incoherence between 
the rhythm of the words and the shaping of the musical phrase will arise in performance if the 
song is analyzed in A major. Considering the affinity between the first Lied and the Blumen 
passage of the twelfth, the closest connection should be made between the sudden unclenching 
of the blossoms, and the opening or dawning of love; this link will be missed if the 
progression through Knospen sprangen… is interpreted as a cadence. Flower imagery not only 
figures prominently in many of the poems that Schumann chose to set, but also forms a special 
logic of its own in the cycle of those settings. If the progression is broken into two at the 
midpoint, then the return of flowers in the cycle becomes decorative, instead of logical, as it is, 
and the love consequently will appear as simply self-generated, against an indifferent floral 
backdrop. The tension should be carried through sprangen…da as this is the root of the 
dominant chord.  If Prawer is right to read the poem as a kind of chain of impulses that all lead 
from one to the next toward the final line, then an analysis in D-major-as-Neapolitan could 
express this idea clearly, avoiding the performance problem of a cadence in bars 7-8. 
                                                
361 S. S. Prawer, German Lyric Poetry: A Critical Analysis of Selected Poems from Klopstock to Rilke (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), p. 10f. 
362 Hallmark, The Genesis of Schumann’s “Dichterliebe”, p. 134. 
363 Ibid., p. 135. 
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 Schumann’s advanced, anti-organic practice lies in the contradiction between the three 
sharps seen in the score of “Im wunderschönen Monat Mai” and what its tonality sounds like 
to the ear: the Neapolitan region applied to C-sharp major.  
 This contradiction cannot be overstepped, but, given the universal delusional context 
of reification, it should be resolved on the side of performance.    
 The important words Herzen (heart) and die Liebe (the love) gain their interest not 
from arbitrary non-chord tones, to which the performers can add emphasis, but from a number 
of harmonic elements that work together: the most powerful harmonic movement of a half-
step up to the subdominant chord on Herzen; the number of alterations, liberated by the 
applied Neapolitan figuration, in this thirteenth chord that takes up the whole of bar 10; the 
placement of the root almost at the end of this figurated chord, following the norm of the style 
brisé of Renaissance lute-playing, the advanced music of the past, norm which this Romantic 
song reinstates as its idiosyncrasy; the high voicing of this root, which is in fact the highest-
sounding pitch of the chord; the minor g6 variant on Liebe, indicating an alternative reading of 
historical progress, this literal progress up the scale. The moment of greatest tension follows 
on the first three syllables of aufgegangen (unfolded). It is interesting to note that the 
crescendo starts over the chord change, but that it does not extend to the high point of the 
phrase. It leads in each case to a moment of chord asynchrony, where tonal clarity may be 
expected. The tension is truly dissolved on the last syllable of aufgegangen, the tonic chord in 
all voices. The ritardando marking on the second sixteenth note of the second beat of bar 
twelve (d'') suggests the beginning of a new progression, despite the slur indications. On this 
reading, the last three-quarters of the second beat would be a new chord, a G-sharp half-
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diminished chord, that, despite this harmonic departure, nonetheless shares a common tone 
(the d'') with the preceding D-major tonic triad.  
 Lied I bears a certain strophic structure, which nonetheless takes on the appearance of 
being through-composed. The autograph makes use of repeat signs, with the instruction that 
the second verse be written out in the engraving.364 In that case, an “Erstes Tempo” (a tempo) 
marking should be read into bar 16 so that the end tempo of the ritardando in bars 12-15 is not 
adopted for the second verse, which would make the piano interlude a smooth transition into a 
slower second verse. Strophic form is exactly what rules out a slower tempo for the second 
verse, for this is the treatment reserved for repeats in entertainment music. There it is used 
because what is being heard for the second time tends to be perceived as going faster, so, 
following this logic, in order for the two identical passages to sound subjectively the same, the 
repeated passage actually has to be played at a slower tempo. The whole idea of the repeat 
sign is to deny primacy to the listener’s subjective impressions, and in fact to break the power 
that illusions of perception have over the subject by revealing them to be appearances. For this 
reason, the repeat is not incidental to the sonata, which is truly the major form of the capitalist 
era. However, Schumann emphatically did not want repeat signs for the first Lied of 
Dichterliebe. He had nothing against repeat signs, but avoids them in his Lieder.365 This is 
consistent, for if a second verse is different from a first verse, then the setting of the second 
verse is not a repetition of the setting of the first verse, and the repeat signs are falsifying. In 
                                                
364 Hallmark, The Genesis of Schumann’s “Dichterliebe”, p. 36f. 
365 See, for example, Robert Schumann, Drei Romanzen, Opus 28, nach der Originalausgabe herausgegeben von 
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instrumental music, a section in which all the parts but one are repetitions of a previous 
section needs to be written out again, for this saves confusion in rehearsals; so one wonders 
why the practice should be different in vocal works. Schumann’s demand for the music for 
each verse to be written out, instead of the words of the first verse copied under those of the 
second, suggests that strophic form is not the same music repeated with different words, but 
rather, different words that actually change the same music. But where the words are the same, 
as they are at the beginning of each verse, the music, it seems, can be the same. The strophic 
form can best be realized, then, with the choice of a single tempo that can go with both verses, 
on one hand, and, on the other, with a placement of the beats within that tempo that varies 
according to the words. The piano interlude is very close to the prelude, but the differences 
indeed bring out a slightly different reading of that progression. In measure 13, as well as in 
the corresponding measure of the postlude, measure 24, Schumann amends the quarter notes 
in the bass of bar 2 to a dotted quarter note, a sixteenth note rest and a sixteenth note. This 
slight change draws attention to the last two sixteenth notes of the measure: a G-sharp 
diminished triad and a C-sharp triad, both missing their thirds, make the slightest of cadential 
gestures. When the pattern returns in bar 15, the tied quarter notes in the bass are not amended, 
but bar 13 re-contextualizes this low C-sharp as a tonic pedal. The (incomplete) C-sharp triad 
stands out more in bar 23 than the same sonority in measure 13, where it is grouped with the 
preceding two sixteenth notes. The Peters Edition, which the Bärenreiter Urtext follows, does 
not actually repeat. Unlike the autograph, these editions show different slur markings between 
interlude and postlude and delay the second ritardando by full measure.366 The late second 
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ritardando invites everything from the downbeat of bar 23 up to the ritardando to be read as a 
single chord, very closely modelled on the Herzen measure chord, —here a g-sharp half-
diminished chord with added ninth, eleventh, thirteenths and even a flattened fifteenth (G-
natural).367 The first two sixteenth notes of the ritardando, much like the Liebe/Sehnen chord, 
present a variant of what preceded: the chord based on g-sharp is re-told as a diminished triad. 
What happens next, unbelievably, is the C-sharp major triad. This slightly distorted cadence 
should spell the end of the applied Neapolitan key region and the return to C-sharp major. But 
immediately thereupon the D is struck again, plunging the Lied back into D-major-as-
Phrygian. The Lied has another chance to end on this idiosyncratic outline of a cadence on C-
sharp, but the ultimate measure does not follow its models in the prelude and interlude, 
measures 4 and 15. Instead, a completely different event occurs, which in a sense has been 
prepared by the substitution of the tied quarter note D of measures 1 and 3 by a sixteenth note 
rest and a Great B-natural sixteenth note in each of measures 12, 14, 23 and 25. Schumann 
draws particular attention to B in order to anticipate the final chord, which would be a 
complete C-sharp major triad, but for the very last note struck, the B-natural. The ritardando 
goes deeper into bar 26 than into the analogous bar, bar 15. In the autograph, the last bar is 
marked Adagio.368 In the context of a Langsam movement, this marking would be more of an 
expression marking than a tempo marking. The last bar can indeed be the slowest part, but the 
Adagio would indicate the slowness of ease or leisure, as opposed to that of grandeur or 
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tension. The idea would have been for the sonority C-sharp – E-sharp – G-sharp369 – B-natural 
to be understood as an independent unit distinct from the rest of the piece. This marking did 
not, however, transfer to the editions. Schumann recognized the expression of this moment, 
but ultimately did not direct attention to it.  
 If smooth transitions assure the integrity of the circle, and of the work, then the cyclic 
form of Dichterliebe is in fact imperilled at many points. The last bar of the first Lied is the 
striking example. In light of Heine’s imagery, this interruption of the strophic form established 
suggests an interruption in the cycle of nature, a break from inevitable, unstoppable 
recurrences. The new sonority that arrives instead of yet another strophe introduces the 
history-making of through-composition, which will be the choice method of setting all but one 
other song in the cycle. But despite the suggestion that the last bar breaks out of the peaceably 
ongoing state of first nature, Dichterliebe is not all about the Fall, original sin and man’s 
expulsion from the Garden of Eden, for this would be to read the buds and birds of May 
literally, as pieces of nature untouched by human activity. The final bar of Lied I is also an 
interruption in human-made conventions. It appears to be the interruption of the cadence, the 
withholding of the tonic that would dissolve the harmonic ambiguity of the song and solve all 
the antinomies of key, but it is indeed the tonic of the song and of the cycle, C-sharp. The 
close of Lied I is so a real contradiction in the blind activity of second nature, which turns 
actual passing moments, diverse instants, history, into single, frozen immediacies to be 
repeated indefinitely—in other words, into myth, into the illusion of what has always been. 
                                                
369 Please note again that the Bärenreiter Urtext Edition (2011) has an E-natural where other sources give G-
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The discontinuousness of the cycle lies not in itself, but between itself and the mass of 
accumulated, merely resting history.  
 In allowing discontinuity to enter his dialectical composition in such jarring fashion, in 
opening the apparently complete work to history, Schumann in fact goes quickly to the 
solution to the problem of dialectical indifferentiatedness that Adorno would articulate in his 
1932 address “The Idea of Nature-History”: 
History, as we have it, behaves as something thoroughly discontinuous insofar as it 
contains not only disparate facts and bodies of evidence, but also disparities of a 
structural sort…. Now this discontinuity, which, as I said, has no right to be forced into 
a structured totality, appears first of all as that between the mythic-archaic, natural 
material of history, of what was, and what surfaces in history, dialectically new, where 
“new” has yet to be spelled out.370 
 
Adorno’s aim in this short piece is “to sublate [aufzuheben] the usual antithesis of nature and 
history.”371 This antithesis has arisen, according to Adorno, because phenomenology has 
finally emptied being of subjective reason. If the huge question of the meaning of being arises, 
it is because subjective reason and the existing have become isolated from one another; 
otherwise, philosophers would always be drawing the meanings out of particular beings, and 
these meanings, depending on the more or less meaningful particulars, would be so diverse 
and would take up so much of the work of philosophical interpretation that it would make no 
sense to stop short and ask about the meaning of Being in totalizing fashion.372 Considering 
that the phenomenological-ontological concept of the existing excludes the subject, Adorno 
does not see how ‘meaning’ could be anything but what the subject puts into the existing, and, 
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therefore, does not see therefore how the existing could be anything but meaningless.373 
Draining the existing of all subjectivity from the outset, then engaging various large-scale 
efforts to reconcile reason and the real, the phenomenological-ontological school falls prey to 
Idealism. Rather than work on actual, historical objects, phenomenology just spins out catch-
all categories, such as historicity374 and “vitality [Lebendigkeit],”375 in which nothing can 
actually go,376 finally ending up with a definition of the whole that is not a system, but a 
“structured totality or unity.”377 In other words, phenomenology does not conceive the whole 
critically, as did Marx, as a system, whether “the monetary system” or “the gang-system” or 
the “credit system” or “the capitalist system of production”: as a real web of relations, spun 
out of a few abstract principles. The explanatory power of Being is not and cannot be verified 
against actual historical, existing things. The other large-scale effort engaged to reconcile 
reason and the real is the reduction of the meaning of being to possibility.378 Adorno considers 
the priority of possibility over actuality to be yet another throw-back to Idealism: “I see an 
Idealist moment in the supremacy of the realm of possibility, for, in the scope of the Critique 
of Pure Reason, the conflict of possibility and actuality [Wirklichkeit] is nothing other than 
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147. 
377 GS, vol. 1, p. 352, or prefer to my translation here “The Idea of Natural History,” p. 115. 
378 GS, vol. 1, p. 347, or translated, “The Idea of Natural History,” p. 112. 
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that of the categorial, subjective structure against the empirical manifold.”379 Adorno therefore 
sees it necessary “to criticize the segregation of actuality and possibility from the side of 
actuality.”380 The specific form that this criticism takes within Adorno’s address is a 
confrontation of the concept of symbol with the concept of allegory. The symbol is 
independent from the symbolically meant, whereas allegory was on a continuum with the 
allegorically meant, for “allegory is expression,” the face of the person undergoing death.381 
While the semiotic tradition stemming from Saussure authorizes sharp separations between 
beings and meanings, so between nature and history, right from the start, expression is a 
remnant of the past that contests the rule of arbitrary signs: what shows up as expression flows 
from what is undergone. Allegory is not free expression, but, to broaden Benjamin’s insight in 
connection with Proust, it results only from what had the power to age us. Allegory, in 
Adorno’s words, is not merely the ongoing process of suffering as it is etched on the human 
face, but emphatically the endpoint of this process in the facies hippocratica and worse: 
“Everything about history that is untimely, painful, unsuccessful from the start, shows itself in 
a face—nay, in a skull.”382 Adorno here seems to fall back on just the superstitious thinking of 
physiognomy and phrenology that Hegel attacks in the famous chapter of Phenomenology of 
Spirit. But Adorno is claiming that not all the readings of things are mere subjectively inserted 
meanings. A face or skull having passed through death gives some indication [Bedeutung], but 
only as the convergence of history and nature. Allegorical physiognomy and phrenology do 
not aim at deciphering the inner essence of the individual personality and spelling out its 
future and potential deeds. The Hippocratic face and the memento mori are there only when 
                                                
379 GS, vol. 1, p. 353, or prefer to my translation here “The Idea of Natural History,” p. 116. 
380 GS, vol. 1, p. 354, or prefer to my translation here “The Idea of Natural History,” p. 117. 
381 GS, vol. 1, p. 358 as translated, “Idea of Natural History,” p. 119. 
382 GS, vol. 1, p. 358, or prefer to my translation here “The Idea of Natural History,” p. 120. 
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the individual can do no more, so interpreting them cannot run afoul of the Hegelian criticism 
aimed at physiognomy and phrenology, which use meanings and intentions to predict the 
individual’s future deeds, hidden propensities and potential dangers, all of which become—at 
least in the mind of the diviner—far more important than anything actual, even the person 
herself. The Hippocratic face and the memento mori are ciphers because they are history and 
nature in one: each is a manifestation of the individual human history that was subjugated to 
massive forces of human nature, to the conditions of existence.383 If we want to know “how it 
is possible to understand, to interpret, this alienated, thingly, dead world,” then we should look 
to the allegory, which goes to the precise point of connection between what phenomenologists 
and ontologists have historically separated absolutely into meaning and being.384 At this point, 
however, Adorno is worried that he wins interpretation back for the reified world of merely 
existing things at the cost of history and nature becoming indistinguishable from one another. 
Worse, his account seems to recommend that we look at everything historical as allegorical, so 
that it will be able to signify.385 This is where Adorno calls on the concept of discontinuity, so 
as to avoid hypostatizing the continuity between expression and thing expressed that occurs in 
allegory. In particular, it is the discontinuity between myth and the new that shows where there 
was previously continuity of subjective reason and existing thing. For it is in being able to 
distinguish where there was subjective reason living in the thing that one knows what to 
interpret. This discontinuity is at the heart of illusion, which Adorno calls “second nature.”386 
Second nature is what at the same time seems totally meaningful and comprehensible in itself 
and is actually just loaded with subjectively inserted meanings. Illusion is not just unreality. 
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384 GS, vol. 1, p. 356, or prefer to my translation here “The Idea of Natural History,” p. 118. 
385 GS, vol. 1, p. 361, or translated, “The Idea of Natural History,” p. 122. 
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The mythic moment of illusion is its real moment, according to Adorno: it is just that we 
experience illusion as expression, which means that we cannot describe what illusion 
expresses independently from that expression.387 Interpretation that remains dependent on 
expression does not break the ban on investigating the future. This dependence of significance 
on its particular expression, this trace of archaic form of mimetic communication, contrasts 
with the new, which is the unreal moment of illusion, its promise of reconciliation, “where at 
the same time the world is most snugly walled off from all ‘meaning’ [»Sinn«].”388 The 
“appearing new [Neues Erscheinende]” has broken off from the past continuity of thing and 
mind.389 The appearing new is just a symbol, a symbolically inserted meaning. There we 
cannot interpret, for not only would that amount to prophecy, and so break the ban on 
investigating the future, but it would also be arbitrary. It would not at any rate attack the 
problem of alienation, which is the reason why we interpret in the first place.  
  The expression of Dichterliebe is illusion. The interruption of the strophic cycle of 
nature in Lied I of Dichterliebe, the new dissonant ending that seems to make musical history, 
seems also to present as expression, as flowing from the pain of the subject in natural longing. 
A great ambiguity in the final bar of the first Lied of Dichterliebe obtains: it is not clear 
whether its rupture is a rupture with cyclical nature or with music history. The confusion of 
nature with history marks at the same time an abrupt discontinuity between the past and the 
new—between the sonority so peculiar for a closing, between the idiosyncratic expression that 
seems to close in on itself, losing all sense, on the one hand, and, on the other, the so-called 
emancipation of the dissonance that it appears to herald. Schumann’s Dichterliebe is 
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advanced, but not because its dissonant ending appears to be a potential that will eventually 
reach fruition in the music of the Second Viennese School. Appearing possibility is the mere 
unreal aspect of aesthetic illusion. The continuity between Schumann and Schoenberg is 
illusory, because Dichterliebe would be satisfied with nothing less than the real reconciliation 
of nature and spirit. The other aspect of aesthetic illusion, its real, historical aspect, is what 
interpretation aims to save. Adequate interpretation breaks with second nature, with the 
reproduction of forgotten subjectivity. In opposition to both nature and history is memory, the 
rescue of the defeated longing and desire of the past, which have been carried close over the 
vastness of paltry, emptying time.  
 The applied Neapolitan key area continues to haunt the non-figurated second Lied, in 
A major. The slow undulation in the bass part of the first Lied, from C-sharp to D and back to 
C-sharp, is recapitulated by the voice part in the antecedent of the first period of the second 
Lied.390 The applied Phrygian key region can explain the series of seemingly disconcerting 
harmonic leaps accompanying the highpoint of the lines Und wenn du mich lieb hast, 
Kindchen, schenk’ ich dir die Blumen all’/ und vor deinem Fenster soll klingen das Lied der 
Nachtigall (here underlined).391 For the progression is not at all unusual if one imagines that 
the harmony enters the applied Neapolitan area on Blumen. The G-sharp half-diminished 
seventh chord on Blumen and the C-sharp major triad that follows it on all’, form an oddly 
proportioned cadence. The clear V – I relation between the roots of the chords conflicts with 
their qualities, the B-natural and D-natural included from D major having given the V chord a 
quality that a V chord would never naturally have. The I chord, however, indeed has a I 
                                                
390 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), II, p. 4, mm. 1-2, with pick-up.  
391 Ibid., II, p. 4, mm. 11-12. “And, darling, if you love me/I’ll give all my flowers to you;/And nightingales at 
your window/Shall sing the whole night through.” Heine, “Aus meinen Tränen spriessen,” trans. Aaron Kramer, 
in The Poetry of Heinrich Heine, p. 70. 
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quality. Unlike the C-sharp chord in the last measure of the first Lied, this C-sharp chord is a 
major triad, so provides what would have been the conventional ending of the first Lied. The 
chords repeat, almost coquettishly, then, as if out of nowhere, appears an A major-minor 
seventh chord, creating an impressive rupture in the harmonic fabric. Yet this instantaneous 
transition into D Major is not inexplicable: for a few measures, the applied Neapolitan key 
region maintains, whose tonics swap off as the cadential goal. As D is the second cadential 
goal, we have not yet left the double tonic key area to return to the key suggested by the first 
note of the cycle—the key of C-sharp major. 
  Arthur Komar remarks the importance of both C-sharp and D in the opening of the 
second Lied, but reads the A major triad (supporting C-sharp in the voice) in measure 1 as the 
point of arrival of the first Lied: “In view of the B left hanging at the end of Song 1, the initial 
C-sharp of Song 2 can be regarded as a local passing-note to the neighbour D, which resolves 
directly to C-sharp in the same measure.”392 The A major chord is consequently, according to 
Komar, the revelation of the true tonic of the first Lied and so the temporary dissolution of its 
tension.393 Komar so reads the D here as mainly subordinate to C-sharp, which is supported by 
the tonic of the first two Lieder. He nonetheless takes stock of Allen Forte’s controversy with 
Heinrich Schenker over which of the two notes—C-sharp or D—is subsidiary to the other in 
the second Lied: 
In spite of the marked harmonic difference between mm. 1 and 13, Schenker analyses 
the two passages alike—D is, in each case, a neighbour to the two adjacent C-sharps. 
Forte disagrees with Schenker, viewing the last phrase as essentially different from the 
first, and places the return of the headnote, C-sharp, in m. 14 after—rather than 
preceding—the tonicized D.394  
 
                                                
392 Komar, “The Music of Dichterliebe,” p. 72. 
393 “Song 1 is in the key of A but makes a point of hanging onto B.” Ibid., p. 70. 
394 Ibid., p. 72. 
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Komar attempts to resolve the controversy by arguing that the alternation of roles between C-
sharp and D has two functions: When D is subsidiary to C-sharp, it clarifies A major as the 
key of the first two Lieder. But when C-sharp is subsidiary to D, it is to serve as an 
intermediary between it and B,395 which will, over the course of the first five songs, gain 
greater harmonic support until it becomes the tonic.396 Komar’s attempt at reconciliation, 
however, subordinates the new, the prominent alternation between C-sharp and D in these first 
two Lieder, to what is already known and familiar: clear statements of monotonal keys. That 
either C-sharp or D can be subsidiary suggests that neither one truly is. The disunity amongst 
Schenker and his followers on just what constitutes the unity of the opening two songs of 
Dichterliebe suggests that Dichterliebe springs out of a fundamental disunity. If one grasps 
this disagreement as contradiction, one grasps the structural illusion that is the condition for 
the possibility of such an antinomy: the definition of music as fundamental unity, expressed in 
the establishment and confirmation of a single tonic.  
 For Schenker, however, it is completely out of the question that both the tonic and the 
flattened supertonic be admitted into the fundamental structure: “In the fundamental structure 
a Phrygian supertonic can no more exist than can a mixture.”397 
 In taking issue not with the concept of tonic, but rather with the exclusionary aspect of 
harmony, the relegation of certain notes to a subaltern category of “non-harmonic tones,” 
which needs no further comment, Schumann at his most advanced holds fast to the hope of 
transcendence (in modulation), yet determines transcendence not as the pure creation or break-
in of the utterly different, but as a different organization of what is already. The exception to 
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this is the E Minor passage in Lied IV, where the modulation coincides with an as-yet unheard 
tone, the D-sharp.398 It is no coincidence that the e minor passage accompanies the lines: Wenn 
ich mich lehn’ an deine Brust, Kommt’s über mich wie Himmelslust.399 With the breakthrough 
of D-sharp here, Schumann suggests that heavenly rapture would be something completely 
Other, a true transcendence from without. The reservation of the transcendence from without 
for paradise is confirmed by the return of e minor as the home key of the sixth Lied, in which 
the beloved takes on the allure of the sacred. It should be noted also that the enharmonic 
equivalent of D-sharp, E-flat, becomes the tonic of “Dein Angesicht,” the song that would 
have followed Lied IV, but which Schumann removed in the course of publication; in it, the 
voice reaches E-flat on the word Himmelslicht (heaven’s light).400 With the unequivocal 
destruction of the beloved’s heavenly aura in the seventh Lied, however, so too is destroyed 
all hope of a pure transcendence from without. From then, D-sharp/E-flat loses its special, 
inherently transcendent status to occur in completely profane contexts, such as Lied XI. 
Through the course of Dichterliebe, we are disabused of the idea of transcendence as the 
incursion of the qualitatively alien; every genuine moment of transcendence in Dichterliebe is 
a new arrangement of known elements, each bearing a history. 
{Section vii} Like Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, Schumann’s Dichterliebe owes 
its revolutionary form to inorganic transformation wrought under internal pressures, not to 
processes of natural growth. In the case of Proust, the logic of rupture and eruption literally 
followed the artistic forming impulse. The idea for the Recherche crystallized spontaneously 
in a single, perfect form, so suddenly that the crystal trapped inner tensions whose counter-
                                                
398 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), IV, p. 6, m. 9. 
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pressures eventually split it into two, but with the strange result that the split and not the 
crystal became the true generator of the work, work whose originating halves lie remote in 
time and space from one another. The idea for À la recherche du temps perdu, preserved as a 
sketch in one of the earliest notebooks that Proust kept for his novel, Cahier IV, is the 
discovery of the secret passage between two separate walking paths.401 In a matter of just a 
few pages, Proust passes from a description of the two walking paths to the discovery of their 
secret communication: “Car je sus alors que le côté de Meséglise et le côté de Garmantes 
n’étaient pas aussi inconciliables que je le croyais autrefois et qu’on pouvait parti [sic] du côté 
de Meséglise pour couper par Garmantes” (Because I knew then that the Meséglise way and 
the Garmantes way were not as irreconciliable as I had believed them to be before and that it 
was possible to set out on the Meséglise way to cut through Garmantes).402 According to 
Claudine Quémar, the presentation of the two seemingly irreconciliable “ways” and the 
“conclusion,” in which they are immediately reconciled, were composed together and form a 
running whole, in which the theme of the planned novel emerges.403 But Proust’s art was 
incapable of such immediate resolution. Thousands of pages separate the description of the 
two walks in the first volume of À la recherche du temps perdu, where the narrator assumes 
the paths to be completely isolated from one another,404 from the discovery of the hidden 
communication between them at the end of what becomes the sixth volume, Albertine 
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disparue.405 The work is literally generated out of the contradictions, the social contradictions, 
contained in the secret passage between the path of the aristocracy and the path of the 
bourgeoisie. Unlike the writing of À la recherche du temps perdu, the composition of 
Dichterliebe did not begin with an unsustainable resolution of real contradiction. Preliminary 
sketches indicate that the cleft was there in the earliest conception of the work: the first idea 
that Schumann conferred to his oblong manuscript pages consists of the vocal line for the first 
song, little different from the final copy, followed by the broken C-sharp dominant seventh 
chord, which he indicated for the ending: “Schluß.”406 Three sharps are given in the key 
signature. The vocal line does not yet contain its one accidental, the g-natural, although, the 
piano part shows a courtesy accidental: the b' is marked natural. The first idea noted for the 
work was indeed an unresolved dominant seventh at the end of a piece. With the composition 
of the piano part, however, the field of research expanded: the question was not only whether a 
piece of a work could end on a dissonance, but also whether the tonic could be recognized 
independently from the presence of dissonance and consonance, from the immediate 
perception of harsh and gentle sounds. Tonic in Schumann is what underlies experiences. 
Dissonances inevitably arise when there are two such subjects, which not only trade 
perspectives, but also hold together contradictions in their opposition, confront their 
experiences with one another and transform one another. Dichterliebe indeed begins and ends 
with the same pitch: C-sharp/D-flat. But when this pitch asserts itself in the final measure of 
the work with all dissonance removed, it does not represent real harmony and resolution, but 
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rather presents the loss of the other subject—final loneliness and the consolidation of self in an 
illusory unity. Schumann is the true dialectical composer: he does not throw out the notion of 
the tonic, but determines it by steps in a different way so that by the conclusion of 
Dichterliebe, it has passed into its opposite. The citation in the final postlude407 underlines the 
deep schism in the work: it returns not to the beginning of the cycle, which would complete 
the circle, but to the near-end of the twelfth Lied,408 missing by fourteen bars the F-sharp 
minor figurated chord on the first syllable of Blumen,409 which seems to be the missing half to 
the C-sharp dominant seventh chord with which the first Lied broke off.410 The reference to 
the postlude of the twelfth Lied in the final postlude thus makes a circlet that takes in the last 
four Lieder, which are characterized notably by the poet’s retreat into dreams, happy ones, as 
well as dark ones that offer no relief from the reality principle, and in which the lonely subject 
lives through a depth of horror that it cannot consciously bear, in waking life. The fourteen 
bars that go between these two worlds, the waking world and the dreaming world, do not serve 
to unite, but stage the moment of greatest disharmony between nature and spirit: the poet, 
reduced to silence, drained of his expressive gifts, sick of his flowers of rhetoric, stands 
accused by the rhetoric of flowers. As in Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, the secret, 
connecting passage between the two circuits is not a unifying moment, but a moment of 
disappointment, disillusionment and alienation, precisely because, through it, the 
contradictions of the work are revealed. The belated F-sharp minor triad on the first syllable of 
Blumen has the right quality, but the wrong function, so cannot still the poet’s longing that the 
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opening Lied left unfulfilled.411 Similarly, the F-sharp dominant seventh chord on sprechen 
has the right root, but the wrong quality.412 Yet these chords do name the object of the poet’s 
longing, which was in fact never named, but only assumed to be the beloved; however, they 
name it only as something displaced to unreality, as the late recognition of what has been lost. 
The true object of longing, revealed in music alone, never explicitly announced in the course 
of the lyric chosen for Dichterliebe, would have been speaking flowers, a truly unsocietized 
language, free of second nature. The misreading of poetic longing, the necessity to refer it to 
conventions and a determinate content, deforms the objects that would fulfil it, finally missing 
them. Occurring as these chords do, in the exceptional world of a brief applied Phrygian key 
area, in which qualities and functions have split apart, the estrangement of the object becomes 
readable as the result of reification, for where chord qualities are no guide to chord functions, 
the fetishism that reduces the former to the latter must give itself up. 
 And everything that transpires from the poet’s confession of longing to the moment in 
which the flowers speak, when it becomes clear what the true object of longing was, once it is 
missed, becomes readable as a history of that reification.  
 The poet’s confession of longing in the first Lied opens directly onto his suffering in 
the second. There the poet objectifies his tears and sighs in what will become a second 
nature—flowers and nightingale song, which seem natural, but are manmade transformations. 
At the same time, he entirely displaces his longing, it would seem, onto the one to whom he 
made the confession. A duplicate of what he also loves, the flowers, becomes an instrument, a 
means to winning the beloved.  
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 In Lied III, the poet withdraws his love of the spreading nature that served as a conduit 
to the beloved, the manifold of roses, lilies, dove, and sun, in exclusive favour of their pure 
synthesis, the beloved herself, who goes by the epic epithet of die Kleine, die Feine, die Reine, 
die Eine (the fine one, tiny one, refined one, only one).413  This Lied corresponds to the 
moment of fetishism, in which the unified thing, which is really made of suffering nature, is 
considered only in its purity, outside of time and work, as source rather than as product. Wild 
nature is thus subordinated to spirit. Yet she herself does turn out to be produced, something of 
a poetic creation in the industrial age: the constant off-beats cease only on the final Eine!—as 
if the song were an assembly line that produced units of love and the “Eine!” were simply the 
finished thing falling off the conveyor belt.  
 In Lied IV, the poet then suffers the consequences of the consolidation of his love into 
a single one. His bitter tears at her words ich liebe dich! (I love you!) might seem an odd 
reaction, yet he suffers from the requirement for unity that he himself has imposed on his love. 
On one hand, he perhaps already fears that his beloved’s love is not exclusive; on the other, 
her human speech becomes for him a painful reminder of his first wish: for nature to speak. 
Something different almost happened in the song’s genuinely enigmatic moment on the 
sprichst…ich chord: the prolonged delay, demanded by the ritardando, in resolving this 
diminished seventh lets the music hang in the vague realm in the middle of the many possible 
keys to which this symmetrical chord can resolve.414 The experience of love opened the 
possibility of a different ego, one that does not adopt the standpoint of a single key; however, 
in the resolution of the chord, the suffering ego of frozen drives becomes the basis of speech. 
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 The failure of speech to fulfil its promise seems to drive the poet to find an objective 
expression for the “wonderfully sweet hour” and the hopes it held: in Lied V, he thinks to 
capture the fleeting hour spent with the beloved by way of a lily, which would be able to play 
back her song off his soul like a quivering phonograph, reproducing the shudder of her kiss, 
shudder that Schumann renders mimetically with animated chords in thirty-second notes. 
Recorded music is an extreme example of a dislocated love of nature, and it is perhaps no 
coincidence that the horns of certain gramophones were indeed shaped like lily calyxes. The 
second nature of Schumann’s lily gramophone is curious in that it not only would record 
external events—songs—, which it would then repeat indefinitely, but would also register 
subjective impulses, the quivering or shuddering that Adorno characterizes as the living 
reaction to being captured, objectified, reified: the “life in the subject is nothing but what 
shudders, the reaction to the total spell that transcends the spell.”415 The poet’s demand for the 
lily’s song to shudder and waver like the beloved’s kiss expresses his wish for the process of 
objectification itself to open onto something beyond objectification: something new. 
 However, in Lied VI, the poet discovers that his beloved has already been captured in 
something old: in the painting of the Blessed Virgin Mary that he studies in Cologne 
Cathedral. This is an antiquated, constructed composition with a massive Baroque texture in 
flowing, horizontal sequences, which suggests a divine logic and order to the powerful current 
of the Rhine:  
 Im Rhein, im heilgen Strome, 
 Da spiegelt sich in den Well’n, 
 Mit seinem großen Dome 
 Das große heiligen Köln. 
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 (The Rhine, the holiest waters, 
 In whose mirror an image is shown: 
 The great cathedral spires 
 Of mighty, holy Cologne.)416 
 
Schumann’s use of the pedal point, now and then harmonically functionless, harkens back to a 
period when this mere gesture towards the upcoming tonic freed time up for restless key shifts 
and unresolved dissonances. This same throw-back to a less mediated era occurs at the end of 
the third Lied, where the tonic pedal begins right after the offbeats are suspended for a 
measure.417 The return of the off-beats with the addition of a tonic (and, later, dominant) pedal 
suggests something like non-contemporaneousness: the juxtaposition of assembly-line 
production and craft production, laid out as a bare contradiction, so that the persistence of the 
more ancient form can no longer serve to disguise capitalism’s radicality. The antiquated 
character of Lied VI, with its tonic pedal point that underlines in meines Lebens Wildnis (in 
my life’s wilderness) suggests that the solution to reification lies in a return to craft 
production.418 Yet the past is not only the place of hope, but also terror: an expedition into it 
reveals that reification is much older than suspected and even has its origins in cult. The poet’s 
love of the beloved is tied up with his aesthetic, even religious, experience of the painting in 
Cologne Cathedral. The beloved exactly resembles the transcendent icon that brings light to 
the poet’s Lebens Wildnis (life’s wilderness). She has become all the more rarefied through it: 
in Lied III, she was made up of heterogeneous, spreading nature, of roses, lilies, dove and sun, 
but here she contrasts with it utterly, allied with the painting that illuminated the wild, 
spreading nature of the poet’s life. The painted Virgin Mary is surrounded by floating flowers 
and angels, and it is perhaps the association with the painted flowers that inspired the poet to 
                                                
416 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), VI, p. 10, mm. 1-15, with pick-up, here with my translation. 
417 Ibid., III, p. 5, mm. 17-21. 
418 Ibid., VI, p. 10, mm. 21-25, with my translation.  
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love a likeness of the painting. There comes an intimation of the object of the poet’s longing: a 
half-diminished F-sharp seventh chord falls on the first syllable of Blumen,419 although 
rendered in a chiselled, texture utterly different from the delicate filigree textures that created 
an affinity between the Blumen chord in Lied XII to the close of Lied I. In Lied VI, it becomes 
doubtful whether the poet ever loved first nature, mediated as it is through its representation in 
art. His love for the beloved flows out of his love of nature or of art, yet it is no less powerful 
for that. In the time of reification, however, he is made to pay the price for his love of a living 
human being, who just happens to carry associations of something that could be beyond the 
reified world. The transcendent moment that in Der Freischütz would have put the individual 
into communication with the objective forces causing his suffering, helping him to surmount 
them and to win the beloved, in Dichterliebe only further isolates the individual and intensifies 
his pain. The poet’s revelation that the beloved resembles a holy object enshrined in the 
Cologne Cathedral should constitute a super-social moment: in this space beyond existing 
society, the poet should be able to call forth a society in which he has his heart’s desire. Yet, in 
the secret art-logic of Dichterliebe, the discovery of the beloved’s resemblance to the painting 
in the Cathedral seems to drive her from him for good. Here an important difference between 
the sequence of songs in Dichterliebe and the sequence of poems in Lyrisches Intermezzo has 
consequences for the interpretation. Schumann did not set the poem in which the beloved is 
revealed to be the intended of someone else, “Wie die Wellenschaumgeborene.”420 He only 
implies the content of this poem musically, foreshadowing the revelation of the beloved’s 
                                                
419 Ibid., VI, p. 11, m. 32 (flowers). 
420 Heine, Lyrisches Intermezzo, XVII, p. 125. 
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unfaithfulness by way of the cuckoo calls, in the second Lied.421 By not setting “Wie die 
Wellenschaumgeborene,” Schumann leaves out a single, obvious explanation for the poet’s 
misery—the bare fact that he is a jilted lover. Lied VII is not the rupture itself, but the poet’s 
reaction to it: the lacuna demands a reconstruction of the actual event. In one of the last 
creative decisions that he took on Dichterliebe, the cutting of four songs from the original 20-
song version of the cycle during the publication process,422 Schumann seemed to insist on both 
the brevity of the love and the strange suddenness of the loss. Originally, four songs separated 
the settings of “Wenn ich in deine Augen seh’…” and “Ich grolle nicht….” In Schumann’s 
definitive, 16-song version, between reciprocal yet troubling love and the irrevocable loss of 
love there are only two songs—the settings of “Ich will meine Seele tauchen…” and “Im 
Rhein, im heiligen Strome…”—songs in which the poet seeks to reproduce the physically 
absent beloved, to keep her only as aesthetic language—as a song, then as a painting. With the 
excision of “Dein Angesicht” and “Lehn’ deine Wang’ an meine Wang’,” so disappears the 
clear association of extremely passionate love with death that could have served as an 
explanation both for the poet’s need to withdraw into the aesthetic realm and for the beloved 
to seek love in its stable, socially-recognized form, marriage. In the published version, the 
beloved’s words and the poet’s tears would appear to conclude their love, rather than 
announce it and begin its transformation into dark, macabre passion, as happens in the version 
of the cycle that Schumann offered for publication. The beloved’s words, met with such grief, 
thus take on a particular importance: her declaration, not the morbid intensity of passion, 
seems to move the poet to seek solitary aesthetic experiences, as if he preferred a likeness of 
                                                
421 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe, II, p. 4, mm. 3-4; mm. 7-8 and mm. 15-17—the falling third motif starting on the 
sixteenth note each time.  
422 Hallmark, The Genesis of Schumann’s “Dichterliebe”, p. 125. 
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her to her, his own words to hers, his poems to her declarative statement that made him cry 
bitterly. But if the poet does indeed decide to withdraw into the aesthetic realm, it cannot be 
thereby assumed that he lays all his hopes in a totally successful sublimation of a problematic 
desire for a fickle woman. The discovery of the likeness of the beloved to the painting in 
Cologne Cathedral brings with it a sense of awe or fear, owing to the nested structure of 
Heine’s poem, in which the Rhine contains a reflection of all of Cologne, which includes the 
Cathedral, which holds the painting. Saved to the end, the beloved’s likeness in the painting, 
becomes like the last, other, thing within nesting boxes, the last thing that cannot contain any 
other thing, so what should be the profoundest truth and the end of the secret and mystery. The 
artistic work of objectification, which seemed to be a way out of love’s pain, is revealed to be 
at the origin of artistic love, which lends this love something inescapable. In seeking to 
preserve his experiences in something other, the lily, the poet has not made a substitute for his 
love; he has merely returned his love to its source—to resemblance in repetition.  
 To his horror, the poet still loves, as can be drawn from his reaction to the definitive 
loss of the beloved in Lied VII. But if he glimpsed something of a logic in his love in Lied VI, 
he does not go on to draw the conclusion that a social logic is at work. The poet does not trace 
the definitive loss of the beloved to anything other than to her cruelty: thus the poet lays the 
entire blame for his private suffering on this other private individual. Yet the appearance of a 
purely personal pain is a true sign of the inadequacy between the subject and social 
objectivity, inadequacy which is really something objective. The poet would not suffer if he 
did not find himself at odds with the alienated world, if his eye knew no distance and if he did 
not expect his gaze to be returned. The catastrophe is able to happen at all because the poet 
remains a believer in aura. What the poet took to be the beloved’s aura was not any intrinsic 
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quality, but simply the memory of things in his experiences of art and nature, the flowers with 
which she had become randomly associated in an encounter with the sacred. The association 
of the beloved with the sacred, which, in Der Freischütz is the seal of Agathe’s goodness and 
fidelity and the proof that Max’s love for her is grounded in the real, in Dichterliebe is a 
guarantee of nothing. If, as Benjamin advances, the dreaming world of capitalist 
phantasmagoria is characterized by resemblances, then any resemblance that a human being 
bears, whether to a dove or to a portrait, is not likely to be traced, but will continue to operate 
on the subconscious level. There can be no waking human relations when operating 
resemblances are automatically screened out, just part of the annoying repetitive character of 
life under mass production. The poet can place resemblances, but, it would seem, too late. The 
poet’s consciousness of what precise association animates his love does not actually release 
him from his misery. For at the root of this misery lie the objective processes of reification, 
which he cannot accuse, even if he knows them well, for he is equally caught up in them. 
Dichterliebe does not end with the loss of the beloved in Lied VII because the problematic it 
sets out is not merely that of interpersonal relations, but rather something closer to that of the 
possibility of immediacy for the artist, who is determined to objectify, but must struggle 
against the objectified. It is never a question for the poet of how to win back the beloved, but it 
may be rather a question of how to render or imitate the beloved, whose beauty has already 
been the subject of another artwork. She is claimed just as much by another man as by the 
weight of the past, suggested by the grand Baroque style of Lied VI. The delicate, intimate 
composition in much of the cycle indeed arises from the urge to rescue all love from its 
traditions and its legacy, from the ideas about it prevalent in “die alten, bösen Lieder” (the 
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horrid, olden Lieder).423 Yet the past persists in distorted, alien, mythological forms, as 
suggested in Lied VII by the dream in which the poet sees a serpent feeding on his beloved’s 
heart. Schumann sets this hideous tableau to a backward cycle through the circle of fifths in 
the bass that does not serve to orient the listener in a key, the keys having anticipated on the 
bass voices (in parallel octaves) so that the chords built on E and A are in D minor, the next 
fifth down, while the following chords, built on D and G, are in C minor, the fifth down from 
G.424 The C chord follows belatedly, but not in the mode anticipated.425 This splitting of 
dominant relations from keys is the mark of the alienation that the text here would have us 
believe does not exist.  
 In Lied VIII, hints of alienation enter the text. The poet realizes that the flowers, in 
which he deposited his feelings, are senseless to them. The lily that, in Lied V, was supposed 
to absorb and make retrievable the most wonderful hour of the poet’s life, fails him in VIII, 
when he seeks in flowers, nightingales and stars some recognition of what he has suffered. He 
does not find the knowledge, compassion and consolation that life returning to life should 
offer, the love that he himself put into the object. Little flowers, nightingales and stars do not 
register the poet’s feelings in a dynamic fashion. They claim innocence as to the complete 
breakdown in the human relations fundamental to their production, in the true manner of 
commodities, which mask human antagonisms that have replaced the collective work of love: 
Sie alle können ’s nicht wissen, 
Nur Eine kennt meinen Schmerz; 
Sie hat ja selbst zerrissen, 
Zerrissen mir das Herz. 
 
                                                
423 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), XVI, p. 34, mm. 4-5, with pick-up, text; with my translation. See also 
Heine, Lyrisches Intermezzo, LXVI, p. 170. 
424 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), VII, p. 13, mm. 28-29. 
425 Ibid., VII, p. 13, m. 30. 
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(Not one of them could know it, 
One only knows my smart: 
The one herself who gave it, 
The one who broke my heart.) 426 
 
Here Heine, writing when the much junior Marx was still a child, recognizably describes 
alienated labour as if from the perspective of the factory worker who personalizes social 
processes. This poem differs from those in which Heine points out the conventional, 
mindlessly social background to the jilted lover’s agony, such as “Ein Jüngling liebt ein 
Mädchen.” Here he captures the subjective experience of the process of alienation without 
naming it. Schumann’s sequence, in which “Und wüßten’s die Blumen, die kleinen” follows 
immediately “Ich grolle nicht….” To the poet of Dichterliebe, there is no bourgeoisie, only the 
woman who wants to make a good marriage. Furthermore, by going off to be bourgeois 
(“Diamantenpracht”—!),427 she is supposed to be fully aware of the suffering she is causing 
the fashioner of songs. The speaker attributes a great deal of self-consciousness, agency and 
intentionality to the oppressor. This attribution is itself an aspect of capitalism, which 
flourishes as long as its ills are presumed to result from the isolated, immoral actions of 
wicked individuals. Yet the jilted lover of Dichterliebe does not symbolize the proletariat, but, 
emphatically poet, is really a worker active in a domain of not yet thoroughly capitalized 
work: the arts. The other member of his working collective has indeed broken away to go after 
diamonds. In Schumann’s songs, love is haunted by the memory trace of the historical trauma 
that occurred with the shift to capitalism, the real heartbreak. Yet the poet lives through this 
loss without full, waking consciousness that he is indeed experiencing the historical desertion 
of the working class by the bourgeoisie. Opening the path for Marx, Heine’s text formulates 
                                                
426 Heine, Lyrisches Intermezzo, XXII, p. 128, with my translation. 
427 diamond splendour 
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the multiple alienation that comes with the rise of the bourgeoisie: alienation of each worker 
from himself or herself; alienation of each worker from other workers; alienation of each 
worker from each thing produced. The one who is left behind to work with the material of 
nature finds particular objects of labour just as alien as the universality that conditions them: 
 …the worker is related to the product of his labour as to an alien object. For on this 
premise it is clear that the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful becomes 
the alien world of objects which he creates over and against himself, the poorer he 
himself—his inner world—becomes, the less belongs to him as his own. It is the same 
in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself. The worker 
puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object. 
Hence, the greater this activity, the more the worker lacks objects. Whatever the 
product of his labour is, he is not. Therefore the greater this product, the less is he 
himself. The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour 
becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, independently, 
as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him. It 
means that the life that he has conferred on the object confronts him as something 
hostile and alien.428 
 
Marx’s manuscripts of 1844 indeed belong to his Paris period, which was also marked by his 
friendship with Heine, with whom he was at times in daily contact: the two met in December 
1843.429 Whatever views Heine may have expressed, whatever the level of his political 
consciousness and activity, however much he was committed or not committed to 
communism,430 the poet’s extremely close work with language and keen understanding of 
social (and aesthetic) illusion brought him to register the alienation of the products of labour, 
albeit in a veiled form, years before Marx. Schumann’s final choice and setting of 16 poems of 
the Lyrisches Intermezzo are extremely revelatory of such alienation as social, particularly in 
the expansion of the harmony.  
                                                
428 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected 
Works, 50 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1975-2004), vol. 3, pp. 229-346, here p. 272. 
429 Schmidt, “Heine und Marx,” p. 143. 
430 Ibid., p. 145 and p. 150. 
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 The split between individual and society reaches acute expression, both in Heine’s text 
and in Schumann’s setting, in Lied IX of the cycle. The ninth Lied dramatizes the marriage of 
the beloved to the other man, event foreshadowed in the second Lied by the cuckoo calls, 
where the text calls for nightingale choruses,431 and in the fourth Lied by the poet’s tears.432 
The poet narrates the celebration with absurd, almost random voice-leading, consecutive leaps 
up of fourths and minor thirds, disconnected from the piano’s whirring of running sixteenths, 
from the waltz that plays on as if in the background, louder as he enters the dance hall, softer 
as his attention is caught by the sight of his beloved dancing, louder as he is overcome by 
events, softer as his beloved disappears. The discrepancies between the dynamic level of the 
voice and that of the piano suggest that the subject is somehow unequal to the external reality, 
which he can observe but in which he cannot intervene.433  
 In Lied X comes the poet’s melancholy rumination, high in the forest, in phrases 
tracing deep valleys, on just what it might inflict on him to hear his beloved’s song again. The 
repetition of song for which he longed in Lied V here becomes something fatal to him. So he 
arrives at a complete disillusionment not only over the claims of song, but also over the real 
return of what has been.434 The dissonant sf acciaccatura chord of an almost Bergian 
                                                
431 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), II, p. 4, m. 7, descending major third in pf., r.h., and its repetition in m. 8. 
The cuckoo motif also occurs in measures 3-4 and measures 15-17. Cf. Gustav Mahler, Symphonie No. 1, 2nd ed. 
(Vienna: Universal Edition, 1906), I, p. 5f., mm. 6-4 before [2], cl. 1, International Music Score Library Project, 
Petrucci Music Library, http://petrucci.mus.auth.gr/imglnks/usimg/d/dd/IMSLP17070-Mahler-Symph1fs.pdf. The 
fact that the interval of a perfect fourth illustrates the cuckoo call in Mahler’s First Symphony does not invalidate 
my claim that an interval a major third illustrates the cuckoo call in Schumann’s Dichterliebe. Common cuckoos 
are not equally tempered—nor are Mahler’s, in fact.    
432 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), IV, p. 7, m. 15. 
433 Ibid., IX, p. 17, mm. 5-7, where the voice is marked mf and the piano is marked p, and p. 18, mm. 25-31 and 
p. 19, mm. 59-65, where the voice is marked p and the piano f. 
434 As Eric Sams has remarked, the beloved’s “song” recurs in the right hand of the piano (stemmed up) in 
syncopated entries, which, out of joint with time, strongly suggest involontary memories breaking in on the 
“distraught mind.” Eric Sams, The Songs of Robert Schumann, foreword by Gerald Moore, revised and enlarged 
3rd edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p. 117. Sams also alludes to a musical citation in bars 
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sonority435 in the cadenza of the postlude, cadential six-four chord gaining unusual dissonance 
not only from a lower neighbour tone in the melody but especially from the persistence of the 
augmented sixth of the bar previous, very dissonance that the cadential six-four was supposed 
to resolve, so, extraordinary dissonance, blatantly contradicts the poet’s affirmation in the text 
that his cathartic release of tears in the forest heights have cured him of love’s pain.436  
 Thereafter the poet descends, in Lied XI, into cynicism at the way of the world. 
 Through each of these progressive displacements of the object, forced by the pursuit of 
fulfilment itself, the poet is alienated from the initial experience of natural beauty of May, 
removed and again removed from nature, so that when his wish for speaking nature is 
fulfilled, in Lied XII, it is completely other, and he does not recognize it:  
 Am leuchtenden Sommermorgen 
 Geh’ ich im Garten herum. 
 Es flüstern und sprechen die Blumen, 
 Ich aber wandle stumm. 
 
 Es flüstern und sprechen die Blumen 
 Und shau’n mitleidig mich an: 
 Sei unsrer Schwester nicht böse, 
 Du trauriger blasser Mann! 
 
 
 This radiant morning of summer 
 I walk in the flowering yard; 
 The blossoms gossip and whisper, 
 I walk with never a word. 
 
 The blossoms gossip and whisper 
 And watch me regretful and sad: 
 “Do not be cross with our sister, 
 You pallid, sorrowing lad!”437 
                                                                                                                                                    
24-25, without however identifying it: “it occurs in the Abegg variations, Papillons, Carnaval, and elsewhere, in 
contexts suggesting the idea of remembered music” (ibid., p. 117 n3).   
435 See Janet Schmalfeldt, “Berg’s Path to Atonality: The Piano Sonata, Op. 1,” in Alban Berg: Historical and 
Analytical Perspectives, ed. David Gable and Robert P. Morgan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 79-109, 
esp. pp. 92-94. 
436 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), X, p. 21, m. 24. 
437 Heine, Songs of Love and Grief, p. 33. 
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The moment of high emotion in Schumann’s setting transpires not at Sei unsrer Schwester 
nicht böse, du trauriger blasser Mann,438 point at which the flowers say something, but from 
the entry into the Phrygian key area,439 continuing in the movement from abstractly but 
sensuously speaking flowers to silent man. The compelling singularity of this moment, 
compared to the more conventional progression to which Schumann set the flowers’ actual 
discourse, casts suspicion on their self-righteous moralizing and derision. They confirm 
themselves to be flowers of the garden variety: a second nature, not the wild speaking first 
nature that the poet seeks. The ich of ich aber wandle stumm is completely alienated from the 
flowers that were the actual goal of the original longing; the self is then left to contend with 
nature that it has distorted through speech. Second nature, of which the poet is a part, 
condemns him to silence; yet silence was what beautiful nature asked of him. This is the self-
reflexive moment of the cycle, and its dramatic reversal. But once the artwork raises the 
possibility of the paradox of a real realization that arises out of the realm of illusion, art, it 
heightens its aesthetic illusion. Over the course of the last four songs, the poet withdraws more 
deeply into dreams, rather than changing his comportment towards the flowers, which have 
turned on him. Whatever the poet experienced in the garden cannot convert to a truth that he 
can then bring to bear on his life.  
 Schumann shows his fidelity to illusion, against the affirmative vocation of art as a 
dispenser of morals, truths and practical knowledge, by closing his cycle with a profusion of 
dreams.  
                                                
438 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), XII, p. 25, mm. 17-20. 
439 Ibid., XII, p. 24, m. 8, on sprechen (speak). 
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 The first of these, in Lied XIII, is the darkest moment of the cycle. The song speaks to 
a reality principle so powerful and far-reaching that it has found its way even into dream, 
revoking every last consolation. The materials are sparse in the extreme. The opening a 
cappella vocal line, Ich hab’ im Traum geweinet (In a dream I was weeping),440 follows the 
same contour as the first vocal phrase of Lied II, Aus meinen Tränen sprießen (Out of my 
teardrops burgeon).441 Yet this time no flowers will come from the dreamer’s tears, which is in 
a sense a hopeful sign, a promise of something different. Without harmonic supports, the 
opening vocal statement of Lied XIII is analyzable both in E-flat minor and in the Phrygian 
mode transposed down a semi-tone, so, starting on the note E-flat rather than E. The 
particularity of the Phrygian mode, which makes it so recognizable, is that each of its 
tetrachords begins with a semitone. This is why the Neapolitan sixth is also called “the 
Phrygian”: it is built on the second scale degree as it would appear in the Phrygian mode, a 
half-step up rather than a whole step up from the first scale degree. The mode of the opening 
statement of Lied XIII is so also a veiled reference to the Phrygian key region of Lied I. The 
Phrygian here, however, lacks its beloved co-tonic. The Phrygian is the mode of song in the 
Dionysian rites, of songs of mourning for the dismembered self. But by transposing the mode 
down a semi-tone, Schumann only references the wild emotion that Aristotle and Plato claim 
that it spontaneously unleashes. Furthermore, the opening melody lies as much within 
modality as within tonality. The a cappella song is then punctuated by the ominously 
conclusive I – V7  – i6,4– V7 – i progression, a play on the basic unit of harmony, which 
appears here as a pattern of hard reality.442 The last two syllables of geweinet (wept) suggest 
                                                
440 Ibid., XIII, p. 26, mm. 1-2, with pick-up (with  my translation). 
441 Ibid., II, p. 4, mm. 1-2, with pick-up (with my translation).  
442 Ibid., XIII, p. 26, mm. 3-4. 
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sighing; the piano counters with a deaf perfect authentic cadence, in minor. The Phrygian 
mode continues into the second line,443 which is met with another tonal statement.444 The first 
moment of awakening is dramatized in the piano part by an augmented triad,445 which recalls 
the incomplete augmented chord at the opening of the cycle.446 But the waking world does not 
provide any solace: the piano confirms the dreamer’s deceived hopes with its own falling 
rejoinder to his tears, suggesting that the disappointed hope has sunk in and that the loss is 
finally real, and realized as such. Yet “reality” looks to be nothing more than the coercive 
reality principle, to judge by the threatening character of the piano’s confirmations. Yet, from 
another angle, the tears in which the dreamer awakes suggest that something of the nightly 
dark production of the unconscious may be retained and brought safely into conscious, waking 
existence. This too seems to be a hopeful sign, yet it is none other than the Cartesian model of 
truth: the restriction of truth to what could be true whether produced in a waking state or in a 
dreaming state, to what could be true even if the producer be utterly mad.447 For tears 
produced by dreams turn out to be tears no less in the waking state. Spanning dreaming and 
waking, truth may be completely distilled and abstracted from the thinking (or dreaming, 
producing) subject, without heed to feelings or dispositions. Truth so becomes a kind of 
residue of illusion. Yet such residues do not necessarily enable the subject in Lied XIII to lead 
a conscious, waking existence. The last dream is an escape into beautiful, warm D-flat major, 
                                                
443 Ibid., XIII, p. 26, mm. 5-6, with pick-up, v.  
444 Ibid., XIII, p. 26, mm. 6-7, with pick-up, pf. 
445 Ibid., XIII, p. 26, m. 8, pf. 
446 Ibid., I, p. 2, m. 1, first two sixteenth notes, pf., l.h. 
447 Dirk Setton, “It Is Possible, but Not Now” (paper presented at the Second Potentiality and Normativity 
Workshop, Exzellenzcluster “The Formation of Normative Orders” (in collaboration with the Department of 
Philosophy at the Université de Montréal), Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, June 8, 2012). Reading 
Paula’s line “I am mad” from George Cukor’s 1944 film Gaslight as an allegory of the divided cogito, Setton 
derives “the irony in the unity of the ‘I think’.” 
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dramatizing a sudden turn:  mir träumte, du wärst mir noch gut (I dreamed you still were good 
to me).448 The moment of awakening, dramatized on auf with an ambiguous, dissonant 
sonority, lies on the frontier of the two key areas, D-flat major and A-flat minor.449 In D-flat 
major, the chord could be an apparent Neapolitan seventh chord in first inversion. An apparent 
Neapolitan seventh is really a IV chord that coincides with a passing supertonic—which here 
would be the E-double-flat—that appears to be the root of a seventh chord built on the 
Neapolitan. If again the E-double-flat is considered to be a passing tone, the chord could be 
VII in natural A-flat minor. Yet, lacking thirds, spare and dissonant, the chord produces a 
striking, unusual sonority, with a slight harmonic halation. The unusual chord promises that 
this awakening will be different; but no, the scene repeats itself: the flood of tears flows 
unceasingly. The musical advance that gives to hope that the world may be released from 
socially structured illusion only produces a cycling around the circle of fifths, then, on Tränen 
(tears) where the circle reverses, regression. In this way, D-flat major becomes the key of 
dreams of something better, that was continuing, dreams from which we await the awakening, 
as Benjamin writes, to which all dreams point. The dreams in Lied XIII are conversions of the 
strongest experiences, whether wonderful or horrifying, into a form that de-realizes them so 
that they may be lived. Meanwhile, it seems that the repressed has been driven so far 
underground as to be virtually irretrievable, lost for interpretation: a bar of silence follows. 
The “reality principle” pattern and the perfect authentic cadence have the last words.    
 While the tears in Lied XIII suggest that there is a term that can go between dreaming 
and waking, less is transferred from dreams to waking in Lied XIV and almost nothing at all in 
Lied XV. The final Lied calls upon the listener to bury the loathsome dreams altogether, so 
                                                
448 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), XIII, p. 27, mm. 26-28, starting at the ritardando (with my translation). 
449 Ibid., XIII, p. 27, m. 29. 
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that they may not be retrieved. The last songs slowly close themselves off from remembering, 
Eingedenken, retreating from the awakening to which all dreams point.  
 The dreamer in Lied XIV remembers most of his dreams of his beloved, but he wakes 
finding himself bereft of the spray of cypresses that she gave him and the soft word that she 
spoke to him. Although Heine never reveals the beloved’s Wort (word),450 Schumann links it 
to Zypressen (cypresses)451 by way of a similar setting: an F-sharp major dominant chord in 
root position.452 Schumann reads the beloved’s speech as consistent with the cypress boughs, 
which traditionally are given to those in mourning. According to the conventional “meaning” 
of cypresses in the language of flowers, then, the beloved would offer consolation to the poet 
in mourning. The cypress chord conventionally offers consolation in another way: as an F-
sharp major triad, it can be the missing half of the cadence of Lied I, as a Picardy third. 
However, in the B major context of Lied XIV, the F-sharp major triad is the dominant. This 
“means” that, in conventional terms, what would have been fulfilment and rest in May is 
ongoing longing now when it finally appears, too late, in a dream. But this is not how 
Schumann’s setting actually remembers the dreamed speech. Just as the actual content of the 
word escapes the awakened dreamer, it escapes the music: the music gives the forgotten Wort 
as I in root position,453 when it was V.454 Musical memory substitutes fulfilment for a 
consolation that does not give closure. Yet according to convention, the music is called upon 
to produce the actual Wort chord at the end: at the cadence. The six-four cadence is touched 
                                                
450 Ibid., XIV, p. 29, m. 30, with my translation. 
451 Ibid., XIV, p. 29, m. 34, with my translation. 
452 The E-natural in measure 30 (ibid., XIV, p. 29) may be analyzed as a passing tone or as an added seventh. 
453 Ibid., XIV, p. 29, m. 37. 
454 Ibid., XIV, p. 29, m. 30. 
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midway through vergessen (forgotten).455 There is an uncomfortable pause, then the startled 
resolution of the suspension and dashed-off tonic. The botched cadence is an unsuccessful 
repression. The music cannot fully accept and legitimize its own substitutions, its 
manipulation of memory, its transformation of the traditional expression of longing (V) into its 
traditional form of fulfilment (I). As it is, the conventional expression of fulfilment changes its 
function utterly: it becomes revisionism.  
 Lied XV almost celebrates the return of repressive capacities. The images are magical, 
fantastically merry, but a closer reading reveals that Heine draws from the lexical field of “Da 
ist ein Flöten und Geigen.” The poet must have in fact dreamed of his beloved’s wedding, yet 
this seems entirely hidden from his awareness. The same words now appear washed of their 
traumatic associations. Not wedding trumpets,456 but simple birds457 schmettern d(a)rein (ring 
out). What beams mit bräutlichem Gesicht (with the mien of a bride) is not his beloved who 
dances in her wedding roundelay,458 but rather flowers blooming in twilight—metaphorical 
beaming brides.459 The “ring” or Reigen is no longer the wedding roundelay,460 but paths 
traced by mere mist rising from the ground.461 In his setting, Schumann follows Heine in 
reinscribing the traumatic event as a happy one, exchanging dissonance for consonance and 
major for minor, in a song made almost entirely of major chords. When Reigen re-appears in 
Lied XV, Schumann sets it to a jolly tonic triad in the home key, rather than to the diminished 
                                                
455 Ibid., XIV, p. 29, m. 37, with my translation. 
456 Ibid., IX, p. 17, mm 8-15. 
457 Ibid., XV, p. 30, mm. 35-36. 
458 Ibid., IX, p. 17f., mm. 20-27, with my translation. 
459 Ibid., XV, p. 30, mm. 23-24. 
460 Ibid., IX, p. 17, mm. 22-24. 
461 Ibid., XV, p. 31, m. 46. 
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seventh chord that attacks it in Lied IX.462 The piano introduction of Lied XV briefly 
references the piano postlude of IX, but the atmosphere is utterly changed. The tugging 
between the tonic and subdominant chords at the beginning of Lied XV463 recalls wild 
glancing back and forth between major tonic and minor subdominant at the end of Lied IX.464 
While the progression in Lied IX represents a dramatic case of mixture (tonic and 
subdominant should both be minor or both be major), in XV, both I and IV are affirmatively 
major. Lied XV negates the equivocal use of minor and major in Lied IX at a second juncture: 
while the trumpets “blare out” the emblematic IV – V – I progression in F major, jarring effect 
in the minor context,465 the birds in Lied XV “blare out” an expansion of a V chord and then 
move to the tonic to make the cadence of the brief, escalating modulation to the dominant, so 
remaining in major.466 Schumann also repeats elements of the harmony of Lied IX while 
changing their character. The V7/V chord and resolution immediately preceding the singer’s 
entry in Lied XV467 refer to the last chords of each section in Lied IX, where they move with 
fury and impulsion to complete the loop of the infernal strophic form.468 While, in Lied IX, 
they have an emphatic effect, in Lied XV, this secondary dominant is coquettish. The IV – V – 
I emblem, referring to the trumpet emblem, dominates the most affirmative passage of the 
cycle:469 the setting of the lines marked Mit innigster Empfindung (with most inward feeling): 
 Ach, könnt’ ich dorthin kommen, 
 Und dort mein Herz erfreu’n, 
                                                
462 Ibid., IX, p. 17, m. 23. 
463 Ibid., XV, p. 30, from the fourth eighth note value of m. 1 to the third eighth note value of m. 3. 
464 Ibid., IX, p. 19, mm. 76-79. 
465 Ibid., IX, p. 17, mm. 10-12. 
466 Ibid., XV, p. 31, mm. 35-36. 
467 Ibid., XV, p. 30, last eighth note value of m. 7 (V7/V) and the first five eighth note values of m. 8 (V).  
468 Ibid., IX, p. 18, mm. 33-34 and p. 19, mm. 67-68. 
469 Ibid., XV, p. 32, mm. 68-69 and mm. 77-78. 
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 Und aller Qual entnommen, 
 Und frei und selig sein! 
 
 Ah, could I only go there 
 And free my heart of pain, 
 And banish all my woe there, 
 Be free and blest again!470 
 
The one thing that is “off” about Schumann’s setting is his disposition of the bass notes of the 
frei und selig measures.471 The F-sharp and B in the frei und selig bars spell out a V – I; as 
they are the lowest notes we might expect them to ground the chords that overlie them, but the 
chords are not V and I, but rather ii and V. The actual cadence occurs a bar later, supported by 
the correct bass notes. The pseudo-cadence suggests that the reconciliation inherent in the 
words frei und selig is illusory. The similar bass notes at the song’s close ground the final 
cadence, but they depart rhythmically from the bass notes in the frei und selig bars, as if the 
music feels guilt over its earlier affirmative role and can no longer follow the poet in its 
delusion that he could be free and blissful (or blessed) even in dreams. The poet’s unconscious 
strategy of recoding the traumatic event as a benign one turns out to be an extension of the 
reigning ideology of exchange, in that it treats images as if they were just tokens to which 
negative or positive meanings could be arbitrarily assigned. Lied XV makes the overt claim 
that dreams are really nothing—“idle foam”—, whereas the system of references in which 
Heine and Schumann enmesh this declaration denies it. The dreams are non-arbitrary 
manifestations of what the subject has suffered, albeit caught in a magical form in need of 
adequate interpretation.  
                                                
470 Heinrich Heine, The Complete Poems of Heinrich Heine: A Modern English Version, trans. Hal Draper 
(Cambridge, MA: Suhrkamp/Insel Publishers Boston, 1982), p. 66. 
471 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), XV, p. 33, mm. 81-82 (“free and blest” in Draper’s translation). 
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 Lied XVI follows directly from Lied XV: if dreams are mere foam, rationalizes the 
dreamer, then let us rid ourselves of them for good. Heine’s final “Lied” of the Lyrisches 
Intermezzo is an attempt to spirit away the work’s enigmatic character. The narrator ends with 
a direct appeal to the readers to bury the “nasty olden Lieder,” to bring a mammoth coffin that 
will contain them (and much else, yet unrevealed) and to organize the stupendous materials 
and labour necessary to tip the whole thing into the sea. In the lyric that Schumann set, it is not 
clear how far along the audience members advance in their work, for the last verb has a form 
common to both indicative and subjunctive tenses. It is possible to translate 
Wisst ihr warum der Sarg wohl 
So groß und schwer mag sein?  
Ich senkt’ auch meine Liebe 
Und meinen Schmerz hinein!472 
as  
Do you know why the coffin 
Must be so great and heavy? 
I’d like to bury there my love 
And my sorrow too473 
 
or as 
Do you know why the coffin 
Might be so large and heavy? 
I laid deep all my love 
And all my pain therein!474 
 
In the first translation, the fantastic plan has not yet been carried out. The last lines are a 
challenge: “Would you still do all this for me, knowing that you would also be ridding the 
world of my love and my pain?” Knowing now what the coffin contains, the addressees are 
left to decide whether to continue to assist the poet in his intended removals. Schumann’s 
                                                
472 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), p. XIII. Cf. Heine, Lyrisches Intermezzo, LXVI, p. 171, which has legt’ 
where Dichterliebe has senkt’. 
473 As translated by Richard Stokes, in R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), p. XIII. 
474 My translation. 
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setting might support the second translation, although the status of musical events as real or 
imaginary cannot be determined absolutely. The breaking of the vii of vii fully diminished 
chord into a first block, consisting only of the root, doubled, in the deepest bass and the 
seventh in the soprano, and a second block, of extreme density, marked with a sforzando, 
indeed suggests a long mass tilting up off a ledge, then tipping down quickly with a sharp 
clap, then into indistinctness.475 The sinking of the coffin appears to occur on a different plane 
or at a different stage from what comes before. The arrest of the eighth notes (which have been 
incessantly running from the vocal entry476) sharply separates the lines “die sollen den Sarg 
forttragen,/und senken in’s Meer hinab” from everything that has preceded.477 In this reading, 
the continual scheming or planning ends with the end of the running eighth notes, whereupon 
the plan appears to be carried out. According to such a translation, the listeners would be 
complicit in burying the coffin, even though the narrator openly avowed that he was 
withholding knowledge of the contents. The last lines are a revelation of what has been lost. 
The truly miserable, heartless ones would be the listeners who agree to see buried what they 
do not know, who still might not realize what has been lost, who think not “What have we 
done?” but rather “Ah, the poet has finally come to terms with his bad love affair.” Only fools 
would agree to the definitive suppression of a thing, without even bothering to find out what it 
contains. But the appeal of Heine’s “Lied,” now old, to bury die alten, bösen Lieder is almost 
gentle irony, compared with the implicit accusation behind Schumann’s broken diminished 
chord. Ostensibly demurring all help, sympathy and understanding, the poet tests to see if his 
listeners are so stupid and so cold as to consign him to oblivion, whether they really could be 
                                                
475 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), XVI, p. 34, m. 39. 
476 Ibid., XVI, p. 34, pick-up to m. 4. 
477 Ibid., XVI, p. 36, mm. 36-39, with pick-up (who should bear away the coffin/and sink it into the sea). 
 512 
cajoled into wiping away the clues that would explain his intense love and unbounded grief: 
with the broken chord, it seems that they really are that stupid and that cold. Yet, in another 
sense, the coffin sinking into the sea is also illusion. The old songs may be non-extant, yet not 
utterly lost to the advancing consciousness, which, seeing beyond the work’s abnegation, 
strives desperately to return the whole cycle in memory, to solve the enigma of the poet’s 
grief. It is a simple, observing consciousness that accepts what has happened, believing the 
coffin’s contents to be unrecoverable, safely forgotten. The last song, darkly negative, leaves 
its own fate undecided, rushing headlong against all notion of self-preservation in its attack on 
the old, horrid songs. It recognizes the power of formalism, the basis of total administration, 
where planning happens in complete ignorance of the inner content. Heine’s personalization of 
social conditions obscures the notion that there can be no individual heartlessness, for the 
burial of the old, evil songs would be an act of socially-imposed forgetting, which hardened, 
loveless society imposes on itself. Heine at least makes no illusion about the prevailing hatred 
of expression, hated for the memory trace of mimetic language that expression evokes.   
 The common reading of Lied XVI is that the poet, unburdened by the weight of the 
past, reaches reconciliation in the “reflective” postlude, with its reference back to Lied XII. 
Neumeyer argues that Dichterliebe possesses organic unity by virtue of this citation, within 
the concluding postlude in D-flat major. He reads the return affirmatively, as a reflection on 
the flowers’ “address” and therefore as the poet’s acceptance and appropriation of his external 
circumstances: “The postlude in the major after the minor of the song proper mitigates the 
element of bitterness undoubtedly present in the text and adopts a tone of ‘coming to terms 
with the situation.’”478 Yet nothing gives to think that the reference to the postlude of the 
                                                
478 Neumeyer, “Organic Structure and the Song Cycle,” p. 97. 
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twelfth Lied in the conclusion of the work indicates that the poet has somehow accepted the 
flowers’ judgement on his character. The final postlude does not mitigate the bitterness of 
Heine’s text, certainly not by the sheer fact that it is in a major key, for throughout the work 
Schumann advances a critical position towards the affirmative use of major keys, often by a 
pointed use of mixture: the C Major of Lied VII (“Ich grolle nicht”—!)479 is so much false 
bravura at the early break-in from C minor of the half-diminished seventh chords on Herz,480 
while the Picardy third, in Lied IX, with which the last, frantic glancing between major and 
minor, intensified in chromatic descent, finally settles can only incite the cringe that soft-focus 
portraits do today, blurred as it is by a grace note, sounded at pianissimo, as if it offered a 
perspective on the departing happy newlywed couple through the rejected lover’s bitter 
tears.481 Schumann has also associated major keys with a loss of subjectivity, a kind of 
automatism, in, for example, the driving assembly-line song factory of Lied III, the facile 
truism of Lied XI, the resolutely pseudo-happy compulsion of Lied XV. Yet the final postlude 
of the cycle is not in the B-flat major of Lied XII, which it references, but in D-flat major. It so 
recalls the thirteenth Lied, the lines  
 Ich hab’ im Traum geweinet, 
 Mir träumte, du wärst mir noch gut. 
 Ich wachte auf, und noch immer 
 Strömt meine Tränenflut 
 
 In a dream my tears were falling; 
 I dreamed you were true to your vow. 
 I woke, and my torrent of sorrow 
 Is pouring even now482  
 
                                                
479 I don’t complain. 
480 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), VII, p. 12, m. 3. 
481 Ibid., IX, p. 19, m. 84. 
482 Heine, “Ich hab im Traum geweinet,” trans. Aaron Kramer, in The Poetry of Heinrich Heine, p. 78. 
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in which the passage …wärst mir noch gut. Ich wachte (auf)… brightens fleetingly to a warm 
D-flat major.483 The ultimate return to D-flat major in the postlude of the sixteenth and last 
Lied of Dichterliebe is too good to be true. It suggests that there has been neither a real, 
positive transformation of existing structures nor a full comprehension of the disaster on the 
part of the poet—only a retreat into the pure interior, from which he does not wake: the cycle 
closes on a perfect authentic cadence in the key of dreaming and illusion, D-flat major. The 
citation therefore does not suggest that the poet has somehow gained reflective distance on the 
events and has so reconciled himself to them. The postlude of the last Lied is indeed a 
reflective, memorial moment in the work. But the intensification of the illusory character from 
the point in the cycle whence it cites to the end attests to the non-affirmative character of 
Schumann’s music, which does not assume that reflective distance alone reconciles. The 
poet’s need to love and to experience his love at a distance put him at odds with himself and 
the world: objectification cannot reconcile itself and love, for reconciliation is implicitly 
reciprocal. 
 Yet the conclusion of Dichterliebe gives reason to hope that there may yet be 
awakening. The postlude of Lied XII, from which the postlude of Lied XVI cites, is not a mere 
extension of the sung words, for, while the falling arpeggio motif continues through it, entirely 
new melodic material, a beautiful, syncopated rising line, joins a harmony that remembers 
certain harmonic events in the cycle up until there. The postlude of the sixteenth Lied is thus 
twice-removed, citing from a reconstruction or narration of events in the twelfth. It is 
“progression” not merely in the musical sense, but also in the historical sense, a progression of 
events, remembered.  
                                                
483 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), XIII, p. 27, mm. 27-(29) (…were still good to me. I woke (up)….). 
 515 
  The four-bar citation of the postlude of the last song begins on the dominant over a 
tonic pedal, then proceeds to IV7 – V4,2 – I, the large piece of the most common progression in 
Western music. In Lied XII, it recalls the first Lied, where Schumann uses the sequence iv6 – 
V7 – I to set the high-points (here underlined) of the lines Da ist in meinem Herzen die Liebe 
aufgegangen and Da hab’ ich ihr gestanden mein Sehnen und Verlangen.484 The restoration of 
the major IV chord in the major key in the twelfth Lied also refers to a more recent instance of 
the emblem—the three bars in the ninth Lied, in F major, starting on the first occurrence of the 
word schmettern of the opening lyric Das ist ein Flöten und Geigen, Trompeten schmettern 
darein.485 The return of this progression condenses two declarations—the poet’s declaration of 
longing to the beloved and the trumpet’s declaration of the marriage of the beloved. In those 
songs, the ambivalence of the progression, referring at once to the love that came over the poet 
in a private dawning and to the beloved’s love for someone else, announced in a boisterous, 
public blaring, expresses not a mere paradox, but, in a temporal medium, experience—the 
experience of what seems to be a purely arbitrary reversal of circumstances. The rising line, 
supported by the emblematic harmony, is tinged with pathos.  
 The German sixth that follows the IV – V – I progression in Lied XVI touches on the 
poet’s un-heroic cast in this misery, picking up on several important moments of his alienation 
earlier in Lied XII. The opening progression of Lied XII is incomplete: the piece begins on the 
German sixth. The German sixth in fact introduces each of the first three two-line segments in 
Lied XII.486 The exception is the fourth and last two-line segment, which is led in by an 
                                                
484 Ibid., I, p. 2, mm. 11-12 and p. 3, mm. 22-23 (Then in my heart I felt/The love for her unfold….Then I 
confessed to her/My longing and desire).  
485 Ibid., IX, p. 17, mm. 10-12 (There is a fluting and fiddling/And trumpets blaring in there…). 
486Ibid., XII, p. 24, m. 1; m. 6, second dotted quarter note value; and m. 11, second dotted quarter note value.    
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augmented chord that serves as a clever transition between B-flat major and G major/minor 
passages.487 The German sixth does indeed appear in the setting of these last two lines of the 
poem, as a transition out of the G major/minor passage, and, for the first time, it is set to 
words: it falls on the blasser (pallid, “white” with envy) from the flowers’ speech.488 So, the 
German sixth first offers a possible point of convergence between wordless flowers’ speech 
and human silence, but it is then tied to a particular content. Falling on blasser, the German 
sixth picks up the association of an external view of the poet, of the man drained of life and 
speech, through the eyes of a second nature that has learned the distorted, cruel and 
perspectivistic language of man. The piano postlude of Lied XII in a sense attempts to return 
the German sixth to wordlessness.  
 The German sixth in the postlude of Lied XVI is followed by the crescendo-
decrescendo chord: a diminished seventh chord applied to the supertonic.489 The entry into the 
enharmonic equivalent of C-sharp major, D-flat major, in the last Lied would seem to have 
signalled the definitive exit from the applied Phrygian key area, so it is noteworthy that the 
secondary tonic of the cycle, D, here returns briefly in the guise of this vii°/ii seventh chord 
(vii°7/ii in D-flat major=D°7). The prior resolutions of vii°/ii to ii (on Kindchen, schenk’ ich dir 
die....490 and, repeatedly, on sprichst: ich liebe dich, so muss ich…491) are upward movements 
of a half-step, so reiterate the first half-step movement into the applied Phrygian key region. 
Resolving in this way, the diminished seventh chords cleared up their tonal ambiguity. This 
resolution is different. It neither opens onto a fully chromatic key region nor resolves to ii.  
                                                
487 Ibid., XII, p. 25, m. 16, second dotted quarter note value. 
488 Ibid., XII, p. 25, m. 19, for the value of the second dotted quarter note. 
489 Ibid., XVI, p. 37, m. 54. 
490 Ibid., II, p. 4, mm. 10-11 (…my child, I’ll send you the…). 
491 Ibid., IV, p. 7, mm. 13-14 (….say: I love you, so I must…). 
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 It is unclear what a pianist asked to crescendo and decrescendo on a singly struck 
chord is to do. There is a performance practice that takes Schumann’s impossible piano swells 
to address themselves purely to the non-sensuous ear. These “lozenge” markings or “hairpins” 
may be akin to the marginal illuminations of medieval books, the mnemonics, which could not 
have been completely foreign to Schumann, whose father was a book dealer.492 Their purpose 
is to aid in the study of the text, to open a way back into the specific page from life:  
Such images are not iconographical, nor do they illustrate or explain the content of a 
particular text. They serve the basic function of all page decoration, to make each page 
distinct and memorable, but their content is not only specific to the particular page on 
which they are drawn. One should consider them as images which serve to remind 
readers of the fundamental purposes of these books – Bibles, Psalters, decretal 
collections, prayer books – books that are made for study and meditation, to be mulled 
over. They contain matter to be laid down and called again from their memorial store-
houses, shrines, fiscal pouches, chests, vases, coops, pens, cells, and bins.493 
 
Images with a purely memorial function did not break the ban on idolatry: they were an 
extension of the formal divisions introduced into the running text as topics. Yet despite its 
memorial function, Schumann’s “illuminated” chord nonetheless demands to be played. 
Interpreters confronted twice with the seemingly impossible demand of a crescendo on a 
singly struck chord are forced to find a solution, but whether they break the chord, accent it 
strongly, treat it as a fleeting intensification of the espressivo or take time and draw it out, the 
struggle in achieving one makes the passage difficult to forget. The first “illuminated” chord 
in Lied XII must be retained in memory, so that its return in Lied XVI does not produce a 
mere vague familiarity, but actually rouses the memory to put these two precise moments 
together. The marking, a miniature of the expressive swell of the Romantic phrase, demands 
that even the single sixteenth note be read as full of history, changing, and recalls the 
                                                
492 In familiar, musicians’ language, “hairpins” seems to be the term of choice. Although the crescendo-
decrescendo is not exactly a lozenge in Schumann’s scores, in Beethoven’s autograph scores, it can be.   
493 Mary J. Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 323. 
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memorial character of art—for the Muses were the offspring of Memory. The marking is not 
only a way of cross-referencing the two postludes; it also references other diminished seventh 
chords applied to the supertonic: that on Kindchen of Lied II,494 but especially that on sprichst: 
from Lied IV.495 The marked chord is different from these, for it does not resolve as expected. 
It is followed not by the ii chord, as in the other cases, but by another applied chord, the 
dominant applied to the dominant.  
 There are slight discrepancies between the postlude of Lied XII and its citation in the 
postlude of Lied XVI. In Lied XII, a seventh chord follows the memory chord, whereas in 
Lied XVI, the chord after it is missing its seventh. This discrepancy shows the mnemonic 
chord diverging in two different tonal directions. The extra tone in Lied XII makes the chord a 
dominant seventh, which is typically employed to orient the listener: this C dominant seventh 
chord strongly indicates that the tonic is F.496 While it disambiguates the diminished seventh 
chord preceding it, this secondary dominant also alludes to a like moment: to the secondary 
dominant on the word weinen (weep) in Lied IV, another dominant seventh in first inversion, 
also applied to the dominant, but which does not resolve to the dominant.497 So the two chords 
in Lied XII, diminished seventh applied to the supertonic and dominant chord applied to the 
dominant,498 are in fact a condensation of the passage setting the words doch wenn du 
sprichst: „Ich liebe dich!“ so muss ich weinen bitterlich,499 so:  
 sprichst: „Ich...“ [weinen].500 
                                                
494 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), II, p. 4, m. 10. 
495 Ibid., IV, p. 7, m. 13. 
496 Ibid., XII, p. 25, m. 25 (the extra tone is the b-flat, pf., r.h. Cf. XVI, p. 37, m. 55, where there is no 
corresponding D-flat).  
497 Ibid., IV, p. 7, m. 15.  
498 Ibid., XII, p. 25, mm. 24-25. 
499 But when you say: “I love you!” then I must weep, and bitterly. 
500 ……………... say: “I………………….............weep…………........ 
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Just as the German sixth in the postlude attempted to undo the determinate, declarative content 
of the flowers’ signifying speech, this condensation likewise skips the determinate content of 
the beloved’s speech act, proceeding directly to expression, the tears. In Lied IX, the V/V 
chord in fact gives the very distinct impression of bawling or howling, where it forms the 
racing, accented conclusion to each of the poet’s strophes, so drives the music around in a 
circle with unstoppable, infernal impulsion.501 In it, the poet seems compelled to replay the 
horrible marriage scene: the roundelay, the noise and the beloved in the midst of it all. The 
outburst at the end of each verse suggests that the poet receives absolutely no therapeutic 
benefit from describing the scene: words are useless in alleviating his suffering, which repeats 
itself endlessly. Added to this, another instance of this applied dominant, the V7/V chord on 
ich of ich aber wandle stumm suggests that the poet, silenced, has in fact become his tears.502 
The postlude so reiterates the poet’s shift into wordless grief by drawing this movement 
together in the V of V chord.  
 The substitution of a major triad for a dominant seventh in the citation of Lied XVI 
gives an utterly different sense of harmonic movement away from the illuminated chord. In 
Lied XII, the second beat of bar 25, occupied as it is by the dissonant major second of the 
dominant seventh, inverted, remains a moment of harmonic tension. Some sense of rest comes 
at on the fourth sixteenth note value, when the G finally resolves the A-flat of the illustrated 
chord. But the dominant seventh impels the progression forward, and consequently a 
movement around the circle of fifths is felt very strongly thereafter.503 The sense of rupture 
between the illustrated chord and the applied dominant is in some sense repaid by the fifths 
                                                
501 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), IX, p. 18, mm. 33-34 and p. 19, mm. 67-68. 
502 Ibid., XII, p. 24, m. 10 (“I walk with never a word” in Arndt’s translation, Songs of Love and Grief, p. 33). 
503 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), XII, p. 25, mm. 25-26. 
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that follow. In the final Lied, XVI, the corresponding transition out of the mnemonic chord 
evokes a subtle, momentary floating off the ground. Effectively, we have moved up a semi-
tone, from a D-natural diminished seventh chord (the mnemonic chord) to an E-flat major 
chord.504 Although the two chords do not share a single note and belong to no common 
tonality, the movement between them is clearly perceptible once the indicator of key, the 
dominant seventh, is removed. It recalls the semi-tone movement from one tonic to the other, 
from I to the Neapolitan in the first Lied.505 But the wonderfully expressive music here does 
not simply repeat in remembering: it twins moments of its experience. The expected resolution 
of the diminished seventh applied to ii is ii, as it was indeed resolved in Lied II and Lied IV of 
the cycle.506 The E-flat chord is not far off from this, however: it can in fact be analyzed as a 
major II chord, as the expectation for a resolution to ii is so strong.  
The major II chord is the last step in the history of the supertonic that Schumann has 
told in this cycle. The supertonic first appears as the Neapolitan chord, which is able to 
become a second tonic, a collective subjectivity, throughout Lied I and briefly in XII.507 
Second, it appears as the minor ii chord, which in Lieder II, III and IV becomes associated 
with a suffering ich not yet entirely detached from nature. In Lied II, the ii chord encompasses 
first, second and third persons—the relation of I and thou made possible by flowers is a 
harmonic identity.508 In Lied III, the ii chord surfaces notably on the first syllable of 
Liebeswonne (delights of love)509 and that of Liebe (love).510 In Lied IV, it links Leid 
                                                
504 Ibid., XVI, p. 37, mm. 54-55. 
505 Ibid., I, p. 2, pick-up to m. 1 (C-sharp) and m. 1, first sixteenth note, pf., l.h. (D-natural). 
506 Ibid., II, p. 4, mm. 10-11 and IV, p. 7, mm. 13-14. 
507 Ibid., XII, p. 24, mm. 8-9, from sprechen. 
508 Ibid., II, p. 4, m. 11 on schenk’ ich dir die (I’ll send you the) of schenk’ ich dir die Blumen all’ (I’ll send you 
the flowers, all). 
509 Ibid., III, p. 5, m. 4 . 
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(suffering) and ich (I).511 Third, the supertonic appears as the iiø7 chord, associated in Lieder 
V, VII and VIII with the peculiar suffering due to the objectified, mediated poetical love, 
reified in song, but nonetheless denied by the reified world of conventions.512 The half-
diminished chord on ii also punctuates the end of the poet’s confession in Lied X.513 The 
dramatic reappearance of the half-diminished seventh chord on the last sung syllable of the 
entire work514 suggests the disappearance into the grave of the sea of all the things that were 
supported by this chord: song,515 love,516 the speech of stars517 and much else. Fourth, the 
supertonic later takes the form of a Neapolitan chord that fails to open onto a chromatic 
region, in the eighth518 and tenth519 Lieder.  Fifth, the supertonic is the simple second scale 
degree, the lonely floating atom, the clinamen that, passing under the accented incomplete IV 
chord in Lied XIII, gets caught in its gravitational field to form the “apparent” Neapolitan 
seventh chord, the moment of awakening from happy dream and beautiful illusion of you were 
still good to me, where every last consolation with which the ego could indulge himself has 
been rudely stolen from him.520 The subject becomes the floating supertonic, atomized, part of 
a larger, solid structure but in appearance. The major II chord is the last form of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
510 Ibid., III, p. 5, m. 10. 
511 Ibid., IV, p. 7, m. 3 and m. 5. 
512 Ibid., V, p. 8, m. 1 with pick-up on Ich will meine (I would that my…); V, p. 8, m. 3 on Kelch (calyx); V, p. 8, 
m. 9 on Lied (song); V, p. 9, m. 11 on Kuss (kiss); V, p. 9, m. 15 on the first syllable of wunderbar (wonderfully); 
VII, p. 13, m. 21 on Herz (heart), in a notable case of mixture; VII, p. 13, m. 29 on Lieb (love); VIII, p. 14, m. 7 
on heilen (heal); VIII, p. 15, m. 23 on sprächen (would speak); and VIII, p. 16, m. 30 on the first syllable of 
zerrissen (rent, broken). 
513 Ibid., X, p. 21, m. 20, for the value of the second quarter note. 
514 Ibid., XVI, p. 36, m. 51. 
515 Ibid., V, p. 8, m. 9.   
516 Ibid., VII, p. 13, m. 29. 
517 Ibid., VIII, p. 15, m. 23. 
518 Ibid., VIII, p. 14f., mm. 11-12 (traurig und krank) and p. 15, mm. 19-20 (Sternelein). 
519 Ibid., X, p. 20, m. 10 (von). 
520 Ibid., XIII, p. 27, mm. 29. 
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supertonic.521 The history of the supertonic in this cycle, as a history of the suffering subject, 
enters into the unusual, isolated event and the breakthrough moment in the last Lied becomes 
readable as subjectivity, even in its abstraction. This moment of expression, the major II 
chord, is, as Adorno claims, “fully mediated”: 
The instant of expression in artworks is however not their reduction to the level of their 
materials as to something unmediated; rather, this instant is fully mediated. Artworks 
become appearances [Erscheinungen], in the pregnant sense of the term—that is, as the 
appearance of an other—when the accent falls on the unreality of their own reality.522 
 
The V/V chord heard as II has consequences for what follows: the fifths progression clear in 
the twelfth Lied (C – F – B-flat)523 is here less strongly felt, while the subdominant seventh 
chord524 is granted greater prominence. The peculiarity of the subdominant seventh chord is 
that the F in the upper voice and the G-flat in the bass of the IV chord can both be analyzed as 
passing tones. Yet it does seem however odd to consider these prominent outer voices to be 
merely auxiliary, especially given the relative note values and the fact that for the value of one 
eighth note only these voices are heard. Again, the tendency of the Phrygian is toward twelve-
note harmony. On this, the passage repeats up to and including the German sixth. The 
mnemonic chord is not, however, repeated. In Lied XII, an incomplete V/V chord in second 
inversion replaces the diminished seventh mnemonic chord,525 whereas in Lied XVI an 
incomplete minor seventh ii chord in second inversion finds its place there.526 The citation 
continues for two more bars on a prolonged cadential six-four. 
                                                
521 Ibid., XV, p. 37, m. 55, for the value of the first dotted half note. 
522 GS, vol. 7, p. 123 as translated, Aesthetic Theory, p. 79. 
523 R. Schumann, Dichterliebe (2011), XII, p. 24, mm. 10-11. 
524 Ibid., XVI, p. 37, m. 55, reading a seventh from the G-flat dotted half note in the bass and the F half note in 
the treble.  
525 Ibid., XII, p. 25, m. 26, for the value of the last sixteenth note. 
526 Ibid., XVI, p. 37, m. 56, for the value of the last eighth note. 
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 The last postlude so casts suspicion over the poet’s claims to have buried his pain and 
his love, the old songs and dreams; it suggests that such a radical, wilful act of forgetting only 
leads surely to deeper dreaming and delusion, the projection of all happiness into the past, 
mere dreams of how good people were to one another once upon a time: “Since Platonic 
anamnesis, the not-yet-existing has been dreamed about in remembrance [Eingedenken], 
which alone concretizes utopia without betraying it to existence. Illusion goes with existence: 
even then, existence had never been.”527 Dichterliebe ends up in the pure illusion of happiness, 
but if Schumann does not shatter it, he leaves open the possibility that the moment of 
awakening may happen outside his work, that it may be the moment of awakening “to which 
every dream at last refers.”528 Schumann’s music might forgive forgetting, but it awaits 
remembrance. 
   
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
527 GS, vol. 7, p. 200, or prefer to my translation here Aesthetic Theory, p. 132. 
528 Walter Benjamin, “[Pariser Passagen II],” in Gesammelte Schriften, 6 vols. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1972-
1987), vol. 5, pp. 1044-1059, here p. 1058 as translated by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin, “‹The 
Arcades of Paris›‹Paris Arcades II›,” in The Arcades Project, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 873-884, here p. 884. 
{Epilogue} Adorno’s concept of aesthetic illusion seems like an outmoded subject today. 
Its redemption was long ago dismissed as unnecessary1 and as reactionary.2 But illusion was 
never completely abandoned in art. Perhaps the most important living painter to come through 
its crisis, Gerhard Richter, is emphatically committed to Schein, although his is a “homeless 
semblance,” in the words of Hal Foster—an aesthetic illusion that survives after its exile.3 
Richter presents the dilemma between modernism and post-modernism but does not succumb 
to its force: his solution “is not a progressive form of critical art, but neither is it a cynical kind 
of posthistorical pastiche. It does not resolve its contradictions so much as it performs them 
and, again, in doing so, suspends them.”4 Richter dismantles the conditions of the possibility 
of his own art. He is able to bring representation back into art, but only by default—his 
material, photographs, just happens to be a representing medium. On the one hand, his work is 
based in fiction and illusion—he exposes photography as openly subject to manipulation and, 
indeed, employed to manipulate. On the other hand, his work is anti-illusory, in that it sheds 
light on the mechanism of social control in real photographs—the condition of his work’s 
possibility. This dialectic of illusion indicates that aesthetic illusion cannot be written off, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Günter Figal and Hans Georg Flickinger, “Die Aufhebung des schönen Scheins: Schöne und nicht mehr schöne 
Kunst im Anschluß an Hegel und Adorno,” Hegel-Studien 14 (1979): pp. 197-224. In their confrontation of 
traditional aesthetic categories with modern art, Figal and Flickinger claim that no “redemption of illusion” is 
necessary because illusion takes on a different aspect when art is no longer beautiful: “the illusoriness of 
mediating rationality” (ibid., p. 219). They suggest that understanding modern art as the sublation (Aufhebung) of 
illusion rather than as the crisis of illusion takes up the critical position of “no-longer-beautiful art vis-à-vis 
conceptual rationality” (ibid., p. 215). While it is true that Adorno speaks of the “crisis of illusion,” he does not 
subsume all modern art under this concept: the crisis of illusion refers not to all modern art equally as a whole, 
but to the final, uncritical stage of a nominalist strain of modernism (GS, vol. 7, p. 156, or translated, Aesthetic 
Theory, p. 101f.). Without citing any examples of actual works, Figal and Flickinger reduce all modern art to the 
category of “no-longer-beautiful art,” then argue for the sublation of the category of illusion, whereas the slow 
section of the Gigue from Arnold Schoenberg’s Opus 29 is no less beautiful than the gorgon from Greek 
mythology is ugly.     
2 Peter Bürger, Zur Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), p. 71. 
3 Hal Foster, “Semblance According to Gerhard Richter (2003),” in Gerhard Richter, ed. Benjamin H. D. 
Buchloh, October Files 8 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2009), pp. 113-134, here p. 127. Foster is alluding to 
Clement Greenberg’s notion of “homeless representation.” 
4 Ibid., p. 129. 
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despite its continued disgrace in post-modern art. Richter’s paintings are determined in such a 
way that the only alternative to artistic aesthetic illusion seems to be pure social illusion. 
Aesthetic illusion in Richter means for once not to be manipulated by the claims of the media; 
but it does not mean that manipulation by the media does not still continue in reality. Paintings 
sourced from old newspaper photographs stand as reminders of past barbarism and 
fabrications, of the old sacrifices and ancient coercion, while, in the present, new forms of 
control and stupefaction do their work. Unlike Anselm Kiefer’s facile references to Paul 
Celan, which by no means guarantee correct consciousness for his toxic productions, Richter’s 
reference to Celan does not advertize itself: it can be detected only in his artworks’ 
determination not to advance, not to react against the imperative that “Todesfuge” evokes, and 
in their movement to refuse affirmative culture. His paintings do not pretend to be above the 
barbarism, but they are not completely barbaric. They hold onto aesthetic illusion because 
social illusion has not passed. 
 The recent focus on appearance and apparition, on the vanishing or performative side 
of art, wishes to spare aesthetics and art the ideology critique that is the real dynamo powering 
Adorno’s brilliant dialectics of illusion. This tendency has representatives on either side of the 
Analytic/Continental divide, lending weight to Adorno’s thesis that the forming process of late 
capitalist development is so strong that no distinction can resist its homogenizing forces.5 On 
the Analytic side, David Davies conceives of all art as performance: art is the artist’s act of 
painting a picture or the musician’s act of playing a composition.6 But by making art the 
artist’s or artists’ intentioned activity, Davies ignores the atomization of consciousness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 GS, vol. 4, p. 28 §6 translated by E. F. N. Jephcott as Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life 
(London: Verso, 2005), p. 26f. 
6 David Davies, Art as Performance (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2004). 
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brought about by the division of labour, which also traverses art—particularly the highly 
industrialized forms of film, installation and multimedia performance. While Davies does not 
ignore other aspects of art—his approach is highly syncretic, drawing impressively on the 
entire roster of major Analytic thinkers of art—, he sees performance as the essential element, 
and this focus directs attention away from the intentionless, reified object and art’s 
unconscious contributors, who are inadvertently forced to make art by dint of a system of 
taxation and the division of labour.7 In other words, art conceived one-sidedly as performance 
never comes up against the contradiction between production and work produced, between 
performance and art object—the artistic aesthetic illusion that is the way into a reflection on 
mere social illusion. A similar avoidance of the contradiction can be seen on the Continental 
side, notably in Martin Seel, who refuses it by privileging perception, which is not really a 
factor in the traditional antagonism between the aesthetics of Sein and the aesthetics of Schein: 
“From one of these perspectives or the other, aesthetic consciousness is regarded almost as the 
total lack of attention to the concrete Here and Now of the observable world”—something 
which he finds deplorable: “We should not accept this disastrous consequence.”8 His 
aesthetics of appearing, by contrast, conceives of aesthetic consciousness as attentiveness to 
the present: aesthetic comportment revolves around the “momentary and simultaneous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It is difficult to circumscribe the “collaborators” in a highly specialized art such as film. Individual members of 
the crew are certainly aware that their actions aim at a completed film, but due to the atomization of their roles, 
they do not know what foci of appreciation they are helping to specify, even while being aware of certain 
interpretive norms pertinent to their tasks. Davies suggests that only artists have the consciousness to specify 
intentions, whereas their assistants, clueless as to the artistic statements they are inadvertently helping to 
articulate, are not part of the authorial collective. The assistant’s actions are thus “intentionless.” Yet the idea of 
art informel is intentionless art, in which all artists to work like artists’ assistants. Art informel is correct insofar 
as the division of labour cuts means off from ends, from the final purpose of work itself. All art is intentionless in 
the sense that no one actually knows or has control over what will become of his or her own product, how it will 
be received, what it will accomplish. In this sense, the lived moment is “obscure” (Bloch) and social activity 
“intentionless” (Adorno, Benjamin). By making art the artist or artists’ intentioned activity, Davies not only 
obligingly stops thought at the division of labour, but also attributes to artists an autonomy that they do not in fact 
possess. 
8 Martin Seel, Die Macht des Erscheinens (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007), p. 13 (my translations). 
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richness of appearing.”9 Propped up by a misconception—the Adornonian aesthetics of 
illusion in fact requires very keen observation of and attention to the passing sound or isolated 
patch of colour for aesthetic consciousness to obtain at all—, Seel’s aesthetics of appearing 
goes counter to the Modernist, critical, dialectical aesthetics, which directs itself to the non-
simultaneous or non-contemporaneous (ungleichzeitig) contradictions in the object. However 
diverse their views on art, aesthetics, politics, religion and philosophy may have been, 
Theodor Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht all saw the contradictions 
of uneven development as indications that the seemingly closed and total reality could still be 
different—i.e., that it was really open. Once grasped as a non-simultaneity and not as separate 
spheres existing simultaneously on the same plane, the conflict between the old and the new 
can be worked on productively. From critique within these rifts and brinks something other 
than what exists can see the light of day. With the knowledge that contradictions cannot be so 
easily avoided or overstepped comes the knowledge of what exactly is open in reality. It is 
reasonable to hope that what exists may be freed from ideological repetition compulsion, 
reasonable to hope for the end of contradiction and reasonable to act with these aims. While 
practical aims have no place in art, contradictions attest to its element of social reality. In 
Robert Schumann’s Dichterliebe, op. 48, no. 1, social reality inheres in the contradiction 
between the three sharps in the key signature on the printed page and the secret key that the 
ear hears (the Neapolitan region of C-sharp major). This contradiction indicates that there is a 
real, social dimension to art, which gives itself to be merely a world of illusion. While 
Dichterliebe does not possess a solution to reification, it permits the thought that the universal 
delusional context of reification has not had the last word. Things can still be different than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Ibid. (my translation). 
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they are. When “existence is magically turned into its own ideology by its faithful 
duplication,” then the consciousness that things may be different from the concrete Here and 
Now of the observable world is correct as much in art as in life.10 But an aesthetics of 
appearing, along with the kind of aesthetic reception that it promotes, is not apt to bring forth 
this consciousness. Today this is not a mere disadvantage to theory, but actually 
irresponsible.11 The redemption of illusion is more than the redemption of an aesthetics of 
illusion.12 
 The disdain for illusion in the domain of aesthetics is moved by the positivist spirit, 
which considers suspect anything that goes beyond the Here and Now of the observable world. 
In a sense, art’s own disdain for illusion also belongs to positivism. Adorno suggests that the 
crisis of illusion was touched off when artworks themselves began to make their claim to truth 
by direct expression, rather than through illusion.13 Such change in the criterion by which the 
artwork itself asks to be judged invites confusion in the sphere of letters. In “Der Essay als 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 GS, vol. 3, p. 301 (my translation). 
11 GS, vol. 4, p. 283 § 153, or translated Minima Moralia, p. 247. 
12 J. M. Bernstein, “Why Rescue Semblance? Metaphysical Experience and the Possibility of Ethics,” in The 
Semblance of Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, ed. Tom Huhn and Lambert Zuidervaart 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 177-212. Bernstein is entirely right to want to redeem illusion: “If 
immanence were self-sufficient and complete, then despair would be rational and final” (ibid., p. 184). His 
philosophical grounding, however, is Idealist rather than materialist. Bernstein claims that “the question of 
aesthetic semblance is the question of the possibility of possibility” (ibid., p. 195). But Adorno claims not that 
illusion, Schein, but that “the reality [Wirklichkeit] of artworks bears witness for the possibility of the possible” 
(GS, vol. 7, p. 200, in my translation). Bernstein claims that the redemption of illusion “recognizes that 
transcendence is, finally, not vertical but horizontal, a promise—toward  a future habitation of this world” (“Why 
Rescue Semblance?,” p. 208). But transcendence must be more than a promise about the future in order for hope 
to be rational, since promises can be broken (and often are). Bernstein claims that because, in art, the “formation 
of meaning and interaction is riveted to the conditions of possible perception, the exposure of the subject to a 
singular object, it [the rescue of semblance] is materialist” (ibid., p. 208). A formation of meaning “riveted” to 
existing conditions of the possibility of percepetion, however, is still Idealist, not materialist. Adorno for his part 
claims that “since death is irrevocable, it is ideological to assert that a meaning might rise in light of fragmentary, 
albeit genuine, experience.” GS, vol. 6, p. 371 as translated by E. B. Ashton, Negative Dialectics (1997 repr., 
New York: Continuum, 1973), p. 378.  
13 GS, vol. 18, p. 60, or translated by Wieland Hoban, “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles on New Music,” under 
“Musical expressionism,” in Night Music: Essays on Music, 1928-1962, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (London: Seagull, 
2009), pp. 269-321, here p. 275. 
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Form,” Adorno argues, against Lukács, that the essay is not an artform, for concepts are its 
medium, and that it makes a claim to “truth devoid of aesthetic illusion.”14 But when art also 
makes a claim to truth devoid of aesthetic illusion, all that is left to divide the essay from the 
artistic sphere is the essay’s conceptual medium. For Habermas, the conceptual medium is not 
sufficient to distinguish the essay from the artwork: he concurs with Axel Honneth “that even 
as a theoretician Adorno assimilated his mode of presentation to the aesthetic mode.”15 
Habermas implies that having an aesthetic mode of presentation disqualifies theory as 
theory.16 He seems to view art as a realm of sensuous, expressive particulars of the here-and-
now observable world, which is perhaps why he sees, mistakenly, Adorno’s category of the 
most advanced works of modern art as a “junk category” in which all the truth that does not fit 
into concepts goes, and which would be accessed by way of a theory that has become 
aesthetic: “Because it has to do with concepts, critique can only show why the truth that 
escapes theory finds a refuge in the most advanced works of modern art—out of which we 
surely could not coax it without an aesthetic theory.”17 From there, Habermas tends toward 
what Brian O’Connor has called “virtual ‘mind meld’”—the habit of Adorno’s interpreters to 
assimilate him to other thinkers.18 Habermas claims that Adorno’s position “on the theoretical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 GS, vol. 11, p. 11, or prefer to my translation here that of Shierry Weber Nicholsen, “The Essay as Form,” in 
Notes to Literature (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), vol. 1, pp. 3-23, here p. 5. 
15 Jürgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, vol. 1, Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche 
Rationalisierung (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), p. 516 as translated by Thomas McCarthy, The Theory 
of Communicative Action, vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p. 385. 
16 This supports Raymond Geuss’s rather bald statement that “the oddest thing about this whole discussion 
[positivist Ideologiekritik] is the extent to which Habermas is himself infected with the positivism against which 
he is struggling.” Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 30. 
17 Habermas, Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung, p. 515f. as translated, Reason and 
the Rationalization of Society, p. 385. 
18 For Brian O’Connor’s oppugnation of the “mind meld” tendency in Adorno scholarship, see his book 
Adorno’s Negative Dialectic: Philosophy and the Possibility of Critical Rationality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 2005), p. 149. Facile assimilation of Adorno’s categories and concepts to those of easier thinkers may not 
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claims of objectivating thought and of reflection”19 is close to the neo-ontologist one. But the 
“most advanced works of modern art” is not a junk category, or “project,” like the new 
ontologists’ project of historicity.20 The truth of the most advanced modern artworks is not a 
quality or characteristic that theory does not possess; there is no truth without negation. In 
truth, illusion can be determinately negated by the most advanced Modern artworks or by 
discursive criticism, but this does not conflate art and philosophy: truth is not something 
existing, contained in a given domain. 
 It should perhaps be underscored that in “The Essay as Form,” Adorno does not claim 
that the essay is devoid of aesthetic illusion—only that it makes a claim to truth devoid of 
aesthetic illusion. Habermas’s charge that aesthetics gave the line to Adorno’s theoretical 
manner of presentation remains inconsequential as long as that theoretical work makes a claim 
to truth other than through the generation of contradictions, their dialectic. Adorno’s essays 
indeed each make a claim to wholeness, each operating on the aesthetic mode of presentation. 
His Aesthetic Theory is no less prone to illusion, moving constantly between what a thing 
appears as and what it is. But his work is true not by dint of its highly aesthetic quality, which 
no interpreter fails to remark. The criterion of truth that it sets itself is quite other—it is the 
specificity of what in the total delusional context he negates. Adorno’s contribution to 
philosophy is not his condemnation of the culture industry, jazz, television, radio, Stravinsky, 
new ontology, existentialism, phenomenology, positivism, astrology, propaganda, bourgeois 
mores, capitalism or communism. Rather, his contributions are micrological—out of a number 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be a product of intellectual laziness, as O’Connor suggests, but could be the manifestation of identifying thinking, 
of the general social tendency to wipe out distinction. To counteract the “mind meld” tendency, O’Connor shows 
that Idealism is an important point of divergence between Adorno and the ontologists. See ibid., p. 162.  
19 Habermas, Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung, p. 516 as translated, Reason and the 
Rationalization of Society, p. 385. 
20 See GS, vol. 1, p. 351f. for Adorno’s critique of historicity. 
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of tiny determinations and manoeuvres, an idée reçue becomes visible, lights up, then goes 
out. The measure of the truth of his work is surgical precision—a precision that saves. 
Adorno’s criticism does not destroy jazz, new ontology, logical positivism or anything else; it 
attaches to very specific problems, in different areas of research, that endanger the whole. For 
example, his essay “On Jazz” may have been motivated by the intention to bring down jazz; 
what actually transpires in “On Jazz” is the dissolution of certain received ideas about jazz—
for example, the dissolution of the notion that the lead singer in a jazz number is a free lyrical 
subject.21 Likewise, Adorno may have personally detested logical positivism, but what 
actually transpires in his masterwork Negative Dialectics is the determinate negation of 
illusions that feed positivism—for example, the notion that contradictions in a philosophical 
text are errors, for which the thinking subject alone is responsible.22 Finally, Adorno’s 
supposed anti-illusion position, associated with his apparent defense of the Modern music of 
the Second Viennese School, is a mere generalization when held up to his compliment of 
Alban Berg’s Lyric Suite as “true to illusion.”23 Certainly the aesthetic forms of Adorno’s texts 
provide the precision with which he is able to negate illusion, but these aesthetic forms are not 
themselves the measure of truth. If the aesthetic form were the measure of truth, Adorno 
would have failed by it. In his most programmatic text on philosophical composition practice, 
“The Essay as Form,” Adorno ridicules Descartes’s four rules for thinking;24 yet he succumbs 
to them himself in Introduction to the Sociology of Music, which starts out with a typology of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 GS, vol. 17, pp. 74-108, esp. p. 95f., or in the translation by Jamie Owen Daniel modified by Richard Leppert, 
“On Jazz,” in Essays on Music, ed. Richard Leppert (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), pp. 470-
495, esp. p. 488. 
22 GS, vol. 6, esp. p. 154, translated by E. B. Ashton as Negative Dialectics (1997 repr., New York: Continuum, 
1973), esp. p. 151.   
23 GS, vol. 13, p. 451, or prefer to my translation here that of Juliane Brand and Christopher Hailey, Alban Berg: 
Master of the Smallest Link (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 104.  
24 GS, vol. 11, pp. 22-26, “The Essay as Form,” pp. 14-17. 
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listening behaviour.25 Obviously, the point of Adorno’s typology is not to present and to 
negate an aesthetic form. Adorno’s point is the following: the decline in the category of the 
“good listener” mirrors the decline in general musical education, and this makes the vast 
population easy prey to manipulation by the culture industry. Adorno makes virtually the same 
point in the first chapter of Aesthetic Theory, but in a highly un-schematic, dialectical open 
form.26 The literary philosophical forms that Adorno adopted—aphorisms, essays, 
meditations—should not enter into judgments on the truth or falsity of his work. Philosophical 
texts indeed have aesthetic illusion—the illusion of naturalness and independence. But this is 
not the illusion that they aim to determine and to dissolve. The illusions that they aim to 
determine and to dissolve are the specific contents of a contradictory society, different every 
time. It seems that aesthetic illusion—the illusion of naturalness and independence—in the 
philosophical context only confuses the issue of that text’s truth. Yet the positivist spirit that 
insists on standardized forms for research considers neither the consequences of imposing a 
homogeneous form on all writers nor the raison d’être of literary philosophical form. Non-
conceptual, autonomous form is generated out of the need to let suffering speak in a world of 
repression and domination. Literary form acts as a container for the aggressive or frustrated 
energies generated in critique, energies generated whenever the social critic tries to undo the 
bonds of surplus repression—the bonds of repression over and above what is needed to fulfil 
the needs of society. This is why, when treating something serious, philosophers cannot be 
faulted for the highly unusual forms that their work takes. The more difficult the material, the 
more courageously the philosopher takes it on, the more alien the form. As we have seen, pre-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 GS, vol. 14, pp. 178-198. 
26 GS, vol. 7, p. 17, translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor as Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf 
Tiedemann, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 6.  
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given, accepted schemata can be easily recuperated by regressive movements, and the 
schematism peculiar to the academic setting is no exception. Organic unity received broad, 
unquestioning acceptance in arts and letters before the Nazis appropriated it. While organicism 
in itself may have a regressive element, its widespread acceptance made it easy to recuperate. 
But because anything at all can be distorted and recuperated, the best strategy against 
recuperation cannot be to cling to what has been pure and incorruptible, to what was resistant 
to Nazi interference—the “entartete Kunst.” Rather, among the best defenses against 
heteronomous interference are critique, debate, a dialectic of forms—in short, freedom toward 
the object to determine the form of the text that speaks to it. 
 In the Western tradition, form serves memory. Form was a latecomer—often the work 
of a scribe whose task was “to punctuate,” or, to divide up and mark the text.27 Today, form is 
normally the forerunner of the work itself. Formally, this thesis, however, has followed the 
older model, taking as its criterion not the faithful execution of a preconceived plan, but rather 
remembrance—the degree to which its form lends the work to memory. Adorno’s paragraph 
titles do not completely block the social tendency to group materials formally prior to 
composition, because these “Stichworte,” or “keywords,” control the text invisibly from 
above. I have returned to the old tradition of naming the work or each part of the work by its 
incipit in order to contest Adorno’s title fetishism through form.28 The effect is to close the 
work off to what it is about, or, better, to embed what the work is about so closely within the 
work itself that the thing becomes loaded with the history of its concept. The present work, if 
it succeeds, must be more than it is—a carrier for repressed history, for what cannot be said. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Mary J. Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 281. 
28 See GS, vol. 11, pp. 325-334, translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen as “Titles: Paraphrases on Lessing,” in 
Notes to Literature, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), vol. 2, pp. 3-11. 
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Even those “daubing away”29 are deterred by the powerful, are indeed the violated who 
scream. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See GS, vol. 17, pp. 272-291, esp. p. 254, as translated by Susan H. Gillespie, “Difficulties,” in Essays on 
Music, pp. 644-679, esp. p. 645.   
{Bibliography} Since the apparatus makes frequent recourse to shortened forms of 
citation, the main consideration in compiling the bibliography was the ease of reference to the 
complete publication details of the works cited. The list of works cited therefore makes do 
with a minimum of divisions: 
 
a. Musical Scores 
b. Books, Articles, Essays, Lectures, Letters, Theses, Interviews, Sketches, Sound Recordings  
 
This division by medium accommodates a different indexing scheme for musical works, 
which are more suitably arranged alphabetically by composer and then numerically by opus 
number (or, if need be, year).  
 
These choices render the list of works cited little helpful as a guide to reading on particular 
topics or authors. In order to compensate for this weakness, I supply the following remarks on 
the literature. 
 
The main work consulted was Theodor W. Adorno’s Gesammelte Schriften, abbreviated in the 
notes as GS. Complete bibliographical details for the translations may be found in section (b.) 
of the works cited. The particular texts of the GS referenced in the present study are as 
follows: 
 
“Die Aktualität der Philosophie” (vol. 1, pp. 325-344, translated as “The Actuality of 
Philosophy”);  
 
“Die Idee der Naturgeschichte” (vol. 1, pp. 345-365, translated as “The Idea of Natural 
History”);  
 
Dialektik der Aufklärung: Philosophische Fragmente, with Max Horkheimer (vol. 3, 
translated as Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments);  
 
Minima Moralia: Reflexionen aus dem beschädigten Leben (vol. 4, translated as Minima 
Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life);  
 
Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie: Studien über Husserl und die phänomenologischen 
Antinomien (vol. 5, pp. 7-245);  
 
Drei Studien zu Hegel (vol. 5, pp. 247-381, translated as Hegel: Three Studies);  
 
Negative Dialektik (vol. 6, pp. 7-412; translated as Negative Dialectics);  
 
Ästhetische Theorie (vol. 7, translated as Aesthetic Theory);  
 
“Die revidierte Psychoanalyse” (vol. 8, pp. 20-41); 
 
“Studies in the Authoritarian Personality [excerpts],” with Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. 
Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford (vol. 9.1, pp. 143-509];  
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Prismen (vol. 10.1, pp. 9-287, translated as Prisms), especially “Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft” 
(pp. 11-30, translated as “Cultural Criticism and Society,” pp. 7-34); 
 
“Die Kunst und die Künste” (vol. 10.1, pp. 432-453); 
 
the essays collected in the two published volumes and planned third volume of Kritische 
Modelle (Eingriffe: Neun kritische Modelle, vol. 10.2, pp. 455-94; Stichworte: Kritische 
Modelle 2: vol. 10.2, pp. 595-782; “Kritische Modelle 3”: vol. 10.2, pp. 783-799, translated 
collectively as Critical Models), especially “Jene zwanziger Jahre” (vol. 10.2, pp. 499-506, 
translated as “Those Twenties, pp. 41-48), “Erziehung nach Auschwitz” (pp. 674-690, 
translated as “Education After Auschwitz, pp. 191-204) and “Marginalien zu Theorie und 
Praxis” (pp. 759-782, translated as “Marginalia to Theory and Praxis,” pp. 259-278);  
 
Noten zur Literatur (vol. 11, translated in two volumes as Notes to Literature), especially “Der 
Essay als Form” (pp. 9-33, translated as “The Essay as Form,” vol. 1, pp. 3-23), 
“Engagement” (pp. 409-430, translated as “Commitment,” vol. 2, pp. 76-94) and “Ist die 
Kunst heiter?” (pp. 599-606, translated as “Is Art Lighthearted?” vol. 2, pp. 247-253);  
 
Philosophie der neuen Musik (vol. 12, translated as Philosophy of Modern Music);  
 
Mahler: Eine musikalische Physiognomik (vol. 13, pp. 149-319, translated as Mahler: A 
Musical Physiognomy);  
 
Berg: Der Meister des kleinsten Übergangs (vol. 13, pp. 321-494, translated as Alban Berg: 
Master of the Smallest Link);  
 
“Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die Regression des Hörens” (vol. 14, pp. 14-50, 
translated as “On the Fetish-Character in Music and the Regression of Listening” in Essays on 
Music, pp. 288-317);  
 
“Das Altern der Neuen Musik” (vol. 14, pp. 143-167, translated as “The Aging of New 
Music,” in Essays on Music, pp. 181-202);  
 
Einleitung in die Musiksoziologie: Zwölf theoretische Vorlesungen (vol. 14, pp. 169-433, 
translated as Introduction to the Sociology of Music);  
 
Quasi una fantasia (vol. 16, pp. 249-540, translated as Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern 
Music), especially “Vers une musique informelle” (vol. 16, pp. 493-540) and “Musik, Sprach 
und ihr Verhältnis im gegenwärtigen Komponieren” (vol. 16, pp. 649-664, translated as 
“Music, Language, and Composition” in Essays on Music, pp. 113-126);  
 
Moments Musicaux: Neu gedruckte Aufsätze (vol. 17, pp. 7-161, translated as Moments 
Musicaux, in Night Music, pp. 1-266), especially “Schubert,” (vol. 17, pp. 18-33, translated as 
“Schubert” in Night Music, pp. 19-46) and “Über Jazz,” (vol. 17, pp. 74-108, translated as “On 
Jazz,” in Essays on Music, pp. 470-495);  
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Impromptus: Zweite Folge neu gedrückter musikalischer Aufsätze (vol. 17, pp. 163-344), 
especially “Schwierigkeiten” (pp. 253-291, translated as “Difficulties” in Essays on Music, pp. 
644-679) and “Kleine Häresie” (pp. 297-302, translated as “Little Heresy” in Essays on Music, 
pp. 318-324);  
 
Theorie der neuen Musik (vol. 18, pp. 55-176, translated as Theory of New Music, in Night 
Music, pp. 267-473), esp. “Neunzehn Beiträge über neue Musik” (vol. 18, pp. 57-87, 
translated as “Nineteen Encyclopaedia Articles on New Music,” pp. 269-321) and “Über das 
gegenwärtige Verhältnis von Philosophie und Musik” (vol. 18, pp. 149-176, translated as “On 
the Current Relationship between Philosophy and Music,” in Night Music, pp. 426-473 and as 
“On the Contemporary Relationship of Philosophy and Music,” in Essays on Music, pp. 135-
161);  
 
“Situation des Liedes” (vol. 18, pp. 345-353); and  
 
“Toward a Reappraisal of Heine” (vol. 20.2, pp. 441-452).    
 
The collection Essays on Music reproduces two essays that Adorno wrote and published in 
English in his lifetime, and which do not appear in the GS: “The Radio Symphony (An 
Experiment in Theory” (pp. 251-270) and, with the assistance of George Simpson, “On 
Popular Music” (pp. 437-469). I draw on both of these. 
 
Other primary sources consulted were the gradually appearing volumes of the Nachgelassene 
Schriften (NaS), edited by the Theodor W. Adorno Archiv in Frankfurt and published by 
Suhrkamp. These posthumous works are arranged into six divisions or “Abteilungen”— (I.) 
Fragments; (II.) Philosophical Notes; (III.) Studies on Poetry; (IV.) Course Lectures; (V.) 
Extemporaneous Talks; and (VI.) Talks, Discussions and Interviews. In the notes, I refer to 
these works by the titles of the individual volumes, rather than by Abteilung (division) and 
Band (volume) of the NaS. Of the works published as Nachgelassene Schriften (NaS), the 
most thought-provoking and productive for the present research was Zu einer Theorie der 
musikalischen Reproduktion (NaS, division I, vol. 2 translated as Towards a Theory of 
Musical Reproduction). Adorno’s lectures were also instructive. Einführung in die Dialektik 
serves as an excellent propaedeutic to dialectical theory (NaS, division IV, vol. 2). Ästhetische 
Theorie in some sense supersedes the 1958/59 lectures Ästhetik (NaS, division IV, vol. 3). As 
editor Eberhard Ortland notes, Adorno reviewed the transcript of the recorded lectures for his 
work on Ästhetische Theorie, notating and even striking out particular passages (p. 395 n2). 
Nonetheless, Ästhetik (1958/59) contains unbound insights, spared in Adorno’s editing work 
on the transcripts, yet never built into Ästhetische Theorie.   
 
A selective consultation of the letters was made. Suhrkamp has published a good deal of 
Adorno’s voluminous correspondence in the series “Brief und Briefwechsel.” Edition Text + 
Kritik has brought out other of Adorno’s correspondence and is responsible for another source 
of note, the Frankfurter Adorno Blätter. This serial publication, also edited by the Theodor W. 
Adorno Archiv, contains previously unpublished material by and on Adorno and related 
figures, such as Walter Benjamin.  
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Gracious permission was granted by the Theodor W. Adorno Archiv to cite from copies of the 
correspondence between Adorno and Rudolf Kolisch held in its collections, as well as from 
copies of certain annotated musical scores that were in his possession. 
 
In selecting the secondary literature for the present study, I took into consideration Brian 
O’Connor’s observations and criticisms of the influence of Jürgen Habermas’s reading of 
Adorno on contemporary German philosophy (see below, Brian O’Connor, Adorno’s Negative 
Dialectic, pp. 165-170, esp. p. 165). In reading Jürgen Habermas, Axel Honneth and Albrecht 
Wellmer, I found support for O’Connor’s claim that these interpreters are oriented toward 
Adorno’s philosophy by way of a “linguistic turn” that Adorno himself avoids (ibid., p. 190 
n1; p. 168). Yet other Germanophone interpreters of Adorno seem perfectly happy not to 
discuss the communicative theory of action, and figures so towering as Regina Becker-
Schmidt, Peter Bürger and Carl Dahlhaus exhibit such independence of spirit and originality 
that they can scarcely be classed under “secondary literature.” 
 
Indispensible for any study on Adorno are The Origin of Negative Dialectics by Susan Buck-
Morss and The Melancholy Science by Gillian Rose. Thirty-five years of research have 
accrued since their publication, but the questions and debates that these studies raise have not 
been exhausted.  
 
The classic general introduction to Adorno’s thought is Adorno by Martin Jay, whose early 
interest and work on the Frankfurt School (see below) received Max Horkheimer’s gratitude 
(see Horkheimer to Jay, Montagnola, December 1971, in Horkheimer, Gesammelte Schriften, 
vol. 18, p. 789f.). I also relied on Simon Jarvis’s ambitious Adorno: A Critical Introduction. 
Raymond Geuss’s The Idea of a Critical Theory may also serve as an introduction, but it is 
more appropriate in the context of Anglo-American philosophy. More recent introductions to 
Adorno include Adorno by Brian O’Connor (London: Routledge, 2013) and Adorno and the 
Ends of Philosophy by Andrew Bowie (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013).      
 
Of the many available biographies of Adorno, Stefan Müller-Doohm’s Adorno served as my 
guide for the present study. To gain an understanding of the historical and institutional 
contexts in which Adorno matured, I relied on two monographs: Martin Jay’s The Dialectical 
Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research and Rolf 
Wiggershaus’s The Frankfurt School. 
 
An important English-language source of Critical Theory articles and translations is the 
periodical Telos. 
 
A number of anthologies of diverse essays and excerpts have appeared in the years since 
Adorno’s death. For the present study, I consulted Adorno and the Need in Thinking (ed. 
Donald A. Burke et al., see below), Theodor Adorno: Key Concepts, edited by Deborah Cook 
(Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing, 2008), The Cambridge Companion to Adorno (ed. Tom 
Huhn, see below), The Semblance of Subjectivity, edited by Tom Huhn and Lambert 
Zuidervaart (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), Adorno: A Critical Reader, edited by Nigel 
Gibson and Andrew Rubin (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002, uncited), Theodor W. Adorno (Simon 
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Jarvis, ed., see below) and The Actuality of Adorno: Critical Essays on Adorno and the 
Postmodern, edited by Max Pensky (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997, 
uncited).  
 
Adorno-Konferenz 1983, edited by Ludwig von Friedeburg and Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983) remains the primary collection of Adorno-related conference 
proceedings. Les Normes et le Possible: Héritage et perspectives de l’École de Francfort, 
edited by Pierre-François Noppen et al. (s.l.: Éditions de la maison des sciences de l’homme, 
2012, uncited) constitutes the proceedings of “Une critique des pratiques culturelles? 
Évolution et actualité du modèle de l’École de Francfort,” an international workshop on 
critical theory and culture held at the Centre canadien d’études allemandes et européennes, 
Université de Montréal, September 22-24, 2010. 
 
I consulted several monographs and articles on particular aspects of Adorno’s philosophy. 
Adorno: The Recovery of Experience by Roger Foster and Adorno’s Negative Dialectic by 
Brian O’Connor tackle the notorious difficulty of Adorno’s thought responsibly—by showing 
his deep level of engagement with different philosophers and (in Foster’s case) art. The strong 
point of Foster’s book is his chapter on Husserl (“Failed Outbreak I: Husserl,” pp. 89-111), 
while Brian O’Connor is strong on Adorno’s relation to German Idealism and to its surviving 
vestiges in, for example, new ontology.  J. M. Bernstein’s Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics 
attempts to derive from Adorno’s existing works the Magna Moralia that he never wrote. 
While Deborah Cook justly criticizes the Ideality of Bernstein’s “complex concept” in her 
“From the Actual to the Possible: Non-identity Thinking,” he is right to raise the 
incompatibility of the simple concept with embodied ethical life, especially considering 
Hegel’s endorsement of the simple concept and rejection of “the composite 
[zusammengesetzte] concept” as “something worse than materialism” in The Science of Logic 
(Werke, vol. 6, p. 291 as translated by G. di Giovanni, p. 542). Yet, more recent and focussed 
than Bernstein’s book on Adorno’s ethics is Adorno: l’humaniste: Essai sur sa pensée morale 
et politique by Marie-Andrée Ricard. Both books evoke childhood, art and metaphysical 
experience at their close, but Ricard manages to avoid affirmation while remaining 
determinedly utopian. This balance is missing from “Adorno’s Dialectical Realism” by Linda 
Martín Alcoff and Alireza Shomali. Neither this article nor Alison Stone’s “Adorno and 
Logic” convincingly argues for the adoption of negative dialectics. Closer to aesthetic themes, 
Mimesis on the Move by Karla L. Schultz is an engaging work; however, some slight 
misreadings there are magnified in works by subsequent authors, notably by Yvonne Sherratt 
in Adorno’s Positive Dialectic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, uncited), 
which Cook also criticizes in “From the Actual to the Possible.” Gilles Moutot’s Adorno: 
Langage et réification is perhaps too brisk a treatment of its subject; it requires closer readings 
of specific passages from the corpus to gain depth. Nonetheless, the present study owes much 
to it.  
 
There are numerous comparative studies now available, but not all those who seek “to mediate 
between two bold thinkers” have “the eye to see uniqueness,” as runs the Nietzsche aphorism 
that Adorno includes in his “morality of thinking” (Minima Moralia, §46). Karin Bauer 
remembers it in her Adorno’s Nietzschean Narratives: Critiques of Ideology, Readings of 
Wagner (p. 3). For the present study, I also consulted The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation 
	  	   540	  
from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (University Park, Penn.: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1992, uncited in the present work) and “Negative Dialectic as Fate: Adorno and Hegel,” 
both by J. M. Bernstein, Deborah Cook’s Adorno, Habermas, and the Search for a Rational 
Society (London: Routledge, 2004, uncited), “The Concept of Totality in Lukács and Adorno” 
by Martin Jay, The Sovereignty of Art: Aesthetic Negativity in Adorno and Derrida by 
Christoph Menke and “From Speculative to Dialectical Thinking – Hegel and Adorno” from 
Gillian Rose’s collection of essays Judaism and Modernity. 
 
I achieved a better understanding of Idealism by consulting the dissertation of my senior 
colleague Pierre-François Noppen. Completed at Paris IV, “Marx, Horkheimer, Adorno et le 
projet d’une théorie post-hégélienne de la dialectique” concerns two competing models of 
dialectical theory. 
   
Adorno has not escaped the necessary evaluation of the philosophical canon in light of 
feminist critique. Since Susan Buck-Morss’s statement “Adorno was not a feminist,” a number 
of feminist readings of his work have appeared (Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative 
Dialectics, p. 206 n188). Karin Bauer devotes a section of her book Adorno’s Nietzschean 
Narratives to the views of Adorno and Nietzsche on women and gender (pp. 102-116). 
Furthermore, entire collections of feminist readings of Adorno have appeared: Adorno: 
Culture and Feminism, edited by Maggie O’Neill (London: Sage, 1999), the themed issue 
“Adorno critique de la domination” of Tumultes edited by Sonia Dayan-Herzbrun et al. (no 23, 
novembre 2004) and Feminist Interpretations of Theodor Adorno, edited by Renée Heberle 
(University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006). Of special note is Regina 
Becker-Schmidt’s article “Critical Theory as a Critique of Society: Theodor W. Adorno’s 
Significance for a Feminist Sociology” in the O’Neill volume. I also consulted Lisa Yun Lee’s 
Dialectics of the Body: Corporeality in the Philosophy of T. W. Adorno. 
 
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion by Lambert Zuidervaart succeeds in its 
aim at providing an accessible introduction to Adorno’s aesthetics. In a different sense, it is a 
foil to another engaging introductory text, Marc Jimenez’s Adorno et la modernité, which 
denies—unfairly, I think—reconciliation and redemption to Adorno’s aesthetics (see, for 
example, Jimenez, p. 202). Shierry Weber Nicholsen’s Exact Imagination, Late Work stands 
out as being conscientiously adequate to Adorno’s aesthetic theory, in both form and content. 
Rüdiger Bubner’s “Kann Theorie ästhetisch werden? Zum Hauptmotiv der Philosophie 
Adornos” is not adequate to Adorno’s aesthetics, but certainly shows the tensions in it. 
Perhaps the most serious and challenging criticisms of Adorno’s aesthetics may be found in 
Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde, which, while not a book specifically on Adorno, 
marks both a rupture and transition from Aesthetic Theory. His subsequent essay “Adorno’s 
Anti-Avant-Gardism” attacks Adorno more directly. Bürger, however, does not treat musical 
works, whereas Adorno draws very heavily from music to build his aesthetics. Adorno himself 
treated the question of the unity of the arts in his essay “Die Kunst und die Künste,” where he 
came down heavily against the total work of art and suspicious syntheses (GS, vol. 10.1, 
pp. 432-453). 
 
Art’s other “torn half” is the culture industry. Without pretending to treat these two 
unreconciled halves in a balanced manner, I wished at the very least to juxtapose art and its 
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other (supra, Chapter II). Deborah Cook’s well-researched The Culture Industry Revisited sets 
out Adorno’s thought on the culture industry by way of a dialectic of viewpoints drawn from 
the secondary literature. Karin Bauer’s Adorno’s Nietzschean Narratives problematizes the 
relation between the culture industry and high art in the figure of Richard Wagner (see esp. 
pp. 117-171). Two articles on a topic related to the culture industry, the decline of listening, 
may be found in the Cambridge Companion to Adorno, edited by Tom Huhn: Lydia Goehr’s 
“Dissonant Works and the Listening Public” (pp. 222-247) and Robert Hullot-Kentor’s “Right 
Listening and a New Type of Human Being” (pp. 181-197, uncited in the present work). 
Challenging objections to Adorno’s model of listening may be found in Rose Rosengard 
Subotnik’s essay “Toward a Deconstruction of Structural Listening: A Critique of Schoenberg, 
Adorno, and Stravinsky” in Deconstructive Variations. 
 
Works consulted on Adorno’s concept of aesthetic illusion include J. M. Bernstein’s “Why 
Rescue Semblance? Metaphysical Experience and the Possibility of Ethics,” the chapter 
“Rettung des Scheins?” in Peter Bürger’s Zur Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik (pp. 59-82), 
Günter Figal and Hans Georg Flickinger’s “Die Aufhebung des Schönen Scheins: Schöne und 
nicht mehr schöne Kunst im Anschluß an Hegel und Adorno,” Thomas Huhn’s “Adorno’s 
Aesthetics of Illusion,” the chapter “The Crisis of Schein” in Fredric Jameson’s Late Marxism: 
Adorno, or, The Persistence of the Dialectic (pp. 165-176), Lorraine Markotic’s “Enigma, 
Semblance, and Natural Beauty in Adorno’s Epistemological Aesthetics,” Hyung-won Min’s 
Zur Kritik und Rettung des Scheins bei Th. W. Adorno, Norbert Rath’s “Dialektik des 
Scheins—Materialien zum Scheinbegriff Adornos,” Albrecht Wellmer’s “Wahrheit, Schein, 
Versöhnung: Adornos ästhetische Rettung der Modernität” and Lambert Zuidervaart’s 
Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion.       
 
Adorno’s Aesthetics of Music by Max Paddison remains the main reference in English for 
Adorno’s philosophy of music. My readings on Adorno’s philosophy of music include “What 
Adorno Makes Possible for Music Analysis” by Kofi Agawu, La pensée musicale de Theodor 
W. Adorno: L’épique et le temps by Anne Boissière, Chapter 9 (“Adorno: Musical Philosophy 
or Philosophical Music?”) of Andrew Bowie’s Music, Philosophy and Modernity, “Analysis 
as Mediated Immediacy: Adorno, Hepokoski & Darcy, and the Dialectics of Musical 
Analysis” by Jan Christiaens, “Adorno and Schoenberg’s Unanswered Question” by Murray 
Dineen, “Dissonant Works and the Listening Public” and “Adorno, Schoenberg, and the 
Totentanz der Prinzipien—in Thirteen Steps,” both by Lydia Goehr, “Amidst the Plurality of 
Voices: Philosophy of Music After Adorno” by Nikolas Kompridis, “Reading History in the 
Ruins of Nature” by Max Paddison, Music as Philosophy: Adorno and Beethoven’s Late Style 
by Michael Spitzer, selected essays in Deconstructive Variations: Music and Reason in 
Western Society and Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in Western Music, both by 
Rose Rosengard Subotnik, and Kunst als begrifflose Erkenntnis: Zum Kunstbegriff der 
ästhetischen Theorie Theodor W. Adornos by Martin Zenck. I made selective use of 
Apparitions: New Perspectives on Adorno and Twentieth-Century Music, edited by Berthold 
Hoeckner (London: Routledge, 2006) and of Expression, Truth and Authenticity: On Adorno’s 
Theory of Music and Musical Performance, edited by Mário Vieira de Carvalho (Lisboa: 
Edições Colibri, 2009). 
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The literature consulted on Robert Schumann was directed by the unity question, and may not 
be suitable for research on other questions. Nonetheless, some general works can be 
recommended. Despite the apparently honest efforts of John Daverio in his Robert Schumann 
and John Worthen in his Robert Schumann, the abuse that Robert Schumann has suffered at 
the hands of biographers has still not been put right—and perhaps cannot be. This is why I 
preferred Robert Schumann im eigenen Wort to biographies. Despite its incongruity with the 
academic milieu, this handsome florilège compiled by Willi Reich (no less!), by and large lets 
Robert Schumann speak for himself. Margit L. McCorkle’s Werkverzeichnis is an important 
resource, marred, however, by its judgements on Robert Schumann’s personal history, medical 
details and work habits. Thomas Alan Brown’s The Aesthetics of Robert Schumann includes 
historical and philosophical background to Schumann’s music, as well as concise, pointed 
analyses of selected works. Eric Sams’s classic The Songs of Robert Schumann comments on 
each of the 246 songs of the Peters edition. The serial publication Schumann Studien, brought 
out by the Robert-Schumann-Gesellschaft (Zwickau), is a repository of articles on and around 
Schumann. The main score consulted was the 2011 Bärenreiter edition of Dichterliebe. Also 
consulted were the Norton critical score edited by Arthur Komar and the undated Peters 
(first?) edition available electronically via the Petrucci Music Library. A sensible starting 
point for any research on Dichterliebe is The Genesis of Schumann’s “Dichterliebe”: A 
Source Study by Rufus E. Hallmark. Barbara Pearl Turchin’s PhD thesis, “Robert Schumann’s 
Song Cycles in the Context of the Early Nineteenth-Century ‘Liederkreis’,” provides 
noteworthy historical background to Schumann’s song cycles. Besides Komar’s essay in the 
Norton Critical Score, I consulted on the unity question David Neumeyer’s “Organic Structure 
and the Song Cycle,” David Ferris’s Schumann’s Eichendorff “Liederkreis” and the Genre of 
the Romantic Cycle (especially chapter 2, “Analyzing Dichterliebe”), and the Yonatan Malin’s 
review of Julia Beate Perrey’s book, Schumann’s “Dichterliebe” and Early Romantic Poetics. 
Two notable essays touching on Schumann are Kofi Agawu’s “Ambiguity in Tonal Music: A 
Preliminary Study” and David Kopp’s “Intermediate States of Key in Schumann.”    
 
The complete publication details of the works cited may be found in the following two lists. 
 
 
 
a. Musical Scores 
 
Musical scores cited are classed alphabetically by author, then numerically by opus, then, if 
need be, date of publication. 
 
Beethoven, Ludwig van. Streichquartette=String Quartets, op. 59. Edited by Jonathan del 
Mar, Quartet in E minor, op. 59, no. 2, pp. 52-92. Kassel: Bärenreiter, 2008.  
 
———. Symphony No. 5 in C Minor, op. 67. Edited by Jonathan Del Mar. Urtext. Kassel: 
Bärenreiter, 2001. 
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———. Quartett für 2 Violinen, Bratsche und Violoncell, Op. 131, Quartett No. 14.  1863. 
Reprint, New York: Dover, 1970. International Music Score Library Project, Petrucci 
Music Library, http://petrucci.mus.auth.gr/imglnks/usimg/4/44 
/IMSLP04768-Beethoven_-_String_Quartet_No.14_Dover.pdf. 
 
Berg, Alban. Sonate für Klavier, Opus 1. Herausgegeben von Klaus Lippe. Vienna: Universal 
Edition, 2006. 
 
———. Vier Stücke für Klarinette und Klavier, Opus 5. Vienna: Universal Edition, 1924. 
 
Berio, Luciano. Sequenza IXa per clarinetto solo. Vienna: Universal Edition, 1980. 
 
Hindemith, Paul. Sonate in E für Geige und Klavier. Mainz: B. Schott’s Söhne, 1935. 
 
Mahler, Gustav. Symphonie No. 1. 2nd ed. Vienna: Universal Edition, 1906. International 
Music Score Library Project, Petrucci Music Library, http://petrucci.mus.auth.gr 
 /imglnks/usimg/d/dd/IMSLP17070-Mahler-Symph1fs.pdf. 
 
———. Symphonies Nos. 3 and 4 in Full Score. New York: Dover, 1989. 
 
Mozart, Wolfgang Amadeus. Quartet, C Major for 2 Violins, Viola and Violoncello, Köchel, 
No. 465, composed 1785, revised with foreword by Rudolf Gerber. London: Ernst 
Eulenberg, [s.a.].  
 
Schoenberg, Arnold. Five Pieces for Orchestra, op. 16, new version=Fünf Orchesterstücke. 
Revised edition, reduced for normal-sized orchestra by the composer. New York: 
Peters, 1973. 
 
———. Suite für Klavier, op. 25. Vienna: Universal Edition, 1925. 
 
Schumann, Robert. Kinderszenen=Scenes from Childhood, op. 15. Edited by Holger M. 
Stüwe. Urtext. Kassel: Bärenreiter, 2011. 
 
———. “Was will die einsame Träne,” Myrten. In Lieder für eine Singstimme mit 
Klavierbegleitung nach den Handschriften und Erstdrucken, Originalausgabe, 
herausgegeben von Max Friedlaender, pp. 49-50. Frankfurt: C. F. Peters, s.a.  
 
———. Drei Romanzen, Opus 28. Nach der Originalausgabe herausgegeben von Wolfgang 
Boetticher. Fingersatz von Walther Lampe. Neue verbesserte Ausgabe. Munich: 
G. Henle, 1977. 
  
———. Liederkreis Opus 39 für Singstimme und Klavier. Fassungen 1842 und 1850. 
Herausgegeben von Kazuko Ozawa. Munich: G. Henle, 2010. 
 
———. Dichterliebe: Liedercyklus aus dem Buch der Lieder von H. Heine für eine 
Singstimme mit Begleitung des Pianoforte componirt und Frau Wilhelmine Schröder-
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Devrient zugeeignet von Robert Schumann, Op. 48. Leipzig: C. F. Peters, [s.a.]. Plates 
2867a,b. International Music Score Library Project, Petrucci Music Library. 
http://imslp.org/wiki/Dichterliebe,_Op.48_%28Schumann,_Robert%29. 
 
———. Dichterliebe: An Authoritative Score, Historical Background, Essays in Analysis, 
Views and Comments. Edited by Arthur Komar. New York: W. W. Norton, 1971. 
 
———. Dichterliebe, op. 48. Edited by Hansjörg Ewert. Translation of song texts by Richard 
Stokes. Kassel: Bärenreiter, 2011. 
 
Weber, Carl Maria von. Der Freischütz: Romantische Oper in drei Aufzügen. Text von 
Friedrich Kind nach den Quellen herausgegeben von Joachim Freyer. Leipzig: Peters, 
1976. 
 
Webern, Anton. Sechs Bagatellen Op. 9 für Strechquartett (1913). Vienna: Universal Edition, 
1924. 
 
 
 
b. Books, Articles, Essays, Lectures, Letters, Theses, Interviews, Sketches, Sound 
Recordings  
 
These cited sources are alphabetized word by word by main entry, then title. Diacritical 
markings are ignored in the alphabetization.  
 
Adorno, Theodor W. “The Actuality of Philosophy.” Translated by Benjamin Snow [?]. Telos, 
no. 31 (Spring 1977), pp. 120-133. 
 
———. Aesthetic Theory. Edited by Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann. Translated by 
Robert Hullot-Kentor. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. 
 
———. Alban Berg: Master of the Smallest Link. Translated with introduction and annotation 
by Juliane Brand and Christopher Hailey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994.  
 
———. Ästhetik (1958/59). Herausgegeben von Eberhard Ortland. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2009. 
 
———. “Aufzeichnungen zur Ästhetik-Vorlesung von 1931/32.” Frankfurter Adorno 
Blätter 1 (1992), pp. 34-90. 
 
———. Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords. Translated by Henry Pickford. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1998. 
 
———. Einführung in die Dialektik (1958). Herausgegeben von Christoph Ziermann. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2010. 
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———. Erziehung zur Mündigkeit: Vorträge und Gespräche mit Hellmut Becker, 1959-1969. 
Herausgegeben von Gerd Kadelbach. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970. 
 
———. Essays on Music. Edited by Richard Leppert. Translated by Susan H. Gillespie, Max 
Paddison, Robert Hullot-Kentor, Frederic Will, Thomas Y. Levin, Wes Blomster, 
Jamie Owen Daniel and Duncan Smith. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.  
 
———. Gesammelte Schriften [GS]. Herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann unter Mitwirkung 
von Gretel Adorno, Susan Buck-Morss und Klaus Schultz. 20 vols. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1973-1986.  
 
———. Hegel: Three Studies. Translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1993. 
 
———. “The Idea of Natural History.” Translated by Bob Hullot-Kentor. Telos, no. 60 
(Summer 1984), pp. 111-124. 
 
———. Introduction to the Sociology of Music. Translated by E. B. Ashton. New York: The 
Seabury Press, 1976. 
 
———. The Jargon of Authenticity. Translated by Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will. 
Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973. 
 
———. Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason” (1959). Translated by Rodney Livingstone. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001. 
 
———. Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft” (1959). Herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995. 
 
———. Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
 
———. Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life. Translated by E. F. N. Jephcott. 
London: Verso, 2005. 
 
———. Negative Dialectics. Translated by E. B. Ashton. Reprint, New York: Continuum, 
1997.  
 
———. Night Music: Essays on Music, 1928-1962. Edited by Rolf Tiedemann. Translated by 
Wieland Hoban. London: Seagull Books, 2009. 
 
———. Notes to Literature. Edited by Rolf Tiedemann. Translated by Shierry Weber 
Nicholsen. 2 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991-1992. 
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———. Ontologie und Dialektik (1960/61). Herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann. Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 2002. 
 
———. Philosophy of Modern Music. Translated by Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. 
Blomster. New York: Seabury, 1980. 
 
———. Prisms. Translated by Samuel Weber and Shierry Weber. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press, 1981. 
 
———. Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music. Translated by Rodney Livingstone. 
London: Verso, 1992. 
 
———. “Theses on the Language of the Philosopher.” Translated by Samir Gandesha and 
Michael K. Palamarek. In Donald A. Burke et al., Adorno and the Need in Thinking, 
pp. 35-40. 
 
———. Towards a Theory of Musical Reproduction: Notes, a Draft and Two Schemata. 
Edited by Henri Lonitz. Translated by Wieland Hoban. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
2006. 
 
———. Zu einer Theorie der musikalischen Reproduktion: Aufzeichnungen, ein Entwurf und 
zwei Schemata. Herausgegeben von Henri Lonitz. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2001. 
 
———. “Zum Probleme des musikalischen Analyse.” Frankfurter Adorno Blätter 7 (2001), 
pp. 73-89.  
 
———, and Walter Benjamin. Briefwechsel, 1928-1940. Herausgegeben von Henri Lonitz. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994. 
 
———, and Alban Berg. Briefwechsel, 1925-1935. Herausgegeben von Henri Lonitz. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997.   
 
———, and Alban Berg. Correspondence 1925-1935. Edited by Henri Lonitz. Translated by 
Wieland Hoban. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 2005.   
 
———, and Rudolf Kolisch. Correspondence. Theodor W. Adorno Archiv, Frankfurt-am-
Main. 
 
———, and Alfred Sohn-Rethel. Briefwechsel, 1936-1969. Herausgegeben von Christoph 
Gödde. Dialektische Studien. Munich: edition text + kritik, 1990. 
 
Agawu, Kofi. “Ambiguity in Tonal Music: A Preliminary Study.” In Pople, Theory, Analysis 
and Meaning in Music, pp. 86-107. 
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———. “What Adorno Makes Possible for Music Analysis.” 19th Century Music 29, no. 1 
(Summer 2005): pp. 49-55. 
 
Alcoff, Linda Martín, and Alireza Shomali. “Adorno’s Dialectical Realism.” Symposium 14, 
no. 2 (Fall 2010): pp. 45-65. 
 
Aldwell, Edward, and Carl Schachter. Harmony and Voice Leading. 3rd ed. Belmont, Calif.: 
Thomson/Schirmer, 2003. 
 
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: 
DSM-5. 5th ed. Arlington, Va.: American Psychiatric Association, 2013. 
 
Arato, Andrew, and Eike Gebhardt, eds. The Essential Frankfurt School Reader. Introduction 
by Paul Piccone. New York: Continuum, 1982. 
 
Aristotle. The Metaphysics. Vol. 1, Books I-IX. With an English translation by Hugh 
Tredennick. Loeb Classical Library, 271. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 
London: William Heinemann, 1933. 
 
Aristotle. Poétique. Texte établi et traduit par J. Hardy. Paris: Société d’Édition “Les Belles 
Lettres.” 1977.  
 
Augustine. Confessions. Translated by R. S. Pine-Coffin. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961. 
 
Baudelaire, Charles. Œuvres complètes. Texte établi, présenté et annoté par Claude Pichois. 2 
vols. Paris: Gallimard, 1975. 
 
Bauer, Karin. Adorno’s Nietzschean Narratives: Critiques of Ideology, Readings of Wagner. 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. 
 
Becker-Schmidt, Regina. “Critical Theory as a Critique of Society: Theodor W. Adorno’s 
Significance for a Feminist Sociology.” Translated by Rebecca van Dyck. In Adorno: 
Feminism and Culture, edited by Maggie O’Neill, pp. 104-118. London: Sage 
Publications, 1999.  
 
Beckett, Samuel. “Endgame: A Play in One Act,” followed by “Act Without Words: A Mime 
for One Player.” Translated by the author. New York: Grove Press, 1958.  
 
———. “Fin de partie,” suivi de “Acte sans paroles.” Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1957. 
 
Benjamin, Andrew. “Tradition and Experience: Walter Benjamin’s ‘On Some Motifs in 
Baudelaire’.” Chapter 7 in The Problems of Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin, edited 
by Andrew Benjamin, pp. 122-140. London: Routledge, 1991.  
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Benjamin, Walter. The Arcades Project. Edited by Rolf Tiedemann. Translated by Howard 
Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999. 
 
———. Briefe. Herausgegeben und mit Anmerkungen versehen von Gershom Scholem und 
Theodor W. Adorno. 2 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966. 
 
———. Gesammelte Schriften. Unter Mitwirkung von Theodor W. Adorno und Gershom 
Scholem. Herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann Schweppenhäuser. 6 vols. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1972-1987. 
 
———. Illuminations. Edited and with an introduction by Hannah Arendt. Translated by 
Harry Zohn. Reprint, New York: Schocken Books, 1969. 
 
———. Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings. Edited and with an 
introduction by Peter Demetz. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. New York: Schocken 
Books, 1986. See especially “On the Mimetic Faculty,” pp. 333-336. 
 
———. Versuche über Brecht. Herausgegeben und mit einem Nachwort versehen von Rolf 
Tiedemann. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966. 
 
Bernstein, J. M. Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001. 
 
———. “Negative Dialectic as Fate: Adorno and Hegel.”  In Huhn, The Cambridge 
Companion to Adorno, pp. 19-50. 
 
———. “Why Rescue Semblance? Metaphysical Experience and the Possibility of Ethics,” In 
The Semblance of Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory, ed. Tom Huhn 
and Lambert Zuidervaart, pp. 177-212. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997. 
 
Bloch, Ernst. Erbschaft dieser Zeit. Erweiterte Ausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1962.  
 
———. Heritage of Our Times. Translated by Neville Plaice and Stephen Plaice. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990. 
 
———. The Principle of Hope. Translated by Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice and Paul Knight. 
3 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995. 
 
———. Das Prinzip Hoffnung. 3 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1959. 
 
———. The Utopian Function of Art and Literature: Selected Essays. Translated by Jack 
Zipes and Frank Mecklenburg. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988. 
 
Boissière, Anne. La pensée musicale de Theodor W. Adorno: L’épique et le temps. Paris: 
Beauchesne, 2011. 
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Bowie, Andrew. Music, Philosophy and Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007. 
 
Brecht, Bertolt. Werke. Herausgegeben von Werner Hecht, Jan Knopf, Werner Mittenzwei und 
Klaus-Detlef Müller. Große kommentierte Berliner und Frankfurter Ausgabe. 30 vols. 
Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag; Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988-2000. See esp. vol. 2, 
pp. 229-322, Die Dreigroschenoper; vol. 6, pp. 7-86,  Mutter Courage und ihre 
Kinder; vol. 21, pp. 327-331, “Gegen das ‘Organische’ des Ruhms, Für die 
Organisation”; and vol. 23, pp. 65-97, “Kleines Organon für das Theater.”    
 
Breton, André. L’amour fou. S.l.: Gallimard, 1937. 
 
———. Mad Love (L’Amour fou). Translated by Mary Ann Caws. Lincoln, Nebraska: Bison 
Books, 1988. 
 
Brosses, Charles de. Du Culte des dieux fétiches, ou, Parallèle de l’ancienne Religion de 
l’Egypte avec la Religion actuelle de Nigritie. Texte revu par Madeleine V.-David. S.l.: 
Fayard, 1988. 
 
Brougham, Milton, A. Price Heusner, and Raymond D. Adams. “Acute Degenerative Changes 
in Adenomas of the Pituitary Body—with Special Reference to Pituitary Apoplexy.” 
Journal of Neurosurgery 7, no. 5 (September 1950): pp. 421-439. 
 
Brown, Marshall. “Mozart and after: The Revolution in Musical Consciousness.” Critical 
Inquiry 7, no. 4 (Summer 1981): pp. 689-706, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1343145. 
 
Brown, Thomas Alan. The Aesthetics of Robert Schumann. Reprint, Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1975.  
 
Bubner, Rüdiger. “Can Theory Become Aesthetic? On a Principle Theme of Adorno’s 
Philosophy,” translated by Nicholas Walker. In Jarvis, Theodor W. Adorno, vol. 1, 
pp. 14-39. 
 
———. “Kann Theorie ästhetisch werden? Zum Hauptmotiv der Philosophie Adornos.” In 
Materialien zur ästhetischen Theorie Theodor W. Adornos, Konstruktion der Moderne, 
herausgegeben von Burkhardt Lindner und W. Martin Lüdke, pp. 108-137. Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980. 
 
Buck-Morss, Susan. The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, 
and the Frankfurt Institute. New York: The Free Press, 1979. 
 
Bürger, Peter. “Adorno’s Anti-Avant-Gardism,” Telos, no. 86 (Winter 1990-91): pp. 49-60. 
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von Friedeburg und Jürgen Habermas, pp. 177-197. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1983. 
 
———. “The Decline of the Modern Age.” Translated by David J. Parent. Telos, no. 62 
(Winter 1984-85): pp. 117-130.  
 
———. Theorie der Avantgarde. 2. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980.  
 
———. Theory of the Avant-Garde. Translated by Michael Shaw. Foreword by Jochen 
Schulte-Sasse. Theory and History of Literature, edited by Wlad Godzich and Jochen 
Schulte-Sasse, 4. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. 
 
———. Vermittlung – Rezeption –Funktion. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979. 
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Burgess, Jonathan S. The Tradition of the Trojan War in Homer and the Epic Cycle. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 
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———, Colin J. Campbell, Kathy Kiloh, Michael J. Palamarek and Jonathan Short, eds. 
Adorno and the Need in Thinking: New Critical Essays. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2007. 
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